Defense Issues Research Articles

ESPAÇOS DE VIOLÊNCIA NA NARRATIVA MOÇAMBICANA CONTEMPORÂNEA

Em 2003, João Paulo Borges Coelho publica o seu primeiro romance As duas sombras do rio, tendo por base acontecimentos verídicos ocorridos nas margens do Zambeze, entre 1985 e 1989. Sendo historiador, especializado em questões de segurança e defesa, o autor tem uma posição privilegiada no acesso à informação, o que levaria a supor tratar-se de uma narrativa histórica ou documental. Contudo, a acumulação de significações em suspenso faz escapar o romance à leitura unívoca de um relato e remete a percepção da violência trazida à superficie para um campo de incerteza e de questionamento que o autor desenvolveu em Campo de trânsito, cuja ação decorre num campo de prisioneiros. Podem-se estabelecer analogias entre as duas narrativas ligadas por perspetivas filosóficas de Emmanuel Levinas.

Europe’s nuclear woes: Mitigating the challenges of the next years

ABSTRACTAs long as the relationship between Russia and the West continues to be confrontational, the urgent task will be to stabilize and manage the confrontation. For NATO, this primarily means balancing deterrence and assurance measures to its easternmost allies without entering a new arms race. NATO should step up its efforts to foster talks with Russia on current military threats and on arms control, possibly by seeking reconstitution of the NATO-Russia Council as a crisis management forum and mechanism for dialog, dealing with dangerous military incidents and better communicating each side’s intentions. As for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty crisis and the interlinked issue of the European missile defense, US officials should consider face-saving options to reassure Russia that Western missile defense installations have no offensive capabilities – provided that Russia convinces the new US administration that it has returned to compliance with the INF Treaty. Over the mid- to long-term, NATO and Russia must initiate a serious and open dialogue about the two core issues at stake – the freedom and sovereignty of states to seek alliance membership and the (contradicting) Russian interest of maintaining a sphere of influence over its “near abroad.” A well-prepared conference – akin to the 1975 Helsinki Summit, with various preceding rounds of consultations at ambassadorial level, and including the nonaligned states in Europe – might be a way to kick-start the discussion.

European Union Security Policy: Historical Retrospection

The EU security policy is an inseparable part of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy elaborated within the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. Sucurity and defence issues are quite vulnerable for any state sovereignty that is why it took Member Statets rather long time to agree on principles, directions and priorities of their common security policy as well as on cooperation with the NATO. With the development of the European Community, in the sphere of security policy a number of structures were established and a number of principled documents were adopted. The article researches the evolution of the EU security policy influenced by external cgallenges and threats

Armenia: some features of internal (in)stability

ABSTRACTThe April 2016 four-day “war” in the area of the Nagorny Karabakh conflict, as well as the developments that followed, have unveiled a whole stratum of serious problems in “stable” Armenia, including ones relating to defence issues. The aftermath of these events will continue to strongly influence internal processes in all three state entities: Armenia, the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, and Azerbaijan. This article aims to analyse some long-term consequences of the 2–5 April 2016 events in terms of their influence on Armenian internal political and social developments. The political transformations ongoing currently in Armenia can be best described as a “palace coup d’état”: they have been initiated by a ruling elite which benefited from general population’s low levels of public participation and social mobilization. In the absence of a charismatic leader and strong leadership in general, a tangible programme of action, or unity among the different components of civil society, the ruling elite retains the capacity to influence the varying reconstitution of groups and to alleviate, through small-scale concessions, tensions in Armenian society.

A Comparative Study about Aggression in Self-defense between Iranian and British Criminal Law

One of issues that are predicted in criminal law to protect the individuals’ right is legal self-defense. It entered in criminal laws of most countries around the world and is also recognized in UK. Self-defense is the most important example of permitted crime that is eroded the legal part of crime. So, when the conditions of self-defense exist, the defendant act shall not be considered as crime. But it is permissible that the defender is done and base on that, not only has no criminal liability but also has no civil liability. England, like Iranian legal system, recognizes self-defense and in certain situations and circumstances and considers the use of force and legal violence. In legal system of England, like Iranian one, self-defense is recognized and in certain situations and circumstances, it considers the use of force and violence as a permissible measure. In justifying its philosophy, different comments and theories have been proposed and base of self-defense is expressed by these views. The controversial issue of self-defense isn't limited to criminal law of Iran. All legal systems allow their followers in term of serious violations of their rights or others, if is necessary even by force, to protect themselves or others. In various legal systems, there are different approaches to range and subject of belligerency. Therefore, in this paper, a comparative study about aggression in defense issues in Iran and England is performed and theoretical foundations of criminal law in these countries are presented. In This type of detailed comparative study of legal systems, the useful results and conclusions are presented; so many ambiguities in the legal system are cleared.

