Experience In Afghanistan Research Articles

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan: lessons to be learned?

This article examines the experience of the Soviet army's occupation of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. It draws heavily on the report of the Russian General Staff, which gives a unique insight into the Soviet–Afghan war by senior Russian officers, many of whom served in Afghanistan. The author then places this analysis in the broader geopolitical context of Soviet expansionism from the early 1970s to the mid 1980s. And the author proceeds to ask: Did Afghanistan account for the demise of the USSR? Finally, the issue of whether there are parallels with the failure of the Soviet Union's invasion and the current problems facing the USA in Afghanistan is examined.

Grand Strategy and the Graveyard of Assumptions: Britain and Afghanistan, 1839–1919

This article comprises a reply to those who seek to use the British historical experience in Afghanistan in order to draw parallels with current operations in that country. It argues that, while the conceptual and physical response to the issue of Afghanistan on the part of Empire policy-makers during the period 1839–1919 was characterised by periods of indecision and mistaken assumptions, their grasp of strategic principles allowed the formulation of a series of Afghan policies that would serve to protect and indeed enhance British interests in the region for over a century and which stand in stark contrast to the seemingly incoherent Afghan strategy articulated by the current British government.

NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War

Since the end of the Cold War, the debates about NATO burden-sharing have changed considerably, yet descriptions of the basic burden-sharing dynamics have changed little since the Cold War era. This article shows that burden-sharing disputes remain a basic alliance problem, but they have changed fundamentally since 1989. The most salient burden-sharing disputes are worse today, illustrated most profoundly by experiences in Afghanistan. This article contrasts the major disparities between in alliance contributions during the Cold War and today. Working within the framework of collective goods theory, the article shows that NATO's ability to project military power is best accounted for by traditional security functions that the alliance still serves. Because of disputes and uncertainty over its strategic roles, and the tendency for many members to still perceive it as a vehicle for ‘keeping the Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in’, collective action problems related to out-of-area operations remain serious, but can be assuaged through careful management.

MEDEVAC

In current military operations, the survival rates of critically injured casualties are unprecedented. An often hidden aspect of casualty care is safe transport from the point of injury to a field hospital and subsequently on to higher levels of care. This en route critical care, which is provided by flight medics under the most austere and rigorous conditions, is a crucial link in the care continuum. This article introduces the role and capabilities of US Army MEDEVAC and reflects the author’s recent experience in Afghanistan as a flight medic. This article provides an assessment of the operational issues, medical capabilities, and transport experiences to provide a real-world view of critical care transport from the battlefield. The MEDEVAC helicopter environment is one of the most difficult, if not the most demanding, critical care environments. This overview brings to light a small but important piece of the care continuum.

Neurosurgery in Afghanistan during “Operation Enduring Freedom”: a 24-month experience

"Operation Enduring Freedom" is the US war effort in Afghanistan in its global war on terror. One US military neurosurgeon is deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom to provide care for both battlefield injuries and humanitarian work. Here, the authors analyze a 24-month neurosurgical caseload experience in Afghanistan. Operative logs were analyzed between October 2007 and September 2009. Operative cases were divided into minor procedures (for example, placement of an intracranial pressure monitor) and major procedures (for example, craniotomy) for both battle injuries and humanitarian work. Battle injuries were defined as injuries sustained by soldiers while in the line of duty or injuries to Afghan civilians from weapons of war. Humanitarian work consisted of providing medical care to Afghans. Six neurosurgeons covering a 24-month period performed 115 minor procedures and 210 major surgical procedures cases. Operations for battlefield injuries included 106 craniotomies, 25 spine surgeries, and 18 miscellaneous surgeries. Humanitarian work included 32 craniotomies (23 for trauma, 3 for tumor, 6 for other reasons, such as cyst fenestration), 27 spine surgeries (12 for degenerative conditions, 9 for trauma, 4 for myelomeningocele closure, and 2 for the treatment of infection), and 2 miscellaneous surgeries. Military neurosurgeons have provided surgical care at rates of 71% (149/210) for battlefield injuries and 29% (61/210) for humanitarian work. Of the operations for battle trauma, 50% (106/210) were cranial and 11% (25/210) spinal surgeries. Fifteen percent (32/210) and 13% (27/210) of operations were for humanitarian cranial and spine procedures, respectively. Overall, military neurosurgeons in Afghanistan are performing life-saving cranial and spine stabilization procedures for battlefield trauma and acting as general neurosurgeons for the Afghan community.

