The Myth of the Pacific Society: Quebec's Contemporary Strategic Culture

Abstract

Introduction One of most enshrined notions in Canadian foreign policy is that French-speaking Quebecois have a different attitude toward many issues than other Canadians, resulting in a national division that has come to be known as 'the two solitudes. This attitudinal difference is said to be particularly striking on defense and security policy issues. Historian J. L. Granatstein calls phenomenon the (2)--a phenomenon labeled by Jean-Sebastien Rioux as wisdom. According to this view, Rioux claims, English and French-Canadians hold differing views on security and defence issues, with French-Canadians being more dovish, isolationist, and antimilitaristic than their Anglo counterparts. This world-view allegedly causes Quebecers to oppose increases in defence spending; to be against military interventions overseas; and to favour using Canadian Forces (CF) only in humanitarian or peacekeeping roles. (3) In short, Quebecois are more pacifist, isolationist, and/or antimilitarist than their compatriots. Two sets of evidence are generally used in literature to support that claim. The first is a list of historical events, usually centered on two world wars, that are used to describe defiance and hostility of French-Canadians toward military institutions and their reluctance to serve in armed forces. The second is public opinion polls that allegedly show, one after other, a considerable difference between two linguistic groups (or, more precisely, between Quebec and other Canadian provinces). Quite aside from any political instrumentalization that one can make of such claims (from outright accusations that Quebecois are cowards and anti-Canadian, to a proclamation of distinctiveness of Quebec's society), this difference in attitude is believed to be quite important in Canada's foreign policy decision-making. According to J. L. Granatstein, Quebecois are given a disproportionate influence in this process and are thus deforming Canada's foreign policy. This phenomenon is supposed to be at work in such recent events as decision of Chretien government not to participate in coalition of willing against Iraq in March 2003 and Paul Martin's failure to support U.S. program on missile defense. (4) The thesis that Quebec's stance affects Canada's foreign policy is part of given that it perceives opposition to two above-named U.S. initiatives as an extension of Quebec's hostility either to creation of a Canadian Navy at beginning of 20th century or to conscription measures during two world wars. In this article we will offer a different interpretation of nature of Quebecois views on military issues and question whether historical record supports idea that Quebecois are, in fact, pacifists. In other words, is it true that Quebecois are generally more distrustful or critical than other Canadians toward use of armed forces as an instrument of national and international problem-solving? Has this attitude changed over time? Is conventional wisdom regarding Quebec still accurate to describe that province's contemporary public opinion? Is critical stance observed in 2003-2004 surrounding Iraq issue same as one observed in 1910, 1917, or 1942? We will try to show that neither of two main sets of data used to support claim of pacifist thesis is as convincing as it seems. If French-Canadians could be labeled as antimilitarist or isolationist (but certainly not pacifist) until mid-20th century, things have changed since then. In fact, we argue that French-Canadians have expressed an internationalist attitude toward defense and security matters. One of key problems in qualification of a society's attitude lies in definition of concepts. Such notions as pacifism,(5) antiwar, (6) antimilitarism, (7) anti-imperialism,(7) isolationism, (8) and neutralism (9) are generally left undefined and vague by authors. …