Anti-satellite Weapons Research Articles

New Technologies & Strategic Stability

A variety of new technologies, ranging from broad enabling technologies to specific weapon systems, may threaten or enhance strategic stability. In this essay, I analyze a technology's potential to significantly affect stability along three axes: the pace of advances in, and diffusion of, this technology; the technology's implications for deterrence and defense; and the technology's potential for direct impact on crisis decision-making. I apply this framework to examples including hypersonic weapons, antisatellite weapons, artificial intelligence, and persistent overhead monitoring. Formal arms control to contain dangers posed by some of these seems technically possible, though currently politically difficult to achieve. Others, particularly enabling technologies, resist arms control based on effective verification. The major powers will therefore instead have to find other ways to cope with these technologies and their implications. These options should include exchanges with potential adversaries so that pathways to nuclear escalation, and possible mitigating steps, can be identified and discussed.

A Developing Arms Race in Outer Space? De-Constructing the Dynamics in the Field of Anti-Satellite Weapons

Fears about the militarization of space are widespread. For example, the recent development of Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capabilities by rising powers like China and India is often described as a technologically driven arms race. This article takes a social constructivist approach to deconstruct the dynamics of this supposed arms race. Using a case study of Mission Shakti, the 2019 Indian ASAT test, the conclusion is that the ASAT arms race is more complex than it seems at first glance. Most importantly, states seem less motivated by security gains but frequently make status-seeking arguments. This offers possibilities for de-securitizing outer space again.

To Clear or to Eliminate? Active Debris Removal Systems as Antisatellite Weapons

Outer space is a congested strategic domain. The issue of space debris mitigation is one of the key issues of safe space traffic. However, active debris removal (ADR) systems may raise concerns about their dual-use capabilities. In this article, the authors have analyzed the ADR systems focusing on their potential as space weapons. The article concludes that ADR systems can be utilized for harmful purposes, although with limited impact. This limited potential of ADR systems to become antisatellite weapons allow for the development of such systems keeping in place basic confidence and trust building measures. The authors believe the further commercialization of space sector could enhance the space debris mitigation efforts.

How the next nuclear arms race will be different from the last one

ABSTRACTAll the world’s nuclear-armed states (except for North Korea) have begun modernizing and upgrading their arsenals, leading many observers to predict that the world is entering a new nuclear arms race. While that outcome is not yet inevitable, it is likely, and if it happens, the new nuclear arms race will be different and more dangerous than the one we remember. More nuclear-armed countries in total, and three competing great powers rather than two, will make the competition more complex. Meanwhile, new non-nuclear weapon technologies – such as ballistic missile defense, anti-satellite weapons, and precision-strike missile technology – will make nuclear deterrence relationships that were once somewhat stable less so.

Outer Space and Strategic Stability in South Asia

ABSTRACTSince the nuclearization of South Asia, in 1998, the relationship between two nuclear armed neighbors—India and Pakistan—is often explained and discussed in a Cold War context. Uneasy with the changed geostrategic realities of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, India is adopting limited conventional war strategies against Pakistan, pursuing Ballistic Missile Defense, and possibly adopting a first-strike strategy that shifts from India’s declared no-first-use policy of nuclear weapons. This study analyzes how Indian space-based capabilities augment its Ballistic Missile Defense program and its aspirations of a first-strike based on preemption. Subsequently, the article draws linkages between Indian space-based capabilities, including anti-satellite weapons, and impacts on strategic stability in South Asia.

Space Deterrence: In Search of a "Magical Formula"

