Ballistic Missile Defense Research Articles

South Korea’s Defense Posture against the North Korean Nuclear Threat: Dangerous Reluctance

This paper examines South Korea’s defense preparedness against a possible North Korean nuclear attack. It applies three options of nuclear defense: preemptive attack against North Korean nuclear weapons and facilities, interception of airborne North Korean nuclear missiles, and civil defense to reduce casualties from a nuclear explosion. North Korea may have succeeded in developing about 10 nuclear weapons and making them small and light enough to be delivered by its ballistic missiles. It is imperative for South Korea to prepare defenses against a nuclear attack in the case its diplomatic efforts and deterrence measures fail. South Korea needs to be able to conduct a preemptive strike when a North Korean nuclear attack is imminent. It should also build up its ballistic missile defense systems in order to intercept any North Korean nuclear missiles that may survive a preemptive strike. Moreover, South Korea should prepare for its civil defense by constructing blast and/or fallout shelters to help more people survive a possible nuclear explosion.

A Comparative Study on South Korea‘s Ballistic Missile Defense and Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense

A Comparative Study on South Korea‘s Ballistic Missile Defense and Japan's Ballistic Missile Defense

Defence and Discovery: Canada’s Military Space Program, 1945–74, by Andrew B. Godefroy

Andrew B. Godefroy, Defence and Discovery: Canada's Military Space Program, 1945-74, Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012. 256 pp., ISBN: 978-0774819602, $32.95 (pbk)Defence and Discovery sets out to provide reader with an analysis of Canada's role in exploration of upper atmosphere and outer space from end of Second World War in 1945 until ratification of country's first space policy in 1974. As author indicates, the book seeks to reveal nature of first three decades of Canada's exploration of space and to place it within wider context of political history of Canadian science and technology (6).Organized chronologically and thematically, Defence and Discovery examines specific periods of space research and technological development and key players who were involved in this important activity. Godefroy begins his analysis by looking at security and aerospace research prior to Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik rocket in October 1957. Next, he turns to Canada's engagement with missiles and rocketry, with particular focus on development of Black Brant rocket and Churchill range. Sequentially, Godefroy then examines Canada's early space policies, nation's development and launching of Alouette satellite followed by agreement with United States on use international satellites for ionospheric studies. The book then looks at Canada's participation in militarization and weaponization of space in 1960s with particular emphasis on anti-ballistic missile defence activities and Royal Canadian Air Force's space defence program. Godefroy concludes his examination by discussing demise of Cold War space program and Canada's new agenda for activity in outer space. The reader will not be surprised to learn that money, resources, and politics played key roles in demise of Canada's ambitions in space in 1960s.Defence and Discovery is a well-written book with significant amounts of primary source research and technical detail about Canada's engagement and scientific and technological developments in upper atmosphere and space. Considered from a scholarly perspective, this book clearly provides a wealth of evidence and technical detail about its subject. It is a significant addition to body of knowledge on Canada's history with space. As author himself observes, there has been very little scholarly work completed in this subject area. However, scholarly strength of this work is also a weakness for general reader. It is a detail-oriented monograph that is not an easy read for someone without an existing understanding of Canada's military and political history. …

Boost-glide Weapons and US-China Strategic Stability

ABSTRACTThe United States and China are testing boost-glide weapons, long-range strike systems capable of flying at Mach 5 or faster through the upper atmosphere. For the United States, these systems would provide a conventional prompt global strike capability, which, together with US ballistic missile defense programs, Chinese experts regard as a threat to China's ability to conduct nuclear retaliation. This perception is encouraging the Chinese military to modify its nuclear posture in ways that tend to create greater risks for both sides. If China's own boost-glide systems are meant to carry nuclear payloads only, their deployment would not fundamentally alter the current situation between the two states. However, if they were conventionally armed or dual-purpose, or if the United States could not determine the payloads they carried, the deployment of Chinese boost-glide systems could compound problems of strategic stability created by the introduction of ballistic missile defense, antisatellite, and antiship ballistic missile capabilities. If the technical hurdles can be overcome, it may be difficult for the two sides to refrain from these deployments in the absence of strong mutual trust or an established arms-control relationship. New confidence-building measures and expanded mutual transparency are warranted to avoid creating new dangers.

