Defense Issues Research Articles

Canada and NATO

LORD ISMAY, CANADIAN-STYLELord Ismay, NATO's first secretary general, famously summed up the purposes of the Atlantic alliance as keeping the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. Behind this legendary bon mot was a stern reality that encapsulated NATO's grand strategic rationale. It was first and foremost about security. Security meant holding the Soviet Union militarily and politically at bay so that behind the shield afforded by American power, western Europe, with West Germany firmly entrenched a liberaldemocratic market-economic community, could recover, flourish, and never threaten anyone again. And so NATO did all three things, making it one of the most successful alliances history.Canadian diplomats and politicians who heard Ismay's formulation no doubt agreed with it. Canada had a fundamental interest European security. During the 20th century, Canada saw as vital to its interests the prevention of any single power from dominating Europe - first Germany, against which Canada went to war twice, and then the Soviet Union. Today, Canada has a fundamental interest defeating Islamist terror. To this end, Canada is playing a leading role NATO's efforts Afghanistan.Canada was a founding member of the alliance and, at the time of its establishment, deeply committed to it. At the Department of External Affairs, Escott Reid, who as assistant undersecretary of state for external affairs was heavily involved the negotiations leading up to the North Atlantic Treaty, noted, [t]his link across the North Atlantic seems to me to be such a providential solution to so many of our problems that I feel we should go to great length and even incur considerable risk order to consolidate our good fortune and ensure our proper place this new partnership.1 From such a superheated level, Canadian enthusiasm for NATO could only cool subsequent years. Indeed, Canada sometimes struggled with being entangled with nuclear weapons the service of the west's collective defence, doubted whether any direct Canadian military contribution to European defence made sense, and even worried that participation NATO was overwhelming its foreign and defence policies. Yet no Canadian government ever gave any serious consideration to leaving the alliance entirely favour of neutrality.NATO provided Canada, addition to security, with a trio of useful extra services. First, involvement the alliance meant that Ottawa was in. It had a seat at the most important allied table the world. Second, because of the very character of the alliance, with its wide membership, its political acceptance of any level of contribution on the part of those members, and its reliance on nuclear deterrence, Ottawa was able to keep its defence costs down for most, albeit not all, of the history of NATO. Finally, NATO allowed Canada's leaders to keep out criticism of its defence policy from multiple quarters. Governments were largely insulated against charges from the left that Canada had simply become a partner to behemoth or powder monkey to the United States, and from the right that it was not doing enough for collective defence.Canadians, it is fair to say, have obsessed for nearly 60 years over being in has meant and how much it has paid off. While Ottawa emphasized the influence it had allied quarters as NATO struggled with the great issues of defence, deterrence, peace, and security, Europe and now Afghanistan, Canadian scholars and journalists debated endlessly over exactly how influential it really was. It would have been far better simply to have settled upon a conclusion Peyton Lyon reached 1963 that what can scarcely be questioned is that Canada has gained more influence over western defence and foreign policies by being inside NORAD and NATO than if she remained on the outside.2 But even Lyon could not do so, going on later years to administer surveys to international decision-makers that seemed to indicate that Canada had more influence than Italy. …

