Definition Of Freedom Research Articles

Definitions of Freedom and Their Student Affairs Application

The author explains the two dominant conceptualizations of freedom—positive and negative—in the history of Western social and political thought, applies them to how public and private colleges interpret and judge student behavior, and offers a model of interpretation that incorporates both definitions more fully into student affairs practice.

Interpersonal Comparisons of Freedom

This paper is about the relevance, to the definition of freedom, of values or goods other than freedom. In this respect,its subject matter is not at all new. However, I do believe that new light can be thrown on the nature of this relationship by paying more attention to another relationship – one which exists within the concept of freedom itself. There are two senses in which we can be said to possess freedom. Firstly, there is the sense in which we can be said to be freeto do a certain particular thing. Secondly,there is the sense in which we can be said to possessa certain ‘amount’,‘degree’ or ‘quantity’ of freedom, in some overall sense.1I believe that most recent accounts of the relationship between freedom and other goods are inconsistent, because they see those other goods as affecting the truth value of claims about freedom in the second sense, but not in the first.

Freedom and civilization: When more is less.

AbstractHuman freedom is seen as a negotiated meaning, constructed in a particular social and historical context, and explicated through personal narrative. Some brief examples of meanings - in - transition are presented, together with more extensive narratives which describe the construction and practice of human freedom in relation to the intricacies of a civilized world. David, a retired journalist, and Fred, a slightly aging hippie, tell their stories of negotiating, experiencing, and practising freedom.The notion of human freedom, however vague, has glowing favourable connotations for most people. It's also true that there are many conceptions of freedom which have been explored and examined by philosophers, politicians, jurists, and novelists for thousands of years. Of course, there is no last word on it. Human freedom has even been exposed to the thumb screws of experimental psychological research without surrendering its ultimate secrets (cf. Westcott, 1988).When I say I am studying human freedom, people almost always say, What do you mean by freedom? In saying this, they tacitly acknowledge that there are many conceptions of freedom, and in my reply, I acknowledge the same. I say, just the point; it's not what I mean by freedom, but what other people, individuals, mean by freedom in their daily lives. That's what I'm interested in and that's what I've been studying, in a progressively evolving fashion, for nearly 20 years.I began with tentative interviews (Westcott, 1977), moved on to more traditional questionnaire studies (Westcott, 1982), and, dissatisfied with aggregate data, I have returned to interviews and a narrative approach (Westcott, 1992). I take an explicit social constructionist perspective on this research, maintaining the position that meaningful, intentional, human social activity is governed by meanings, and meanings are human constructions, negotiated linguistically in a social and historical context (cf. Gergen, 1985). These meanings are embedded in the narratives people tell themselves, and others, making sense of their lives (cf. Bruner, 1990; Polkinghorne, 1988).Human freedom is certainly one such web of negotiated meanings, and this is why freedom means many things to many people, and why the philosophical literature can provide meanings to suit almost every taste (cf. Westcott, 1988, Ch. 1).Most of the philosophical literature is prescriptive: different authors argue for single conceptions or definitions of freedom, and these single conceptions compete. These single conceptions are ordinarily quite abstract and are at a level well above individual concrete behaviour. But freedom in individual lives is practiced and experienced in quite concrete ways by ordinary people who don't generally think very much about it -- except to reflect on some kind of presence or absence, satisfaction or longing.So I have been interviewing a variety of informants on what kind of a role freedom plays in their lives, how they experience freedom, and what they do, if anything, to enhance this much - sought - after state of affairs and experience. I take a narrative approach to the interviews, I try to avoid abstract conceptions or definitions; I discourage treatises. Rather, I seek people's own stories of how and when they experience freedom, or the lack of it, and ultimately seek some commonalities or differences between them.One may argue that this is merely an exercise in sociolinguistics. In response, I can point out that the social constructionist position is that everything is an exercise in sociolinguistics. We are talking about meanings and meanings do not exist anywhere except in a context of human communication.Freedom and InsecurityI'd like to begin with some examples of the notion of negotiating a construction of freedom. I will draw on a few quotations from the popular press, a novel, and an interview. Each of these occurs in the context of a change of the informant's circumstances. …

The Measurement of Pure Negative Freedom

Examining the question of whether or how far freedom is measurable contributes to the analysis of the concept of freedom in two ways. First, it involves attempting to establish criteria for answering questions about ‘how free’ individuals or societies are. Secondly, it helps to show how far different definitions of freedom really conflict, in as much as those definitions are themselves motivated by intuitive extent-of-freedom assessments in the first place. Critics of the ‘pure negative’ conception of freedom (freedom as the absence of purely physical impediments to action) have argued either that freedom is unmeasurable on such a conception, or that such a conception is counterintuitive, because the measurements of freedom implied by it conflict with the intuitive comparisons which we normally make. Closer examinations of the nature of measurement and of the nature of act individuation show both of these criticisms to be ill founded.

