The aim of this study is to analyze the use of asynchronous circuits to improve the security of information systems against side-channels attacks, which are means of obtaining unauthorized access to confidential data and performing unauthorized actions in the system. Side-channels attacks are fundamentally different as compared with a cryptographic analysis and an exploitation of software errors in their focus on the hardware of the system under attack. Integrated circuits unintentionally create electromagnetic signals during their operation and have a number of performance characteristics that can be investigated by an attacker and therefore become the sources of information leakage, i.e., side-channels. The security of modern information systems cannot be fully ensured without increasing resistance to such attacks. One of the methods to counter side-channel attacks is the use of asynchronous circuits, which main distinguishing feature is the refusal from the use of a global clock signal to synchronize individual elements of an integrated circuit in favour of local synchronization provided by the "handshake" mechanism. Integrated circuits designed using asynchronous circuitry have a number of unique benefits that make it possible to effectively resist side-channel attacks, such as timing attacks and attacks with using power consumption analysis. This paper presents a classification of side-channels attacks, describes asynchronous circuits and their properties that increase their resistance to certain types of side-channels attacks, and provides examples that clearly show the increase in the protection of information systems with the asynchronous circuits.