The European Rapid Reaction Force: Implications for Democratic Accountability

This study aims to provide an overview of democratic accountability aspects of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), taking into account that the development of an operational European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the further fine tuning of the ERRF are part of a dynamic process. In this context, this study examines aspects of the ERRF where a growing gap in democratic accountability is identified and recommends measures of bridging this gap. Given that the ERRF is still at its initial stages and has not been officially utilized in any international crisis, the author borrows a narrow definition of democratic accountability developed by Robert Behn. According to this definition, a governing body is accountable when it explains and justifies its specific actions or inactions. In this framework, the author addresses the questions of how the European Union (EU) acts; what it has set to accomplish on issues relating to the ERRF; and, who it answers to.Accordingly, this study looks at the divergent and vague definitions of the Petersberg Tasks that have prevailed among the EU member states as well as within the European Union. The paper concentrates primarily on the role of France and the UK, the leading states in ESDP issues, without which an EU military operation could not take place. It proposes prescribing precise limits to the Petersberg Tasks, both in terms of geographical reach and the intensity of the operations. Another aspect of democratic accountability of the ERRF is assessing EU decision-making processes and coordination mechanisms. In this context, we address such questions as, how do the European Parliament (EP), European Commission and Council of the European Union work together on defense issues? What are relations like between the EP and the newly (trans)formed Interim European Security and Defense Assembly? More importantly, how do EU citizens feel about efforts at militarizing the EU? The last section explores the transparency of the ERRF from an international perspective. It therefore assesses EU-NATO relations; considers the possibility of creating an autonomous EU planning apparatus; looks at relations between the EU and non-EU 'partners'; deals with American concerns regarding EU military capabilities; and, addresses the relevance of a UN mandate in EU military operations.

'Everybody has a Chance': Nuclear Angst, Civil Defence, and the History of Emotions in Postwar West Germany

This essay employs the issue of West German civil defence as a vehicle to write the history of postwar fear and anxiety. Drawing on more recent theoretical efforts at conceptualizing a history of emotions, the essay first outlines the contours of a postwar ‘emotional regime’ that tended to pathologize fear and anxiety. Against the general background of West Germany's position in the Cold War, the essay highlights the limitations and inherent contradictions of West Germany's civil defence preparations from the late 1940s onward. It then focuses on the planning, production, and reception of the first government-sponsored civil defence brochure, “Everybody Has a Chance”, that had been in the making since 1957 but was not distributed until the autumn of 1961, shortly after the building of the Berlin Wall. Yet rather than containing popular fears, the publication directed attention to the shortcomings of West German civil defence and thus ended up intensifying nuclear angst. In particular, selective memories of German suffering in World War II shaped largely negative popular responses to the government's civil defence campaign. By the mid-1960s, however, this popular opposition to civil defence—as well as nuclear angst in general—began to decline gradually. The essay concludes by providing a multifaceted explanation for this subtle emotional shift. Emotional change needs to be explained with reference to a variety of factors, including changing domestic and international contexts, the emergence of a new commemorative culture, and shifts within the emotional regime itself.

Do nematocysts sequestered by aeolid nudibranchs deter predators? - a background to the debate

The paper by Aguado & Marin (2007) and the critique by Penney (2009) illustrate a common problem in modern science: it is exceedingly difficult to keep up with the enormous and rapidly expanding literature over a very wide field. It is hard enough to become knowledgeable on the enormous literature in one area (molluscan defences), but when one has also to keep up with the literature in another area (the functioning of nematocysts in coelenterates), it becomes ever more difficult, even with the advantages of the Internet. The carefully designed experiments of Aguado & Marin (2007) have a flaw to which Penney (2009) has drawn attention: the responses of predators to nematocyst preparations may actually be responses to noxious chemicals rather than to the physical properties of the nematocysts themselves. However, the issue of chemical versus nematocyst defence in aeolids is not new, but was first raised 100 years ago by

The Defense of Superior Orders in International Law: Some Implications for the Codification of International Criminal Law

AbstractThe defense of obedience to superior orders has been one of the most controversial issues in international criminal law. Although the Nuremberg Trials put forth the “Nuremberg Principle” on the superior orders defense, the principle has remained unclear on the so-called moral choice test. Basically, the situation has not been changed throughout the subsequent international rule-making process. International society has apparently rejected automatic immunity by the superior orders defense; however, a consensus has not been achieved on the question of conditional immunity, particularly on the grounds of coercion. In tackling these remaining problems, it would be advisable to examine the legal and theoretical characteristics of each component of the relevant discussion. It would also be desirable to consider some essential difficulties incidental to international rule-making. This article, in conclusion, draws attention to the possibility of certain self-constraint with regard to international law, leaving the issue of the coercion defense to the respective national legal system.

