Embedded in Turmoil and Triumph, George Shultz's [1993] 1100-plus pages account of his service as secretary of state, is his assessment of Ronald Reagan as president and his guide to managing executive branch. As to former, Shultz makes best case he can for Reagan without resorting to either significant distortions or misleading omissions. Shultz portrays President Reagan as a forceful leader with vision and sound judgment and argues he left the country far better than he found [1993, p. 1133], but does not cover over Reagan's managerial incompetence. Although Shultz does not set out specific organizational and staffing rules for an effectively managed White House, Turmoil and Triumph can be mined to yield clear, credible guidelines. In this brief piece it is not possible to capture fully complex interaction that shaped Shultz's guidelines, but I can derive and discuss his management rules, give a flavor of dynamics of Reagan foreign policy process, and spell out why Shultz's insights on managing White House are so important. Secretary Shultz, who offers by far most interesting and useful insider look at Reagan as manager and leader to date, is such a valuable critic because he himself had been an outstanding top-level manager in private and public sectors over a long period of time. Few cabinet secretaries have come to their position with comparable organizational knowledge and prior managerial success. Before becoming secretary of state, Shultz had been a business school dean and head of a major corporation, as well as Office of Management and Budget director and secretary of both Labor and Treasury in Nixon-Ford years, thus serving both at top of White House as well as a cabinet secretary. Beyond his managerial experience, wisdom, and competence, Shultz's high integrity shows clearly in his treatment of appropriate relationship between a president and his principal policy advisers, be they White House staff or cabinet secretaries.