On Alleged Inconsistency in Reid's Theory of Moral Liberty

Abstract

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 453 La Mothe le Vayer, Franqois de. Discours de la Diversit~ d'Humeurs de plusieurs Nations, et particuli&ement des Francois et des Espagnols touchant les affaires du temps present La Perri6re, Guillaume de. The Mirror of Policy Watson, William. A Decacordon of Ten Quodlibetical questions concerning Religion and State: wherein the author framing himself a quilibet to every quodlibet , decides an hundred cross interrogatory doubts, about the general contentions betwixt the seminary priests and Jesuits at this present Columbia University JAMES JAY HAMILTON ON AN ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY IN REID'S THEORY OF MORAL LIBERTY In a valuable essay in this journal, Jerome Weinstock argues that one of the most important insights in Thomas Reid's writing on active power and free will is his attempt to provide some coherent basis for the notion of having power over the determinations of one's will. ~An important part of this basis, according to Weinstock , is that Reid related this power to having a competent reasoning ability or faculty of judgment. But the exact nature of the relationship remains obscure in Reid's hands, Weinstock claims. He asks, "Is ... Reid's view that this power implies our having rational capacities, is simultaneous or coextensive with it, or synonymous with it? ''2 Weinstock argues that some of Reid's pronouncements on this issue only obscure the matter. What obscures the matter most, according to Weinstock, is that Reid is inconsistent about the relation of having power over the determinations of one's will and having rational capacities. I argue that a careful reading of Reid's argument shows that he is not guilty of the inconsistency Weinstock alleges, and I answer Weinstock's question about whether it is Reid's view that having power over the determinations of one's will implies, is coextensive with, or is synonymous with, having rational capacities. Weinstock expresses the inconsistency he finds in Reid as follows: "Although Reid first tells us that power over one's will implies judgment and reason, very shortly afterwards he tells us that it is at least conceivable that this power may be possessed by a being who has no reasoning abilities at all! ''3 The inconsistency Weinstock alleges is between the following principles: (a) Power over one's will implies judgment or reason. (b) "We may, perhaps, be able to conceive a being endowed with power over the determinations of his will, without any light in his mind to direct that power to some end.'" There is no doubt that if Reid accepts (a) and (b), he is guilty of an inconsistency. "Reid's Definition of Freedom," Journal of the History of Philosophy 13 (July 1975):335-45. 2Ibid., p. 338. Ibid., p. 339. ' Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man in The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. Sir William Hamilton, 6th ed., 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Maclachan and Stewart, 1863), 2:600. 454 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY In fact, however, Reid never asserts (a) and would not accept it. According to Reid, we do not know whether (a) is true: "What connection there may be, in the nature of things, between reason and active power, we know not. But we see evidently that, as reason without active power can do nothing, so active power without reason has no guide to direct it to any end. These two conjoined make moral liberty .... "~ Reid argues that an agent cannot be said to have active power to produce an effect unless all the means necessary to its production are in his power. 6 Since Reid takes power over the determinations of the will to be a necessary means, 7 it follows that an agent's having active power to bring about an effect implies that he has power over the determinations of the will necessary to produce that effect. Thus, if we do not know what connection there may be, in the nature of things, between reason and active power, neither do we know what connection there may be between reason and power over the determinations of the will. Because of this, Reid would not have accepted (a)-not because he believed it to be false, but because it is not known...