NATO Territorial Ballistic Missile Defense and its Implications for Arms Control

ABSTRACTSince 2002, NATO's territorial missile defense has evoked continuous debates between NATO states and the Russian Federation. Thirteen years have passed without reaching a common denominator. This article provides a comprehensive overview of the historical background of the debate and the technical details of the missile defense system, highlighting its shortcomings and the state of its deployment process. It also contrasts the military-technical and political arguments of both sides, before addressing the applicable norms of international law to highlight violations and the effect of this noncompliance on existing arms control measures.

A trajectory for homeland ballistic missile defense

The Ground-based Midcourse Defense system is intended to protect the US homeland against limited attacks from intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles. It has succeeded in intercepting target missiles and can engage a threat launched from North Korea or the Middle East, targeting any point in the USA. Nevertheless, high-profile struggles and program changes related to homeland ballistic missile defense (BMD) continue to make headlines. The most significant struggle has been a string of three straight intercept test failures over five years, followed by the recent successful intercept test in June 2014. This article first briefly reviews the current threats of concern. It then examines homeland BMD policy objectives, followed by the current major technical issues in supporting these objectives and, then, the likelihood of negating a warhead. Finally, it highlights major considerations that should be part of the trajectory the US government takes moving forward.

극초음속 비행체의 공기광학 조준오차 예측을 위한 전산해석 연구

Aero-optic phenomena cause the image position displacement on an imaging plane of the airborne optical/IR systems. Particularly, the aero-optic boresight error(BSE) is important factor for homing, positioning and aiming applications of hypersonic flight interceptor missile. In this paper, an estimating method of aero-optic BSE for a hypersonic flight vehicle is studied. A ray tracing method and a transform method of refractive index fields from flow density fields are combined with computational fluid dynamics(CFD) method.

Vector Guidance Approach to Three-Player Conflict in Exoatmospheric Interception

This paper discusses a three-player conflict in which a missile intercepts a target while avoiding a defender launched by the target, all having bounded controls. Unlike linearized kinematics, the present approach adopts full three-dimensional vector kinematics suitable for an exoatmospheric engagement. In particular, time to go is calculated using a recently developed, game theoretic nonlinear feedback equation, leading to a guaranteed miss strategy and to simple sufficient conditions for the missile to intercept the target while avoiding the defender.

The Development of the US National Missile Defense and its Impact on the International Security

The article reflects the US officials' point of view on the development of its national missile defense. The major threat to international security is the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the former Soviet Union made huge efforts to reduce and limit offensive arms. However, presently the proliferation of ballistic missiles spreads all over the world, especially in the Middle East, because of the ballistic missile technology falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups. Missile defenses can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the U.S. or its allies. With the possible attack regional missile defense systems will be promptly mobilized to enhance an effective deterrent. The ultimate goal of such large-scale missile defense deployment is to convince the adversaries that the use of ballistic missiles is useless in military terms and that any attack on the United States and its allies is doomed to failure. The United States has missile defense cooperative programs with a number of allies, including United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and many others. The Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability. The initiative of the development of US BMD naturally belongs to the United States. That country has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities, exceeding by far those of the other NATO members combined.

The symbolic politics of ballistic missile defense: seeking the perfect defense in an imperfect world

Ballistic missile defense (BMD) politics present an interesting evolution in how the USA, especially Congress, has come to think about BMD both as operational reality and as a symbolic policy. The argument here is that BMD's operational reality is increasingly overshadowed by its symbolic aspects. Such a status arose from rapidly changing international and domestic politics. The end result is a situation in which BMD policy in a sense floats above the question of its actual combat effectiveness. Its primary mission in part is sustaining US capacity to remain a global power and support its allies.

The Utility of Nuclear and Conventional Forces in the Second Nuclear Age: A Japanese Military Perspective