Understanding the European Union

After the Second World War, the division of Europe into two antagonistic blocs led Western European countries to strengthen their collaboration on defense issues (Treaty of Brussels, 1948, Western European Union - WEU, 1954) and economic (European Organization of Economic Cooperation, 1948 or the European Payments Union, 1950). The goal of some of the most enthusiastic Europeans of the moment, was to increase the degree of supranationality and reach a level of integration that would prevent the reedition of endemic tensions among the European powers. The internationalization of the economy and communications, made inevitable a Europe with a confederate structure that could compete with the world leader; U.S. The USA. they played a fundamental role in the promotion of economic integration in Europe, because it represented a very valuable market for their products and had to curb the expansive impetus of the Soviet Union.

Development of underwater robotics

In the scientific surroundings, the statements that Oceanographic researches are, in many aspects, more complex and challenging, even compared to space research are not rare. Now, in the middle of the second decade of the XXI century, there is no doubt that the study of the oceans has become an issue of global importance, covering economic, industrial, social, defense and many other activities and interests of the society in the modern world. We are seeing the necessity of expanding the boundaries of Oceanographic research, increasing the number of types and growth of quality of measurements in the water column as well as their systematization, increasing of the depths of research, which is caused by the growing necessity of sea bottom studies, etc.

Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan by Noell Wilson

Reviewed by: Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan by Noell Wilson Luke S. Roberts Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan. By Noell Wilson. Harvard University Asia Center, 2015. 258 pages. Hardcover $39.95/ £29.95/ €36.00. This provocative book provides us with a new understanding of maritime defense during the Tokugawa period. Taking the perspective of the daimyo houses that bore the burden of actual defensive duties, author Noell Wilson highlights in particular the roles of the Nabeshima of Saga domain and the Kuroda of Fukuoka domain, whose chief duty was defense of the international trading port of Nagasaki. She argues that in the mid-seventeenth century they participated in creating a "Nagasaki model" of coastal defense, which became the template for coastal defense in the Ezo region toward the end of the eighteenth century and then later in the Kanto re- gion during the final decades of Tokugawa rule. Rather than taking on coastal de- fense directly and using its own substantial forces, the Tokugawa shogunate instead assigned daimyo to bear this duty even in its own territories (such as Nagasaki) right up to the end of the regime itself. Daimyo houses incrementally took greater control of the content of their duties and expanded the prerogatives accrued to them through such service. This naturally weakened Tokugawa leadership in the sphere of coastal defense. Wilson argues that domains such as Saga played key roles in creating defense policy and advancing technological development and that this situation ultimately influenced the particulars of the Tokugawa regime's collapse in the 1860s. This book is a solid contribution to Western scholarship on the rich complexity of Tokugawa foreign relations, a field that has grown rapidly ever since Ronald Toby's pathbreaking State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan.1 Wilson acknowledges this earlier research, but points out that hers is the first work to treat the issue of maritime defense as important to Tokugawa-era polity and foreign relations. Furthermore, as with Robert Hellyer's recent research on the foreign trade of Satsuma and Tsushima domains, Wilson's monograph contributes to decades of scholarship considering the larger Tokugawa regime from the perspective of daimyo domain studies.2 These two contributions ensure that Defensive Positions will play an important role in key debates in Tokugawa history for some time to come. Chapter 1 explores how the Tokugawa regime arranged for the defense of Nagasaki in the wake of the Shimabara rebellion, the expulsion of the Portuguese, and the restriction of the Chinese and Dutch traders in Japan to Nagasaki. The Tokugawa relied heavily on the Nabeshima (Saga); Kuroda (Fukuoka); Ōmura (Ōmura); and, in an auxiliary capacity, seven other nearby domains to provide the weapons and manpower for defense. These domains were under the direction of Tokugawa hereditary vassal (fudai) officials, but the actual degree of control declined over the centuries. Both the Nabeshima and the Kuroda were assertive of their [End Page 322] prerogatives from the beginning and gradually, especially after the 1670s when the position of Nagasaki Commander was abolished, they came to assert greater degrees of actual independence in managing harbor defense even as they maintained a formal posture subservient to the orders of the Nagasaki Magistrate. This pattern became a template for later developments in coastal defense. The next chapter details government efforts to suppress smuggling between Chinese merchants and Japanese in the waters of western Japan, a subject that is particularly interesting because of its absence from the English-language literature to date.3 This trade had been growing rapidly since the final decades of the seventeenth century, when Japan's main export was silver. Japan's economy was rapidly undergoing monetization, and its mines were gradually giving out, prompting a desire by the Tokugawa government to restrict silver exports. This context has been ably narrated by Robert Hellyer, but Wilson adds an important military dimension to the story.4 As Chinese smugglers' activities were shut down near Nagasaki under pressure of local forces, they moved north to the Genkai Sea area, just west of the Straits of Shimonoseki, to trade with merchants exiting the Inland Sea. The Tokugawa began characterizing...

