Experience In Afghanistan Research Articles

Deployment-related mild traumatic brain injury, mental health problems, and post-concussive symptoms in Canadian armed forces personnel

Up to 20% of US military personnel deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan experience mild traumatic brain injury (mTBI) while deployed; up to one-third will experience persistent post-concussive symptoms (PCS). The objective of this study was to examine the epidemiology of deployment-related mTBI and its relationship to PCS and mental health problems (MHPs) in Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel. Participants were 16153 personnel who underwent post-deployment screening (median =136 days after return) following deployment in support of the mission in Afghanistan from 2009 - 2012. The screening questionnaire assessed mTBI and other injuries while deployed, using the Brief Traumatic Brain Injury Screening Tool. Current MHPs and PCS were assessed using items from the Patient Health Questionnaire, the Patient Checklist for PTSD, and the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire. Log-binomial regression explored the association of mTBI, other injuries, and MHPs with PCS, using the presence of 3 or more of 7 PCS as the outcome. Results are expressed as adjusted prevalence ratios (PR). mTBI while deployed was reported in 843 respondents (5.2%). Less severe forms of mTBI (associated only with having been dazed or confused or having "seen stars") predominated. Blast was reported as a mechanism of injury in half of those with mTBI. Multiple PCS were present in 21% of those with less severe forms of mTBI and in 27% of those with more severe forms of mTBI (i.e., mTBI associated with loss of consciousness or post-traumatic amnesia). After adjustment for confounding, mTBI had no statistically significant association with PCS relative to non-TBI injury. In contrast, MHPs had a strong association with reporting 3 or more PCS (adjusted prevalence ratio (PR) =7.77). Deployment-related mTBI prevalence was lower than in many US reports; most of those who had had mTBI were free of multiple PCS. PCS was strongly associated with MHPs but not with mTBI. Careful assessment of MHPs is essential in personnel with a history of combat-related mTBI and PCS.

Forward aeromedical evacuation

Abstract : The US Army pioneered air evacuation of casualties from the battlefield to a forward operating surgical treatment facility after the advent of the helicopter. This rotary-wing capability was initially used for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) during the Korean War but evolved to the extent that lifesaving resuscitation was initiated en route by the US Army during the Vietnam War. More recently in Iraq and Afghanistan, medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) by platforms operating under a US and UK joint system has matured to the point where advanced medical capabilities are brought forward to the point of injury (POI). Emerging data from the Afghanistan experience however indicate that clinical and doctrinal gaps exist in US forward aeromedical evacuation (FAME) capability. In this review article, we provide a brief history of military MEDEVAC centered on the evolution of FAME, describe the current FAME platforms in Afghanistan, discuss lessons learned from recent studies examining the performance of the current FAME platforms, and propose the way ahead for FAME in future conflicts.

Exploring the Dreams of Canadian Soldiers with Content Analysis

The current study extended previous research on the dreams of Canadian males to the dreams of Canadian male soldiers. Participants included 25 Canadian male soldiers with operational experience in Afghanistan as well as an age and gender matched control group of 25 Canadian male civilians. Dream reports were scored using the Hall and Van de Castle (1966) content analysis guidelines. In addition, emotional intensity as well as intensity of aggression was rated by two independent judges. There were many significant relationships among content categories for soldiers. Also, many significant differences were found between soldiers and civilians when examining dream content. Both groups had dream imagery that supports the continuity hypothesis in relevant and meaningful ways. As expected, soldiers had more dream imagery relating to war and their experiences overseas compared to civilians. Time spent overseas was significantly related to certain dream imagery for soldiers. Limitations and directions for future research with soldiers are discussed.

Taliban adaptations and innovations

Since 1978, insurgents in Afghanistan have endured a state of constant conflict, facing two occupying forces that have fielded modernized, highly capable militaries with a multitude of numerical and technological advantages over them. The asymmetry of these conflicts drove a rapid cycle of adaptation and innovation on the part of the insurgents that continues today. The Taliban way of war and approach to governance focuses on turning populations against political weakness and fielding simple and effective governance at the local and provincial levels. The Taliban has proven to be a highly adaptive, innovative, and resilient organization, drawing on tactics from conflicts in Iraq, Pakistan, and their own experience in Afghanistan to fight an effective and enduring defensive jihad. The introduction of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and more recently a rising rate of assassinations all demonstrate the Taliban's ability to adapt tactically and innovate at the strategic level. These innovations are even more significant when one considers the cultural, social, and ideological barriers to change and how the Taliban overcame those barriers to include in their arsenal formerly taboo actions, such as suicide bombing. Understanding the innovation shown by insurgents in Afghanistan provides critical insights into the conflict the US-led coalition faces today and how it may be fought tomorrow.

