Conflict Game Research Articles

ИГРОВОЙ ПОДХОД К РЕШЕНИЮ ЗАДАЧИ ОПТИМИЗАЦИИ ФОРМЫ УДАРНИКА И СТРУКТУРЫ СЛОИСТОЙ СРЕДЫ ПРИ ВЫСОКОСКОРОСТНОМ ПРОБИВАНИИ

The questions of the shape optimization of an axisymmetric rigid impactor and structure optimization of layered perforated plates are studied on the base of the Nash game approach for layered plates made on the given set of materials. As a criterion of the multipurpose optimization problem it is chosen the ballistic limit velocity under additional constraints on the impactor mass and the layered shield mass. The process of penetration of the rigid body into an elastic-plastic medium is modelled by the application of the two parts representation for the resistance force. It is proposed and realized the solution algorithm of the conflict game problem: the optimal shape impactor against the optimal structure layered shield. It is considered the case when the impactor mass is given and does not depend on its volume and also the case with the constraint on the impactor mass (volume). With the application of an evolution numerical method (genetic algorithm) the optimal shapes of penetrating bodied and corresponding optimal shield structures are found and analyzed for all cases. Keywords: multipurpose optimization, game approach, high speed penetration, layered structures, ballistic limit velocity. &nbsp

The Conflict Games: Getting Ready To Bring Mediation to the 2016 Brazil Olympics

The Olympic Games are the biggest sports gathering in the world. They are a mega‐event that depends on a complex combination of efforts, beginning with a city's nomination as a host candidate and only ending after the dissolution of the Local Organizing Committee.

Goals, Payoffs, and Classification of Games

This article shows that the conventional definition of pure conflict, pure common-interest and mixed-motive games based on the correlation of players’ payoffs, is inadequate. The reason is that payoffs do not always fully reflect potential complexity of players’ goals. I therefore generalize the standard model of strategic games by explicitly modeling players’ goals and propose a new definition of pure conflict, pure common-interest, and mixed-motive games based on mutual compatibility of players’ goals. I also show that the information about players’ goals can be useful for an analysis of various possibilities of how players can strategically modify the game to increase their equilibrium payoffs.

Incentives for Peace

Why are some peace agreements successful while others fail? In this paper I study under what conditions there exist successful peace contracts that guarantee peace as the unique equilibrium of an ongoing civil conflict. I develop a model where a government and a rebel group simultaneously decide whether they want to fight or not to gain control over some territory. If they fight they choose their military capacity that jointly determines the territory they control. If they don't fight their military capacity and territory control is determined by an exogenous peace contract. I show that if the agents only care about the fraction of territory they control, there are no peace contracts that make peace the unique equilibrium of the conflict game. In contrast successful peace contracts are possible when: i) agents sufficiently care about consumption, ii) the benefits of peace are large enough in comparison to the rents of war, and iii) the peace contract implies a partial disarmament of the player with the least territory control during war, although total disarmament is not always possible.

Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements, Bargaining, and Conflict

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage bargaining and conflict game with side-payments. In this game, residents (Proposers) make side-payment offers and contestants (Responders) decide whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. When subjects earn their roles, conflicts are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned rights impact behavior in three important ways: (1) residents who have earned their position persistently offer larger side-payments; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) residents whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully and exhibit greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher conflict intensity.

Why Can’t We Be Friends? - Entitlements and the Costs of Conflict

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments because Responders should always accept them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our experiment reveals that some individuals use this non-binding mechanism to avoid conflict. Moreover, when subjects earn their roles (Proposer or Responder), conflicts are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make larger offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict, but (3) Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully with greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher conflict intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to encourage agreement and increase welfare; thus, our findings highlight the important consequences of endogenizing the costs of conflict. Our analysis suggests that earned entitlements alter behavior by influencing the beliefs of Proposers about the willingness of Responders to accept a peaceful resolution. As a result, these Proposers make persistent high offers, and when their beliefs are disappointed by a Responder’s decision to accept a side-payment and still enter conflict, they retaliate.

Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict

We design an experiment to explore the impact of earned entitlements on the frequency and intensity of conflicts in a two-stage conflict game where players may attempt to use non-binding side-payments to avoid conflict. In this game, Proposers make offers and Responders decide simultaneously whether to accept the offers and whether to engage in a conflict. A simple theoretical analysis suggests that Proposers should never offer side-payments because Responders should always accept them and then still choose to enter conflict; however, our experiment reveals that some individuals use this non-binding mechanism to avoid conflict. Moreover, when subjects earn their roles (Proposer or Responder), conflicts are 44% more likely to be avoided than when roles are assigned randomly. Earned entitlements impact behavior in three important ways: (1) Proposers who have earned their position persistently make larger offers; (2) larger offers lead to a lower probability of conflict; but (3) Proposers whose offers do not lead to conflict resolution respond spitefully with greater conflict expenditure. Hence, with earned rights, the positive welfare effects of reduced conflict frequency are offset by higher conflict intensity. This result differs from previous experimental evidence from ultimatum games in which earned entitlements tend to encourage agreement and increase welfare; thus, our findings highlight the important consequences of endogenizing the costs of conflict. Our analysis suggests that earned entitlements alter behavior by influencing the beliefs of Proposers about the willingness of Responders to accept a peaceful resolution. As a result, these Proposers make persistent high offers, and when their beliefs are disappointed by a Responder’s decision to accept a side-payment and still enter conflict, they retaliate.

Modeling and solution of COA development based on timed influence net and game theory

The development of a course of action (COA) is one of key steps in operation planning. Considering the conflict game, resource restriction, and the influence of execution time, this paper establishes a COA development model based on the timed influence net and game theory. The given problem is solved by transforming it into a standard matrix game model. An example is provided to illustrate this model and its solution.

On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict

We introduce three extensions of the Hirshleifer–Skaperdas conflict game to study experimentally the effects of post-conflict behavior and repeated interaction on the allocation of effort between production and appropriation. Without repeated interaction, destruction of resources by defeated players can lead to lower appropriative efforts and higher overall efficiency. With repeated interaction, appropriative efforts are considerably reduced because some groups manage to avoid fighting altogether, often after substantial initial conflict. To attain peace, players must first engage in costly signaling by making themselves vulnerable and by forgoing the possibility to appropriate the resources of defeated opponents.

A Model of Offensive versus Defensive Technology

Offense-defense theory argues that conflict and war are more likely when offense has the advantage over defense. This paper's interest is in exploring how the prime hypotheses in offense-defense theory can be challenged when it comes to making predictions about conflicts caused by revisionist states (or terrorism). In this paper, I propose a model of a continuous time conflict game between two asymmetric states, in which a status quo state develops defensive technology and a revisionist state develops offensive technology, with incomplete information on the revisionist state's militancy level. The equilibrium analysis shows that the risk of terrorism is maximized when, overall, the offense-defense balance is relatively even. This paper's findings suggest an alternative framework in explaining asymmetric conflicts in the contemporary context, and provide insights into understanding the likelihood of terrorism.

Oxytocin motivates non-cooperation in intergroup conflict to protect vulnerable in-group members.

Intergroup conflict is often driven by an individual's motivation to protect oneself and fellow group members against the threat of out-group aggression, including the tendency to pre-empt out-group threat through a competitive approach. Here we link such defense-motivated competition to oxytocin, a hypothalamic neuropeptide involved in reproduction and social bonding. An intergroup conflict game was developed to disentangle whether oxytocin motivates competitive approach to protect (i) immediate self-interest, (ii) vulnerable in-group members, or (iii) both. Males self-administered oxytocin or placebo (double-blind placebo-controlled) and made decisions with financial consequences to themselves, their fellow in-group members, and a competing out-group. Game payoffs were manipulated between-subjects so that non-cooperation by the out-group had high vs. low impact on personal payoff (personal vulnerability), and high vs. low impact on payoff to fellow in-group members (in-group vulnerability). When personal vulnerability was high, non-cooperation was unaffected by treatment and in-group vulnerability. When personal vulnerability was low, however, in-group vulnerability motivated non-cooperation but only when males received oxytocin. Oxytocin fuels a defense-motivated competitive approach to protect vulnerable group members, even when personal fate is not at stake.