NATO DEFENSE EXPENDITURES: COMMON GOALS OR DIVERGING INTERESTS? A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

By testing for structural breaks in defense expenditures, the dates of change in the pattern of defense expenditures for the NATO allies are determined. If NATO members are responding to a common threat, the breaks should be similar, in both direction and dates, for defense expenditures. The breaks should occur during major NATO strategy shifts. The results of the structural analysis tests suggest that NATO allies do not have an integrated response to NATO‐specific defense issues. It appears that NATO members, in general, adjusted their defense spending according to economic imperatives, political issues, and ally‐specific defense agendas.

Canada, Strategic Defence, and Strategic Stability

Canada has contributed to North American strategic defence, and been an ar- dent proponent of strategic stability, since the early Cold War. Though seem- ingly compatible, Canada's involvement in continental strategic defence and advocacy of strategic stability has been nagged by an underlying contradiction. As part of its contribution to the strategic defence of the continent, Canada has tacitly endorsed and facilitated the United States' offensively oriented nuclear strategies. Canada's support of strategic stability, however, has aimed to dis- courage offensive nuclear doctrines and the arms races they have tended to fuel. Given this contradiction, Ottawa might have decided to harmonize its policies, either by abandoning strategic defence roles that have supported of- fensive American nuclear doctrines, or by ceasing to be an advocate of strate- gic stability and strategie arms control. But this has not been the path chosen by successive Canadian government since the mid-1960s. Instead, Canadian governments have opted to accept the contradiction and pursue a two-track approach: for more than four decades, Canada has contributed to continental strategic defences that have aided offensively oriented nuclear strategies, while simultaneously vaunting the value of strategic stability and strategic arms control.Following this two-track approach has served Canadian governments well. It allowed Ottawa to protect Canada and Canadians by emphasizing the futility of nuclear war and arms races. Yet it further permitted the Canadian military to assist the United States in defending North America and in maintaining a credible nuclear weapons posture, one capable of prevailing over common adversaries during a conflict. Since each of these policies and outcomes served the Canadian national interest, Ottawa was determined to avoid developments that exposed the contradictory nature of the two tracks, or that pushed Canada to choose between its commitment to strategic defence and its advocacy of strategic stability. Canadian governments have managed to conceal this contradiction and avoid making such a choice for most of the past four decades. However, there has been one technological development, ballistic missile defence, that has routinely threatened to expose the contradiction and force Ottawa to give precedence to strategic defence over strategic stability, or vice versa. Nonetheless, in spite of the pressure exerted by BMD, Canadian governments preserved the two- track approach; the missile defence issue has not compelled Ottawa to downgrade either its existing commitments to strategic defence or its support of strategic stability and arms control. A question that remains is whether future Canadian governments will be able to preserve this dual approach when the missile defence issue arises again, which is likely to happen within the next few years.This article examines the history and future of Canada's involvement in the strategic defence of North America and advocacy of strategic stability. It begins with an overview of Canada's strategic defence and stability policies during the Cold War and post- Cold War eras, with a particular focus on the politics surrounding Canadian participation in BMD. Next, it analyzes how the government's decision to decline a formal role in BMD in 2005 represented a reapplication of the two-track approach. It concludes with a discussion of the strategic defence and stability options a future Canadian government is likely to face.BALANCING STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STABILITY, 1945-2000Canada's involvement with the strategic defence of North America began in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Convinced that the Soviet Union would soon develop atomic weapons and long-range bombers capable of striking North America, Canada and the United States began planning a joint air defence of the continent in 1946. This planning accelerated in 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated an atomic device and fielded its first intercontinental bomber. …

Life with Hoyt: Avoiding Misrepresentation Claims in Negotiating Settlement Agreements