Coalitions, institutions and big tents: the new strategic reality of armed intervention

Armed interventions of the past decades demonstrate that strategic leadership can give way to lofty campaign plans, conflicting strategic narratives and concern with tactical, as opposed to strategic, issues. The intervention debate rightfully emphasizes the need for both leadership and institution-building to rectify this situation, but then breaks down into discord: some critics argue that stronger leadership by big nations is necessary, others that this type of leadership wrecks the collective institutions that are needed in a new age of multilateralism and interdependence. This article argues instead that strategic leadership grows out of the effort to connect the three distinct political arenas that have come to dominate armed interventions: coalitions, institutions and big tent diplomacy. Strategic leadership is not about choosing between coalitions or institutions; it is about building bridges among these political arenas. The article embeds this argument within the strategic literature and demonstrates how it emerges from an engagement with modern armed interventions. It engages in two in-depth assessments of NATO's experiences in Afghanistan and Libya and then undertakes a more general discussion of the steps that can be taken to encourage strategic leadership.

Examining effects of equine-assisted activities to help combat veterans improve quality of life

INTRODUCTION It is well documented that a high number (24%) of veterans returning home from military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan experience varying degrees of posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms and impaired quality of life [1-2]. Helping veterans successfully reintegrate into civilian life has become a focus of both the military and private psychological services, as well as other community-based groups. While psychological treatment for veterans is provided by the Department of Veteran Affairs, the Department of Defense, and private services, many veterans do not seek the help they need out of fear of the negative stigma associated with mental health care [1]. Recently, efforts have been made to reduce barriers to treatment by developing interventions that are more friendly, such as educating unit members about mental health issues and including them in the treatment. In addition, soliciting the support of leaders and supervisors in the identification and assistance of veterans receiving treatment is proving to be beneficial [2]. One specific intervention that incorporates fellow veterans and leader support in the treatment is the Professional Association of Therapeutic Horsemanship (PATH) International Equine Services for Heroes program (formerly known as the Horses for Heroes program). This unique program includes a horse as part of the treatment, with the goal to help wounded military service personnel and veterans improve both physically and mentally [3]. The therapeutic effects of interacting with a horse on the ground or riding on top of the horse are not new and date back to earlier times. The ancient Greeks gave horseback rides to raise the spirits of the chronically and incurably ill [4-5]. It was not until 1875, however, that the first systematic study of therapeutic riding (TR) was reported. After prescribing pony riding as a treatment for a variety of conditions, French physician Chassaign concluded that riding was helpful in the treatment of certain types of neurological paralysis. He noted improvement in posture, balance, and joint movement and a striking increase in morale [6]. The PATH International Equine Services for Heroes program, built on these early findings, is a broad program designed to help veterans through the use of a variety of equine-assisted activities and therapies (EAATs). In an effort to understand how an intervention that partners a veteran with a horse may help improve quality of life, we examined a specific EAAT known as TR. TR uses equine-assisted activities (EAAs) for the purpose of contributing positively to the cognitive, physical, emotional, and social well-being of people with disabilities [3]. Because this program is fairly new, officially started in 2007, little research has been conducted to determine the therapeutic effects on quality of life for veterans. Anecdotal evidence reported by individual riding centers from Web sites, newsletters, and press releases suggests positive outcomes in both physical and mental health from participating in this program, but more research is needed to validate the efficacy of the program. Furthermore, a recent Tricare decision that classified hippotherapy (a specific EAAT program designed to improve physical mobility) as investigational and not reimbursable makes it even more imperative to start the research conversation about the efficacy of using EAAT programs to treat combat veterans with mental and physical wounds. STUDY The purpose of our exploratory study was to begin to address the need for research in EAA by assessing the changes in quality of life indicators and depression symptoms of veterans participating in a PATH International Equine Service for Heroes TR program. Our research design included both qualitative and quantitative data collection over a 24 wk period with 13 veterans. We chose the 36Item Short Form Health Survey version 2 (SF36v2) and Beck Depression Inventory-2nd edition (BDI-II) to assess changes in health behaviors and depression symptoms. …