‘New Thinking’ in the Pentagon

According to Thomas Ricks, the ‘Old War’ ended on 19 March 2005 – the date on which a marine squad in Iraq went on a killing spree after being attacked. These four fine books are about the profound learning process that is being experienced by the American security apparatus in order to find ways to address the ‘new wars’ in Iraq and Afghanistan and, indeed, in other parts of the world. The name of General Petraeus is associated with this learning process, although it has to be understood more as a social movement – changed perceptions that have bubbled up from junior-level officers frustrated by what was happening on the ground. One officer tells Linda Robinson that the US army consists of ‘Cold War generals, Bosnia colonels and Iraq captains’. General Petraeus’ role has been to empower the captains. Two of the books are by soldiers and they develop the security thinking that underlies this learning process. David Kilcullen and John Nagl have both been deeply involved in formulating the new ideas that were tried out in Iraq after 2006 and are being tried out now in Afghanistan. John Nagl was a co-author of the new counterinsurgency manual produced under General Petraeus’ supervision during his stint at Fort Leavenworth prior to taking over the operational command in Iraq. David Kilcullen is an Australian with experience in Afghanistan, East Timor, Thailand and Indonesia, who also contributed to the manual and became General Petraeus’ counterinsurgency adviser in Iraq. John Nagl’s book takes its title from a quotation from T. E. Lawrence: ‘To make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife’. Nagl’s main proposition is that success in conducting counterinsurgency operations depends on the military’s capacity for learning and adaptation and he develops a model to show what learning and adaptation must involve. He argues that the British army is a learning institution in contrast to the American military, which is deeply resistant to change; it is averse to unconventional tactics and it tends to believe in the importance of mass destruction, technology and ‘the unique moral mission’ of the United States. He traces these attitudes back to the ‘strategy of annihilation’ in the War against Native Americans and shows how it was reinforced by two world wars. The book contrasts the British adaptation to the Malayan Emergency with American conduct in Vietnam, where primacy was given to conventional military operations in a situation characterised by ‘a complex nationalistic and internecine struggle’. In Malaya, the British developed counterinsurgency principles, which included the use of minimum force, civil–military cooperation and flexibility of strategy. In Vietnam there was huge resistance to these kinds of tactics, as proposed by the US Marines. One senior officer said: ‘I’ll be damned if I permit the United States Army, its institutions and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this lousy war’. And after the war, the US army refused to learn the lessons of what went wrong; on the contrary the preferred text on the war was the book by Colonel Harry Summers, which concluded that the Vietnam War was not conventional enough. David Kilcullen’s book, which is likely to become a classic of counterinsurgency studies, draws attention to the global character of today’s insurgencies. He argues that what he calls the Taqfiri terrorists – the global Islamists – exploit local situations and mobilise ordinary people through a combination of bribery, marriage and intimidation. The ‘accidental guerrillas’ of his title are those people who have been, as it were, infected by the Taqfiri terrorist syndrome. He contrasts what he claims is the population-centric approach of classic counterinsurgency with the enemy-centric approach of counter-terror. Population security means protecting people from violence and providing basic services. He argues that placing the emphasis on population security allows you to detach the accidental guerrilla from the terrorist, or, in Petraeus’ words, to ‘separate the Global Policy Volume 1 . Issue 1 . January 2010

MEDEVAC

In current military operations, the survival rates of critically injured casualties are unprecedented. An often hidden aspect of casualty care is safe transport from the point of injury to a field hospital and subsequently on to higher levels of care. This en route critical care, which is provided by flight medics under the most austere and rigorous conditions, is a crucial link in the care continuum. This article introduces the role and capabilities of US Army MEDEVAC and reflects the author's recent experience in Afghanistan as a flight medic. This article provides an assessment of the operational issues, medical capabilities, and transport experiences to provide a real-world view of critical care transport from the battlefield. The MEDEVAC helicopter environment is one of the most difficult, if not the most demanding, critical care environments. This overview brings to light a small but important piece of the care continuum.

Bridging the gap: the role of pharmacists in managing the drug supply cycle within non‐governmental organizations

Access to essential medicines remains one of the biggest problems that developing countries are facing in health care systems. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are implementing health programmes on the ground in areas affected by natural disasters or conflict. A vital component of these health programmes is the drug supply system. Based on a field research conducted in Pakistan 2007 and a field work experience in Afghanistan within an international NGO-Merlin-this paper analysed the four functions of the Drug Supply Cycle (Selection, Procurement, Distribution and Use) focusing attention on the importance in management support systems once the emergency phase is over. It shows the core role that the pharmacist plays within NGOs as a member of the health staff with the ability to improve the management of the Drug Supply Cycle.