In 2007, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Hoyt Properties, Inc. v. Production Resource Group, L.L.C. (Hoyt II), holding that factual statements made by attorneys in settlement negotiations are actionable if reasonably relied on by their clients' adversaries. Some in the legal community fear this holding puts undue constraints on settlement negotiations, while creating potential liability for an attorney's representation to their client's adversary. This article addresses these fears. Hoyt is about merely telling the truth and carefully drafting settlement agreements. Part II examines the factual background and procedural history of Hoyt and presents a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis. Part III introduces the basic contractual nature of settlement agreements, covering issues of capacity, authority, formation, defense, fraud and misrepresentation, and the requirement of a writing. Part IV examines the duties owed by attorneys to their clients' adversaries, emphasizing the difference between affirmative representations and non-disclosures. Finally, Part V presents a solution to those fearful of Hoyt - careful drafting of settlement agreements. Use of integration and representation clauses should reduce the risk that extra-contractual statements, like those at issue in Hoyt, will survive to form the basis for a rescission of a settlement agreement. Thus, although some in the legal community fear negative repercussions from Hoyt, in reality, it does not announce any fundamental change to the law. Rather, Hoyt simply underscores the need for well-considered statements in settlement negotiations and careful drafting of settlement agreements.

Indo-US Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: Rhetoric Versus Substance

Following the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland, India and Pakistan emerged as important states in the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The gathering momentum in the Indo-US relations during the Clinton Presidency underwent a dramatic transformation. Although increased cooperation in defence issues is understood to have ‘led’ the India–US relationship to its current level, it has not culminated in enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation. This perceived lack of cooperation can be located within the perceptual differences on key security issues. This paper seeks to examine whether the upswing in Indo-US relations and claims of heightened cooperation, has led to a commensurate level of counter-terrorism cooperation between both countries.

The Myth of the Pacific Society: Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture

Introduction One of most enshrined notions in Canadian foreign policy is that French-speaking Quebecois have a different attitude toward many issues than other Canadians, resulting in a national division that has come to be known as 'the two solitudes. This attitudinal difference is said to be particularly striking on defense and security policy issues. Historian J. L. Granatstein calls phenomenon the (2)--a phenomenon labeled by Jean-Sebastien Rioux as wisdom. According to this view, Rioux claims, English and French-Canadians hold differing views on security and defence issues, with French-Canadians being more dovish, isolationist, and antimilitaristic than their Anglo counterparts. This world-view allegedly causes Quebecers to oppose increases in defence spending; to be against military interventions overseas; and to favour using Canadian Forces (CF) only in humanitarian or peacekeeping roles. (3) In short, Quebecois are more pacifist, isolationist, and/or antimilitarist than their compatriots. Two sets of evidence are generally used in literature to support that claim. The first is a list of historical events, usually centered on two world wars, that are used to describe defiance and hostility of French-Canadians toward military institutions and their reluctance to serve in armed forces. The second is public opinion polls that allegedly show, one after other, a considerable difference between two linguistic groups (or, more precisely, between Quebec and other Canadian provinces). Quite aside from any political instrumentalization that one can make of such claims (from outright accusations that Quebecois are cowards and anti-Canadian, to a proclamation of distinctiveness of Quebec's society), this difference in attitude is believed to be quite important in Canada's foreign policy decision-making. According to J. L. Granatstein, Quebecois are given a disproportionate influence in this process and are thus deforming Canada's foreign policy. This phenomenon is supposed to be at work in such recent events as decision of Chretien government not to participate in coalition of willing against Iraq in March 2003 and Paul Martin's failure to support U.S. program on missile defense. (4) The thesis that Quebec's stance affects Canada's foreign policy is part of given that it perceives opposition to two above-named U.S. initiatives as an extension of Quebec's hostility either to creation of a Canadian Navy at beginning of 20th century or to conscription measures during two world wars. In this article we will offer a different interpretation of nature of Quebecois views on military issues and question whether historical record supports idea that Quebecois are, in fact, pacifists. In other words, is it true that Quebecois are generally more distrustful or critical than other Canadians toward use of armed forces as an instrument of national and international problem-solving? Has this attitude changed over time? Is conventional wisdom regarding Quebec still accurate to describe that province's contemporary public opinion? Is critical stance observed in 2003-2004 surrounding Iraq issue same as one observed in 1910, 1917, or 1942? We will try to show that neither of two main sets of data used to support claim of pacifist thesis is as convincing as it seems. If French-Canadians could be labeled as antimilitarist or isolationist (but certainly not pacifist) until mid-20th century, things have changed since then. In fact, we argue that French-Canadians have expressed an internationalist attitude toward defense and security matters. One of key problems in qualification of a society's attitude lies in definition of concepts. Such notions as pacifism,(5) antiwar, (6) antimilitarism, (7) anti-imperialism,(7) isolationism, (8) and neutralism (9) are generally left undefined and vague by authors. …