Parameters – Full Issue

American Landpower and the Middle East of 2030 by Micael R. Eastman. The Afghanistan Experience: Democratization by Force, by Cora Sol Goldstein. COIN is Dead–Long Live Transformation, by Matthew Ford, Patrick Rose, and Howard Body. Afghanistan: Strategy and War Termination, by Christopher Tuck. The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power: British Strategic failure in America 1780-1783. by Daniel T. Canfield. The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency, by Steven Metz

Afghanistan: Strategy and War Termination

Why has ending war in Afghanistan proved to be so problematic? In theory, the decision to end a war should be relatively straightforward. One or more of the belligerents determine whether or not it is worth continuing the conflict and, as long as at least one of them decides that continuing to fight is not worth the investment, peace is offered and the conflict terminates. Clausewitz encapsulates this rational, commonsense approach to the ending of war when he asserts: the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow. (1) By this logic, and in the context of Afghanistan, the dilemma associated with how and when to end the war could have been avoided by engaging in a rational cost-benefit analysis: how much has the war cost and what is the value of the objectives we were pursuing? Once the former exceeded the latter, then the Coalition should have struck a deal with the Taliban and left Afghanistan. Instinctively, of course, we know that the decisions involved in ending a war cannot be as simple as this rational cost-benefit analysis. But, why is that so? One powerful argument blamed the ambiguous protraction of the Afghanistan war on the West's failure to comprehend and apply the principles of classical theory. Since in principle it should be no more difficult to end a war than it is to start one, theoretically one need only adhere to the precepts of an effective to bring about the rational and purposeful end to an armed conflict. The bad strategy argument views the difficulty associated with ending the war in Afghanistan as a failure to understand, or apply, the principles of effective strategy--such as a clear and attainable end state, adequate means or unity of effort--as a consequence of an emerging strategic illiteracy. The argument presented is the West has been out-strategized by its opponents. (2) This article argues a different thesis: that, notwithstanding some of the evident difficulties associated with the adopted in Afghanistan, the war there is a reflection of a much longer standing phenomenon--it is easier to start conflicts than it is to end them. (3) The fact that Afghanistan is one of many such examples of problematic, protracted conflicts suggests that, in addition to a range of specific difficulties associated with the peculiarities of the nation, there may be a range of broader structural challenges that contribute to making the purposeful termination of a conflict an inherently problematic activity. Put another way, wars can be difficult to end even when conscious, rigorous effort is made to try and realize the best practices. This article addresses two themes: the recurrent structural problems associated with ending a war, and how they have contributed to undermining Coalition attempts to terminate the conflict in Afghanistan. In doing so this author will investigate the significance to war termination of four questions and the challenges associated with answering them: who will win; is there an achievable peace; peace at what cost; and, can the war be terminated? Taken together, the complexities surrounding the answers to these four questions suggest, whatever the quality of one's strategy-making, there are recurrent structural factors present to a greater or lesser extent in all armed conflicts that constrain the strategies that can be conceived and executed. If is the art of the possible, then many of the problems we have experienced in Afghanistan result not from illiteracy or a lack of understanding of what needs to be done, but rather from inescapable dilemmas and contradictions inherent in almost any attempt to end a conflict. If these problems are, in fact, inherent to the activity of ending all wars, then whatever lessons we think we might learn from our experiences in Afghanistan for the formulation of strategy, our challenges there will be open to repetition in the future. …

