Chinese Communist Youth League Research Articles

Reinventing Fashion as an Affective Apparatus by China's Youth: Bilibili, Danmaku Commentaries, and the Online Hanfu Ceremony During the COVID-19 Outbreak

Hanfu, an attire newly reinvented by China's youth, has been revived as traditional Chinese attire and further reconstructed as a symbol of China's emerging cultural identity. During the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, the annual National Costume Day, launched in 2018 by the Chinese Communist Youth League, transitioned into an online event on Bilibili, an emerging media platform in China. Known as the online Hanfu ceremony, this National Costume Day comprised self-produced short films contributed by Hanfu supporters who created videos during the lockdown. This article employs a case study approach focusing on the online Hanfu ceremony to delve into the impacts of such an event in the wake of a national health crisis. Its results indicate that Hanfu served as an affective apparatus to gather Chinese people online, evoking feelings of nationalism through the notion of cultural confidence. By assembling as a community online via Bilibili, younger Chinese people were able to experience a sense of belonging and affective moments of attachment. Such positive affective sentiments provided solace and cohesion, aiding individuals in navigating the collective ordeal of COVID-19, thereby serving the nation through configuring Hanfu as an affective apparatus—a tool for constituting solidarity.

An Unaccepted Official Quora: The Process of Guiding Online Youth Opinion by the Chinese Communist Youth League

Abstract: With reference to an online platform, Qingnian zhisheng, under the auspices of the Chinese Communist Youth League, this article focuses on the process by which the Chinese government guides the public opinions of young netizens. An authoritarian performance appraisal system was adopted to command and monitor the construction and promotion process of local agencies in a top-down and hierarchical approach. Under the increasingly strict appraisal requirements, the widening contradiction between state ideology and young netizens' demands has added a burden to grassroots bureaucrats' workload and eventually forced them to deviate from the original policy objective of online youth opinion guidance by fabricating performance appraisal data.

Where there is panic, the media are close by

Abstract The widespread panic associated with media exposure is a serious challenge to worldwide governments in the prevention and control of the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, alleviating negative social emotions, particularly panic, is an urgent issue for the state media. By using the comments of a Weibo post from The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League, drawing on the notion of extrinsic emotion regulation, this paper conducts a detailed analysis of negative emotions regulation through discourse strategies by the Chinese state media and their effects in the context of COVID-19. The results demonstrate that, by exploiting language strategies, the state media can arouse positive emotions amongst users, thus distract the public from experiencing negative emotions. In addition, the state media participate in online interactions, thereby creating positive public emotional spaces. This study indicates that digital platforms like Weibo, occasionally equipped with emotionalized narrative, are of significant value in the regulation of negative emotions in public crisis contexts.

The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization, by Konstantinos D. Tsimonis. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021. 211 pp. €99.00/£90.00/US$120.00 (cloth).

<i>The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization</i>, by Konstantinos D. Tsimonis. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2021. 211 pp. €99.00/£90.00/US$120.00 (cloth).

TSIMONIS, Konstantinos. 2021. The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam: Amste

TSIMONIS, Konstantinos. 2021. The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization. Amsterdam: Amste

Book Review: The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization by Konstantinos D. Tsimonis

Book Review: <i>The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization</i> by Konstantinos D. Tsimonis

The Chinese Communist Youth League, Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization, by Konstantinos D. Tsimonis

The Chinese Communist Youth League, Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization, by Konstantinos D. Tsimonis

Konstantinos Tsimonis, The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization

Konstantinos Tsimonis, The Chinese Communist Youth League: Juniority and Responsiveness in a Party Youth Organization

WITHDRAWN: Assessing the risks of teenagers' socialization and exploring the healthy personality development under the backgrounds of internet society and time-space transformation.

Ahead of Print article withdrawn by publisher.

Social Capital and Self-Rated Health: Empirical Evidence from China.

This study assesses the relationship between social capital and self-reported health (SRH) by comparing different genders and ages. It utilizes data from the 2016 China Family Panel Study data with a sample of 30,657 adult individuals from 25 provincial-level administrative regions in China. This was a cross-sectional study conducted with computer-assisted face-to-face interviews to assess social capital and self-rated health among Chinese adults. A multi-level Poisson regression model is employed to model social capital-related dependent variables using the independent variable of fair/poor health status. In terms of social relations, mobile phone use can improve men’s health. However, this effect is insignificant for women. Moreover, gender and age interact with the relationship between social capital and individual health. The relationship between trust and self-rated health is not significantly different between men and women. The frequency of feeling lonely and the lack of feelings for the community in which they live have a negative impact on self-rated health, but there are no obvious differences in terms of gender. The number of meals per week with family members is negatively correlated with men’s SRH, but there is no correlation with adult women 41 and above. Lack of help from neighbors is negatively correlated with men’s health, but not with that of adult women 40 and below. Being a member of the Chinese Communist Party or a member of the Chinese Communist Youth League is positively correlated with SRH for women 60 and above.