The development of the antisatellite (ASAT) weapons is a crucial process of the second era of space militarization. As a result, outer space loses the status of a sanctuary. However, this process does not steam only from the technological advance but also from strategic circumstances. The increasing number of space actors makes the system less stable. The degree of dependency on space assets is significantly different in different countries, what creates the vulnerability gap. What is more, the capability to defend a space infrastructure is profoundly limited due to physical and technological limitations, favoring offensive actions. Outer space is turning into offense-dominant domain.The growing risk of using ASAT weapons and the paramount importance of satellites in supporting armed forces prompt a search for protecting space infrastructure. Therefore, the space deterrence seems to be an attractive tool of increasing the security of space assets. So far, this branch of deterrence has been in the margins of strategic studies as the possibilities of undertaking action against space assets were very limited.The aim of the article is to analyze the adequacy of the development of the space deterrence concept, with the respect for strategic and technological circumstances and to compare it to nuclear deterrence as being one of the most examined deterrence concepts. The starting point for the analysis is the general characteristics of deterrence concept with special regard to nuclear deterrence as an example of its effective application (even though the capability to generate deterrent effect is still in dispute). This article subsequently examines the reasons making the space deterrence a current and important issue – the end of sanctuary and the creation of new battlefield in outer space, resulting from the pursuit of operational deployment of ASAT weapons. The strategic consideration is taken into account, including asymmetric dependence on space assets and, consequently, unfavorable to US military benefit-risk balance of space warfare. The difficulties in protecting the space infrastructure, favoring offensive action, are examined. The parallelism between nuclear and space deterrence is indicated two key differences – the lack of existential threat and retaliation credibility characterizes space deterrence. Based on these theoretical frameworks, the sample of escalation ladder in space is proposed. It should be stressed that the ladder refers only to the attack on space infrastructure (and the attack from space at the top of the ladder). The subsequent section thus attempts to answer the question where an attack on satellites should be placed on the escalation ladder. Should the hypothetical retaliation be limited to space infrastructure? The key conclusion of the analysis is that building space deterrence as an independent construct is not justified.

Kessler Syndrome: System Dynamics Model

The present article explores the Kessler syndrome (the potentially catastrophic accumulation of debris in the low-earth orbit) through system dynamics methodology. It models satellites and three classes of debris, their fragmentation, interactions, and gradual decay over 50 years. It presents 5 scenarios: (a) a “business as usual” approach, which leads to exponential accumulation and growing rate of satellite losses, but no catastrophic chain reaction; (b) a conflict with a large-scale deployment of antisatellite weapons, leading to an accelerated accumulation and losses, but still no chain reaction; (c) electromagnetic pulse scenario modeling loss of control over satellites en masse; (d) cessation of all low earth orbit (LEO) satellite launches, illustrating high inertia of the system, which continues to produce more debris; and (e) scenario representing an attempt to mitigate the situation via direct removal of some portion of inactive satellites from the LEO. All scenarios take place in 2040. The article demonstrates the gravity of the situation and the necessity for a sustainable long-term solution, as orbital debris poses a threat to our future space operation even without triggering a catastrophic chain reaction.

The implications of Chinese strategic culture and counter-intervention upon Department of Defense space deterrence operations

ABSTRACTThe People's Republic of China (PRC) and its rapidly evolving space forces are viewed to be one of the principal threats to the United States' national security space infrastructure and the U.S. capability for timely force projection in the Pacific Theater. This view, especially since the 2007 kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons test, added emphasis to the Space Posture Review of 2010 and the Department of Defense's quest for deterrence as a means to secure the sanctuary of space from weaponization. This article will examine the strategic culture of the PRC and how it impacts the space deterrence philosophies of both the PRC and the U.S. Department of Defense.

Interception in differential pursuit/evasion games

A qualitative criterion for a pursuer to intercept a target in a class of differential games is obtained in terms of future cones: Topological cones that contain all attainable trajectories of target or interceptor originating from an initial position. An interception solution exists after some initial time iff the future cone of the target lies within the future cone of the interceptor. The solution may be regarded as a kind of Nash equilibrium. This result is applied to two examples: 1. The game of Two Cars: The future cone condition is shown to be equivalent to conditions for interception obtained by Cockayne. 2. Satellite warfare: The future cone for a spacecraft or direct-ascent antisatellite weapon (ASAT) maneuvering in a central gravitational field is obtained and is shown to equal that for a spacecraft which maneuvers solely by means of a single velocity change at the cone vertex. The latter result is illustrated with an analysis of the January 2007 interception of the FengYun-1C spacecraft.