The challenge of reset

Abstract In this contribution, Obama’s reset in U.S. – Russian relations is viewed in terms of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. To link the macro-level of discourse theory to the micro-level of linguistic analysis, the empirical study implements the analysis of indexicality (Chilton 2004) and assumptions (Fairclough 2003) as applied in critical discourse analysis. Obama’s first term representations of Russia were examined in four contexts: global nuclear nonproliferation; Iran and North Korea; the New START Treaty; European ABM system and NATO – Russian relations. Articulations in the first and second contexts exhibited Obama’s strategies to construct Russia as partner in his hegemonic project of global nuclear nonproliferation. Articulations in the third context demonstrated Obama’s strategies of creating different discursive Russias to achieve the ratification of START, whereas no strategies proved successful in mitigating the issue of missile defense. In all four contexts, Obama’s construction of Russia was, to various degrees, permeated by ambiguity.

La Unión Europea y la OTAN en el marco de la nueva Estrategia Global de Seguridad de la Unión Europea

The article analyzes the relationship between the European Union and NATO on defense issues, as reflected in the different security strategies of the European Union, with particular attention to the 2016 EU’s Global Strategy. The paper focuses on the 2003 European Security Strategy, the 2008 Implementation Report, and the new approaches to both the international environment and the European security, that are developed in the Global Strategy. The evolution of NATO policy is also discussed, as well as the changes of the United States security and defence policy towards Europe during the Obama administration. Finally, the article discusses the future of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU (CSDP) after Brexit, and the consequences for the EU-NATO relationship.

Epilogue: European security and defence in the shadow of Brexit

This piece provides an epilogue to the Forum on European security following the UK EU Referendum. The EU has been a centrepiece in Britain’s foreign policy. The piece argues that Brexit presents the prospect of a major rethink in the aims, ambitions and conduct of British diplomacy and defence. From the perspective of third parties – and most especially for the EU and its member states – the reaction to the prospect of Brexit has been no less clear and the impact on European security no less certain. The piece highlights how contributors to this Forum all share the assessment of an uncertain future whether discussing bilateral relationships, the impact on the EU and NATO or the political economy of European defence. This Forum illustrates that it will be a European security and defence future of considerable uncertainty. A central issue to be resolved will be whether the EU and the UK are able to build a strategic partnership that encompasses issues of foreign policy, security and defence. The UK will also need to recalibrate its key bilateral relationships in Europe and with the US. This creates an ambitious agenda for practitioners and analysts alike.

Legal regulation of economic activity and economic relations in a special period

Defense issues have gained a vital importance today for the Ukrainian people, as well as the protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since the anti-terrorist operations in Donetsk and Lugansk regions has been launched, the national economy, public authorities, other public bodies, local authorities, Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military units, civil defense forces, enterprises, institutions and organizations were shifted to special period of functioning. The existing significant legal array of economic activities during a special period requires theoretical and legal analysis for proper coordination of legislative norms by their regulatory subject and by their hierarchical structure in order to elaborate some suggestions to amend the existing economic legislation of Ukraine. Economic activity in times of crisis is a separate special mode of economic relations, carried out by public authorities, military command, the military administrations of other government agencies, local governments, enterprises, institutions and organizations during mobilization (except targeted one) in the period of martial law and / or wartime, and partly in the recovery period after the end of hostilities. The scope of economic relations in a particular period is represented by: 1) organizational and economic relations of public authorities, military command, law enforcement, military administration for the proper implementation and further application of a special period; 2) economic and industrial relations of the companies and organizations, performing direct economic activity taking into account regulatory forth restrictions on the rights and freedoms of the activity; 3) intraeconomic relations subject to the limitations of common standards during mobilization (except targeted one) in the period of martial law and / or of war, and partly in recovery period after the end of hostilities. Having considered the current imperfect state of economic activity regulation and economic relations in times of crisis, there were elaborated some practical recommendations, namely: 1) to adopt the Law of Ukraine "On legal regime of the recovery period." 2) to do amendments to Part. 1, Art. 417 of the Commercial Code of Ukraine of January 16, 2003 and put it as follows: "1. In times of crisis the legal mode of economic activity is based on the legislative acts aiming to protect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine, establishing and ensuring human rights and freedoms.

