Afghanistan: Strategy and War Termination

Abstract

Why has ending war in Afghanistan proved to be so problematic? In theory, the decision to end a war should be relatively straightforward. One or more of the belligerents determine whether or not it is worth continuing the conflict and, as long as at least one of them decides that continuing to fight is not worth the investment, peace is offered and the conflict terminates. Clausewitz encapsulates this rational, commonsense approach to the ending of war when he asserts: the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow. (1) By this logic, and in the context of Afghanistan, the dilemma associated with how and when to end the war could have been avoided by engaging in a rational cost-benefit analysis: how much has the war cost and what is the value of the objectives we were pursuing? Once the former exceeded the latter, then the Coalition should have struck a deal with the Taliban and left Afghanistan. Instinctively, of course, we know that the decisions involved in ending a war cannot be as simple as this rational cost-benefit analysis. But, why is that so? One powerful argument blamed the ambiguous protraction of the Afghanistan war on the West's failure to comprehend and apply the principles of classical theory. Since in principle it should be no more difficult to end a war than it is to start one, theoretically one need only adhere to the precepts of an effective to bring about the rational and purposeful end to an armed conflict. The bad strategy argument views the difficulty associated with ending the war in Afghanistan as a failure to understand, or apply, the principles of effective strategy--such as a clear and attainable end state, adequate means or unity of effort--as a consequence of an emerging strategic illiteracy. The argument presented is the West has been out-strategized by its opponents. (2) This article argues a different thesis: that, notwithstanding some of the evident difficulties associated with the adopted in Afghanistan, the war there is a reflection of a much longer standing phenomenon--it is easier to start conflicts than it is to end them. (3) The fact that Afghanistan is one of many such examples of problematic, protracted conflicts suggests that, in addition to a range of specific difficulties associated with the peculiarities of the nation, there may be a range of broader structural challenges that contribute to making the purposeful termination of a conflict an inherently problematic activity. Put another way, wars can be difficult to end even when conscious, rigorous effort is made to try and realize the best practices. This article addresses two themes: the recurrent structural problems associated with ending a war, and how they have contributed to undermining Coalition attempts to terminate the conflict in Afghanistan. In doing so this author will investigate the significance to war termination of four questions and the challenges associated with answering them: who will win; is there an achievable peace; peace at what cost; and, can the war be terminated? Taken together, the complexities surrounding the answers to these four questions suggest, whatever the quality of one's strategy-making, there are recurrent structural factors present to a greater or lesser extent in all armed conflicts that constrain the strategies that can be conceived and executed. If is the art of the possible, then many of the problems we have experienced in Afghanistan result not from illiteracy or a lack of understanding of what needs to be done, but rather from inescapable dilemmas and contradictions inherent in almost any attempt to end a conflict. If these problems are, in fact, inherent to the activity of ending all wars, then whatever lessons we think we might learn from our experiences in Afghanistan for the formulation of strategy, our challenges there will be open to repetition in the future. …