The Afghanistan Experience: Democratization by Force

On 7 October 2001, the Bush administration launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to dislodge al Qaeda forces, neutralize the Taliban in Afghanistan, and decapitate their respective leadership. President Bush insisted that the United States was not at war with the Afghan people or with Islam, and the Afghan civilian population was not identified as the enemy. Therefore, the Pentagon attempted to minimize civilian casualties. OEF toppled the Taliban regime, but did not eliminate the Taliban influence in Afghanistan. The Taliban, although expelled from power, still preserved connections with the rural Pashtun. Following the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the American agenda for Afghanistan rapidly metamorphosed into a nation-building project. In theory, the reconstruction and democratic reform of Afghanistan offered an opportunity to transform one of the poorest countries on earth. Afghanistan had a 90 percent illiteracy rate, one of the highest infant mortality rates in the world, and an average life expectancy of just over forty years. The living conditions for women were particularly harsh and cruel, since the Taliban had restricted their access to education, health care, and work. President Bush justified nation-building in Afghanistan in moral and political terms. After liberating [Afghanistan] from a primitive dictatorship ... we had a moral obligation to leave behind something better. We also had a strategic interest in helping the Afghan people build a free society ... because a democratic Afghanistan would be a hopeful alternative to the vision of the extremists. (1) The idea of liberation played an overwhelming role in President Bush's postwar strategy for Afghanistan. The Bush administration assumed that once freed from the shackles of the Taliban tyranny, the Afghan population would embrace the Western agenda of reconstruction and institutional development. The Western allies put in place an interim government in Kabul led by Hamid Karzai, and the loya jirga approved a new constitution in 2003. The International Security Assistance Force, under British command, began training a new Afghan army, and the United Nations developed a humanitarian assistance plan as well as educational initiatives to combat illiteracy and increase educational opportunities for girls and women. It is evident the ambitious American-led project of democratization faltered. After eleven years of combat, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have drastically modified their objectives in Afghanistan. President Obama decided to withdraw the majority of American forces by 2014, and his administration has narrowed the aims of American intervention in the country. The Obama administration's goal is to leave behind native military and police structures that in principle should prevent al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from operating with impunity. Why has the United States been unable to accomplish its original objectives in Afghanistan when it was able to radically transform two formidable enemies, Germany and Japan, following World War II (WWII)? Several competing explanations have been advanced to explain this failure. David Edelstein, Chair of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, claims that military occupations succeed only if they occur in a threat environment in which the security, survival, and integrity of an occupied territory is menaced. According to Edelstein, in the absence of a strong and believable external threat, the desire for self determination is inevitable, and the emergence of a significant movement of resistance, unavoidable. (2) Dov S. Zakheim, the former Undersecretary of Defense, claims the Bush administration seriously underfunded the reconstruction of Afghanistan because it had become increasingly focused on Iraq. (3) In fact, Afghanistan received less assistance per capita than did postconflict Bosnia and Kosovo, and the budget for the reconstruction of Afghanistan amounted to less than half of what the United States spent in Iraq. …

Noble Commitments and Harsh Realities

When UN Secretary- General Boutros-Ghali introduced his Agenda for in 1992, Canadians welcomed the prospect of international commitment to more effective conflict prevention and sustained peacebuilding. Two decades of subsequent experience have left us somewhat chastened. The harsh realities of our experience in Afghanistan have severely challenged our once-noble aspirations as peacemakers and nation-builders. So, too, have our interventions in African conflicts. Twenty years have made us much the wiser about what is really required for successful and lasting peacebuilding.The paragraphs that follow are a personal reflection on how three of Canada's interventions in Africa have, through the harsh realities of experience, shifted the Canadian public and government from rather widespread and noble commitments to more limited aspirations: Somalia in 1992-93, when we joined the United States in providing security for humanitarian aid delivery; our more successful traditional peacekeeping role with the United Nations mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000; and our whole-of-government contribution over several years to building peace and human rights in Sudan and Darfur. The lessons we have learned in these multilateral initiatives are important in considering Canada's responses to current and future demands, not least in South Sudan, and for moving forward with a renewed agenda for peace.SOMALIA, 1992-93In the year immediately following the publication of An agenda for peace, Canada joined the United States in a major intervention in Somalia. The UN's unified task force, of which Canadian troops were a substantial part, was to act under a security council mandate to provide the immediate security necessary to get food past feuding warlords to starving Somalis. Canadian diplomatic, aid, and defence officials had initially been dubious about a Canadian military role in Somalia: Somalia was not a traditional Commonwealth or francophone partner and it had little strategic or commercial connection with Canada. Indeed, it was largely unknown to most Canadians.Canadians, however, were clearly distressed at the highly visible scale of man's inhumanity to man and the media and parliamentarians reflected a popular concern that Somalis could not just be left to starve: Canada must take decisive action to help. Perhaps even more persuasively, top levels of the US administration urged our prime minister to send Canadian troops to join their forces in an American-led intervention. Canada went to Somalia for humanitarian goals, but also for foreign policy reasons well beyond Canada's immediate interests in the Horn of Africa. We were part of a broader multilateral scheme led from Washington, rather than New York, that recognized an anarchic Somalia as a threat to international security.Our forces made it work, up to a point. Our technical competence was not questioned. Our troops fulfilled their humanitarian mission by providing secure food aid delivery and working successfully to combine emergency assistance with longer-term development. By early 1993, they were well embarked on many of the goals outlined in the Agenda for peace.When the Canadian effort fell apart, it was over an entirely unexpected incident involving members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment's brutal beating death of a Somali teenager, rather than a serious challenge from Somalia. And when the American forces fell into their own peacebuilding trap, it was because, as sophisticated and overwhelming as they were, they had met their match in little-understood local networks, commitments, and clan loyalties, as well as mission creep.The truth is, none of us succeeded in Somalia, neither the unified task force nor the subsequent United Nations operation in Somalia. Somalia is today an even greater international threat than it was when Canada first went there. Somalis still suffer the ravages of bad or no government, lack of development, and deprivation. …