Anxiety, Freedom and Democracy

Arousing anxiety is one of the most important instruments of tyranny. Arousing anxiety is a weapon used not only by dictatorial societies, but also by the dictators of the family, school, workplace or organization. The essence of anxiety is the inability to actively control situations perceived as threatening —the experience of this lack of control and the inability to avert the impending threat causes this situation. In the interest of preserving and strengthening their power, the person or group possessing crucial information is able to withdraw the possibility of control, or to portion it out as a reward; in this way anxiety is aroused in those affected. Arousing anxiety is not only an instrument, but can also be the essence of the exercise of power for its own sake. Tyrannical power wishes to ensure full freedom of decision for itself at all times and it therefore does not commit itself, not even in the form of an agreement serving its own interests. This is true for all relationships of dependency in which the more independent partner is able to withhold information, thereby keeping the other partner in a state of “loss of control”. If the plumber does not turn up at the time agreed and does not inform us of this beforehand, if the garage does not repair the car on the grounds of a shortage of spare parts despite the fact that they have parts, we are placed in a state of powerlessness. We encounter various forms of abuse of power and induced anxiety day after day, but do not pay sufficient attention to it, do not recognise it in its essence and do not understand how this slow-acting poison kills. However, we can also arrive at a psychological definition of freedom and democracy through an understanding of the essence of arousing anxiety and of anxiety.

Sex, Freedom & Equality in Rousseau's "Emile"

This article challenges interpretations of Rousseau's Emile that see its program of female education as inconsistent with that of males and with Rousseau's general principles. Using Rousseau's definition of freedom, the author explores how the educations of both sexes aim at creating interdependencies rather than self-sufficiency or slavery and concludes that Emile is not as free, nor Sophie as enslaved, as some have argued. The differences in their educations are seen as appealing to identical understandings of the human condition and development, freedom and dependence, happiness and suffering, and the tasks of politics.

A Realist Foundation for Essentially Contested Political Concepts

BELIEF continues to pervade academic life, at least officially, that reasoned arguments concerning the great political issues can persuade opponents. Unofficially, however, there seems to be a growing sentiment since the Enlightenment that without shared political and social values, specific arguments about democracy, justice, or liberty are bound to end, at best, in a mutual shrugging of shoulders. Each party's specific insights, according to this view, can only be appreciated by those sharing the value-laden conception on which those insights depend. Consider the notion of freedom. Nearly everyone would agree that being bound and gagged in a closet represents a loss of freedom. Paradigmatic examples like these reassure us that discussions of this notion are not empty exercises trading in homophonies. Yet is a worker with relatively few or very unappealing job opportunities truly free? What about the woman who agrees to become a surrogate mother out of economic necessity? Is a citizen politically free who does not vote due to lack of information, apathy, cumbersome registration procedures, or dejection? Apparently, differing answers to these questions reflect not merely different definitions of freedom but different values. We all know how the