The Strength of a Weak Organization: The Communist Youth League as a Path to Power in Post-Mao China

AbstractHow can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.

Questions on the Study of “The Communist Youth League and China Elite Politics” in Western Circles of Politics

The role of the Chinese Communist Youth League within China's politics is significant. But, such important institution has received insufficient analysis for a long time. Since Hu Jintao's coming into power, a reasonable numbers of cadres, with the youth league working experience, have entered the China's elite politics. And this institution arouses the focus of Western scholars. However, limited by the bias and the misunderstanding, scholars from the Western political science regarded the youth league as the foundation of certain political faction, not an institution of assisting the elite circulation for the party. Under the purpose of deepening the understanding of the research approach of the English world, this article is going to systematically analyze the former researches of the youth league in Western world.

On The Art Of Making Business Plan - A Successful Case

Abstract “Challenge Cup” business plan competition of Chinese college students is held jointly by Central Committee of Chinese Communist Youth League, China Association for Science and Technology, Ministry of Education and All-China Students Federation. It is held every two years and is universally acknowledged as the “Scientific and Technological Olympics” of Chinese college students. It is important to make a business plan after the student chooses a subject of business plan, builds a business creation team, and does a wide &amp; deep marketing investigation. However, tens of year’s practices of business plan competition have seen that business plan’s theory is not closely related to the practice, its practicality is not strong and the attractiveness &amp; persuasiveness need to improve. Thus, it’s necessary to do a summarization through analyzing cases.

Chinese Communist Youth League, political capital and the legitimising of volunteering in China

In China, the Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) has been the most important impetus for formal volunteering since the early 1990s. This article begins by scrutinising the historical and institutional impulses that motivate the CYL to promote volunteering, and examines the CYL's major role in legitimatising volunteering in the past 20 years. Findings suggest that the ascribed political capital of the CYL has bestowed enough power to legitimise volunteering under the current regime, and in turn, the efforts in legitimising possibly re-enhanced the CYL's political capital. First, as a policymaker, the CYL has established a national monitoring system to legitimise volunteering. Second, as a policy executor, the CYL prefers to legitimatise grassroots voluntary service organisations in a flexible way, rather than just strictly following the written rules. In addition, the CYL's special political status affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party also indicates that, in essence, the CYL's potential in legitimisation is contingent on broader institutional change in China.

Balance of Factional Power in China: The Seventeenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party

The Seventeenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held on 15–21 October 2007 in Beijing, produced some interesting changes to the balance of power among different factional groups in Chinese politics. Compared to the balance of power among factional groups generated as a result of the Sixteenth National Congress of the CCP five years earlier, the four major factional groups had different experiences. In terms of power index, the Shanghai Gang, a factional group affiliated with Former General Secretary Jiang Zemin, declined substantially; the Qinghua Clique, graduates of the Qinghua University, also declined significantly; the Princelings, children of former high-ranking officials, however, increased a great deal; and the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group, a factional group closely associated with General Secretary Hu Jintao, witnessed substantial expansion. In terms of group cohesion index, both the Shanghai Gang and the Qinghua Clique shrank significantly; the Princelings increased somewhat; and the CCYL Group expanded substantially.

Hu Jintao's Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China's Elite Politics

After becoming General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2002, Hu Jintao surprised many observers by consolidating his power in a short period of time. There are two aspects to this power consolidation. First, he quickly promoted a large number of supporters, most notably his associates from the Chinese Communist Youth League, to key positions. Second, he buttressed himself as the core of the top leadership, at the same time forming a viable working relationship with other leaders, most notably Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong. This resulted in a stable and viable power structure dominated by Hu. The institutionalization of Chinese elite politics in the last decade has created favorable conditions on which Hu was able to capitalize. However, future successions may still be hampered by institutional impediments.

The 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: formal institutions and factional groups

What was the political landscape of China as a result of the 16th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)? The answer is two‐fold. In terms of formal institutions, provincial units emerged as the most powerful institution in Chinese politics. Their power index, as measured by the representation in the Central Committee, was the highest by a large margin. Although their combined power index ranked second, central institutions were fragmented between central party and central government institutions. The military ranked third. Corporate leaders began to assume independent identities in Chinese politics, but their power was still negligible at this stage. In terms of informal factional groups, the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL) Group was the most powerful by a large margin. The Qinghua Clique ranked second. The Shanghai Gang and the Princelings were third and fourth, respectively. The same ranking order also holds in group cohesion indexes. The CCYL Group stood out as the most cohesive because its group cohesion index for inner circle members alone was much larger than those of the other three factional groups combined. The Qinghua Clique came second, and the Shanghai Gang third. The Princelings was hardly a factional group because its group cohesion index was extremely low. These factional groups, nevertheless, were not mutually exclusive. There were significant overlaps among them, especially between the Qinghua Clique and the Shanghai Gang, between the Princelings and the Qinghua Clique, and between the CCYL Group and the Qinghua Clique.

