Developing a European Intervention Force

Abstract

THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES THE ATTEMPT by members of the European Union (EU) and allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to work out the political details of a European intervention capacity. In the so- called Berlin model of June 1996, which built on the agreements reached in Brussels in January 1994, NATO members agreed to construct the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) inside their organization; if, however, the European members needed to act on their own (that is, without the United States), NATO would make its assets available.(f.1) To give substance to the plan, NATO began to develop Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) - a force model that combines different services such as army, navy, and air force with different national contributions into one command and control framework - that would allow the Western European Union (WEU) to conduct operations with NATO's agreement and with NATO assets.Two events precipitated preparations for a European intervention force. First, in late 1998 at an Anglo-French summit in St Malo, Britain dropped its opposition to substantial EU involvement in military affairs and joined France in calling for an autonomous European crisis response capacity. The second key event was the 1999 war in Kosovo. In the words of NATO's new secretary general, George Robertson, 'The European Security and Defence Identity is no longer just an attractive idea, it has become an urgent necessity.'(f.2) The general consensus in the aftermath of the war was that Europe had to enhance its political and military machinery so that it could respond to crises such as Kosovo without relying completely on the United States.(f.3)Behind NATO-EU manoeuvring, there are deep worries on both sides of the ocean about the future of Euro-Atlantic co-operation. The Europeans want to be able to handle a crisis like Kosovo on their own, but they do not want to lose NATO to congressional overreaction, especially as they peer anxiously over their shoulders at Russia. They also worry about unilateralist and high-tech strategies emanating from Washington that might dictate all future security operations in Europe. Americans, for their part, want the Europeans to stay interoperable with them in their rapid ascent into technologically sophisticated military capabilities. But they realize that with such capability comes the potential for independent European interests, and they know that France and others would be keen to articulate this. They are also apprehensive about a perceived European desire to be free of American leadership.The British move at St Malo towards a practical and semiautonomous European defence capacity changed the inter-organizational landscape between NATO and the EU to an extent not seen since the end of the cold war. Although it seems premature to herald, as some have done, the St Malo declaration as the 'final stage of European integration,'(f.4) it goes a step beyond the ESDI-in-NATO agreed upon in 1996. It adds: ready access to key NATO assets for a European force that sequences its decisions with NATO but might not operate under NATO's auspices. The Americans and Europeans have both made compromises to create a space in which European decision-making and military capabilities can grow without violating the dogmas of unnecessary duplication, unilateral decoupling, and no discrimination against non-EU members. The formula works as follows: in a crisis, the Europeans give NATO the first shot at dealing with it. If NATO declines, the Europeans may act autonomously with a reasonable expectation of using certain NATO assets, including those directly supported by the United States.In analyzing developments over the last two years, it is apparent that the politics of European security and defence are far from settled and that European-American tensions over the essence of a European defence identity remain acute. Since Kosovo, the Americans have been bent on the rapid build-up of military capability, while the Europeans have pursued more independent 'say and do' from NATO. …