In recent debate on Japan's security policy, proliferation of WMD and their delivery means, such as missiles, has been one of central issues. This issue is particularly critical to Japan, given North Korea's acceleration of its nuclear weapons program alongside its long-range missile project. Japan's new National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) focus on both nuclear proliferation and emerging nuclear threat posed by North Korea. At same time, tension between Japan and China in East China Sea has been increasing, while tensions between China and countries in South China Sea have similarly been on rise.This essay will present a Japanese perspective on nuclear dimension of regional security by, first, explaining Japan's nuclear-related policies; second, discussing roles of nuclear forces in Japan's security policy; and, third, exploring Japan's security strategy for managing a possible stability-instability paradox in region, with particular emphasis on East China Sea.Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy and Nuclear ForcesOne of most important aspects of Japan's security policy since World War II is its non-nuclear policy based on non-nuclear principles, referring to principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not permitting their entry into Japan.1 Not only does Japan adhere to these three principles as fundamental elements of its national policy, but Japan's Atomic Energy Basic Law also prohibits country from manufacturing or possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Japan ratified Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in June 1976 and put itself under strict obligation not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons as a non-nuclear weapons state.Japan's possession of nuclear weapons, however, is not necessarily restrained by its constitution. While designed to make nation as peaceful as possible, constitution does not exclude outright Japan's pursuit of nuclear options. The government's basic interpretation is that Article 9.2 of constitution does not prohibit possession of force that is within minimum range necessary for self-defense.2 Therefore, if weapon in question, whether conventional or nuclear, is within these bounds, it is not constitutionally banned. If thus confined to minimum necessary level for self-defense, possession of nuclear weapons is considered constitutional for Japan. Here it should be noted that minimum necessary level applies to limit of individual self-defense and does not include collective self-defense in government's interpretation of constitution.The Role of Nuclear Forces in Japan's Security StrategyJapan has continuously relied on United States to deter nuclear threats against itself and has maintained that the extended deterrence of United States with nuclear deterrence at its core is indispensable.3 At same time, conventional elements of deterrence have become more important in recent years with dramatic improvements in technologies such as ballistic missile defense and precision-guided weapons. U.S. reliance on conventional elements of deterrence has increased alongside reduction in size of U.S. nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, as Japan improves its ballistic missile defense and other capabilities for deterrence by denial, it no longer needs to depend solely on nuclear forces to maintain credible nuclear deterrence. Although Japan currently has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons, it is worth exploring why Japan would not be better off possessing its own nuclear option. This section of essay aims to clarify utility of nuclear weapons for Japan from a military point of view based on Robert Art's analysis of different roles of force: deterrent, defensive, compellent, and swaggering use.Deterrent use of nuclear weapons. …

Limit missile defense—or expand it?

Since 2002, when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the international arms control regime has included no limits on missile defense. Washington wants to keep it that way, insisting that it “will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on US ballistic missile defenses.” Many experts believe that missile defense undermines strategic stability; but some argue that missile defense can play a role in denuclearization. Here, Wu Riqiang of China, Tatiana Anichkina of Russia (2015), and Oliver Thränert of Germany (2015) debate whether arms control arrangements should include limits on missile defense—or whether advances in missile defense should be encouraged because they might contribute to disarmament.

Going too fast: Time to ban hypersonic missile tests?

The technology surrounding missiles that fly at five or more times the speed of sound is not mature, but several nations have tested hypersonic missiles. The envisioned military value of hypersonic delivery systems lies in their ability to strike quickly over long distances while evading early-warning radars and ballistic missile defenses—but some proponents of the technology also argue that hypersonics could replace nuclear weapons in some roles. Critics, meanwhile, see hypersonic missiles as destabilizing: They could be mistaken for ballistic missiles, could be used in attacks against nuclear and other strategic military assets, and could even be outfitted with nuclear warheads. Amid these concerns, calls have emerged to halt a developing hypersonic arms race by enacting a moratorium on hypersonic testing and eventually establishing a test ban treaty. Here, Mark Gubrud of the United States, Rajaram Nagappa of India (2015), and Tong Zhao of China (2015) debate how serious a threat hypersonic missiles pose to global security, and whether a test ban is the best way to moderate such a threat.

Going too fast: Time to ban hypersonic missile tests?

The technology surrounding missiles that fly at five or more times the speed of sound is not mature, but several nations have tested hypersonic missiles. The envisioned military value of hypersonic delivery systems lies in their ability to strike quickly over long distances while evading early-warning radars and ballistic missile defenses—but some proponents of the technology also argue that hypersonics could replace nuclear weapons in some roles. Critics, meanwhile, see hypersonic missiles as destabilizing: They could be mistaken for ballistic missiles, could be used in attacks against nuclear and other strategic military assets, and could even be outfitted with nuclear warheads. Amid these concerns, calls have emerged to halt a developing hypersonic arms race by enacting a moratorium on hypersonic testing and eventually establishing a test ban treaty. Here, Mark Gubrud of the United States (2015), Rajaram Nagappa of India (2015), and Tong Zhao of China debate how serious a threat hypersonic missiles pose to global security, and whether a test ban is the best way to moderate such a threat.