The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict

Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An “extremist,” who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements). (JEL D74, D82)

Reciprocity and Retaliation in Social Games With Adaptive Agents

Game theory has been useful for understanding risk-taking and cooperative behavior. However, in studies of the neural basis of decision-making during games of conflict, subjects typically play against opponents with predetermined strategies. The present study introduces a neurobiologically plausible model of action selection and neuromodulation, which adapts to its opponent's strategy and environmental conditions. The model is based on the assumption that dopaminergic and serotonergic systems track expected rewards and costs, respectively. The model controlled both simulated and robotic agents playing Hawk-Dove and Chicken games against subjects. When playing against an aggressive version of the model, there was a significant shift in the subjects' strategy from Win-Stay-Lose-Shift to Tit-For-Tat. Subjects became retaliatory when confronted with agents that tended towards risky behavior. These results highlight the important interactions between subjects and agents utilizing adaptive behavior. Moreover, they reveal neuromodulatory mechanisms that give rise to cooperative and competitive behaviors.

“Gostaria de se tornar Tenente”: oficiais da Guarda Nacional – um perfil socioeconômico no Brasil Meridional (1850-1870)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the National Guard officers’ corps during the Brazilian Empire. Considering mainly the men who participated in it during the period between 1850 and 1873, it seeks to understand factors involving social practices and behavioral interfaces of various subjects in a delimited context, viz. the former German settlement of Sao Leopoldo, in the Province of Rio Grande do Sul. Thus, it aims at unveiling games of cooperation and conflict, whose analysis focuses on the militia officer’ corps in order to sketch a socioeconomic profile of its members. Key words: National Guard, officers, ascension, Empire, socioeconomic profile.

Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts

We investigate parochial altruism, the combination of in-group altruism and out-group hostility, in an experimental conflict game preceded by a prisoner’s dilemma. Our data are consistent with parochial altruism, but cannot be explained by in-group pro-sociality or out-group hostility alone.

Side-payments and the costs of conflict

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve a dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 87% of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 39% of gains come from avoided conflicts and 61% from reduced conflict expenditures.

Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict

The Demsetz hypothesis states that secure claims to property arise when the value of creating those rights is sufficiently high. This paper examines the conditions under which this holds in an anarchy equilibrium in which players may allocate labor to production, to conflict, or to the public good of secure claims to property protection. In a simultaneous choice Nash equilibrium, no secure claims to property are created. However, if players play a sequential choice game in which secure claims to property protection occurs in the first stage, then the strategic benefit of reducing others’ subsequent conflict allocation causes secure claims to property to arise. Secure claims to property in a social contract are imperfect, but for sufficiently high productivity of resources, the social contract welfare dominates autocracy.

The Paradox of Revenge in Conflicts

The authors consider a two-period game of conflict between two factions, which have a desire for revenge. It is shown that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, the desire for revenge need not lead to escalation of the conflict. The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by two effects: a value of revenge effect (i.e., the benefit of exacting revenge) and a self-deterrence effect (i.e., the fear of an opponent’s desire to exact revenge). The authors construct examples where the equilibrium is such that the self-deterrence effect paradoxically outweighs the value effect and thereby decreases the factions’ aggregate effort below the level exerted in the no-revenge case. This paradox of revenge is more likely, the more elastically the benefit of revenge reacts to the destruction suffered in the past and the more asymmetric is the conflict. The authors discuss the implications of revenge-dependent preferences for welfare economics, evolutionary stability, and their strategic value as commitment devices.

Investment under Anarchy

This paper presents an experimental test of a 2-player, one-shot game of conflict in which we vary the strength of property rights and the return on investment. Our results suggest that stronger property rights reduce conflict and increase investment. Contrary to intuition, we find increasing the rate of return has practically no effect on investment and that this failure to stimulate investment is largely due to deficiencies in property right institutions.

Side-Payments and the Costs of Conflict

Conflict and competition often impose costs on both winners and losers, and conflicting parties may prefer to resolve the dispute before it occurs. The equilibrium of a conflict game with side-payments predicts that with binding offers, proposers make and responders accept side-payments, generating settlements that strongly favor proposers. When side-payments are non-binding, proposers offer nothing and conflicts always arise. Laboratory experiments confirm that binding side-payments reduce conflicts. However, 30% of responders reject binding offers, and offers are more egalitarian than predicted. Surprisingly, non-binding side-payments also improve efficiency, although less than binding. With binding side-payments, 87% of efficiency gains come from avoided conflicts. However, with non-binding side-payments, only 39% of gains come from avoided conflicts and 61% from reduced conflict expenditures.