DEFENCE ECONOMICS: PERSPECTIVES FROM TURKEY. INTRODUCTION*

This special issue of Defence and Peace Economics (DPE), entitled ‘Defence Economics: Perspectives From Turkey’ is a collection of five papers presented at the Third Annual International Conference...

Managing Defense Transformation in Small and Medium-Sized NATO Countries

Defense transformation in small and medium-sized countries has a dialectical aspect. On one hand, it is a general process that has arisen as a result of the effect of the forces of globalization on domestic security and defense issues. As such, it is identical for all countries, having the same features. On the other hand, as a critical organizational process, defense transformation represents a unique response by each nation’s defense institutions, a response that is crafted in order to cope with challenges coming from both internal and external sources. This paper will analyze the challenging dimensions of defense transformation from the perspective of the binomial relationship of willingness and affordability, and will compare the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches. It is obvious that the complexity of the defense transformation process comes from the many questions it raises and requirements it poses, which each country must solve for its own specific context.

Passing-On Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages Against the Violations of Competition Law: What Can the EC Learn from the US?

This paper analyses the raison d'etre of the current initiative for the federal policy change in the US regarding the issues of passing-on defense and indirect purchaser standing in order to draw policy lessons for the EC in the light of the Commission's Green Paper on private enforcement of Community competition law. The paper finds that transatlantic policy learning in the substantive sense does not seem plausible due to the dramatic difference between the American rationale regarding the goals of private enforcement and the European doctrine of direct effect. Nevertheless, the paper argues that the US experience contains important policy lessons regarding the risks brought forward by private enforcement under diverse standards in the lack of effective judicial cooperation mechanisms in a multi-level polity. After analysing the current positions of the Community and national laws from this perspective, the Paper finds that there is substantial room for diversity amongst the national standards. In addition, although existing Community measures provide solid ground for judicial cooperation, those measures should be strengthened in order to avert the litigation chaos which forced a policy change in the US. Consequently, the Paper suggests that the Commission gives substantial weight to the procedural aspects of private enforcement in its forthcoming White Paper which the Green Paper largely overlooked.

Entrapped on the Web? Applying the Entrapment Defense to Cases Involving Online Sting Operations

Many law enforcement agencies are currently responding to the problem of online crime by establishing proactive investigative units that track criminals on the Internet. Not only do these specialized teams face problems in the area of emerging technology, they are also faced with handling emerging legal issues. The current research examined the issue of the entrapment defense, and how previously established physical realm doctrine could be applied to the investigation of online crimes such as child pornography. Relying on previous case law it would appear that entrapment claims related to online sting operations involve consideration of: a) did the law enforcement officer continuously contact the suspect with the intention of trying to convince the individual to engage in a particular type of behavior, b) how long was the relationship between the undercover officer and the suspect, and c) how much, if any, reluctance to commit the criminal act did the suspect provide evidence of?

