Acquisition Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

The Iranian Nuclear Threat and the Israeli Options

As a result of developments including the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Muammar Al-Qaddafi's decision to cease WMD programs, and the weakening of the Syrian military, only one potential strategic threat against Israel remains: the Iranian nuclear program. Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is likely to transform the Middle East's strategic balance, force changes in Israel's national security planning in general and its nuclear policy in particular. This article analyses the options open to Israel in response to a nuclear Iran, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. Evaluation of the options available to Israel reveals seven alternatives. In the near future, Israeli decision makers will have to decide whether to adopt one or a mix of options ranging from preemptive attack to unconcealed nuclear deterrence. After analysing each of these options, the conclusion is that Israel probably will move to unconcealed nuclear deterrence in the event of Iran completing the development and the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Arms control after Iraq: normative and operational challenges

The stated reason for invading Iraq was its alleged clandestine pursuit of weapons of mass destruction in defiance of UN resolutions. Even though the allegation was proven false, the international community remains preoccupied with the threat of the proliferation and use of such terrible weapons. The questions discussed in this book include doctrinal issues regarding the use of force in general; the implications of a shift in the utility of nuclear weapons from deterrence to compliance and of a focus on non-proliferation to the neglect of disarmament; the place and role of the United Nations in controlling the spread and use of WMD; the regional dynamics of proliferation concerns in North-east Asia and the Middle East; and the threats posed by the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles by non-state actors.--Publisher's ddescription.

Nuclear Weapons as Symbols: The Role of Norms in Nuclear Policy Making

Throughout history, nuclear weapons have been considered to be the ultimate weapons. This understanding largely detached them from the portfolio of conventional military means and assigned them a symbolic meaning that influenced the identity and norms creation of nations. In most countries today, the development of nuclear weapons is considered morally prohibitive, incompatible with a country's identity and international outlook. In some states, however, these negative norms are overridden by a positive set of norms, causing nuclear weapons to become either symbols of invulnerability to perceived threats or the regalia of major power status. Main purpose of this paper is to explore on the conditions that cause most states to develop a moral aversion to nuclear weapons, yet effectively lead to their glorification in others. Many studies on the normative understanding of nuclear weapons consider the existence of a negative normative predisposition, often referred to as 'nuclear taboo', as a major factor in preventing their acquisition and use. Other studies acknowledge the existence of a nuclear taboo inhibiting the use of nuclear weapons, but point to the existence of the opposing effect of norms, frequently referred to as the 'nuclear myth', when it comes to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. This myth emerges when certain symbolic meanings are attached to nuclear weapons, such as a state's identity, self-image, and its desired position in the international system. With 180 odd countries in the world abstaining from the acquisition of nuclear weapons and 8 countries in possession of them (with two further countries assumed to have pursued their acquisition), one might consider the dominance of the nuclear taboo over the nuclear myth to be the rule. The core question is thus why and how this relationship reversed in the case of defectors.

REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE?

Decisionmaking processes leading to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by democratic states have served as the basis for theories about nuclear proliferation. In contrast, less is known about how a totalitarian regime responds to immense external pressure to abolish unconventional weapons it considers crucial for its security and survival. This article will analyze how we can explain Iraq's behavior after the passing of Resolution 1441 and during the United Nations inspections in 2002–2003.

Learning to live with uncertainty: The strategic implications of North Korea's nuclear weapons capability

This article challenges the popular assumption that North Korea's nuclear weapons capability poses a dire threat to international security. It argues that the adverse impact of North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons has been exaggerated and that pessimistic accounts of the strategic implications of this capability have overlooked the strong status quo bias inherent in North Korea's worldview. These accounts have also glossed over the primarily defensive motives underpinning Pyongyang's quest for nuclear weapons. There are dangers attached to North Korea's nuclear capability, especially the possible transfer of fissile material to terrorist groups or rogue states, and the effect it may have in spurring regional neighbours to reassess their non-nuclear status. Contrary to common assumptions, however, the idea that a nuclear-armed North Korea is determined to foment regional instability and challenge the strategic status quo in East Asia is not supported by a close reading of Pyongyang's motives and worldview. The behaviour and statements of the regime suggest that the DPRK is predisposed to accept the logic of deterrence in its relationship with the US. As long as Washington maintains an active and robust posture of extended strategic deterrence on the Korean peninsula, the regime in Pyongyang will continue to be dissuaded from initiating the use of nuclear weapons against other regional states.

