In modern times there is a widespread conviction that every state should be prepared for extraordinary circumstances that may pose a threat to the security of the state, including the democratic system, as well as the security of its citizens. Therefore, the constitutions of democratic states define situations referred to as “states of emergency”, the occurrence of which justifies the introduction of an extraordinary legal regime1. These are states of particular danger, the removal of which is not possible by ordinary measures and therefore requires measures of an exceptional nature. Often these measures include restrictions on the exercise of certain individual rights and freedoms, as well as the conferral of specific powers on certain bodies (usually the executive branch) to combat the threat that has arisen. It is therefore important that all of these regulations are contained in constitutional norms and only developed in subordinate acts like statutes. The problem of states of emergency has also been noticed in the documents of international law. According to Art. 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights2, “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion orsocial origin. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16, and 18 may be made under this provision”. Provisions that cannot be limited concern, among others, the inherent right to life, freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, and being subject to medical or scientific experimentation, slavery, being held in servitude, being imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a contractual obligation, or the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.