Playing with fire: the looming war with China over Taiwan

Introduction The 1996 Missile Crisis Prelude to the Missile Crisis The Tiananmen Massacre The U.S. Sells F-16 Fighter Planes to Taipei President Lee Visits His Alma Mater America's China Threat Debate China's America Threat Debate After the Crisis Taiwan's 1996 Election President Clinton Visits China The Taiwan Relations Act is Refurbished The Missile Defense Issue The Present Standoff President Lee Comments That Taipei-Beijing Talks Should be Nation-to-Nation Taiwan's 2000 Election Taiwan's 2004 Election Conclusions The Future of U.S. China/Taiwan Policy

Attention Deficits: Why Politicians Ignore Defense Policy in Latin America

Interest in defense issues among Latin American politicians has faded with the advent of widespread democratization in the region and the retreat of the armed forces to their barracks. Defense policy is rarely subject to the same level of public scrutiny and debate as other major policy issues faced by the region, such as health, education, and public safety. This is puzzling because by ignoring defense policy, civilian leaders in the region risk ceding authority to their militaries, allowing them a degree of self-management and undermining the consolidation of democratic civilian control of the armed forces. This article explains civilian politicians' inattention to defense as a function of three factors: a historical path that has produced armed forces with limited capabilities that are more often a threat to their own governments than their neighbors; a relatively benign international threat environment in Latin America that makes neglect of defense policy a low-risk proposition; and the low importance that voters assign to the provision of the national defense as either a public or a private good. Under these circumstances, it is rational for most civilian politicians to ignore defense policy and focus their attention instead on coup avoidance.

Passing-On Defense and Indirect Purchaser Standing in Actions for Damages Against the Violations of Competition Law: What Can the EC Learn from the US?

This paper analyses the raison d’etre of the current initiative for the federal policy change in the US regarding the issues of passing-on defense and indirect purchaser standing in order to draw policy lessons for the EC in the light of the Commission’s Green Paper on private enforcement of Community competition law. The paper finds that transatlantic policy learning in the substantive sense does not seem plausible due to the dramatic difference between the American rationale regarding the goals of private enforcement and the European doctrine of direct effect. Nevertheless, the paper argues that the US experience contains important policy lessons regarding the risks brought forward by private enforcement under diverse standards in the lack of effective judicial cooperation mechanisms in a multi-level polity. After analysing the current positions of the Community and national laws from this perspective, the paper finds that there is substantial room for diversity amongst the national standards. In addition, although existing Community measures provide solid ground for judicial cooperation, those measures should be strengthened in order to avert the litigation chaos which forced a policy change in the US. Consequently, the paper suggests that the Commission gives substantial weight to the procedural aspects of private enforcement in its forthcoming White Paper which the Green Paper largely overlooked.

