Conflict Game Research Articles

Power allocation between radar and jammer using conflict game theory

AbstractConflict game theory is employed to analyze the countermeasure relationship between radar systems and jammers. To address this issue, a novel utility function and a Conflict Power Allocation Game (CPAG) algorithm are introduced for determining the Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution of the game. The utility function enables the calculation of optimal power response functions for both the radar system and the jammer, with the NE solution of the CPAG algorithm obtained through numerical computation. Simulation results demonstrate the convergence of the proposed CPAG algorithm to the NE solution, validating its efficacy. Finally, an analysis of the relationship between the utility function and pricing factors is conducted based on the proposed CPAG algorithm and simulation outcomes.

Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting

This study addresses the emergence of (unarmed) peace and investments in arms within a guns-vs-butter conflict setting. We introduce a novel feature within the conflict game and separate the decision to start a conflict and the investment in arms, following the theoretical framework of Garfinkel and Syropoulos (2021). Based on this model we experimentally examine the emergence of peace while varying resource inequality among conflicting parties. We find that inequality leads to more conflicts and higher investments in arms. Despite these trends, achieving a state of unarmed peace is rarely observed in both treatments. Our results highlight the critical role of trust in attaining peaceful outcomes and show that armed peace, although not an optimal strategy in either treatment, is one of the most frequently chosen decisions.

Asymmetric conflict games with an extremist

This paper extends the conflict game of Baliga and Sjöström (2012) by allowing for an asymmetry between players. We demonstrate that (i) a player with a greater net gain from playing a hawkish action is more likely to play a hostile action and thereby the risk of war increases with it, and that (ii) an extremist cannot manipulate the conflict via cheap-talk message whenever the properties of actions are asymmetric between the players.

Conflict Under Incapacitation and Revenge: A Game-Theoretic Exploration

Abstract In real life, winning a conflict sometimes does not end the conflict. Revenge motivations can stay and provide momentum to the conflict, thus leading to further escalation of the conflict. This is known as the value effect or vengeance effect of revenge. However, the presence of revenge can lead to de-escalation of the conflict out of self-deterrence and sometimes retaliation out of revenge is not possible if the combatant is incapacitated. Hence, the impact of revenge on the level of violence is a priori not clear. This paper is an attempt to answer that question. Using a two-period game of conflict this paper tries to show how desire and capabilities of the combatants to exact revenge can influence the intensity of the conflict. This paper shows the following: how the strategies of the combatants are influenced by the value effect of revenge, self-deterrence and incapacitation of the combatants; how the stronger combatant is in a favourable position in the conflict and can prevent its opponent from going into second period conflict out of revenge; when the combatants are equally strong the intensity of the conflict starts falling with time. It also lays out some real-life conflicts and existing empirical work to support the results.

Does empathy make us less maximizers? Empirical proof against rational choice

We analyzed how empathy affects rational decision-making during a conflict situation. The study collected empirical evidence from eighty volunteers who participated in a laboratory experiment where Palacio et al.'s (2015) 2x2 Conflict Game, as well as Davis's Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) were used to measure empathy and rational choice. Volunteers were divided into four groups, two of which played with the same person, while the other two played with a random partner. The study found that dimensions of empathy can both increase and decrease rational choice, with no single effect. Interestingly, the study also found that proximity to empathic situations promotes altruistic behavior. The results were correlated using a Generalized Linear Model. Overall, this study provides important insights into how empathy can influence decision-making during conflict, which has implications for fields such as psychology and economics.

The effect of similarity perceptions on human cooperation and confrontation

By assuring aversive actions are followed by similarly aversive reactions, legislators of antiquity aimed to reduce belligerence and aggression. In the present study we show how similarity perceptions drive cooperation and confrontation across several strategic decision types. Examining the choices made in three one-shot symmetric conflict games: the prisoner’s dilemma, the chicken, and the battle of the sexes, we show how a short encounter with a stranger accounts for the formation of subjective similarity perceptions, which together with the expected payoffs of the game determine the choice of the preferred alternative. We describe the role of similarity perceptions for all two-by-two games, specifically for a subset of fifty-seven games that are sensitive to similarity perceptions with the opponent. We then suggest that this mechanism, by which individuals maximize expected payoffs, is key to the understanding of the evolution of cooperation and confrontation.

The Effects of Video Games on Digital Generations and their Relationship to the Concept of Social Isolation (Arabic)

The study aims to identify the impact of electronic video games on different categories of digital generations (Generations X, Y, Z, and Alpha) and their relationship to social isolation. The study used a survey tool on a sample of 237 individuals. Results showed a significant relationship between different age groups and preferred video games types. The study also found that Generation Alpha prefers war, conflict, and sport games; Generation Z prefers war and conflict games; Generation Y prefers racing games; while Generation X prefers strategic games. In addition, the study found no significant relationship between different age groups and sources of knowledge about electronic video games. For social context preferences, Generations Alpha and Z tend to play with friends, while Generations Y and Alpha prefer to play alone. Finally, the study found significant differences between different age groups and the scale of social isolation in favor of Generations Alpha and Z.