Caught in the Net: Lessons from the Financial Crisis for a Networked Future

Since 2000 the Department of Defense (DOD) has committed itself to implementing a vision of the future of combat usually referred to as Network-Centric Warfare (NCW). This vision, as described by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, holds that robustly networking the force will improve information sharing, collaboration, and shared situational awareness. (1) The DOD has invested considerable resources in its efforts to develop and implement NCW despite criticism from within and outside the armed forces. Much of the inspiration for NCW came from the business world, particularly the technological and organizational changes associated with information technology. These business roots have been a source of ammunition for NCW's critics, who argue that, at least when it comes to operations, uncertainty in war makes business and war incompatible.... Business and war certainly have significant differences, but this critique is simply incorrect. Uncertainty is a major factor faced by businesses and militaries alike. Both compete with rivals to survive, innovate to improve their performance, and act despite uncertainty, risk, and information scarcity. These similarities are pronounced enough that, when they are correctly adopted, ideas and theories from the business world can provide insight on many issues facing militaries, including operational and strategic ones. (2) The fact that business ideas can help militaries, however, does not necessarily strengthen the argument for NCW. The current financial crisis was caused in part by pervasive mistakes and misjudgments in the financial world. These mistakes were enabled, and their consequences aggravated, by network effects and cognitive errors rooted in technological approaches to dealing with complexity and uncertainty. Just as examples from the business world inspired NCW, the current crisis, which has a size and severity exceeding that of any since the Great Depression, illustrates risks that the designers and users of the future network have to understand and mitigate, risks not previously identified by critics of NCW. The crisis shows that while networks can substantially improve organizations' efficiency and performance, they can also leave them vulnerable to an unpredictable cascade of failures. The network-centric approach promises to allow commanders to understand battlefields with unprecedented clarity and fidelity. The financial crisis, however, shows that these tools can mislead as well as illuminate due to their simplification of a far-more complicated underlying reality. Finally, NCW will create the potential for simulations of future battlefields that would provide commanders with tools of unprecedented power for managing risk and uncertainty. Failures in risk-management models played a key role in the financial crisis, however. They can lead to massive and unanticipated errors if the models do not accurately capture reality and instead give users a false confidence in their understanding of the environment. This article uses the financial crisis to illuminate these three potential dangers inherent in the NCW approach. This critique is not meant to suggest abandoning NCW, but rather to recommend a cautious approach to the critical endeavor of preparing the American military for its networked future, one that takes all potential risks into account. Net-Centric Warfare Background The movement toward NCW is official DOD policy. The last Quadrennial Defense Review Report in 2006 described the net-centric vision: Harnessing the power of information connectivity defines net-centricity. By enabling critical relationships between organizations and people, the Department is able to accelerate the speed of business processes, operational decisionmaking, and subsequent actions. Recent operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the value of net-centric operations. …

Playing with principles in an era of securitized aid

The international community's response to reconstructing Afghanistan, following the US-led regime change invasion post-11 September 2001 (9/11), brought actors such as the military and private corporations more fully into the humanitarian sphere. As a result, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), traditionally charged with taking humanitarian action, face a number of challenges and dilemmas. Their legitimacy and their ability to act impartially, be perceived as neutral and to maintain their independence have become increasingly constrained. How the NGOs adapt when their humanitarian space is constrained affects who, where and what aid gets delivered and on what principles. However, little is known about the dynamics of humanitarian space or how the NGOs have adapted in practice. Filling the gap in empirical knowledge might enable the NGOs to deal better with the constrained environments they are likely to encounter as the ‘war on terror’ continues to unfold. This research, based on field work in Afghanistan during mid-2006, suggests the politicization, developmentalization and securitization of aid, often referred to as ‘new humanitarianism’, has triumphed in the post-9/11 environment. The role of the NGOs as neutral actors has been seriously undermined, not least by the NGOs themselves. Having legitimized regime change intervention, they find themselves prevented from negotiating their space with any group not approved by the architects of the new political dispensation. As the country slips towards a serious humanitarian crisis, there may be no way back from their lost neutrality. The best use that can be made of these findings is to identify what the Afghanistan experience can teach NGOs for operating under constrained humanitarianism.