Japan’s Changing Security Norms and Perceptions Since the 1990s

Changes in Japanese security policy and institutions over the past decade and a half nullify cultural and institutionalist views of Japan's postwar pacifism. The boundary of the Self-Defense Force (SDF)'s activity-which had been understood exclusively as defending Japan's own territorial integrity-was expanded to UN peacekeeping activities in the early 1990s, and through a series of policy and institutional changes was expanded further to rear support for U.S. troops in regional contingencies and antiterrorist actions. These changes have been accompanied by significant shifts in Japanese attitudes on defense and security issues. Despite the public's fear of entrapment in war through the alliance relationship with the United States, most Japanese believe that Japan needs to strengthen its defense capability through closer military ties with its alliance partner, and that it is better to revise the peace constitution in order to legitimize the SDF and provide it with military flexibility. Key words: Japan, East Asian security, U.S.-Japan relations Dominant Views Postwar Japanese security norms and institutions generally have been regarded as being consistently pacifist. Based on his public opinion survey analysis from 1945 to 1984, for example, Bobrow maintained that Japanese security perceptions had been passive, with the nation relying on its alliance with the United States and pursuing military minimalism with no clear principles. 1 Since the end of World War II, the Japanese have embraced peace as the integral part of postwar democracy.2 Ikenberry and Kupchan argue that this resulted from socialization by a hegemonic power, the United States. During the post-World War II occupation, the United States was able to force the acquiescence of Germany and Japan through diffusion of a set of normative ideals of democratization and demilitarization and the internal reconstruction upholding these ideals.3 Both culturalists and institutionalists in the field of international relations argue for the continuity of Japanese security norms and the maintenance of Japan's postwar security policy, which allow only for a basic defense capability. Katzenstein finds that Japan has indeed kept to its passive and peace-oriented security policy, despite changes in material relations following the end of the cold war, precisely due to the consolidated anti-military culture. He points out that the anti-military culture has effectively limited Japanese government's security policy options, helped by Japanese procedural norms respecting a vocal minority such as radical pacifists.4 Berger also emphasizes that anti-military sentiments still bind post-cold war leaders of Japan and Germany so that, most recently, neither country could opt for participation in the coalition forces during the Gulf War despite belief in its desirability.5 Institutionalists take the general public policy structure to be more accountable for the continuity of security policy in Japan. Katzenstein and Okawara point out that bureaucratic control of the Japanese military and the decision-making process of public policy prioritizing economics have prevented the centralization of security policy and its autonomy. In addition, social isolation of the military and its lack of legitimacy in society make defense and security policy much weaker.6 Risse-Kappen classifies the Japanese security policy process as quasi-corporatist, where major policy groups participate through institutionalized channels rather than seek broader political coalition.7 These groups tend to be much weaker, however, compared to those in other policy areas. Calder says defense policy remains an orphan in Japanese distributive politics since there are no visible interest groups representing defense policy and politicians specialized in defense issues generally do not draw popular support.8 Gradual but Substantial Changes in Japan's Security Policy The aforementioned arguments rightly point to the importance of identity, norms, and institutions in shaping national interest and security policy. …

European armaments collaboration and integration

PurposeThe paper seeks to address the European Union's emerging role in the management of international security challenges and its implications for collaboration in armaments procurement. While the former is about integrating member governments at policy level, the latter concerns organising states' defence industries into a cohesive and competitive supply base.Design/methodology/approachTheoretical frameworks include historic‐comparative analysis and the bureaucratic politics model. Independent variable comprises state actors and interest groups, while the dependent variable comprises the outcomes in terms of defence policy and armaments collaboration decisions. European armaments integration is considered, contrasting liberal inter‐governmentalism and neo‐functionalism theory. Case study data are derived from official EU document sources.FindingsIn general, national governments tend to protect important industrial actors irrespective of ownership. Bringing market and defence issues closer challenges the traditional separation between “low” and “high” politics. The collaboration in armaments acquisition isad hocand somewhat piecemeal in nature. Structures have evolved in an attempt to integrate the armaments process with spill‐over effect at policy level fostering armaments integration, helped by a more favourably structured and organised defence industry symptomatic of neo‐functionalism. Co‐ordination of European defence policy and armaments procurement through EDA should, in theory, lead to longer‐term co‐ordination, co‐operation and integration between the member states. The latter may see it in their interests to integrate as they come to recognize that EU institutions lack the capabilities to make policies realistic.Originality/valueEuropean armaments procurement and integration is not well researched; nor are the theoretical issues well understood. An explanation (model) of European armaments procurement integration is developed, along with an identification of key facilitators.

STRATEGI PEMBANGUNAN KAWASAN PERBATASAN KALIMANTAN BARAT – SARAWAK DALAM KONTEKS PENGUATAN KETAHANAN NASIONAL

The border of Indonesia and neighbouring state region ever peep out very complex strategic issues of economic life, political, social, cultural, law enforcement, defence and security state. It’s free Island of Simpadan and Ligitan to hand of Malaysia and Ambalat conflict are represent the real example of small part of the strategic issue becoming threat factual to sovereignty of Indonesia state. Special particularly in region border of West Kalimantan and Sarawak (East Malaysia) which is very loaded with the left behind problem, poorness and various tranasional crime. In consequence needed a correct development strategy to its eliminate so that created a strong national resilience in that area.