NATO to build on biometrics experience in Afghanistan

NATO to build on biometrics experience in Afghanistan

Interview with Major General David A. Rubenstein, FACHE, Commanding General of the US Army Medical Department Center and School, and Chief, US Army Medical Service Corps

Major General David A. Rubenstein, FACHE, is the commanding general of the US Army Medical Department Center and School and chief of the US Army Medical Service Corps. He previously served as the Army deputy surgeon general and, prior to that, as the commanding general of Europe Regional Medical Command and command surgeon for US Army Europe and 7th Army.General Rubenstein is the recipient of numerous military awards and decorations. He has served as a Regent, Governor, and Chairman (2008-2009) of the American College of Healthcare Executives and is a member of ACHE's Counselors Committee and Voluntary Giving Committee.A graduate of Texas A&M University and the Army War College, he also earned a master's degree in health administration from Baylor University and a master's degree in military art and science from the Army's Command and General Staff College. He has twice been listed among Modem Healthcare magazine's 100 Most Influential People in Healthcare, was appointed an honorary graduate professor of healthcare administration at Baylor University, and received the Outstanding Federal Healthcare Executive Award from the Association of Military Surgeons of the United States.General Rubenstein earned the inaugural US Army Medical Service Corps Mentor of the Year Award and was inducted into the Army Medical Department's Order of Military Merit. He is the recipient of ACHE's 2012 Gold Medal Award in the category of nondelivery healthcare organizations. This award recognizes individuals who go beyond the confines of their own organizations to continually contribute to the improvement of healthcare services and community health.Dr. O'Connor: Congratulations on being a recipient of ACHE's 2012 Gold Medal Award! What factors led you to a military career and to healthcare management in particular?MG Rubenstein: What led me into a military career was receiving an ROTC scholarship and taking it to Texas A&M University. I was a member of the Corps of Cadets, who were in uniform all the time, with formations twice a day. That experience lit a fire and made me want to stay in the Army for as long as I could and as long as I enjoyed it.Why healthcare? I had designs in college of eventually going to graduate school to become a physical therapist. I applied to two programs and was the number-one alternate at each. Both told me to reapply the following year. I graduated from college and was commissioned a lieutenant in the Medical Service Corps. I was interested in healthcare, and if I was going to be in the Army, that was what I wanted to do. My interest in healthcare is centered on taking care of soldiers and their families. That is what has driven me. Interestingly enough, a year later when it was time to reapply to the two physical therapy programs, I found myself in Germany as a medical platoon leader in charge of 35 medics and two providers and taking care of 800 infantrymen. I was enjoying myself and never reapplied to those physical therapy programs. One of those two programs was the Army graduate program in physical therapy, over which I am now the commanding general.Dr. O'Connor: What are the greatest challenges you face as the commanding general of the US Army Medical Department Center and School and chief of the US Army Medical Service Corps?MG Rubenstein: In the current phase of my career I have two duties. My primary duty is to command the Army Medical Department Center and School. We envision, design, and train a premier military medical force for the nation. Envision and design mean that we develop the doctrine, organizations, and equipment to support healthcare on a battlefield or in a humanitarian situation. Train speaks to the education and training mission. My challenge is to ensure that we stay relevant to a transforming military, providing it the healthcare it demands and deserves. Staying relevant means looking at and studying our experiences in Afghanistan, for example, and attempting to foresee what future conflicts might look like. …