Toward Pokhran II: Explaining India's Nuclearisation Process

The basic objective of this paper is to assess India's acquisition of nuclear weapons in light of the general debate why states ‘go nuclear’ and build nuclear arsenals. In general, analysts proffer four arguments about proliferation of nuclear weapons. They are: (1) security concerns; (2) prestige; (3) technological imperatives; and (4) domestic politics. The first posits that security concerns directly related to a state's physical security and survival might drive a state to acquire nuclear weapons. A state, when operating in an environment of anarchy and acute security dilemmas, remains very concerned with national security and survival. Depending on the intensity of security dilemmas, states often resort to developing lethal military forces, including, in some instances, nuclear weapons. For example, the ‘first generation’ nuclear powers (the USA, the USSR, the UK, France and China) and the ‘second generation’ nuclear states (India, Pakistan etc.) acquired nuclear weapons because they each faced an acute security threat from a strategic adversary.

From Ambivalence to Influence: Australia and the Negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty

In early 1967 it appeared that the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva would successfully negotiate a multilateral treaty to curb global proliferation of nuclear weapons. This triggered an urgent review by the Australian Government of its policies on the civil and military applications of nuclear technology. The need to build a coherent response to a US expectation that its Pacific ally would sign the prospective Nuclear Non‐Proliferation Treaty imposed discipline upon a hitherto ad hoc approach to nuclear policy development. Those in the new Gorton Government and the nuclear science bureaucracy who advocated the embrace of nuclear technology—in both its civil and military applications—fought, and ultimately lost, a battle against proponents of the NPT. The resolution of the struggle for supremacy within elements of the policy community impelled the Government to demand and receive concessions from the USA. Originally silent on how the NPT might be interpreted and operationalised in order to maximise support, the US now shared its views with the members of the Western Alliance. US willingness to compromise with Australia in this way exceeded what its Pacific ally had cause to expect and illustrates that middle powers can wield influence on a global scale when circumstances permit.

Unveiling South Africa's nuclear past

Research into South African apartheid-era nuclear weapons history has been severely hampered by longstanding secrecy laws, not to mention the destruction of most policy records. The recent declassification and release of a 1975 Defence Force memorandum recommending the acquisition of nuclear weapons, however, shows that important documents have survived. This document sheds new light on military attitudes about nuclear acquisition, and about the extent of the South African-Israeli alliance. It confirms that Israel had offered South Africa missiles, and may have offered nuclear warheads as well. While the release of the 1975 document is promising, the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000 and the convening of an interdepartmental Classification and Declassification Review Committee in 2002 do not thus far represent a decisive shift toward greater openness on apartheid-era history. The state's incentives for disclosure, controlled to avoid nuclear technology leakage, include the benefits of the lessons of the past to the global non-proliferation regime, contributing to South Africa's prestige and foreign policy agenda, and enhancing the country's democratic transparency.

Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950-63

The advent of nuclear weapons in the 1940s brought enormous change to doctrines regarding the use of force in resolving disputes. American strategists have been widely credited with most of these; Canadians, most have assumed, did not conduct their own strategic analysis. Avoiding Armageddon soundly debunks this notion. Drawing on previously classified government records, Richter reveals that Canadian defence officials did come to independent strategic understandings of the most critical issues of the nuclear age. Canadian appreciation of deterrence, arms control and strategic mobility differed conceptually from the US models, as did Canadian thinking on the controversial issues of air defence and the domestic acquisition of nuclear weapons. The title illustrates Canada's considerable latitude for independent defence thinking while providing key historical information that helps make sense of the contemporary Canadian defence debate.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons

