Defence Identity Research Articles

The Duty to Protect: Gender in the Swedish Practice of Conscription

In this article, we turn first to a brief discussion of feminist contributions in the field of security, defense, and collective identity, and then argue that Swedish nationalism is tied to a particular form of collective identity formation through the practice of conscription. Drawing on Elshtain's notions of `just warriors' and `beautiful souls', we go on to spell out how women, historically, have been situated within the discourse of militarism. Finally, we look at how the contribution of women to the military has been perceived and argued, and then point out how a small number of female soldiers may be instrumental in exposing a particular value system of gender, citizenship, and collective identity.

Europe as a power multiplier for French security policy: Strategic consistency, tactical adaptation

Successive leaderships during the French Fifth Republic have sought to manipulate Western Europe into assuming the strategic objectives of security policy that France could no longer attain alone but which it was not prepared to forsake: national grandeur and an elevated global rank. Hence, there was a transferral of French ambitions to the European level; the latter would act as a power multiplier for France. Within this, three distinctive periods can be discerned. First, the promotion of an autonomous European security and defence identity (ESDI) directed by France. Second, the pursuit of ESDI within the structures of the Atlantic Alliance. Third, the relocation of ESDI within the European Union. The phases highlight a strong coherence in that they represent tactical shifts in the quest for strategic goals in response to shifting external factors.

European defence autonomy: Inevitably illusory

With recent events in Bosnia and Kosovo providing evidence of an increasing American reluctance to commit ground forces in support of European security, the members of the European Union have understandably begun work on the creation of an autonomous defence capability. Closer European integration and the changing strategic value of the region to the US have created the incentive for a more coherent European approach on defence issues, but the immediate likelihood of genuine EU autonomy is remote, not least because the allies cannot agree on the fundamental parameters of co‐operation. As in earlier episodes when European defence co‐operation was proposed, the United States is reluctant to cede political influence commensurate with its diminished appetite for resolving regional conflicts. Through its possession of unique military assets, America has the ability to stifle European ambitions that Europe should wield greater military influence. Together with internecine European disagreement over defence restructuring, the ambivalent American attitude to a separate EU defence identity threatens to transform the initiative into a palliative for American isolationism.

ESDI: “Separable but not separate”?

The development of a European Security and Defence Identity that is “separable but not separate” from NATO took a new turn at the European Union's Helsinki summit in December 1999, However, the EU's plans to absorb soon the Western European Union and to create a rapid reaction corps by 2003 raise a tangle of membership issues, as well as questions of a more fundamental nature.

What tasks for the torrejón centre?

The efforts under way in Europe since the 1990s to, define a European defence identity have led to an awareness of Europe's dependence on the United States. The problem is not that Europe is incapable of defending itself, but that its security has up until now been organised to fit into the Atlantic Alliance mould. The integration of American and European forces in a common structure, together with the United States' financial power and capacity for innovation, have gradually led Europe to depend closely on American logistics, transport and C4I (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence) capabilities.