Going too fast: Time to ban hypersonic missile tests?

The technology surrounding missiles that fly at five or more times the speed of sound is not mature, but several nations have tested hypersonic missiles. The envisioned military value of hypersonic delivery systems lies in their ability to strike quickly over long distances while evading early-warning radars and ballistic missile defenses—but some proponents of the technology also argue that hypersonics could replace nuclear weapons in some roles. Critics, meanwhile, see hypersonic missiles as destabilizing: They could be mistaken for ballistic missiles, could be used in attacks against nuclear and other strategic military assets, and could even be outfitted with nuclear warheads. Amid these concerns, calls have emerged to halt a developing hypersonic arms race by enacting a moratorium on hypersonic testing and eventually establishing a test ban treaty. Here, Mark Gubrud of the United States (2015), Rajaram Nagappa of India, and Tong Zhao of China (2015) debate how serious a threat hypersonic missiles pose to global security, and whether a test ban is the best way to moderate such a threat.

Limit missile defense—or expand it?

Since 2002, when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the international arms control regime has included no limits on missile defense. Washington wants to keep it that way, insisting that it “will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on US ballistic missile defenses.” Many experts believe that missile defense undermines strategic stability; but some argue that missile defense can play a role in denuclearization. Here, Wu Riqiang of China (2015), Tatiana Anichkina of Russia, and Oliver Thränert of Germany (2015) debate whether arms control arrangements should include limits on missile defense—or whether advances in missile defense should be encouraged because they might contribute to disarmament.

Limit missile defense—or expand it?

Since 2002, when the United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the international arms control regime has included no limits on missile defense. Washington wants to keep it that way, insisting that it “will continue to reject any negotiated restraints on US ballistic missile defenses.” Many experts believe that missile defense undermines strategic stability; but some argue that missile defense can play a role in denuclearization. Here, Wu Riqiang of China (2015), Tatiana Anichkina of Russia (2015), and Oliver Thränert of Germany debate whether arms control arrangements should include limits on missile defense—or whether advances in missile defense should be encouraged because they might contribute to disarmament.

Conditional Deterrence and Missile Defense

The traditional view of ballistic missile defense is that defensive weapons are destabilizing. This article explains why the more broadly and traditionally accepted classical approach to deterrence is flawed and demonstrates the greater explanatory power and implications of conditional deterrence based on power parity theory. Given the implications that can be drawn from conditional deterrence, this article demonstrates that limited efforts at developing and deploying missile defenses enhance deterrence and reduce the ballistic missile threat in the short term and may also discourage the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Emission Spectroscopy of Hypervelocity Impacts on Aluminum, Organic and High-Explosive Targets

Laboratory experiments of hypervelocity impacts on aluminum, nylon and high-explosive targets are presented. Spectral measurements of the impact flash are recorded, together with radiometric measurements to derive the temperature of the flash. Such experiments aim at demonstrating that the impact flash produced by a ballistic missile interception contains the spectral information required to identify the content of the intercepted missile. It is shown that the elements that are part of the aluminum projectile and/or aluminum target are successfully identified from the obtained spectra. For the case of a nylon/aluminum target organic molecular emission lines characteristic of CN and C2 are also identified. The CN molecular band is also observed for the case of a high-explosive target, although the detection of organic elements from such targets is more difficult than for nylon targets. In most cases, the temperature of the impact flash measured using the radiometer is in the range 2500 – 4000K, whereas a comparison between simulated and experimental spectra shows temperatures up to 9000K. Hence a conclusive impact flash temperature could not be obtained.

Na orbitální frontě stále klid? Pomalá proliferace proti-satelitních zbraní

The article strives to explore the issue of relatively slow proliferation of anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). Until now only three countries developed the ASATs. The issue is examined through the analytically separate factors that might motivate or dissuade the ASAT proliferation. The main strategic roles that ASATs may play in a state's security policy are defined, and their relevance vis-à-vis proliferation is assessed. The roles include: a defensive measure against adversary's space-based nuclear weapons, a force multiplier for a nuclear first strike, a countermeasure against adversary's anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM), an asymmetric counter to a technologically superior adversary, and a counter-value weapon. Other explored factors carrying a potential relevance for the ASAT proliferation include legal constrains, environmental and technical aspects.