Committee Of Imperial Defence Research Articles

Invasion, raids and army reform: the political context of ‘flotilla defence’, 1903-5

In response to the pressure of the invasion debates of 1903–5 the Admiralty developed a new strategy, ‘flotilla defence’, to counter arguments brought forward by the War Office. This concept was a purely political one; it was a cynical bid to mislead the Committee of Imperial Defence in order to secure naval funding. By placing ‘flotilla defence’ in this context this article will demonstrate that it was not, as has been claimed, a revolutionary naval strategy, but part of the polarization of defence policy which led to a breakdown in relations between the army and the navy.

The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training, and Deploying the British Army, 1902-1914, by Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly

The Edwardian period was a challenging time for the British army. Setbacks experienced during the unexpectedly costly and protracted war in South Africa at the turn of the century provoked grave concern about the efficiency of the nation’s armed forces. The end of Britain’s ‘splendid isolation’ in Europe, characterised by new diplomatic arrangements with France and Russia, raised new questions about the army’s strategic role, while the industrial and naval challenge from imperial Germany gave rise to renewed fears about the vulnerability of the British Isles to foreign invasion. In 1914 the British army would find itself, for the first time in a century, engaged in a struggle against a first-rate continental power. In their new book, Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly present an impressively detailed and wide-ranging study of the British army during the twelve years between the end of the conflict in South Africa and the outbreak of the Great War. Much of the existing scholarship on this period—including valuable work by John Gooch, Michael Howard, Brian Bond, and Hew Strachan—has been concerned with questions of strategy, or with institutions such as the General Staff and the Committee of Imperial Defence. By contrast, Bowman and Connelly, following the approach of historians such as Edward Spiers, Ian Beckett, and David French, focus on the army at the regimental level. This ‘bottom-up’ approach, examining the ways in which military policy was actually put into practice, proves an effective and fruitful one.

Reality-Check 1906–7: The British Government Recognizes the Limitations of its Power of Offence against the Ottoman Empire

The article deals with the British government's recognition of limitations of its power of defence against the Ottoman Empire. The material used comes mainly from the papers of the Committee of Imperial Defence.

Holding Still: The Private Life of an Air Raid

Holding Still: The Private Life of an Air Raid

Munich, London and ARP

We are currently witnessing a debate on the recreation of a central authority for London. In this connection it is illustrative to look at the role London County Council (LCC), the City and the Metropolitan Boroughs, played during the time of the Munich Crisis’. Here Robin Woolven assesses the impact of the Crisis on the local government of London. He argues that it is important to bear in mind the role the London authorities played at this time since it is unlikely that the establishment of a new local authority for London will mention any significant responsibilities with regard to civil defence. This was also the case with the establishment of the LCC, although its performance during the Second World War was impressive. In particular Robin Woolven looks at the subject of Mr Raid Precautions (ARP) which, despite concerns about involving local authorities on the part of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), was placed under LCC responsibility. Although preparations for a civil defence had begun, the Munich Crisis demonstrated its shortcomings. In fact, the Munich Crisis was seen as a godsend in London in so far as it provided a test of civil defence capabilities. Woolven argues that, although there were certain shortcomings in civil defence, the benefits of LCC involvement in its organisation were formidable.

Divided Attention: Britain's Perception of a German Threat to Her Eastern Position in 1918

While British statesmen had committed their country to war in 1914 largely to preserve the balance of power in Europe, throughout the first world war Britain's concern for continental affairs was seen largely through the prism of her imperial interests. The most compelling argument for the participation of Britain and the Dominions in a European war, made by Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey in 1911, was that the Royal Navy could not maintain command of the seas against a hostile power dominant in Europe. Hence the preponderance of one continental state, Grey argued, would mean the irrevocable shattering of the British imperial system.2 Until the end of 1917, London regarded this loss of naval supremacy as the most serious ramification of a German hegemony on the continent for Britain's imperial interests. Following Russia's collapse, however, the British came to regard a change in the European balance of power as having a far more direct impact on their imperial security. For several of the bleakest months of the war, the German overland threat to India dominated Britain's fears and came to be seen by many in official circles and not just 'imperialists' as the greatest danger to British security. These concerns illuminated the dichotomy never resolved during the war as well as the interdependence of Britain's continental and extra-European strategic interests. Up until just before the Great War, the defence of India, not of the European balance, was by far Britain's most important overseas defence priority. The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) assumed

The channel tunnel question at the committee of imperial defence, 1906–14

(1990). The channel tunnel question at the committee of imperial defence, 1906–14. Journal of Strategic Studies: Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 99-125.

The British Cabinet and the Anglo-French Staff Talks, 1905–1914: Who Knew What and When Did He Know It?