From Star Wars to Space Wars' - The Next Strategic Frontier: Paradigms to Anchor Space Security

Military blueprints by major space-faring powers now encapsulate concepts of 'space support' and 'force enhancement' which point to a central role of space assets in facilitating military operations while notions of 'space control' and 'force application' suggest the weaponization of space, and the putative view that space may in the near future be a theatre of military operations. As defence goals increasingly focus on space as the final frontier evident in development of national missile defence systems, anti-satellite weapons and other space-based systems, international peace and security faces a new challenge. Creators of the current legal regime for space failed to foresee the rapid rate at which technological and engineering breakthroughs would take place. Now the shortcomings in the current regime beg the question of how the law can keep up and address space technology. It is imperative that the international community act now rather than later. In light of the existing lacunae in the international space law regime, this Article seeks to explore avenues/paradigms through which the militarization of space may be regulated and its weaponization addressed.

Dangers of Space Debris

S pace D ebris : the H ubris of H umanity Botao Peng there. Back in 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite weapon test that destroyed a decommissioned weather satellite, smashing the object into 150,000 pieces each larger than 1 cm . Not only does space junk pose a threat to space travel, it also increases the chance of self multiplication. Space debris was not always a problem. In the early years of the space age, scientists would leave abandoned rocket stages in orbit after use. This was not such a bad idea, considering how empty space was at the time. However, over time, the number of space missions increased from simply sending a weather satellite into space to landing a man on the moon. With each mission, more waste was left behind, increasing the amount of debris orbiting the earth. The used rocket stages that once were few and unnoticeable now cloud our view of the heavens. So much in fact, that, 47.7% of debris orbiting Earth is from break-up debris [4] and used propulsion engines cause 45.4% of all satellite break-ups [4] . Such a recent collision occurred in 2005. A 31-year-old U.S. rocket body hit “A single puncture could effectively destroy all electronics , release all the oxygen , impair the escape vessels , and even kill all members aboard .” B erkeley S cientific J ournal • W aste • S pring 2015 • V olume 19 • I ssue 2 • 1 B S J centimeters is not big. 10 centimeters is the average diameter of a bagel. 10 centimeters is even shorter than the length of an average smartphone. So why is 10 centimeters a big deal? Imagine a piece of metal 10 centimeters in diameter orbiting around the Earth in space Yet this piece of metal has enough momentum and force to puncture the International Space Station. A single puncture could effectively destroy all electronics, release all the oxygen, impair the escape vessels, and even kill all members aboard. This is the danger of space debris. Space debris is junk that orbits the earth. This ranges from abandoned satellites to broken segments from rockets and missiles. It also includes defragmented rocket stages as well as broken equipment from collisions with other debris. The first real serious satellite fragmentation occurred in June of 1961 when two satellites collided with one another [4] . The collision resulted in a break-up of the satellites, sending pieces of both into orbit. This only increases the chances of another collision of occurring. Yet the fragmentation does not stop

Na orbitální frontě stále klid? Pomalá proliferace proti-satelitních zbraní

The article strives to explore the issue of relatively slow proliferation of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). Until now only three countries developed the ASATs. The issue is examined through the analytically separate factors that might motivate or dissuade the ASAT proliferation. The main strategic roles that ASATs may play in a state's security policy are defined, and their relevance vis-à-vis proliferation is assessed. The roles include: a defensive measure against adversary's space-based nuclear weapons, a force multiplier for a nuclear first strike, a countermeasure against adversary's anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM), an asymmetric counter to a technologically superior adversary, and a counter-value weapon. Other explored factors carrying a potential relevance for the ASAT proliferation include legal constrains, environmental and technical aspects.