Developing a European Intervention Force

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE ATTEMPT by members of the European Union (EU) and allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to work out the political details of a European intervention capacity. In the so- called Berlin model of June 1996, which built on the agreements reached in Brussels in January 1994, NATO members agreed to construct the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) inside their organization; if, however, the European members needed to act on their own (that is, without the United States), NATO would make its assets available.(f.1) To give substance to the plan, NATO began to develop Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) - a force model that combines different services such as army, navy, and air force with different national contributions into one command and control framework - that would allow the Western European Union (WEU) to conduct operations with NATO's agreement and with NATO assets.Two events precipitated preparations for a European intervention force. First, in late 1998 at an Anglo-French summit in St Malo, Britain dropped its opposition to substantial EU involvement in military affairs and joined France in calling for an autonomous European crisis response capacity. The second key event was the 1999 war in Kosovo. In the words of NATO's new secretary general, George Robertson, 'The European Security and Defence Identity is no longer just an attractive idea, it has become an urgent necessity.'(f.2) The general consensus in the aftermath of the war was that Europe had to enhance its political and military machinery so that it could respond to crises such as Kosovo without relying completely on the United States.(f.3)Behind NATO-EU manoeuvring, there are deep worries on both sides of the ocean about the future of Euro-Atlantic co-operation. The Europeans want to be able to handle a crisis like Kosovo on their own, but they do not want to lose NATO to congressional overreaction, especially as they peer anxiously over their shoulders at Russia. They also worry about unilateralist and high-tech strategies emanating from Washington that might dictate all future security operations in Europe. Americans, for their part, want the Europeans to stay interoperable with them in their rapid ascent into technologically sophisticated military capabilities. But they realize that with such capability comes the potential for independent European interests, and they know that France and others would be keen to articulate this. They are also apprehensive about a perceived European desire to be free of American leadership.The British move at St Malo towards a practical and semiautonomous European defence capacity changed the inter-organizational landscape between NATO and the EU to an extent not seen since the end of the cold war. Although it seems premature to herald, as some have done, the St Malo declaration as the 'final stage of European integration,'(f.4) it goes a step beyond the ESDI-in-NATO agreed upon in 1996. It adds: ready access to key NATO assets for a European force that sequences its decisions with NATO but might not operate under NATO's auspices. The Americans and Europeans have both made compromises to create a space in which European decision-making and military capabilities can grow without violating the dogmas of unnecessary duplication, unilateral decoupling, and no discrimination against non-EU members. The formula works as follows: in a crisis, the Europeans give NATO the first shot at dealing with it. If NATO declines, the Europeans may act autonomously with a reasonable expectation of using certain NATO assets, including those directly supported by the United States.In analyzing developments over the last two years, it is apparent that the politics of European security and defence are far from settled and that European-American tensions over the essence of a European defence identity remain acute. Since Kosovo, the Americans have been bent on the rapid build-up of military capability, while the Europeans have pursued more independent 'say and do' from NATO. …

Towards a European Defence Identity - Thank You Mr Blair!

Towards a European Defence Identity - Thank You Mr Blair!

Will form lead to function? Institutional enlargement and the creation of a European security and defence identity

Will form lead to function? Institutional enlargement and the creation of a European security and defence identity

Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation

European co - operation in foreign policy, or political co - operation, recently completed its third decade of institutional development. Most of this change has taken place at European level, often by adopting or adapting the procedures of the European Community. Yet the expansion of foreign, and now security, policy co - operation in the European Union (EU) has also increasingly penetrated into the domestic politics of its member states. This article suggests a conceptual framework for measuring the ways political co - operation has encouraged corresponding changes in EU member states. Four indicators of national adaptation are stressed: élite socialization, bureaucratic restructuring, constitutional changes,and changes in public perceptions about the desirability and legitimacy of this co - operation. These types of change demonstrate that the demands of foreign policy co - operation are much greater than those outlined in treaty articles, and must be taken into consideration as the EU negotiates its next enlargement with Central and Eastern European states and attempts to develop a European security and defense identity.

NATO's European Pillar: The European Security and Defense Identity

(1999). NATO's European Pillar: The European Security and Defense Identity. Defense Analysis: Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 305-322.

Saint Malo and beyond: Toward European defense

The European Security and Defense Identity has come at a very opportune time for the continent. The lessons of the Kosovo conflict, and Britain's newfound embrace of continental views under Tony Blair, will facilitate this much needed development in an often hesitant European setting.