The role of the British cabinet in the Anglo-French military conversations prior to the First World War has been and remains controversial. The acrimonious debate within the government during November 1911 seems linked inextricably to the flood of angry memoirs that followed August 1914 and to the continuing historical debate over the actions and motivations of the various ministers involved. Two generations of researchers now have examined an enormous body of evidence, yet the leading modern scholars continue to publish accounts that differ on the most basic questions. Historians have proved no more able than the ministers themselves were to reconcile the contradictory statements of honorable men. The persistence of these differences in historical literature demonstrates both the continuing confusion over the cabinet's role in the military conversations and the need for a renewed effort to resolve this confusion.The starting point for any discussion of the staff talks must be the recognition that the meaning of the term changed significantly over the nine years before the outbreak of World War I. The contacts began with a series of informal discussions between senior British and French officers during 1905. The first systematic conversations took place early in January 1906 under the authority of Lord Esher, a permanent member of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), and Sir George Clarke, the CID secretary. Later in that month a small group of ministers, including Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, sanctioned formal, ongoing exchanges between the two general staffs.

The Failure of British Espionage against Germany, 1907–1914

In June 1907 Arthur Balfour, the Conservative leader of the opposition, was visited at home by a group of civilian strategists. They were led by Charles Á Court Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, and had come to enlist his support for an official inquiry into the threat of a German attack on Great Britain. Balfour was presented with a lengthy memorandum of ‘Notes on Invasion…’ which explained their case, and described how the situation had changed since the committee of imperial defence had reported to him as prime minister on the French threat in 1903. This document explained that in the new circumstances invasion was not only possible, but could be rendered certain if Germany carried out her preparations in total secrecy and at great speed. Under the heading ‘Chances of a Surprise’, the paper noted that circumstances favoured Germany, because the assembly of an invading force could be explained ‘as part of the normal yearly training, manoeuvres, &c.’, and even the concentration of a strong fleet near Heligoland was no longer considered unusual.

To the western front: British war plans and the ‘military entente’ with France before the first world war

In November 1914 the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence produced a ‘Report on the Opening of the War’. In his notes towards this Report, Julian Corbett maintained that “our arrangements with the French Naval and Military Staff … fettered our freedom of action”, with the result that “our Army … became committed as an integral part of the allied line and we had to forego all the advantages of operating independently on a line of our own and at our own selected moment, in order to break into the German scheme after it had developed”.

St. John Brodrick and Army Reform, 1901–1903

Edwardian England has become an increasingly significant period for scholarly research. One of the more carefully examined subjects is the interrelationship between politics and army reform. The debacles of the South African War forced the governments to examine England's army, and reforms emerged after 1901. Historians have concentrated on the efforts of Balfour's administration of 1902-05 and Haldane's sojourn at the War Office from 1906 to 1912; these periods witnessed the emergence of the Committee of Imperial Defence and the reorganization of the War Office, the shaping of the General Staff and the development of the British Expeditionary Force. All of these have been subjected to detailed examination — notably, the C. I. D. in recent works by Peter Fraser and Nicholas d'Ombrain, and the War Office by W. S. Hamer.There is, however, at least one gap in the historical literature on politics and army reform: St. John Brodrick's term as Secretary of State for War, 1901-03. An understanding of Brodrick's activities is necessary, since he was, of course, the first War Secretary to attempt reforms as a response to the obvious shortcomings of the army in the South African War. A careful examination will explain why he failed in many of his programs, the political consequences of these failures, and some of his more positive contributions.The breakdown of the British army in the first few months of the South African War, which began in October 1899 and ended in May 1902, shocked and dismayed both the public and the Government.

Sir George Clarke's Career at the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1904–1907

Not much is generally known about the career of Sir George Sydenham Clarke as first secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence other than his arrival at Whitehall in 1904 and his departure under something of a cloud three years later. Yet Clarke's career is in many respects worthy of study. He can lay strong claim to being the first defence ‘bureaucrat’, and as such his career served to establish a pattern into which his successors had to fit themselves. His activities during his three years of office do much to illuminate the methods by which strategic decisions were reached and demonstrate the obstructions that beset the professional civil servant in such a milieu. The influence of the committee which he served has been the subject of considerable analysis and comment; Clarke's personal disposition helps to explain die remark of one scholar that, for a body occupying its influential position, the CID achieved relatively little.1 Finally, the manner of Clarke's going illustrates the political strength of the navalist lobby and of Sir John Fisher at a crucial time in the making of defence policy.

Norman Angell and The Great Illusion: An Episode In Pre-1914 Pacifism

On 11 January 1910 Lord Esher, a permanent non-government member of the Committee of Imperial Defence and a close confidant of King Edward VII, dispatched these encouraging words to a relatively unknown journalist: ‘Your book can be as epoch making as Seeley's Expansion of England or Mahan's Sea Power. It is sent forth at the right psychological moment, and wants to be followed up.’ The recipient of the letter, a Mr Ralph Lane (better known under the pseudonym of Norman Angell), had just begun to receive recognition for his small monograph, Europe's Optical Illusion, later revised and expanded into its more celebrated version, The Great Illusion. Esher's words were prophetic. The Great Illusion ran into numerous editions: it sold over two million copies from 1910 to 1913, in 1939 over half a million, and was translated into twenty-five languages.