Red Queen and Red King Effects in cultural agent-based modeling: Hawk Dove Binary and Systemic Discrimination

ABSTRACT What endogenous factors contribute to minority (Red Queen) or majority (Red King) domination under conditions of coercive bargaining? We build on previous work demonstrating minority disadvantage in non-coercive bargaining games to show that under neutral initial conditions, majorities are advantaged in high conflict situations, and minorities are advantaged in low conflict games. These effects are a function of the relationship between (1) relative proportions of the majority and minority groups and (2) costs of conflict. Although both Red King and Red Queen effects can occur, we further show that agents’ increased initial propensity toward conflict advantages majorities.

An Efficient Minimal Text Segmentation Method for URL Domain Names

Text segmentation of the URL domain name is a straightforward and convenient method to analyze users’ online behaviors and is crucial to determine their areas of interest. However, the performance of popular word segmentation tools is relatively low due to the unique structure of the website domain name (such as extremely short lengths, irregular names, and no contextual relationship). To address this issue, this paper proposes an efficient minimal text segmentation (EMTS) method for URL domain names to achieve efficient adaptive text mining. We first designed a targeted hierarchical task model to reduce noise interference in minimal texts. We then presented a novel method of integrating conflict game into the two-directional maximum matching algorithm, which can make the words with higher weight and greater probability to be selected, thereby enhancing the accuracy of recognition. Next, Chinese Pinyin and English mapping were embedded in the word segmentation rules. Besides, we incorporated a correction factor that considers the text length into the F1-score to optimize the performance evaluation of text segmentation. The experimental results show that the EMTS yielded around 20 percentage points improvement with other word segmentation tools in terms of accuracy and topic extraction, providing high-quality data for the subsequent text analysis.

Rational Inattention Dynamics in Stochastic Games: Coordination and Conditioning

Decision-makers that choose information strategies instead of concrete actions elect stochastic choice rules that leave open the potential for errors, which can obfuscate the strategic interactions of players. This article establishes that dynamic, stochastic, games with rationally inattentive agents have Nash equilibria in which players coordinate their choice rules. When these choice rules are compliant with the predisposition of players towards particular actions, the Nash equilibria can be expressed in terms of dynamic logit rules. This result reduces finding Nash equilibria of this type to establishing a joint distribution of actions and states that accommodates the optimal behavior of all players. Logit rule Nash equilibria are used to study an example of strategic coordination, and an example of a zero-sum, strategic conflict game with sequential moves. The resulting equilibria of the second example involve strategies that exhibit conditioning characteristics and can be relevant for applications in principal-agent problems.

Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals

Can egalitarian norms or conventions survive the presence of dominant individuals who are ensured of victory in conflicts? We investigate the interaction of power asymmetry and partner choice in games of conflict over a contested resource. Previous models of cooperation do not include both power inequality and partner choice. Furthermore, models that do include power inequalities assume a static game where a bully's advantage does not change. They have therefore not attempted to model complex and realistic properties of social interaction. Here, we introduce three models to study the emergence and resilience of cooperation among unequals when interaction is random, when individuals can choose their partners, and where power asymmetries dynamically depend on accumulated payoffs. We find that the ability to avoid bullies with higher competitive ability afforded by partner choice mostly restores cooperative conventions and that the competitive hierarchy never forms. Partner choice counteracts the hyper dominance of bullies who are isolated in the network and eliminates the need for others to coordinate in a coalition. When competitive ability dynamically depends on cumulative payoffs, complex cycles of coupled network-strategy-rank changes emerge. Effective collaborators gain popularity (and thus power), adopt aggressive behavior, get isolated, and ultimately lose power. Neither the network nor behavior converge to a stable equilibrium. Despite the instability of power dynamics, the cooperative convention in the population remains stable overall and long-term inequality is completely eliminated. The interaction between partner choice and dynamic power asymmetry is crucial for these results: without partner choice, bullies cannot be isolated, and without dynamic power asymmetry, bullies do not lose their power even when isolated. We analytically identify a single critical point that marks a phase transition in all three iterations of our models. This critical point is where the first individual breaks from the convention and cycles start to emerge.

Adaptive density-based clustering algorithm with shared KNN conflict game

Recently, density-based clustering algorithms have been garnering considerable attention in the unsupervised learning field as they can identify arbitrary cluster shapes. However, classical density-based algorithms are non-backtracking such as density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN) and its improved variants. Therefore, the allocation of samples cannot be optimised during the clustering process. An incorrect division can cause subsequent errors. Furthermore, when the density is unevenly distributed, the globally uniform parameters will inevitably lead to catastrophic error consequences. To address these limitations, this study proposes an adaptive density-based clustering algorithm using the shared k-nearest neighbours (SKNN) conflict game (DC-SKCG). A local density-based adaptive cut-off distance-setting method is designed for the DC-SKCG, and a conflict game method based on SKNN is proposed to optimise the clustering process. Moreover, an automatic fusion mechanism for redundant high-density core regions is presented to (1) reduce the parameter sensitivity of the algorithm and (2) improve the parameter tolerance capacity. A series of experiments are conducted using various datasets demonstrate that DC-SKCG offers higher accuracy and robustness in most cases than state-of-the-art methods.