Sharing the burden? U.S. allies, defense spending, and the future of NATO

ABSTRACTBurden sharing has long been a goal of NATO. This article examines how three major alliance members—Canada, the UK, and Germany—are currently approaching defense issues, and the contributions they are making to the larger Western defense effort. It will reveal that Canada and Germany continue to spend little on defense, and seem broadly content to watch their military forces gradually weaken. On the contrary, however, the UK remains a major defense spender, although its fiscal situation poses a continuing challenge. For NATO to survive, the US must insist that it expects all alliance members to contribute more equitably.

AUTOMATIC WATERLINE EXTRACTION FROM SMARTPHONE IMAGES

Considering worldwide increasing and devastating flood events, the issue of flood defence and prediction becomes more and more important. Conventional methods for the observation of water levels, for instance gauging stations, provide reliable information. However, they are rather cost-expensive in purchase, installation and maintenance and hence mostly limited for monitoring large streams only. Thus, small rivers with noticeable increasing flood hazard risks are often neglected. <br><br> State-of-the-art smartphones with powerful camera systems may act as affordable, mobile measuring instruments. Reliable and effective image processing methods may allow the use of smartphone-taken images for mobile shoreline detection and thus for water level monitoring. The paper focuses on automatic methods for the determination of waterlines by spatio-temporal texture measures. Besides the considerable challenge of dealing with a wide range of smartphone cameras providing different hardware components, resolution, image quality and programming interfaces, there are several limits in mobile device processing power. For test purposes, an urban river in Dresden, Saxony was observed. The results show the potential of deriving the waterline with subpixel accuracy by a column-by-column four-parameter logistic regression and polynomial spline modelling. After a transformation into object space via suitable landmarks (which is not addressed in this paper), this corresponds to an accuracy in the order of a few centimetres when processing mobile device images taken from small rivers at typical distances.

AUTOMATIC WATERLINE EXTRACTION FROM SMARTPHONE IMAGES

Abstract. Considering worldwide increasing and devastating flood events, the issue of flood defence and prediction becomes more and more important. Conventional methods for the observation of water levels, for instance gauging stations, provide reliable information. However, they are rather cost-expensive in purchase, installation and maintenance and hence mostly limited for monitoring large streams only. Thus, small rivers with noticeable increasing flood hazard risks are often neglected. State-of-the-art smartphones with powerful camera systems may act as affordable, mobile measuring instruments. Reliable and effective image processing methods may allow the use of smartphone-taken images for mobile shoreline detection and thus for water level monitoring. The paper focuses on automatic methods for the determination of waterlines by spatio-temporal texture measures. Besides the considerable challenge of dealing with a wide range of smartphone cameras providing different hardware components, resolution, image quality and programming interfaces, there are several limits in mobile device processing power. For test purposes, an urban river in Dresden, Saxony was observed. The results show the potential of deriving the waterline with subpixel accuracy by a column-by-column four-parameter logistic regression and polynomial spline modelling. After a transformation into object space via suitable landmarks (which is not addressed in this paper), this corresponds to an accuracy in the order of a few centimetres when processing mobile device images taken from small rivers at typical distances.