How Five (Partly True) Myths Can Help Teachers Teach About the Constitution

During a casual conversation with a student who had taken several of my undergraduate courses in American poli tics, the student asked, to my dismay, which came first, the Declaration of Independence or one. The one she was referring to was, of course, the U.S. Constitution. Most Americans know of the Constitution's existence (and on good days they can even remember its name), but beyond that, not a lot is generally known. As we approach the 200th anniversary of that other document, it's worth think ing again about how we can help our students better understand it. One way to teach about the Constitu tion is to begin with the popular myth ology that has grown up around the docu ment. In referring to these popular beliefs as myths, I do not mean they are totally false; myths have always pointed to at least a partial truth. For example, one would be hard pressed to find an actual wound from Cupid's arrow, and one would not want to rely solely on the myth of Cupid as a guide to love and marriage. But the story of the blind archer may provide a better beginning point for the study of love than more scientifically rigorous approaches. If we assume that myths provide ex planations or answers, we will be disap pointed; but if we can use myths as a beginning point, to provide questions that provoke debate, we may be able to lead students down the road to a deeper understanding of the subject at hand. Below are five myths I've been able to put to good use. Before turning to the Constitution, however, we must first confront the most pervasive myth about American gov ernment: that its foundation is found in the Declaration of Independence. Americans remember the Declaration because it proclaims their independence and freedom and rejects tyrannical gov ernment. Virtually every American, re gardless of party or ideology, accepts this notion that freedom--understood in the terms of rights--is the legitimate end of our government. While the defi nition of freedom may differ from one part of the ideological spectrum to another, the language of freedom and rights remains constant. The Declara tion is popular because it declares our freedom. The problem is: The Declara tion does not establish a government. In fact, the Declaration's emphasis on the abuse of political power reflects a certain suspicion of government. From liberal fears of the military-industrial complex and invasions of the right to privacy to conservative fears of a large national government's interference in the economy and in local politics, there remains, among most Americans, a common distrust of political power. On one level we know that government is necessary to protect our freedom. On another, we fear that government in

Freedom and Utility

The problem of freedom has been a favourite topic of philosophers of all ages, but there appears to be a definite limit beyond which their speculation cannot go. In fact, they have not even reached agreement in respect of a definition of freedom, and it would be impossible to single out any one of them whose views could be called representative. Yet, in a way, Professor Ayer's lucid statement well typifies the scope of the philosopher's field of enquiry, and this is how he formulates his opinion:

On Alleged Inconsistency in Reid's Theory of Moral Liberty

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 453 La Mothe le Vayer, Franqois de. Discours de la Diversit~ d'Humeurs de plusieurs Nations, et particuli&ement des Francois et des Espagnols touchant les affaires du temps present La Perri6re, Guillaume de. The Mirror of Policy Watson, William. A Decacordon of Ten Quodlibetical questions concerning Religion and State: wherein the author framing himself a quilibet to every quodlibet , decides an hundred cross interrogatory doubts, about the general contentions betwixt the seminary priests and Jesuits at this present Columbia University JAMES JAY HAMILTON ON AN ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY IN REID'S THEORY OF MORAL LIBERTY In a valuable essay in this journal, Jerome Weinstock argues that one of the most important insights in Thomas Reid's writing on active power and free will is his attempt to provide some coherent basis for the notion of having power over the determinations of one's will. ~An important part of this basis, according to Weinstock , is that Reid related this power to having a competent reasoning ability or faculty of judgment. But the exact nature of the relationship remains obscure in Reid's hands, Weinstock claims. He asks, "Is ... Reid's view that this power implies our having rational capacities, is simultaneous or coextensive with it, or synonymous with it? ''2 Weinstock argues that some of Reid's pronouncements on this issue only obscure the matter. What obscures the matter most, according to Weinstock, is that Reid is inconsistent about the relation of having power over the determinations of one's will and having rational capacities. I argue that a careful reading of Reid's argument shows that he is not guilty of the inconsistency Weinstock alleges, and I answer Weinstock's question about whether it is Reid's view that having power over the determinations of one's will implies, is coextensive with, or is synonymous with, having rational capacities. Weinstock expresses the inconsistency he finds in Reid as follows: "Although Reid first tells us that power over one's will implies judgment and reason, very shortly afterwards he tells us that it is at least conceivable that this power may be possessed by a being who has no reasoning abilities at all! ''3 The inconsistency Weinstock alleges is between the following principles: (a) Power over one's will implies judgment or reason. (b) "We may, perhaps, be able to conceive a being endowed with power over the determinations of his will, without any light in his mind to direct that power to some end.'" There is no doubt that if Reid accepts (a) and (b), he is guilty of an inconsistency. "Reid's Definition of Freedom," Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (July 1975):335-45. 2Ibid., p. 338. Ibid., p. 339. ' Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man in The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. Sir William Hamilton, 6th ed., 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Maclachan and Stewart, 1863), 2:600. 454 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY In fact, however, Reid never asserts (a) and would not accept it. According to Reid, we do not know whether (a) is true: "What connection there may be, in the nature of things, between reason and active power, we know not. But we see evidently that, as reason without active power can do nothing, so active power without reason has no guide to direct it to any end. These two conjoined make moral liberty .... "~ Reid argues that an agent cannot be said to have active power to produce an effect unless all the means necessary to its production are in his power. 6 Since Reid takes power over the determinations of the will to be a necessary means, 7 it follows that an agent's having active power to bring about an effect implies that he has power over the determinations of the will necessary to produce that effect. Thus, if we do not know what connection there may be, in the nature of things, between reason and active power, neither do we know what connection there may be between reason and power over the determinations of the will. Because of this, Reid would not have accepted (a)-not because he believed it to be false, but because it is not known...

