Defence Identity Research Articles

NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity

NATO's Dilemma and the Elusive European Defence Identity

NATO after the Cold War, 1991–1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative

With the end of the Cold War, opportunities long foreclosed to Europe came back into view on the horizon. The prospect of Western Europe providing for its own security became a realistic proposition for the first time in fifty years. The French government developed a strategy for replacing US power with a more cohesive European Union security and defence identity which garnered substantial support from other European NATO countries, especially Germany, resulting in an intensive four-year competition over which institution would form the basis of Europe's security and defence capabilities. By the end of 1995, NATO had decisively won this contest, due to rapid reconfiguration of NATO's military structures and the test for both organisations of responding to Yugoslavia's collapse. In the final analysis, it was the military capability of NATO that defeated the French alternative security structure. This article tells the story of that evolution.

Germany and the limits of soft security

The Federal Republic of Germany has since the end of the Cold War been at a crossroad in defining its role in European security. On the one hand, its contribution to democratic reform and economic stabilization in North Central Europe has enhanced enormously the prospects of representative government there; on the other, Germany remains wed to an outdated concept of military security and is reluctant to commit either the fiscal resources or the political capital to assume a role commensurate with Germany's importance in the development of a European Security and Defense Identity. Moreover, Bonn's precipitous diplomacy in the recognition of the breakaway Yugoslav states of Croatia and Slovenia betrays a willingness to permit Germany's allies to assume the less profitable burdens of hard security.

Adapting French defence to the new geostrategic context

France is currently engaged upon a reform of its military and defence structures more far‐reaching than at any time in its recent history. The decision to rejoin the Military Committee of the Atlantic Alliance has important implications for future operations and brings France once more into the centre of European defence. Here General Douin, as Chief of the French Defence Staff, outlines the context in which these reforms are taking place, the key concepts behind them and the conditions for success. The objectives include a restructuring of French forces, including the end of conscription, fulfilling regional and global responsibilities with an increased force projection capability and working with Allies to form a European security and defence identity. General Douin concludes that these reforms, together with continuing financial support from the government, will equip France with the fully modernised and operational forces necessary to meet her commitments into the next century.

The UK's approach to the European security and defence identity

The Western European nations have agreed to_ create a European Security and Defence Identity within the NATO framework. This is in accordance with the British official view. Richard Hatfield here outlines the British position which emphasises that NATO has been and still is an effective and efficient defence system for the European states. Though being satisfied with NATO as a framework for European defence he believes nevertheless that certain things can be done to improve European effectiveness, the core of which should be to establish a common view in Europe which will be the basis for military operations. Adapting both internal and external agendas in NATO is the way to flexibility and modernisation of the Alliance. European security including transatlantic and Russian dimensions, is central, but Europe is larger than NATO. ESDI must be more than just a new label—it must give a reality to the concept, incorporating a specific form of European identity covered by the ESDI banner within NATO, drawing on established Alliance structure.

Europe's security and defence identity: The Western European union's operational development

The evolution of ESDI involves NATO, the EU and WEU. Here Brigadier Messervy‐Whiting focuses on the WEU and, in particular, on the military aspects of its continuing operational development. He uses the six functional fields of communications, coordination, intelligence, logistics, operations and plans as the framework to demonstrate some of the progress made, in the context of ‘B3’ — the Birmingham (WEU), Berlin and Brussels (NATO) Ministerial Meetings last year.

Constructing a European Defence Identity: The Perspectives of Britain, France and Germany

Constructing a European Defence Identity: The Perspectives of Britain, France and Germany

European security: the end of architecture and the new NATO

This article looks at the three institutions which lie at the heart of the debate about European security after the Cold War-NATO, the WEU and the EU-and in particular at the changing relationship between them. Focusing on the June 1996 meeting of NATO'sforeign ministers, and the development of the Combined Joint Task Force idea, this article asks how and why the European security debate developed as it did in 1996, and what a European Security and Defence Identity might actually amount to.

Defence policy and integration in Western Europe

This article considers the recent debates over the possible creation of a European defence identity, focusing in particular on the links, if any, such an organisation might have with the European Union and its institutions. It is divided into three sections. The first considers discussions concerning such a European defence organisation prior to the end of the Cold War. The second examines the debates which led to the signing of the EUT and examines the content of that Treaty. Finally, the article investigates debates on European defence in the framework of the current review of the Maastricht Treaty. It demonstrates that, since the early 1950s, defence has featured sporadically, if at all, on the agenda of European integration. It goes on to argue that whilst, especially in the aftermath of the EUT, some commentators expressed confidence that a corner had been turned and that Europe was on the way to providing itself with a defence identity of its own, less than month into the IGC called to review the Maastricht Treaty, it appears that European union will not succeed in providing itself with such an organisation.