NATO transformed: the Alliance's new roles in international security

NATO TRANSFORMEDThe Alliance's New Roles in International SecurityDavid S. YostWashington: US Institute of Peace, 1998, xvii, 450pp, US$19.95 paperWinston Churchill once observed that if we do not take change by the hand, it will one day seize us by the throat. One can hardly think of a more fitting adage for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the Alliance lurches into its fiftieth year it seems at once united and divided, resolute and timid, decisive yet paralyzed. One could attribute this rather bizarre state of affairs to the pseudo-war in Kosovo, which is a departure from not only the Alliance's core activity (that is, self-defence) but also from the practice of defining goals in a clear and strategic (that is, long-term) manner. These four works on NATO's future do not explore these issues, as each was published before the outbreak of fighting. They do, however, provide as comprehensive an examination of the political and military factors affecting the Alliance's longevity as one is likely to encounter. Together, they examine the issue from a variety of angles ranging from the future orientation of United States foreign policy, efforts to forge a more solid (and competing?) European defence identity, and relations with the other major player in the European security equation: Russia.David Yost's NATO Transformed focuses on what is perhaps the most fundamental question underpinning the Alliance's future. He asks whether NATO has transformed itself from an organization dedicated to collective self-defence into one with a wider, more inclusive mandate which will contribute to, rather than detract from, post-cold war security in Europe. By surveying its efforts to reach out to the states in the former Soviet orbit and its pre-occupation with crisis management in the Balkans, he concludes that NATO has demonstrated the attributes of a collective security body. Although there is little doubt that its core purpose remains intact, its 'open-door' policy toward central and eastern Europe and its sojourn into the world of peacekeeping illustrate both the internal 'push' for a new strategic rationale and the external 'pull' exerted by those regions of Europe which crave peace and stability.Yost is careful not to paint an overly optimistic picture. American hesitancy to take the lead and Europe's decades-old habit of deferring to United States leadership on security matters has compounded the difficulty of forging a strategic identity in the absence of the Soviet threat. He points put that new and enduring objectives - namely, enlargement and collective action based on consensus - are bound to clash since the former will almost inevitably make the latter more difficult. Another challenge will be accommodating Russian sensitivities without fatally compromising either autonomy or the timeliness of a response to emerging crises. Clearly, 'NATO Transformed' is an ironic choice of title. As Yost makes clear, the transformation of the institution and its strategic mind-set is quite unfinished. The volume, therefore, serves as a timely warning to policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic: the cold war may be over but the amount of work yet to be done should not be underestimated.One would think that the question of NATO's role in any future European security architecture would be more problematic if examined from the perspective of states on the periphery of the Alliance. Surprisingly, the contributors to NATO Looks East see few problems and stress that enlargement presents virtually unlimited opportunities for co-operation and confidence-building. …

NATO and the European security and defence identity

NATO and the European security and defence identity

Building a European defence capability

For much of the 1990s, the US and the EU have been trying to define a new transatlantic bargain that balances Europe's desire for a broader and more independent political role with its continued reliance on US and NATO military capabilities. The goal is a European security and defence identity that allows the EU to conduct military missions with command structures, forces and assets that are normally assigned to NATO. Four practical steps are necessary. First, the Western European Union (WEU) should be abolished and its functions divided between the EU and NATO. Second, European militaries must enhance their capability for projecting and sustaining power. Third, NATO's military structure should be adapted to incorporate French participation, even without the full reintegration of France into NATO. Finally, these steps are unlikely to lead very far unless the Americans and Europeans can establish better patterns for managing inevitable transatlantic disagreements over crises like Bosnia or Iraq.

The Regionalization of European

INTRODUCTIONTHE ARGUMENT IS FREQUENTLY MADE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM that Europe is drawing inward. At a conference in April 1998, I heard Glennys Kinnock, a Labour member of the European parliament, bemoan the 'worrying tendency towards isolationism and disengagement' in both London and Brussels. On the face of it, this seems an oddly alarmist perspective.To judge from the declaratory rhetoric floating around Brussels and other European capitals and the array of multilateral decisions in 1997 and 1998, perhaps we should be talking about 'Engagement, enlargement, and Europe's role in world affairs.' When the USSR collapsed, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) immediately embraced the Soviet successor states as members. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the European Union (EU) has provided substantial assistance to almost all post-communist states through the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Former Soviet Union and Mongolia) and PHARE programmes, and continues to do so. The European Commission played a significant role through the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in addressing humanitarian needs stemming from a wide array of civil and interstate conflicts throughout the 1990s.The EU is now seriously embarked on discussions about the accession of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia in the first instance and Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia in a later phase. It is also discussing the admission of Cyprus, although this issue is complicated by the unresolved civil war there and the issue of Turkish relations with the Union.In the meantime, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has followed its initiative to establish the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, and then its Partnership for Peace with the decision to take in three new members (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic). It has complemented the enlargement decision with the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Council, and the conclusion of NATO-Russian and NATO-Ukrainian charters that set out an agenda for the deepening of relations with these two newly independent states. In the meantime, it mounted with considerable success the largest coalition military operation in its history with its Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. It remains engaged at a lower level in a substantial peacebuilding operation there. More recently, NATO has deployed a substantial force to areas neighbouring Kosovo to support the large group of observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) deployed to monitor the ceasefire in Kosovo. As one commentator put it in response to the question of how to halt the purported erosion of NATO: 'The first question - how to save NATO - is the simplest one. NATO is not in trouble.'(f.1)Not content with the eastward vector of engagement, the EU has also established a substantial and deepening Mediterranean dialogue. Recent initiatives on Algeria suggest that the EU has come to see the affairs of the southern littoral of the Mediterranean Sea as crucial to the interests of the European community of states. A similar conclusion might be drawn from the re-activation of Commission diplomacy in the Middle East in 1998 under the United Kingdom presidency. In May 1998, President Jacques Chirac of France joined Yasser Arafat, the president of the Palestinian Council, in a call for an international conference on the Middle East conflict.In the transatlantic context, Europe is complementing its traditional ties in security (namely, NATO) with the institutionalization of permanent dialogues on issues of bilateral interest with the United States and Canada. This initiative is paralleled by similar high-level dialogues with Asia. In short, on the face of it, the period is arguably one of increasing European assertion in world affairs rather than one of withdrawal, despite the evident difficulties in generating the long awaited European security and defence identity (ESDI) and common foreign and security policies. …