Using Phenomenological Research to Drive Dynamic Modeling

One of the most difficult aspects in mathematical modeling and simulation is developing data to drive models and learning. This is particularly difficult when the subject involves intangible variables and concepts such as stress and perceptions that are difficult to ascribe a quantitative value to. This paper provides a description of how qualitative data collected during in depth phenomenological interviews with subject matter experts can be used to drive models. It also provides a case study of insurgency warfare and coalition and Afghan National Government performance during the last ten years. The U.S. government has spent more than $300 billion on the war in Afghanistan. Despite the employment of these resources, the goal of creating stability in the country has not been achieved. Twenty U.S. Army officers with six or more months of experience in Afghanistan were selected by random choice from a specific group. The participants were then interviewed to determine the meaning of their experiences in fighting an insurgency. Data analysis included organizing responses by question to identify the frequency of trends, patterns, and themes; and development of textural and structural descriptions of resource allocation and stability within the context of this study. Data was then transformed to create look-up tables that can be used to model, calibrate, and ascribe quantitative values to various variables in a dynamic insurgency model. A proof of concept model was then created to demonstrate the potential utility and power behind a model that combines the qualities of quantitative mathematical science and qualitative research methodology.

Cross‐class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 2011

Theorists of social movements and revolutions have given great attention to the factors creating vulnerability for the state – including elite divisions, loss of foreign support, and economic problems. Substantial attention has also been given to factors facilitating the mobilization of protest actors, including framing, prior network ties, social and public media, and political openings. Somewhat less evident has been the role of cross-class coalitions, which play a vital role in affecting both the strength of the state and mobilization, and in shaping the outcomes of protest and revolutionary change. If a protest draws support mainly from just one class or group (peasants, workers, students, urban shopkeepers, professionals), the state can confront that group as a disruptive force, and seek to unify elites from other sectors against that threat. However, if protestors represent many different groups, it is much harder for the state to find allies against them. Moreover, while a state can claim to be preserving society by acting against isolated disruptive elements, it is far more difficult to maintain legitimacy when acting against a broad cross-class coalition. Elites are more likely to desert the state, creating crippling elite divisions, if protestors represent a broad spectrum of society. In addition, a broad cross-class coalition facilitates further mobilization by creating ‘meganetworks’ linking prior, tightly-linked within-group networks to each other. The impact of public media in favor of the protestors is also greater if media representation shows protestors as representative of the whole society, rather than as one particular group seeking partisan advantages for itself. For these reasons, virtually all successful revolutions were forged by cross-class coalitions that bridged the diverse goals and interests of different groups, thus pitting society as a whole against the regime and its loyalist supporters. Conversely, revolts rooted in the needs and organization of one particular class or group – peasant revolts, urban uprisings, student protests, regional rebellions – have usually been effectively repressed by regimes able to draw on other groups for support. The three successful revolutions in the Arab world in 2011, in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, all demonstrate the crucial role of cross-class coalitions.

Measuring "Spidey Sense" in a Threat Detection Task: The Role of Physiological Arousal

Physiological sensations are reported by soldiers in relation to events that are only later found to be lifethreatening. Despite these anecdotal reports, the role of physiological responses in detecting threats has not been established. Physiological measures were recorded while experienced (recently returned from Afghanistan) and novice (no experience in Afghanistan) soldiers watched different types of video: walking or driving in neutral environments, and driving in Afghanistan. Participants were asked to identify nonthreatening and threatening situations by button presses according to the video watched. Analyses of eye movements revealed that experienced soldiers displayed smaller saccade amplitude, more fixations, and wider scanning patterns for the videos than novices. Analyses of heart rate variability indicated that physiological stress levels were higher for the experienced soldiers, particularly for the videos. The results suggest that experienced soldiers scanned their environment for threat more systematically than novices, and that this was associated with higher physiological arousal, suggesting a role for affective as well as cognitive processing of stimuli in expert threat detection. Language: en