Comment: Controversies and Evidence in the Market Transition Debate

Despite repeated attempts to integrate competing perspectives (Szelenyi and Kostello 1996; Nee and Matthews 1996), the ongoing market transition debate has shown no signs of resolution. Instead, the 1996 AJS market transition symposium seems to have created more controversy than it settled (Nee 1996; Xie and Hannum 1996; Oberschall 1996; Parish and Michelson 1996; Walder 1996; Fligstein 1996; Szelenyi and Kostello 1996). And subsequent studies continue to reach nearly opposite conclusions (cf. Bian and Logan 1996; Gerber and Hout 1998; with Brainerd 1998; Nee and Cao, in press). When arguments become polarized, it often signals that divisions are falsely drawn (Bates 1997). Although originally made in another context, this observation is applicable here. As principals in this lively debate, we believe that clarification and reevaluation are essential for moving toward a reconciliation of competing viewpoints. In this comment we therefore identify the central issues in the controversy and provide an overall assessment of existing empirical evidence

Youth Work in China: A Case Study

The study of youth work in People's Republic of China (PRC) is important. More than 20 percent of all human beings are Chinese, and Chinese account for an even larger share of Third World citizens. Any claims to universality of a theory, skill, or occupation must confront Chinese experience. Canton is one of PRC's most important windows on outside world. It has experienced great Western impact. The Cantonese are affluent, at least by Chinese standards, and they enjoy many social and recreational activities. Canton's youth population--over 1.5 million, or about 26 percent of city's total population--has been affected by open door policy of last 14 years. The Guangzhou Qing Nian Wen Hua Gong (referred to as the Program) youth services center is one of oldest youth programs in PRC. Youths' value systems; moral standards; ways of living; political thoughts; and concepts of human relationships, time, and welfare have changed greatly during development of emerging market economy (Cao, 1989). Because PRC appears committed to this open door policy (Wang, 1989), it is likely that Program will provide a model for similar projects in other cities in China. Other youth services centers, particularly those situated in coastal open door cities, inevitably will experience same process of development. Because this type of project is institutionalized by government and Communist Party of China (CPC) as a major vehicle for delivering services to young people, Program provides a picture both of current youth work and of its possible future direction in PRC. Yet Program offers an optimal view of such services in PRC, given that Canton is a wealthy city and a showcase for implementation of government's open door policy. This article is based on my years of direct contact with youth organizations in PRC, site visits to Program, in-depth discussions with local cadres and staff responsible for youth services, and observation of youth activities in Canton. It examines Program's philosophy and goals, administration, and services in light of problems caused by modernization in PRC. The Program The Program was initiated in 1950s. Since establishment of present regime, these types of youth services have provided cultural and leisure activities for youths (Canton Qing Nian Wen Hua Gong, 1989). Youth services expanded after trauma of Cultural Revolution, downfall of Gang of Four, and confirmation of open door policy by CPC in 1978. Philosophy and Goals The avowed goal of Program is to develop a new generation of socialist youths with distinctive qualities of so-called Four Qualities of New Man--ideals, moral virtues, intelligence, and discipline (Chinese Communist Youth League Central Committee, 1986). The Program's purpose is to inspire young people to have ideals; to learn modern knowledge; to develop appropriate socialist values, attitudes, and patriotism; and to obey law (Xie, 1989). Throughout, it is clear that Program's dominant goals are political: to educate young people to be supporters and followers of socialist enterprise. Consequently, Program is politically guided and administratively supervised by CPC. Related to its goals, Program is organized to fulfill four specific programmatic functions: (1) to carry out political education, (2) to promote and enrich cultural activities among young people, (3) to organize Communist Youth League's (CYL) cultural and recreational activities, and (4) to offer training for various types of talents among youths (Y. C. Li, 1990). Youth work in PRC is therefore closely related to ideological identity and national development; it is centered on Marxist thought and is developed throughout Communist Revolution (Huang, 1988; Yang, 1990). The Program's charter defines it as link between CYL and youths. …

A Survey of the Contributing Factors That Make It Difficult for Advanced Young People to Join the Party

In 1984, in order to coordinate their efforts with the program of party rectification, the Organization Department of the Kunming Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and the Kunming Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Youth League organized a topical survey on the questions related to promoting the recruitment of first-line advanced young people into the party. This survey involved thirteen units spread over the four systems of large-to-medium-scale enterprises, basic (capital) construction, finance and commerce, and agriculture and water conservation. Six years have since passed. Against the background that the Central Committee of the party has once again brought up the subject of emphasizing the reliance on the working class and the development of recruiting first-line workers into the membership of the party, we carried out an update survey and investigation of the units that had been involved in the original survey. The following article represents the results of some prelimin...