The Rules of War

The ongoing ‘‘war on terror,’’ the difficult postwar experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the clamoring for intervention in Darfur all highlight the ethics of war and peace. An especially prominent and useful tradition of thought about this subject is just war theory, the basic tenet of which is that warfare is sometimes morally permissible. This sets the theory apart from pacifism, which denies this principle, as well as from realism, which stipulates that war and morality have nothing to do with each other and that war ought to be considered solely as a selfish calculus of national interests regarding such things as power, security, natural resources, and economic growth. Just war theory frames basic moral rules to aid decision-makers facing the monumental challenges of war and peace. These rules fall into three categories, still referred to in their original Latin: jus ad bellum (‘‘justice of war,’’ regarding political rules for starting wars); jus in bello (‘‘justice in war,’’ regarding rules for soldierly conduct during war); and jus post bellum (‘‘justice after war,’’ regarding rules to guide the transition from conflict back to peace). Three books have recently been released that contribute to this body of theory. The most impressive book of the trio is Larry May’s War Crimes and Just War, a detailed, theoretically rich, and clearly written monograph, penned by an expert both in just war theory and domestic and international criminal law. The book has already won the American Philosophical Association’s prestigious Frank Chapman Sharp Memorial Prize. May’s work is exclusively about jus in bello, and is multidisciplinary in method, combining the positive laws of armed conflict with the very old natural law theories of such just war theorists as Alberico Gentili, Samuel Pufendorf, and Hugo Grotius. May is a particular fan of Grotius, the hugely influential seventeenth-century Dutch thinker who himself straddled the gap between law and morality. May starts the book by discussing Seneca, the ancient Roman philosopher, and ends the book with a section on the very latest war crimes trials at The Hague, passionately and persuasively arguing against the use of torture in the case of suspected or even known terrorists. This shows great historical breadth

Radiology in a Hostile Environment: Experience in Afghanistan

Imaging equipment deployed with the combat support hospital in Afghanistan represented new technology not previously used in a hostile environment for a prolonged period. In general, the equipment performed well in a stationary location. Having computed tomography and ultrasound scans, in addition to plain radiographs, was very helpful for patient care. Redundancy of digital radiography and ultrasound systems proved prudent. It is recommended that a radiologist continue to be sent with the combat support hospital, particularly when computed tomography and ultrasound systems are in the deployment package. This report acquaints the medical community with information to aid in the planning and performance of future deployments that bring digital imaging to the battlespace.

Averting failure in Afghanistan

The current US and NATO strategy in Afghanistan involves establishing security with a light footprint. However, the deteriorating security environment demonstrates that this strategy has not been s...

Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq

The Afghan model of warfare uses indigenous allies to replace American conventional ground troops by exploiting U.S. airpower and small numbers of American special operations forces. Some argue that this model is widely applicable, enabling a major restructuring of the U.S. military and considerable freedom for American military intervention. An assessment of such claims in light of recent combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, finds the model's applicability to be more limited. Where U.S. allies have had skills and motivation comparable to their enemies', the Afghan model has proven extremely lethal even without U.S. conventional ground forces. But where U.S. allies have lacked these skills, they have proven unable to exploit the potential of American airpower. The model can thus be a powerful tool, but one with important preconditions for its use—and these preconditions limit its potential to transform U.S. force structure or defense policy.

Organizing for peace operations

There have been two general approaches to organizing for peace operations: an ad hoc approach, in which entities independently intervene and operate on the basis of their unique expertise and interest; and a top – down approach, in which all entities are directed and controlled by a single authority. Using the UN experience in Afghanistan, we demonstrate how this view of the organizing problem is limited. Instead, we develop a typology that distinguishes among three systems for organizing peace operations-Command, Market and Community – on the basis of their differences on four analytic dimensions (agency, social attachment, social control and inter-organizational relations). Our analysis of the UN experience in Afghanistan demonstrates the utility of our framework for both theory and practice.

Militarism and Islamism in Algeria

This article focuses on the combined consequences for women of militarization and pan-Islamism—a particular manifestation of Islam that has spread using some of the mechanisms of globalization, especially global trade and global communications. The empirical data are drawn from the civil conflict of the 1990s in Algeria, where an Islamist movement led by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and several armed Islamist groups (notably the GIA, the Armed Islamic Group) terrorized the population and killed tens of thousands of people in an attempt to seize control of the state. External support from pan-Islamists accounts, in part, for the ability of the FIS and the GIA to gain a foothold in Algeria. The pan-Islamist movement has cells in Europe and the Middle East, some of which were in contact with Algerian Islamists. Armed Islamist groups from Algeria received training from Al Qaeda, combat experience in Afghanistan and Bosnia, and financial support from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Iran.