India and Space Weaponization: Why Space Debris Trumps Kinetic Energy Antisatellite Weapons as the Principal Threat to Satellites

Since China tested a Kinetic-Energy Anti-Satellite (KE-ASAT) weapon in 2007, evidence has surfaced that India may have initiated a similar program. This article makes an anticipatory policy intervention against the development of KE-ASAT weapons. It presents data to show that space debris, and not KE-ASAT weapons, pose the highest risk for the safe operation of Indian satellites. It models a KE-ASAT weapons exchange between India and China in three different scenarios to demonstrate that use of such weapons even on a limited scale would produce an exponential increase in space debris. The latter would threaten the safe operation of satellites for all countries concerned. These data suggest that the concept of deterrence as understood in conventional and nuclear spheres is not easily transportable to the domain of space weapons, which threaten the physical destruction of satellites. If weaponization of space becomes inevitable, policy makers would be better off investing in weapons that disable but do not physically destroy satellites.

The environmental dimension of space arms control

Current debates on the prevention of an arms race in outer space are dominated by the traditional perspective of international strategic balance. This article addresses the issue through the often-neglected lens of environmental protection, reviewing a number of environmental instruments as they relate to outer space. It argues that environmental protection, as a non-traditional element, is an instrumental impetus for arms control. The current regime leaves the door open for states to develop conventional orbital weapons and ground-based anti-satellite weapons (ASATs), which would have a significant adverse impact on the space environment. Thus the law of environmental protection is deficient in effectively protecting the space environment from pollution resulting from military activities. It is further argued that the space arms control regime should be strengthened for humanity's common interest in a sustainable space environment. Preferably an international treaty should be concluded to prohibit testing, deployment and use of space-based weapons and ASATs. These substantive obligations also conform to the requirements of safeguarding international peace and security, and the security interests of spacefaring countries.

India, China, and the United States in Space: Partners, Competitors, Combatants? A Perspective From the United States

India's space program used to fall solely under the civil category, but recently it appears to be expanding its use of space for national security efforts and developing capabilities that could give it an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon capacity. This shift by India could have long-term consequences for its relationship with China and Asia's overall regional stability; it also may provide new opportunities for the United States and India to enhance their relations. This article will first explain how the author views the US government's attitudes toward space and cooperation. Next, it will look at India's missile defense program and study the connection between the program and an ASAT capability, as well as its link to China's ASAT tests. Then, it will discuss ways in which India and the United States can use their shared interests in continuing to utilize space to possibly cooperate. Finally, it will contrast how India and China are viewed within the US policy community.

Overview of the legal and policy challenges of orbital debris removal

Much attention has been paid recently to the issue of removing human-generated space debris from Earth orbit, especially following conclusions reached by both NASA and ESA that mitigating debris is not sufficient, that debris-on-debris and debris-on-active-satellite collisions will continue to generate new debris even without additional launches, and that some sort of active debris removal (ADR) is needed. Several techniques for ADR are technically plausible enough to merit further research and eventually operational testing. However, all ADR technologies present significant legal and policy challenges which will need to be addressed for debris removal to become viable. This paper summarizes the most promising techniques for removing space debris in both LEO and GEO, including electrodynamic tethers and ground- and space-based lasers. It then discusses several of the legal and policy challenges posed, including: lack of separate legal definitions for functional operational spacecraft and non-functional space debris; lack of international consensus on which types of space debris objects should be removed; sovereignty issues related to who is legally authorized to remove pieces of space debris; the need for transparency and confidence-building measures to reduce misperceptions of ADR as anti-satellite weapons; and intellectual property rights and liability with regard to ADR operations. Significant work on these issues must take place in parallel to the technical research and development of ADR techniques, and debris removal needs to be done in an environment of international collaboration and cooperation.

Chinese and US Kinetic Energy Space Weapons and Arms Control

A number of gaps divide reality from perception concerning the kinetic energy ballistic missile defense and antisatellite (ASAT) weapons developed, tested, and possessed by the United States and China. This article explains the equivalence of these supposedly distinct classes of weaponry, and reviews the diplomatic history surrounding recent Chinese and US tests of them, particularly in the light of recent WikiLeaks revelations. The inadequacy of arms-control proposals that would address only the testing or use of these weapons as ASATs is discussed, and a more substantive proposal is offered that emerged in a recent meeting between Chinese and US arms-control analysts.