EUROPE INTHE CROSSHAIRS

(By Polina Khimshiashvili. RBC Daily, May 30, 2016, p. 2. Condensed text:) [Russian President] Vladimir Putin visited a European Union country for the first time since November 2015. While in Greece, he saw tourism potential. But [from his Athens press conference] he warned that if NATO’s missile defense shield expands, they will find themselves the targets of Russian missiles. ... was Vladimir Putin’s first visit to Greece since 2007. Despite the long hiatus, relations between Moscow and Athens remained strong. In the wake of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea [see Current Digest, Vol. 66, No. 12, pp. 3 - 11 ]and the start of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, Greece has remained one of Moscow’s main EU partners (Greece has been a member of the EU since 1981, and of NATO since 1952). Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras visited Russia twice in 2015:He came to the Kremlin in April [see Current Digest, Vol. 67, No. 15, pp. 17 - 18 ], and attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June. In January 2016, Putin and Greek President [Prokopis] Pavlopoulos opened the Year of Greece in Russia and vice versa. ... On Friday [May 27] in Athens, Tsipras told the Russian president that [Greece] made a strategic choice in favor of strengthening ties with Russia, since weshare historically close religious and spiritual bonds.However, these close spiritual bonds are not reflected on the economic level, both leaders admitted. Trade turnover has been falling since 2013. In 2014, it amounted to $4.17 billion, a drop of 39% from the previous year. In 2015, trade turnover fell by another 34%, coming in at $2.7 billion, Putin said during a joint press conference. ... Russian presidential aide YuryUshakov said the decline in trade was due to [Western] sanctions and currency fluctuations in both countries. During a briefing in Moscow on Wednesday, he said that Russia is not going to lift the food embargo [it introduced in response to Western sanctions] for certain EU countries. Finally, Tsipras acknowledged during a press conference that his country is interested in supplying agricultural products to Russia, but that this could be done by establishing joint enterprises.. . . ... Presidential aide YuryUshakov said that the politicians touched on issues of bilateral cooperation during the talks. According to Ushakov, the talks did not include the issue of missile defense, with which Putin started the press conference. But it is this issue that drew the Russian leader’s harshest rhetoric. ... Responding to a question on how security-related issues affect economic cooperation in Europe, Putin stated that deployingUS missile defense components in Romania would negatively impact this aspect. will be forced to take the necessary steps. And while yesterday parts of Romania had no idea what it meant to be in the crosshairs, today we will have to take certain steps to ensure ... our security.*** The same thing applies to Poland, Putin warned. ... He said that Russia has been repeating this like a mantra since the early 2000s, but that still no one listens to us. The whole world has seen our capabilities, and the capabilities of our medium-range ground- and sea-launched missiles. We are not violating [any treaties], but the ground-based Iskander [missile] complexes with a range of up to 500 kilometers have also proven themselves, the Russian president said in reference to possible countermeasures. ... In response to Putin’s threats, Polish Foreign Minister WitoldWaszczykowski issued the standard statement that Russia is not under threat: This system is to defend Europe against a missile attack from the Middle East. He stressed that the military presence of the US and NATO forces is a response to very aggressive behavior and threats from the Russian authorities. ... Putin also spoke harshly about energy projects with the EU. We need preliminary guarantees, not just conversations about how this is of great mutual interest - we alreadyfell for that once, and we’re not spending money on these [empty promises] anymore, he said in outlining the prerequisites necessary for future energy projects.He recalled the fate of South Stream, which Moscow scrapped after failing to get the go-ahead from the European Commission, even though work on [the pipeline] had already begun [see Current Digest, Vol. 66, No. 49, pp. 8 - 10]. ... Commenting on Putin’s statements regarding missile defense, energy projects and Ukraine, Tsipras repeatedly stressed his country’s readiness to serve as a bridge between Russia and the EU. Our role is, naturally***to help smooth the differences in order to find a foundation for rapprochement between the EU and Russia, Tsipras said in response to a question about how Greece intends to vote on the issue of extending the EU’s anti-Russian sanctions. ... Putin assured everyone that sanctions were not discussed during the talks, and that Moscow is not expecting miracles from Greece.

Profile-based Maximum Penalised Likelihood Trajectory Estimation from Space-borne LOS Measurements

Estimating the boost-phase trajectory of a ballistic missile using line of sight measurements from space-borne passive sensors is an important issue in missile defense. A well-known difficulty of this issue is the poor-observability of the target motion. A profile-based maximum penalised likelihood estimator is presented, which is expected to work in poor-observability scenarios. Firstly, a more adaptable boost-phase profile is proposed by introducing unknown parameters. Then, the estimator is given based on the Bayesian paradigm. After that, a special penalty for box constraint is constructed based on a mixed distribution. Numerical results for some typical scenarios and sensitivity with respect to a priori information are reported to show that the proposed estimator is promising.