Toward a Sociology of Freedom

Few sociologists have investigated, systematically and empirically, the concept of freedom, as such. this paper, freedom is explored as it is viewed and experienced by people rather than as a philosophical construct. Three dimensions of freedom are identified: ego, discipline, and conditional. These types of freedom are examined in six types of groups and in relation to feelings of loss of freedom. Finally, we approach a theory of freedom, its dimensions, and the manner in which it is experienced by actors. Freedom is a topic more often studied in fields other than sociology (see Dewey and Gould). A search of various sociological journals yields no more than a handful of references pertinent to this topic (for example, Biesanz; DeGre; Gordon and Marquis; Hillery, b; Horowitz, a). The very fact that some have ventured to write in this area is at least partial evidence that the topic has sociological relevance. And yet, with few exceptions there is no attempt by sociologists to provide empirical measures of freedom as such. The approach most often taken is a logical one rather than an effort to link theory with data-especially data on social structure. Where data are used, there is either no measure of freedom (as in Gordon and Marquis), or freedom is only a minor facet of a larger study (as in Neal and Rettig). A survey of thirty definitions of freedom by sociologists and anthropologists (T. Thompson) reveals that slightly less than half (13) define freedom in terms of social structure, whereas more than half (17) emphasize subjective factors. In general, definitions with an emphasis on social structure do so in reference to ongoing systems. Marx and Comte are notable exceptions. These authors, being evolutionists, see human freedom manifesting itself through mutual cooperation, especially in giving benefit to some social structure in the future (T. Thompson, 5). Others tend to focus on objective restraints placed on groups or individuals (Horowitz, b; Lipset; Mills; Parsons). Finally, still others see society, especially industrial society, as freeing the individual through anonymity and the burden of constant choice (Berger; Nisbet; Simmel, in Wolff). Even authors who emphasize subjectivity do not normally exclude social factors. Groups or individuals must still reckon with power structures and other *We wish to thank Michael K. Miller for valuable suggestions and criticisms of the manuscript and Thomas P. Thompson for useful comments. We alone, however, assume full responsibility for the way in which this advice has been used.

Freedom as the Non-Restriction of Options

In a recent article ('Being Free to Act, and Being a Free Man', Mind, April I97I) S. I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein argue that the negative coIception of freedom as absence of impediments-a conception I will henceforth refer to as ncfl-is inadequate for the following reason. Consider the cases of three men: the first-call him ml-decides against a given course of action to avoid threatened penalties; the second, M2, does the only thing the law permits him to do, but it is something he would have done anyway; the third man, M3, is prevented from purchasing eggs because he has not any money. According to ncfl, ml and M3, having been impeded, must be considered unfree, while M2, who is not impeded, must be considered free. But it is odd to say that m3 is unfree: after all, the option of having free eggs was never open to him in the first place. And it is also odd to call m2 free: the option of disobeying the law was not available to him, hence one can quite properly say that he really had no choice but to do as the law required. Benn and Weinstein reject ncf1 precisely because it leads us to talk in such peculiar ways. The cases of ml-m3 suggest a better definition of freedom: nonrestriction of available alternatives or options. According to it, any infringement upon an agent's range of choice constitutes as interference with his freedom (p. 200). In Benn's and Weinstein's words, 'to abridge the possibility of choice is to abridge freedom' (p. 205). This definition enables us to say that ml is unfree to act, not because the threatened penalties impede him, but because they restrict his available options. It also enables us to say of m2 that he is not free, because the law in question does limit otherwise available alternatives-it makes no difference whether he would have chosen them or not. Finally, this definition enables us to avoid calling m3 unfree: charging a price for eggs, though it prevents m3 from obtaining them, does not close any option that, given the property laws of contemporary England, would otherwise be open. Benn and Weinstein proceed to apply their definition of freedom to a variety of examples. The person who cannot attend the opera because his car breaks down is unfree to attend (p. I96); the mountain climber whose ropes are stolen should be called unfree to climb (p. 204); the conscientious objector whose appeal is denied must be considered unfree to refuse service to his country (p. 207); the man whose government arranges that there are no obscene books for him to read is unfree to read them (p. 204). Each of these cases involves a restriction on an agent's range of available options; therefore, according to Benn and Weinstein, it is perfectly appropriate, indeed necessary, to describe each as an infringement on freedom. I agree, with Benn and Weinstein, that ncfi is inadequate, but not for