The roles and challenges of the British armed forces

As we are always being remind ed, the new geo‐political landscape in‐which we all now live has entailed a number of changes and challenges for the armed forces. As Chief of the Defence Staff Field Marshal Sir Peter Inge is particularly well placed to evaluate the key issues brought into play—NATO, with its Partnership for Peace Programme Enlargement and the CJTF concept the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and a new emphasis on crisis management He outlines the specific challenges for the UK armed forces and fundamental ingredients’ formaintaining a full war‐fighting capability, Field Marshal Inge concludes: with a ‘discussion of the most‐ pressing current problem— Bosnia and the operation of the IFOR mission re‐emphasising the determination to successfully complete a complex and difficult job on schedule to the lasting benefit of those on the ground

France Announces More Active Role in NATO; Ministers Appoint New Secretary General, Discuss Bosnia and PfP: Ministerial Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, December 5-6

The summit of July 1994 marked an important stage in the history of the Atlantic alliance. On this occasion, the chiefs of state of our governments defined the principle directions for the Alliance in the coming years: on one hand, that the Alliance should engage itself resolutely in new missions required by the new strategic realities in Europe; on the other, that it should adapt its structures towards the end of bringing its full weight to bear on the development of a European Security and Defense Identity.

Disconcerted Europe: The Search for a Security Architecture

Part 1 Institutional context: European security and defence cooperation during the Cold War, Charles Krupnick the formative years of the new NATO - diplomacy from London to Rome, Alexander Moens the European community and Western European union, Anthony Forster the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Christopher Anstis. Part 2 The role of the major powers: not what they wanted - American policy and the European security and defence identity, C. Krupnick the United Kingdom, A. Forster German security policy in the new European order, Roy Rempel France, Anand Menon. Conclusion: failures of the first round and a proposal for a new strategy, A. Moens and C. Anstis.

The Prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity

The Prospects for a European Security and Defence Identity

Integrating European security through space

For decades, Western European nations have been comparatively uninterested in the military use of space, largely content to rely on the far greater resources of the USA in this area. Today, however, the traditional belief that the security requirements of ‘the West’ are synonymous with those of the USA is increasingly open to challenge. A new European defence identity is emerging, keen to achieve greater autonomy in the security field, albeit remaining within the overarching framework of NATO. Consequently there is a growing requirement for indigenous European capabilities in terms of military space assets. This requirement has been met in part by the establishment, by the Western Union, of a satellite centre in Spain, which currently analyses commercially procured satellite imagery. The centre's capabilities may be expanded if the WEU states decide to add a space-based element — either their own satellite system, or participation in an existing multinational programme. Such a decision is due to be taken towards the end of 1995. This paper concludes by briefly examining the political and security implications of such a decision.

Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Notwithstanding the fact that weapons have lost much of their relevance in the post Cold War era, they are still the object of heavy disputes on both sides of the Atlantic. One central issue is the question whether weapons should have a future role at all. The strategic community in the United States is particularly eloquent in arguing the pros and cons of deterrence as a means of maintaining stability in a world with an increasing number of players. A second dimension of the current debate is the problem of how to arrange deterrence in the future. This is of particular importance for the European and non-nuclear states. The ongoing process of creating a true European Union, including a European Security and Defense Identity, will lead sooner or later to the question of how to integrate the nuclear element in a future European security structure.

A European security and defense identity— what role for the United States?

All practical steps toward a European security and defense identity (ESDI) must not preclude the possibility of a common defense, while assuming that intergovernmental cooperation remains the modus procedendi for the present. Germany still requires an active U.S. role in Europe to strategically counterbalance Russia. The Western European Union (WEU) must continue to play its double role vis a vis both NATO (the European pillar) and the European Union (its military arm). To this end, U.S. liaison or observer status should be established at the WEU.

From independence to cooperation: France, NATO and European security

The end of the Cold War necessarily called into question the role of Europe's security institutions, and the attitudes of the major Western powers towards them. After 40 years of monotonous stability, reform became a necessity. Yet whereas its partners (notably Britain and the United States) pressed ahead with the reform of NATO structures in order to ensure the survival of the alliance after 1989, France, although having criticized the workings of the transatlantic security system for many years, was unable to stamp its influence on the shifting European security landscape. French policies towards European security institutions are, however, undergoing a major transformation. Although the roots of this change can, in part, be traced back to previous Socialist governments, it was under the Balladur government that it became most marked. Yet belated adjustment to the security imperatives of post-Cold War Europe has come too late to aid the realization of the French vision of an independent European defence identity emerging out of the ashes of the Cold War.*

Is there a Common European Defence Identity? The Views of Officers of Eight European Countries

Is there a Common European Defence Identity? The Views of Officers of Eight European Countries

Western European Union: Rhetoric and Reality (Essay)

This paper briefly outlines the historical evolution of the Western European Union, from its origins in the Brussels Treaty to WEU’s recent linkage with the process of European integration. Particular attention is paid to the political and military development of WEU as this relates to the apparent goal of eventual Western European defense integration. It is argued that in spite of the clamour to establish a European Defense Identity under WEU, however, the Europeans do not have a practical short-term alterative to the present situation of military dependence upon the United States and NATO.

UK perspectives of current security arrangements

In his discussion of European security architechture, Rear Admiral Tod examines the range of organisations and institutions involved and likens them to a web of overlapping and mutually supportive strands. At the centre is NATO, which he discusses from its initial conception to changes spurred as a result of the end of the Cold War and the conflict in former Yugoslavia—the new military strategy and peacekeeping. He analyses the role of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and issues‐of NATO reform, in particular enlargement and ‘partnership for peace’. The WEU is explored as a focus for a burgeoning Euro‐peon defence identity and the CSCE as a forum for building foundations of confidence and trust, while the United Nations is recognised as a vital element in need of reform. Together, these structures and mechanisms allow for flexibility of response to the risks, crises and varying needs of European Security.