An endogenous-timing conflict game

Abstract We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjostrom, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.

Bargaining and War: On the Communication Equilibrium in Conflict Games

We present a version of Baliga and Sjostrom’s (2012a) conflict games with two asymmetric players. The players contemplate whether to take an active engagement action to compel the leader of a neighboring state (an extremist) to give up his risky weapons. We show that a player with greater damage from the extremist is more likely to choose an active engagement action than a player with lesser damage. Furthermore, we examine cheap-talk communication equilibria with the extremist. The likelihood of both players choosing the active engagement action decreases by a hawkish extremist who can send a provocative message, if both players are coordination types. If both players are opportunistic types, a dovish extremist can send an appeasement message that causes one player to be more active while another to be more inactive. Lastly, we show that there does not exist any other communication equilibrium for either kind of extremist, for any other combination of player types.

The evolution of taking roles

Individuals are randomly matched to play an ex-ante symmetric hawk-dove game. Individuals assume one of a finite set of observable labels and condition their action choice on their opponent’s label. We study the evolutionary stability of chosen labels and their social interaction structure. Evolutionarily stable social structures differ for games in which a dove player prefers the opponent to play hawk (anti-coordination games), and those in which everyone prefers their opponent to play dove (conflict games). Non-trivial hierarchical social structures can only emerge in anti-coordination games. Egalitarian social structures can emerge in both, but are more fragile in conflict games.

An Endogenous-Timing Conflict Game

We present an endogenous-timing conflict game of incomplete information under strategic complementarity. The model predicts multiple equilibria, in which the outcome follows either a simultaneous move game (Baliga and Sjostrom, 2004) or a sequential game, which improves social welfare. We study the three families of games in the laboratory using gender-balanced sessions. Our results suggest that: (i) social welfare is higher in the endogenous-timing and sequential games compared to the simultaneous game; (ii) men and women make similar decisions in the simultaneous and sequential-move games; and (iii) in the endogenous-timing game women are less willing to commit to the risky action.

Reading a short story changes children’s sustainable behavior in a resource dilemma

Fostering sustainable behavior in children and adolescents should be a central aim of today’s education. Even though the interplay of factors affecting sustainable behavior is complex, simple interventions can be effective too. In the current study, 10-year-olds (N = 132) were read a short story about two foresters who collectively used a forest to gain timber, facing a resource dilemma that involved striving for maximizing their individual profit while sustaining the forest. In the story, the foresters solved the dilemma in favor of the resource, thereby serving as positive role models. Children in the control condition were read a short informative story on urban gardening that did not include a dilemma or any moral cues. Before and after the intervention, children played a fishing conflict game to assess their sustainable behavior. Children who were presented with the positive role models played the game after the intervention more sustainably than before the intervention. Children in the control condition, in contrast, played it even less sustainably after the intervention. The results suggest that a short intervention might affect children’s sustainable behavior.

Escalation in conflict games: on beliefs and selection

We study learning and selection and their implications for possible effort escalation in a simple game of dynamic property rights conflict: a multi-stage contest with random resolve. Accounting for the empirically well-documented heterogeneity of behavioral motives of players in such games turns the interaction into a dynamic game of incomplete information. In contrast to the standard benchmark with complete information, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium features social projection and type-dependent escalation of efforts caused by learning. A corresponding experimental setup provides evidence for type heterogeneity, for belief formation and updating, for self-selection and for escalation of efforts in later stages.

Effect of pedestrian judgement on evacuation efficiency considering hesitation

In this paper, we propose a modification of cellular automata models by introducing the local density field and the hesitation time cost to study the effect of pedestrian judgement of the environment on evacuation. Some studies have employed the surrounding density to describe the decision-making process, while we believe that the anticipation of pedestrians’ moving direction within the visual range has a great impact on evacuation. In addition, the hesitation time cost can be used to illustrate the loss of payoff in the conflict game. Simulation results show that either the presence of too many cooperators or defectors in the evacuation group is not conducive to the safe evacuation. The time cost is the least when the number of cooperators is almost equal to the one of defectors. It is found that heterogeneous pedestrian speeds can improve the evacuation efficiency to a certain extent. The total evacuation time can be reduced if 20% of the pedestrians slow down. Moreover, the vision radius is an essential factor of the evacuation. The evacuation time is the shortest when the radius is about 4 cells.

Adaptive learning in large populations.

We consider the adaptive learning rule of Harley (J Theor Biol 89:611-633, 1981) for behavior selection in symmetric conflict games in large populations. This rule uses organisms' past, accumulated rewards as the predictor for future behavior, and can be traced in many life forms from bacteria to humans. We derive a partial differential equation for the distribution of agents in the space of stimuli to select a particular strategy which describes the evolution of learning in heterogeneous populations. We analyze the solutions of the PDE model for symmetric [Formula: see text] games. It is found that in games with small residual stimuli, adaptive learning rules with larger memory factor converge faster to the optimal outcome.