A preview of the great game in Asia – IV: British agents in the near east in the war of the second coalition, 1798–1801

Having to consult eighteen separate departments of government, scattered not only around London but also in Cairo, Khartoum, Aden, Baghdad, and India, made it very difficult, complained the assistant secretary to the committee of imperial defence, Sir Mark Sykes in 1916, to decide which of Britain's interests in the near east were the most vital, and how they could be best secured.2 Sykes might have added that this difficulty was nothing new. The government of India, in particular, were accustomed to formulating policy in their own right. From Canning's determination to shed himself of the affairs of Persia, by way of Lansdowne's inability to restrain Curzon's prancing in the puddle, as far as Grey's equally strong determination to ignore the views of Minto about the entente with Russia, the clash between the government of India and the foreign office became habitual. As each of these departments frequently had their own agents in the near east, carrying out British policy was little easier than deciding it. The most striking feature of the Great Game in Asia was the sight of troupes of Englishmen, each energetic, dedicated and opinionated, and each at best disregarding and at worst waging war against the others. The Harfordian Controversy, as Lord Minto called it, between Harford Jones and John Malcolm in Persia, was only the most notable feud of many. The practice was the legacy of the year 1798, and of the French invasion of Egypt. Many of the embarrassments faced by the British in the near east ever since stemmed from the confused execution of British policy during the war of the second coalition. To mock the British is too easy: matters were improving. In 1628 Sir Dodmore Cotton starved. And protecting an empire half the world away was very difficult while communications were so slow. In any crisis both the British government and the government of India were likely to act by themselves because there was not time enough to consult the other. Even if no reply was necessary, to send instructions to Fort William around the Cape of Good Hope in the best season of the year took at least four months, and usually five or SiX.3 At other times it took still longer. Wellesley suggested that the service might be improved, if regular packets sailed to and from India every month, carrying small cargoes to enable their captains to make the usual profit.4 The alternative routes were hardly more reliable. A regular service through Egypt the overland route was not possible because, although the beys were agreeable, the

V. The Baltic in British Diplomacy Before the First World War

The separation of Norway and Sweden in 1905 and the subsequent developments in Scandinavian politics evoked in British diplomacy a concern and an activity which are remarkable in view of the neglect into which Baltic questions had fallen during the preceding half-century. This new concern (like the previous neglect) can be explained satisfactorily only by reference to changing strategic circumstances. The diplomatic events are of interest not only because of the light which they shed upon the evolution of wider European politics at the time, but also because of their relation to strategic calculations; and they provide one of the rare instances before 1914 in which the direct influence of the Committee of Imperial Defence on foreign policy can actually be demonstrated.

Churchill at the Admiralty and the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1911–14

Churchill at the Admiralty and the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1911–14

V. The Issue of Army Reform in the Unionist Government, 1903–5

By the end of the nineteenth century the British Cabinet system was still distinguished by autonomy among the great departments of state. It was especially true of the War Office and the Admiralty. The claim has sometimes been made that coherence in the making of naval and military policy was finally achieved with the Committee of Imperial Defence after its formation in 1903. J. P. Mackintosh has shown that the claim can no longer be sustained, that War Office and Admiralty continued to form their separate plans with little or no direction from the C.I.D. They could have been induced to co-operate on the highest level only through pressure from the Cabinet and the prime minister. Neither Campbell-Bannerman nor Asquith took much interest in defence, and while Arthur Balfour did, yet he lacked the qualities of an effective administrator.‘He did not turn to the departments and insist that the conclusions of the Committee should be the basis on which they worked.’

British Official Histories of the Blockade of the Central Powers during the First World War

IN May I96I Her Majesty's Stationery Office announced the release for public sale of a hitherto confidential book on the blockade of Germany and its allies which had been written by Archibald C. Bell of the Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defence, in the Ig3o's.' Since this was one of three studies of the subject produced for official use and since the other two volumes are now available, it seems useful to consider them all in a historiographical review. The first to be printed was written by the then Lieutenant Commander W. E. Arnold-Forster, RNVR, who was attached to the Trade Division of the Admiralty in the early months of the war and who later served as the Admiralty's representative on a variety of committees connected with economic warfare. This book, The Economic Blockade, i9i4-i9i9, was printed in May i920 as a Naval Staff Monograph. Although it was declassified in I942, it was only recently that I was informed of this fact as a result of inquiries made by Professor W. N. Medlicott and Mr. R. W. Mason, the Foreign Office librarian.2 The second book, History of the Blockade, whose preface is dated June i, I920, was written by the well-known historian H. W. C. Davis, then vicechairman in the War Trade Intelligence Department.3 Although a copy of this book was sent by the Comptroller General, Department of Overseas Trade, Development and Intelligence, to the Copyright Office of the British Museum on August 24, I92I, and, according to the officials in the State Paper Room, was never entered in the Suppressed Book Catalogue, I did not discover its

The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914

The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914

Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence; 1885-1959.Franklyn Arthur Johnson

<i>Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence; 1885-1959.</i>Franklyn Arthur Johnson