‘Me Tarzan – You Jane’: The EU and NATO and the Reversal of Roles

This article questions assumptions characterizing NATO as focused on ‘hard security’ and the EU as focused on ‘soft security’. By asking how identities and narratives have been constructed in both organizations, subtle differences are brought to light, indicating that changes have taken place in the self-conception and narrative of the two organizations resulting in different conceptions of role and identity. It is suggested that identity and narrative constructions are influenced by practical action and that the EU under ESDP has experienced positive action, leaving it in a stronger position than NATO on questions of ‘hard security’. The analysis utilizes recent empirical evidence in which the EU and NATO are often compared in terms of partnerships and operations. The article shows that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the EU has been constructing a ‘Tarzan’ narrative, whereas NATO's negative experience in Afghanistan has driven the organization towards a narrative of avoiding failure, emphasizing a ‘Jane’ narrative about partnerships. The pattern may however now be in the process of changing, as evidenced by NATO's robust intervention in Libya, and the EU's preoccupation with establishing the new External Action Service and with the Euro-crisis.

Ballistic Thoracoabdominal Injury: Analysis of Recent Military Experience in Afghanistan

Military surgery has seen the arrival of the critical care provision and cross-sectional imaging enjoyed by civilian trauma surgeons. Ballistic injury to the thoracoabdominal region is uncommon but potentially devastating. The aim of this study was to analyze recent military experience of managing this injury complex. The study is a retrospective analysis of patients, admitted over a 12-month period, to the British Military Hospital in Afghanistan with ballistic thoracoabdominal injuries. In total, 27 patients sustained combined thoracoabdominal injury with a mean new injury severity score of 29±12, revised trauma score of 5.94±2.93 and predicted survival of 71.1%±39.1%. In all, 20 (74%) patients underwent immediate operation, and 7 (26%) were initially managed nonoperatively. Of those requiring surgery, 11 required laparotomy and tube thoracostomy, and 9 required thoraco-laparotomy. Of the seven casualties who were initially observed and/or further investigated, two required laparotomy following computed tomography scanning, and five were managed conservatively, two of whom required delayed surgery. There were nine fatalities, all within 16 days of being wounded. Four patients died from exsanguination, one from a traumatic brain injury, and four from multiorgan failure. Five patients presented with cardiac arrest, two of whom survived. Exploration remains the default treatment. Resuscitative thoracotomy may yield unexpected survivors, even if subsequent laparotomy is required. Nonoperative management appears to be feasible in a small proportion of patients but requires careful selection supported by cross-sectional imaging.

Changing Chaplaincy: a Contribution to Debate over the Roles of US and British Military Chaplains in Afghanistan

This article addresses the challenges presented to NATO military chaplains in conflicts waged in majority-Muslim countries, focusing on the British and US experience in Afghanistan. Though the two militaries have quite different formal guidelines for chaplains about relations with local populations, it is argued here that the challenges for chaplains relating with local religious actors are in many respects similar. Recent changes to chaplaincy guidelines in Afghanistan have reflected a recognition of their potential to act as interpreters for soldiers facing a religious ‘frontier’ with which they are ill-equipped to grapple. However, chaplain engagement with locals on a religious basis is not uncontroversial. With this in mind, this article focuses on the symbolic status of the military chaplain, both within the military and in encounters with locals. Though the symbolism of a Christian chaplain in this context is not unproblematic, it is argued that ultimately chaplains could contribute to the navigation of differences and commonalities between soldiers and civilians. However, at present military chaplains are inadequately trained to deal with the religious Muslim populations they encounter in Afghanistan, Iraq or elsewhere. The contribution closes with conclusions about likely developments in the roles and training of chaplains deployed in Muslim-majority countries in the future.

Through veterans' eyes: the Iraq and Afghanistan experience

Through veterans' eyes: the Iraq and Afghanistan experience

4-D Soviet Style: Defense, Development, Diplomacy, and Disengagement in Afghanistan During the Soviet Period. Part III: Economic Development

This is the third part in a series in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. In this instalment, the authors highlight the importance of the economy to the political stability of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). They maintain that the DRA was not defeated by Islamic insurgents on the battlefield. Rather, the Najibullah regime collapsed in 1992 because it became insolvent after Russia curtailed aid to Afghanistan. While the Soviets attained some of their objectives in Afghanistan after a difficult decade of war, Afghanistan remained a ‘rentier’ state dependent on foreign aid. When Boris Yelstin terminated Russian aid to Afghanistan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Afghan state failed. The Achilles heel of the DRA was its weak system of public finance. As in the early 1990s, Afghanistan today remains heavily dependent on foreign aid. Economic aspects of the Soviet experience are instructive for those concerned about stability in Afghanistan today.