A preview of the great game in Asia – IV: British agents in the near east in the war of the second coalition, 1798–1801

Abstract

Having to consult eighteen separate departments of government, scattered not only around London but also in Cairo, Khartoum, Aden, Baghdad, and India, made it very difficult, complained the assistant secretary to the committee of imperial defence, Sir Mark Sykes in 1916, to decide which of Britain's interests in the near east were the most vital, and how they could be best secured.2 Sykes might have added that this difficulty was nothing new. The government of India, in particular, were accustomed to formulating policy in their own right. From Canning's determination to shed himself of the affairs of Persia, by way of Lansdowne's inability to restrain Curzon's prancing in the puddle, as far as Grey's equally strong determination to ignore the views of Minto about the entente with Russia, the clash between the government of India and the foreign office became habitual. As each of these departments frequently had their own agents in the near east, carrying out British policy was little easier than deciding it. The most striking feature of the Great Game in Asia was the sight of troupes of Englishmen, each energetic, dedicated and opinionated, and each at best disregarding and at worst waging war against the others. The Harfordian Controversy, as Lord Minto called it, between Harford Jones and John Malcolm in Persia, was only the most notable feud of many. The practice was the legacy of the year 1798, and of the French invasion of Egypt. Many of the embarrassments faced by the British in the near east ever since stemmed from the confused execution of British policy during the war of the second coalition. To mock the British is too easy: matters were improving. In 1628 Sir Dodmore Cotton starved. And protecting an empire half the world away was very difficult while communications were so slow. In any crisis both the British government and the government of India were likely to act by themselves because there was not time enough to consult the other. Even if no reply was necessary, to send instructions to Fort William around the Cape of Good Hope in the best season of the year took at least four months, and usually five or SiX.3 At other times it took still longer. Wellesley suggested that the service might be improved, if regular packets sailed to and from India every month, carrying small cargoes to enable their captains to make the usual profit.4 The alternative routes were hardly more reliable. A regular service through Egypt the overland route was not possible because, although the beys were agreeable, the