Abstract
This is the third part in a series in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. In this instalment, the authors highlight the importance of the economy to the political stability of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). They maintain that the DRA was not defeated by Islamic insurgents on the battlefield. Rather, the Najibullah regime collapsed in 1992 because it became insolvent after Russia curtailed aid to Afghanistan. While the Soviets attained some of their objectives in Afghanistan after a difficult decade of war, Afghanistan remained a ‘rentier’ state dependent on foreign aid. When Boris Yelstin terminated Russian aid to Afghanistan after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Afghan state failed. The Achilles heel of the DRA was its weak system of public finance. As in the early 1990s, Afghanistan today remains heavily dependent on foreign aid. Economic aspects of the Soviet experience are instructive for those concerned about stability in Afghanistan today.
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