Space Deterrence: In Search of a "Magical Formula"

Abstract

The development of the antisatellite (ASAT) weapons is a crucial process of the second era of space militarization. As a result, outer space loses the status of a sanctuary. However, this process does not steam only from the technological advance but also from strategic circumstances. The increasing number of space actors makes the system less stable. The degree of dependency on space assets is significantly different in different countries, what creates the vulnerability gap. What is more, the capability to defend a space infrastructure is profoundly limited due to physical and technological limitations, favoring offensive actions. Outer space is turning into offense-dominant domain.The growing risk of using ASAT weapons and the paramount importance of satellites in supporting armed forces prompt a search for protecting space infrastructure. Therefore, the space deterrence seems to be an attractive tool of increasing the security of space assets. So far, this branch of deterrence has been in the margins of strategic studies as the possibilities of undertaking action against space assets were very limited.The aim of the article is to analyze the adequacy of the development of the space deterrence concept, with the respect for strategic and technological circumstances and to compare it to nuclear deterrence as being one of the most examined deterrence concepts. The starting point for the analysis is the general characteristics of deterrence concept with special regard to nuclear deterrence as an example of its effective application (even though the capability to generate deterrent effect is still in dispute). This article subsequently examines the reasons making the space deterrence a current and important issue – the end of sanctuary and the creation of new battlefield in outer space, resulting from the pursuit of operational deployment of ASAT weapons. The strategic consideration is taken into account, including asymmetric dependence on space assets and, consequently, unfavorable to US military benefit-risk balance of space warfare. The difficulties in protecting the space infrastructure, favoring offensive action, are examined. The parallelism between nuclear and space deterrence is indicated two key differences – the lack of existential threat and retaliation credibility characterizes space deterrence. Based on these theoretical frameworks, the sample of escalation ladder in space is proposed. It should be stressed that the ladder refers only to the attack on space infrastructure (and the attack from space at the top of the ladder). The subsequent section thus attempts to answer the question where an attack on satellites should be placed on the escalation ladder. Should the hypothetical retaliation be limited to space infrastructure? The key conclusion of the analysis is that building space deterrence as an independent construct is not justified.