An Afghanistan experience

The Medical Journal of Australia ISSN: 0025-729X 1/ 15 December 2003 179 11/12 591-593 ©The Medical Journal of Austral ia 2003 www.mja.com.au Frontline Medicine THIS IS A brief account of my six months in Afghanistan in 2003. I worked as the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) project doctor in the western province of Herat, spending alternate weeks in Herat City and in Kushk-e-Kohna, a sparsely populated district some two hours north of the provincial capital by four-wheel drive. I arrived in February, just over two years after the US-backed overthrow of the Taliban. Herat is now controlled by its Emir and Governor, Ismail Khan, who rules beyond the reach of Afghanistan’s central government. With a private army of sixty thousand men and control of customs revenue from trade with Iran, it is no wonder he has not, despite invitation, joined the government of Hamid Karzai. His unchallenged power and the considerable wealth at his disposal have in fact made Herat relatively more stable and prosperous than the rest of the country. It is February, and the winter snows are just thinning as I arrive to work in the mobile clinic in Kushk-e-Kohna, which I affectionately call “Kushk”, or “palace”, in the local language of Farsi. The name clearly harks back to a more prosperous time, for there is no palace to be found in this district of sixty thousand people. The inhabitants have mudbrick houses and live mostly off subsistence farming, growing wheat (Box 1) and raising livestock (Box 2). They have lived like this for generations, and life was little different under the Taliban, although now it is evident that young girls are going to newly built schools. There are only two doctors for the entire population — myself and an Afghan doctor recently recruited by MSF. Dr Mohammad Amin has recently graduated, and is enthusiastic about working with MSF, learning English and broadening his knowledge. Before 2003, locals had to gamble on the only “healthcare” available — drugs sold in private pharmacies by untrained “drug sellers”. And so it is that after a week I begin getting used to the hundreds of patients presenting every day, many having walked for hours, thronging around the makeshift consultation room and desperately pressing to be seen (Box 3). The mobile clinics are situated across the district, with MSF’s base in the district centre of Kooklam. We visit one or two An Afghanistan experience

Operation Enduring Freedom: Navy Nurse Corps field experience in Afghanistan

LT Wendy Stone, a Navy Nurse Corps ED nurse, sitting with a wounded Afghanistani patient. As an ED nurse in the Navy, I have always understood that taking care of patients during war is my primary responsibility. On Thanksgiving Day, the call came for me to deploy in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. Marine hospital field experience, combined with extensive trauma training, prepared me to answer the call. (Photo by LCDR Virginia Knight.)

The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan

volume puts a face on the Soviet Afghan experience and begins to add flesh and blood to our previously skeletal appreciation of the war ... book provides a revealing portrait of war in general, in particular, and, coincidentally, the soldiers human condition. David M Glantz Military History Illustrated-This is interesting and unusual book from Cass, composed of several reports written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen in Army Quarterly and Defense Journal- ...making the work valuable for all those likely to be involved in similar future conflicts.. RTR PUBLICATIONS LTD- I doubt if any of the superpowers will try again, but if they do, then this series of books should be invaluable, although many of the lessons they teach, can be equally well applied to other areas in inhospitable terrain and implacable foes. Engineer - The Bear Went Over the Mountains provides outstanding look at and commentary on Soviet against the mujahideen fighters from 1979 to 1989...The Bear Went Over the Mountain is a valuable learning tool, especially for leaders at the battalion level and below. TANK -I doubt if the superpowerswill try again, but if they do, then this series of books should be invaluable, although many of the lessons they teach, can be equally well applied to other areas in inhospitable terrain and implacable foes. Armor-This book offers valuable professional insight into the Russian militarys and operational art, and their ability and willingness to innovate. Intelligence and operations officers might find the vignettes excellent source as they design wargame and training scenarios in preparing units for deployment Marine Corps Gazette- volume provides plenty of material to motivate serious thinking. book is worth yout time. individual reader can stimulate his thinking with the variety of situations. instructor can draw on this volume to illustrate his points, pose tactical decision problems, and motivate appreciation for minor tactics European Security, Vol 8, No 1, Spring 99 - reviewed by Major James C. Larsen, Center for Army Tactics, Fort Leavenworth This collection of vignettes on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is essential reading for the soldier and military historian ... For the young platoon leader of compant commander who may face a guerilla threat, the book may help him understand how to win - or how to lose. For the historian who may be well acquainted with the war, many of Graus insights are truly original thought and will provide entirely new perspective on the conflict. Parameters, Spring 2000 Grau translated, edited and added to the book, providing US perspectives and analysis of the Frunze comments as well as vivid insights into Soviet troop practice. War in History an excellent source for those wanting to understand how the Soviet army operated in Afghanistan

Parallels and divergences between the us experience in Vietnam and the soviet experience in Afghanistan

(1988). Parallels and divergences between the us experience in Vietnam and the soviet experience in Afghanistan. Central Asian Survey: Vol. 7, No. 2-3, pp. 111-132.