The Department of Defense and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Collaborated to Produce the Fall 2015 Wildlife Stewardship & National Defense Issue of the Endangered Species Bulletin (ESB)

The Department of Defense and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Collaborated to Produce the Fall 2015 Wildlife Stewardship & National Defense Issue of the Endangered Species Bulletin (ESB)

Updated concept of validity check when determining the customs value of goods carried in (imported) in the customs territory of Ukraine

The article deals with a study of conceptual basics of validity check when determining the customs value of goods carried in (imported) in the customs territory of Ukraine. On the basis of the analysis of the effective legislation of Ukraine related to the state customs procedures the author revealed the issues of concern that arise when determining the «tentative indicators» of the customs value of goods that is used in the risk management system when clearing the goods carried in the customs territory of Ukraine under import customs regime (release in free circulation).The article gives the author’s definition of the «tentative indicators» notion of the customs value of goods – this is an average customs value of a unit of goods (according to the measurement units described in the Ukrainian classification of goods for external economic activity as well as to other units of measurement and records) that is computed automatically by ASARM for the last six months and is being formed by the moment of customs control and customs clearance based on the electronic customs declaration (at the stage when it is assigned an electronic number).Besides, the author does a legal comparison between the notions «tentative indicators of the customs value of goods» and «indicative prices» and proves that the statement that the «tentative indicators» notion of the customs value of the goods is close by content to the «indicative price of goods» is completely erroneous.It has also been established that by now it makes a problem for the territorial customs bodies of the State Fiscal Service (SFS) to verify correct determination, by the customs applicant or by a person authorized by such applicant, of the customs value of goods carried in (imported) in the customs territory of Ukraine or with respect of which the Price Database of the UAIS of the SFS contains no data about identical or similar goods. Therefore, it remains not clear which «tentative indicators» of the customs value of goods are to be taken into account by the customs applicant or a person authorized by him when carrying in (importing) goods in the customs territory of Ukraine.The author emphasized inexpediency of the computation by the SFS of the statistically average customs value of goods, that are carried in (imported) in the customs territory of Ukraine, which, though they are classified according to the sub-category of goods in compliance with the Ukrainian Classification of Commodities for Foreign Economic Activity, may still have different commercial descriptions and, accordingly, may have various functional uses. Apart of that, a question is raised how the SFS computes the statistically average customs value of goods that are highly liquid and have their trademark as compared with identical goods according to their functional use but have no trademark.It is stated that information about «tentative indicators» of the customs value of goods, that are carried in (imported) in the customs territory of Ukraine is not open and transparent as the customs applicants or persons authorized by them have no access to such information.The author comes to a conclusion that one of the mistakes of the SFS territorial customs bodies officers is that they demand all documents confirming the customs value of goods carried in (imported) in the customs territory of Ukraine that are indicated in Part 4 of Art. 53 of the Customs Code of Ukraine. Indeed, the necessity of submission of separate additional documents should be determined by an officer based on peculiarities of the external economic transaction.Taking into consideration the results of the made study the author comments that it is necessary to make a clear decision concerning the issues of defense of legal principles as regards the customs payment administration, exclusion of reduction of customs values and minimization of customs payments, ruination of possible schemes of import of goods in violation o the legislation of Ukraine related to customs affairs, etc. This is discouraged by a purely comparative nature of the «tentative indicators» and optionality of the application of recommendations of the Methodological recommendations with regard of control determination of the customs value approved by the SFS Order of 11.09.2015, No.689 by the SFS customs house officers

Prospective games for defence strategic decisions in Brazil

Purpose – This paper aims to propose a model, based on strategic simulation and scenario planning, to improve the decision-making process in the Brazilian defence area. Design/methodology/approach – Participants are disposed in three levels: decision-makers team – which goes beyond the Ministry of Defence (and military services) alone and includes other representatives of the executive and legislative branches; political and strategic advisory team – civilian representatives with a broad understanding of the national and international contexts that can contribute to developing insights and shaping the forces that may contribute to the nation’s future; and experts database— experts in fields of interest to national defence, comprising representatives of several sectors and broad areas of knowledge, including scholars, scientists, politicians, military, industry, among others. Findings – The planning and preparation of national defence strategies require a long-term approach, which is multidisciplinary, participatory and contextualized to the geopolitical and institutional frames of the country. Research limitations/implications – However, despite many policy papers intentions, defence issues have always been considered a matter for the military arena due to the country’s cultural background. Practical/implications – Because decisions about defence have long-range impacts and political implications, policy-makers should shape them bearing in mind a complex and politically shared foresight process. Social/implications – This proposed planning process enables a participatory engagement with some civil organizations and individuals as well as amplifies their commitment in national defence issues. Originality/value – The proposal is innovative in South America, considering that it encompasses integrated simulations on participatory foresight processes as well as broadened the civilian–military dynamic relationship and the diverse viewpoints in defence implications analysis to include a wider share of the Brazilian society.