Building Security in Space: A Brief Introduction

Asian Perspective 35 (2011), 497-501 Building Security in Space: A Brief Introduction Peter Van Ness In early April 2011 we convened an international workshop at the University of Hawaii titled “Avoiding an Arms Race in Space.” The idea was to bring space scientists from the United States and China together with international relations specialists to identify common ground for a code of conduct on building security in space. Our objective was to maintain outer space as a global commons for all the world’s people to enjoy. This was perhaps the first meeting of its kind. The articles published in this special issue are written by the Chinese and US participants in the workshop, with the exception of Shenyan Chen, who did not participate because she could not get a US visa in time, but wanted to contribute her article on space debris. We began with the following proposition: An arms race in space among the major powers would be immensely dangerous, destabiliz­ ing, and expensive. Russia, which has a long history in space tech­ nology dating back to Sputnik in 1957, does not today have the resources or the political will to sustain such a race. But China does. This is principally an issue between the United States and China. It is in the interests of both the United States and the People’s Republic of China—and the world!—that the weaponization of space be stopped. All of us are beneficiaries of the many services provided by the satellites orbiting in space. Modem society, as we know it, would not be possible without the space satellites that we have become depend­ ent on for telecommunications, banking and other commercial trans­ actions, the Internet, meteorology, and navigation. The military depends on space satellites for command and control, targeting of weapons, and intelligence gathering; since 2007, China and the United States have both tested antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. In that sense, space has already been militarized. But it is not yet weaponized: there are not yet any space-based weapons. There are now more than 960 operating satellites orbiting the 497 498 Building Security in Space earth. As of May 2011, 443 were from the United States, 101 were from Russia, and 69 were from China. The US satellites were cate­ gorized as 10 civil, 194 commercial, 118 government, and 121 mili­ tary. Complicating the picture and endangering the functioning of these satellites is space debris. More than twenty thousand pieces of space debris of varying sizes are orbiting the earth, many of them too small to track, and they are a serious danger to the operating satel­ lites. For example, in April 2011, and not for the first time, the Inter­ national Space Station had to maneuver to stay a safe distance from a piece of orbital debris. The US-China Joint Statement, published during PRC president Hu Jintao’s official visit to the United States in January 2011, called for bilateral cooperation in many fields, including space. When Pres­ ident Barack Obama announced a New National Space Policy in June 2010 he called for “peaceful cooperation and collaboration in space,” and invited arms-control proposals to make that happen. China has also urged cooperation, insisting that China would not participate in any kind of arms race in space. More recently, the US deputy assis­ tant secretary of defense for space policy, Gregory Schulte, said that the United States wanted to establish a regular dialogue with China on outer space in order to create “rules for the road” and avoid misun­ derstandings between the two countries. In June 2011 The Economist magazine declared “The End of the Space Age,” and in July 2011 Atlantis, the last of five NASA space shuttles, made its final trip to the International Space Station and safely returned to Earth. Yet the space race continues. Both the US and Chinese militaries are pressing forward with plans for space weapons, and commercial firms are competing to put people in space. China plans to launch its own space station by 2015, and is inviting scien­ tists from all countries to participate in its experimental research, while Russia, India, and other spacefaring nations have announced new space...

Towards an effective and adequately verifiable PPWT

The 2008 Russia–China proposal to the Conference on Disarmament on preventing space weapons has attracted wide attention. Lengthy debates have been made on the need for such a treaty and for two of its most disputed elements, namely prohibition of ground-based anti-satellite weapons and verification. This article argues that, regardless of verifiability, such a treaty is urgently needed for the benefit of international peace and security, and for the security interests of spacefaring countries. But in order to serve these purposes effectively, the treaty should at least explicitly prohibit testing, deployment and use of space-based weapons and ground-based anti-satellite weapons. Given the necessary political will, it is feasible to “adequately verify” these constraints. The verification regime should permit the incorporation of new measures in the future, combine international technical means and national technical means, combine remote-sensing technologies and on-site inspections, and be complemented by transparency and confidence-building measures.

A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for Anti-satellite Weapons

The growing number of actors pursuing sophisticated outer space programs gives rise to one of the more novel challenges of the global commons. Once the privileged domain of the United States and th...