The triumph of transatlanticism: NATO and the evolution of European security after the cold war

The end of the Cold War and the resulting American drawdown of forces in Europe only seemed to confirm the need for a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) distinct from NATO. Differences over the scope and nature of the European pillar quickly derailed significant progress towards ESDI as some states, such as Great Britain or the Netherlands, insisted on the retention of NATO as the foundation of any European‐wide security structure while other states, mainly France, insisted on a Eurocentric security system. This essay examines the rise of new security concerns and risks, and the perceived inability of the existing institutions in the early 1990s to deal with these new threats. The policies and priorities of the major powers involved in the security of the region are analyzed against the backdrop of these new risks. The impact of these security issues and national interests are assessed on the reforms and adaptations undertaken since 1990, and the new structures and institutional arrangements that emerged from such reforms and adaptations are evaluated in the context of their ability to meet the new requirements of European security. Despite considerable debate, NATO emerged as the institution best suited to deal with the new security threats to Europe and to serve the national interests of the major West European powers, even to the point of fostering the development of an autonomous European defence indentity.

NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY AND TURKEY

In the aftennath of the Bosnian and Kosova tragedies, the European public opinion has criticised European governments for not preventing ethnic conflİcts in the continent and indeed the public opinion has been right in its judgement. Europe has be en perceived as incapable of making any headway on the problems until the VS and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to intervene to the recent tragedies Iived at the end of the 1990s. The political wiII was lacking, but alsa the structure to prevent conflİcts. The resulting situation raised the question of the need to set up a new comprehensive security and defence system that wiII give Europe greater responsibiIities for its defence by establishing European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), which has been a long historic aspiration for many Europeans.

The european security and defence identity

The european security and defence identity

Sécurité et interdépendance

Security and Interdependence, by Lord Robertson Europe's experience since the Second World War, through the European Union and NATO, demonstrates that interdependence contributes to security. The NATO area has thus become a haven of stability in which war has become impossible. NATO nevertheless remains vulnerable to crises in the Euro-Atlantic region, as was the case in Kosovo, where intervention was required. The continent's security also involves close cooperation with Russia and the countries of the Partnership for Peace. Moreover, the durability of the Transatlantic ties implies fairer burden-sharing within the Alliance, that is, the emergence of a stronger European security and defence identity within the latter.

Building a European defence capability

For much of the 1990s, the US and the EU have been trying to define a new transatlantic bargain that balances Europe's desire for a broader and more independent political role with its continued reliance on US and NATO military capabilities. The goal is a European security and defence identity that allows the EU to conduct military missions with command structures, forces and assets that are normally assigned to NATO. Four practical steps are necessary. First, the Western European Union (WEU) should be abolished and its functions divided between the EU and NATO. Second, European militaries must enhance their capability for projecting and sustaining power. Third, NATO's military structure should be adapted to incorporate French participation, even without the full reintegration of France into NATO. Finally, these steps are unlikely to lead very far unless the Americans and Europeans can establish better patterns for managing inevitable transatlantic disagreements over crises like Bosnia or Iraq.