Toward a Definition of Freedom in Dress

Much clothing research examines conformity in dress as if the antithesis, freedom in dress, were possible. While conforming behavior has been documented, no research on social interaction has shown that a continuum occurs from conformity through varying degrees of conformity ‐freedom to complete freedom in dress; before freedom in dress can be measured it must first be defined.When definitions of freedom from various disciplines are applied to dress, it is difficult to derive testable hypotheses from the resulting concepts. All concepts of freedom state that freedom is relative, that it involves some degree of individual control over choice or the decisionmaking process, plus a feeling of self‐satisfaction or reward. It is in the area of satisfaction, involving a nebulous state of mind, that testing becomes truly difficult. For purposes of research, three hypotheses concerning freedom in dress are presented.

The Definition of Freedom

The space which appeared above the mercury column in Torricelli's tube proved embarrassing to seventeenth-century physicists. Pascal's experiments with it enabled him, not only to invent the altimeter and barometer and to weigh the earth's atmosphere, but also opened a way for Newton's new view of force, making possible modern physics and astronomy. A representative of the traditional school, Descartes's tutor, Father Etienne Nod of the Jesuit College of La Fleche, believed there must be an invisible substance in the top of the tube to hold the mercury up. The contrary notion of a vacuum, of a something which was nothing, he considered absurd, heretical, and unscientific. Wrote Noel:

Valuing Freedom

To have meaningful discussion of freedom requires an agreed definition of freedom in non-valuational terms. A number of hypotheses concerning interpersonal freedom are developed, most of which can be tested empirically using psychological, political or historical evidence. All may be considered rules of choices - "rules stipulating conditions under which it is rational for anyone to assign positive (or negative) value to some particular freedom relationship."

J. S. Mill and the Definition of Freedom

Previous articleNext article No AccessJ. S. Mill and the Definition of FreedomJames P. ScanlanJames P. Scanlan Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 68, Number 3Apr., 1958 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/291169 Views: 266Total views on this site Citations: 3Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1958 University of ChicagoPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Alain Anquetil The Social Liberalism of John Stuart Mill, (Aug 2019): 19–40.https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-23824-7_2Thomas Nys The Tacit Concept of Competence in J. S. Mill's On Liberty, South African Journal of Philosophy 25, no.44 (May 2019): 305–328.https://doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2006.12063059James P. Scanlan Nikolaj ?erny?evskij and Soviet philosophy, Studies in Soviet Thought 7, no.11 (Mar 1967): 1–27.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00832188

International Labor Organization

The 137th session of the Governing Body of the International Labor Organization (ILO) was held in Geneva from October 29 to November 1, 1957, under the chairmanship of E. Calderon Puig. The Governing Body devoted three sittings to the consideration of matters concerning freedom of association, in connection with which it received from the Director-General a report on the establishment of machinery to determine the facts relating to freedom of association in ILO member states. The report contained proposals to strengthen ILO methods of promoting respect for freedom of association under regular constitutional machinery through factual inquiries and the establishment of independent machinery for the adjustment of disputes. Several members of the Governing Body felt that prior to forming the proposed body the definition of freedom of association would require clarification, while others felt that the tripartite principle should be introduced into the suggested independent commission or that a body representing the Governing Body should be installed between the commission and the Governing Body.

Freedom and Authority in Our Time ed. by Bryson, Finkelstein, Maciver and McKeon, Christian Liberty by David A. O’Connell, O. P.

