theological explanation evil, theodicy, that evil willed by God, willed by an absolute God, an absolutely benevolent God.' logic may be painful, in sense that it outrages moral reason, but it remains logical all that. Since God wills all things, God willed Holocaust. Because all things willed by God are good, Holocaust too was good. Not just that good comes from Holocaust, but that Holocaust itself was good, as repentance, sacrifice, purification, sign, redemption, punishment, perhaps all of these, but ultimately good in itself. Not only do such scandalous conclusions necessarily follow from logic of a philosophical God, from an absolute omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and benevolence, but even more painfully and intimately, follow from personal God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, from His special covenant with Jews, and in our day with Israel, in its Passion under Adolph Hitler.2 Part of holy history (Heilsgeschichte), Holocaust above all-where Jews once again take center stage, not only in locale of Middle East, or of Europe, but globally-would have been willed by God, and thus would be good. It would have to be good, or it would be meaningless, and Jews forsaken. As we know, this very line of thought, enunciated in 1961 by a leading German cleric whose moral heroism had earlier been proven by saving Jews during nazi period, so shocked Richard Rubenstein that he rejected altogether any belief in special election of Israel.3 Emmanuel Levinas too was shocked by this sound but appalling logic. Like Rubenstein, he too rejected theodicy, vindication of evil in terms of divine justice. But he did not, in contrast, reject God or idea of Jewish election. How can one affirm God, Israel's election, and ethics after Holocaust? We are driven to ask anew what sense, if any, do religion and morality have if human affairs are divorced from divine justice. Is a God who hides His face, or eclipsed, any different than no God at all? Are we to become like those agnostics whose mendaciousness Nietzsche derides because they now worship question mark itself as God?' If rejection of theodicy leaves those whom God still meaningful with a tremendum, it no more than a clouding of consciousness, an elliptical but false gesture, a brave but empty stubbornness? Levinas answered in negative. After Holocaust, to be sure, he rejected But Levinas meaning of Holocaust precisely end of theodicy. The most revolutionary fact of our twentieth century, Levinas wrote, is that of destruction of all balance between. . . theodicy . . . and forms which suffering and evil take.5 The Holocaust of Jewish people, he continued, paradigm of gratuitous human suffering, where evil appears in all its horror.6 Auschwitz, he wrote, the radical rupture between evil and mercy, between evil and sense.7 But question of evil remains. This most questionable question, older than Job, in fact newly deepened, newly sharpened, radicalized by Holocaust. Levinas did not shirk from asking: What can suffering mean when suffering rendered so obviously (inutile), useless to its core? What can suffering mean when it for nothing, when it heralds and leads only to death and intended only obliteration? Friedrich Nietzsche was also troubled by the meaninglessness of suffering.8 Like Levinas, but of course decades before Holocaust, he too rejected as false and self-deceptive all justifications of suffering as theodicy, example, punishment sin, or a necessary piece of a hidden but divinely ordained whole. But with same stroke, with same hammer blow, Nietzsche rejected all interpretations whatsoever suffering. `Why so hard?' charcoal once said to diamond; `for are we not close relations?' Why so soft? Nietzsche has diamond answer, for are you not-my brothers? …