BOOK REVIEWS Freedom and Authority in Our Time. Edited by BRYSON, FINKELSTEIN, MACIVER and McKEON. New York: Harper, 1953. Pp. 767 with index. $6.00. Christian Liberty. By DAVID A. O'CoNNELL, 0. P. Westminster: Newman, 1959?. Pp. 142. $3.00. One infallible sign of the deepening of the moral crisis in our time is the fact that the headlines in the daily papers can be explained only by recourse to the most profound intellectual and moral principles, so that the ordinary citizen must turn to the philosophers and theologians before he can even digest the day's news. The problems of censorship, public accusation, international conspiracy, the protection and the abuse of the Fifth Amendment, academic freedom, the legitimacy of World Government, the principles governing our dealings with Soviet Russia, repatriation, the revolt of subject peoples--ali of these are moral issues. All of them, moreover, touch upon the problem of human freedom or, more accurately, upon the complex problem of freedom and authority. Two recent publications indicate that thinking men within the Church and without have accepted the responsibility of considering the problem of freedom and authority in the manysided context of private and public life. Freedom and Authority in Our Time is a collection of papers presented and discussed at the twelfth conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion held in New York in Sepiember HJ5l. Christian Liberty, by David A. O'Connell 0. P., is the latest work in the series entitled Thomistic Studies, edited by the faculty of the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D. C. The papers presented in the Freedom and Authority symposium are grouped under diverse sectional headings ranging from the more practical discussions on Freedom and Authority in Practical Life, Freedom and Governmental Authority, Freedom and Legal Authority, Freedom and Authority as a Cultural and Social Phenomenon, to a final investigation of the ontology of freedom in Postulates of Theories of Freedom and Authority and Definitions of Freedom and Authority. Within the generic scope of these sections room is left for a dissection of the freedom: authority dichotomy in relation to Labor Unions, Psychiatry, Social Security, International Relations and World Law, Ethics, Politics, Constitutional Law, Citizenship, Human Rights, the Structure of Cultures, the 565 566 BOOK REVIEWS Interpretation of Science, the Poetic imagination, the Arts, the Pathology of Persecution, Education and Intellectual Development. The task of summarizing the valuable insights contained in this symposium is rendered more diificult by the diversity of subject matter and the diversity of viewpoint. Yet one can discern recurrent leitmotifs which appear again and again throughout the essays, whatever be the subject matter, whatever the intellectual predispositions of the particular author. There is first of all the Authority vs. Freedom school, those who imply that freedom and authority are contraries, a position which is at least suggested by the very title of the symposium. Thus Ernest J. Simmons writes: " Our notion of democracy is based on the rights of the individual against both Church and State." (p. 154) Professor Cohen begins his discussion on the relation of law to freedom and authority with a typical formulation of the antinomy: "H law is a form of authority; if authority implies coercion, and coercion restraint; if the essence of freedom is the absence of restraint-it is obvious that, implicit in any discussion of law, is the problem of freedom." (p. 217) " This brings us to the fact that to a greater or lesser degree authority conflicts with freedom...." (Dorsey, p. 322) This we may call the extreme position and its specific danger is that those who accept it may easily become devotees of one of those "polar 1 ideas " to the detriment of the other. Invariably they gravitate towards the affirmation of a freedom which subordinates authority. This extremt> position tends, therefore, to create another position which may be classified as the Authority for Freedom school. This distinctive resolution receives a theological coloring in Nels Ferre's essay on authority and freedom: " Our thesis is that absolute authority inheres only in the will of God. . . . The will of God ... is always for the fullest possible measure of practicable freedom, and is finally for the perfect freedom of...

Government

During the past decade the functions of our national government have expanded tremendously. There has been a development of the administrative state, a political response to the economic problems of a technological civilization. A new understanding of the divisions of national and state powers has been reached by the federal entry into numerous fields once thought the exclusive domain of the states. There have been important changes in the judiciary. Relatively small changes have occurred in Congress. The most striking change in the actions of this body is the practice of delegation. The executive branch of government has been consolidated into a more unified and more responsive instrument of the popular will. This has been accompanied by an increase in the participation of the electorate in national elections. The basic problem of modern democracy may be thought of as the new definition of freedom. The changes in government in the last ten years would seem to indicate that although the decade has seen a good deal of economic regulation, personal liberties have been protected and advanced.