The acquisition of nuclear weapons

The Case against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent

The case for Ukrainian acquisition of nuclear weapons rests fundamentally on two key arguments: first, Ukrainian nuclear weapons will promote peace and stability in a region that might oth erwise be prone to conflict; and second, nuclear weapons will enhance Ukrainian security, providing an ultimate security guarantee for a state fearful that its sovereignty might otherwise be jeopardized by its enormous and potentially menacing neighbor to the east?Russia. These are not trivial or easily dismissable arguments. They suggest that Ukrainian acquisition of nuclear weapons would produce desir able and beneficial security consequences for both Ukraine and the West. At first glance, they appear to provide a convincing rationale for Ukrainian nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, Ukraine should not become a nuclear power. Its own interests and those of the West will best be served if Kiev fulfills its

American Policy toward Problems of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

I n the mid-seventies, following the Indian nuclear implosion in 1974, a major shift took place in the definition of nuclear capability. Whereas nuclear capability had merely been equated with the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons, its significance broadened to include the possession of nuclear materials, most notably highly enriched uranium and/or weapons-grade plutonium, which could be diverted from civilian uses to nuclear weapons and explosives. India's 1974 demonstration also ushered in an era of concern regarding nuclear proliferation in South Asia. This concern was a product of both the increasing tension between India and Pakistan and concern about militarization of the Indian Ocean. It received expression in projects such as the task force report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, which addressed the problem of nuclear arms in South Asia.' Chaired by Leonard S. Spector, the task force was made up of American specialists in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, South Asian security, and arms control. It attempted to outline the dynamics of nuclear proliferation in South Asia and made recommendations on slowing down the nuclear arms race in that region. This article examines the problem of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, American policies in the region, and changes that have taken place in the South Asian perception of U.S. policy.

The politics of implementing China’s nuclear strategy, part I: 1949–1965

China’s nuclear weapons strategy has evolved under a consensus of the Chinese leadership that it must develop nuclear weapons of its own. However, on three occasions, in 1955, 1959, and 1965 the leadership’s decisions to pursue long-term economic, technological, and weapons development in lieu of short-term acquisition of nuclear weapons resulted in leadership purges. In each case external developments sparked the debate about China’s nuclear strategy, while internal economic and political considerations were the significant factors in resolving the disputes.

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

The pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation has been a major international concern of our times. The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is of great historical significance for having created the world's first nuclear-free zone (NFZ). Article 5 of the Treaty prohibits any nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in the Antarctica. The Treaty of Tlatelolco of 1967 established the first internationally recognised Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in a populated region of the world, namely Latin America. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was an attempt to bring in a global regime to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). States in the latter category can adhere to the NPT while accepting a stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, as long as they do not exercise jurisdiction and control over the weapons. West Germany is an obvious example of such a country. A NWFZ, however, prohibits such stationing of nuclear weapons. The three essential characteristics of a NWFZ are non-possession, non-deployment and non-use of nuclear weapons. NWFZs can help to strengthen and promote non-proliferation by providing a means of extending and reinforcing the NPT. In fact Article 7 of the latter accepts that, “Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” The article merely acknowledged that one such treaty had been negotiated more or less simultaneously with the NPT. The second NFWZ in an inhabited region was not to be established for another eighteen years. At the Sixteenth South Pacific Forum meeting held in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, Forum countries adopted the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty on 6 August 1985 (Hiroshima Day). The Preamble to the treaty expresses the commitment to world peace, a grave concern at the continuing nuclear arms race, the conviction that every country bears an obligation to strive for the elimination of nuclear weapons, a belief in the efficacy of regional arms control measures, and a reaffirmation of the NPT for halting nucleor proliferation. The core NFZ obligations are contained in Articles 3–7. Each party agrees not to manufacture or otherwise acquire, possess or have control—or seek to do so—over any nuclear device; not to assist or encourage others to make or acquire nuclear weapons; to prevent the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons on its territory; not to dump radioactive wastes at sea anywhere in the zone, and to prevent such dumping by others in its territorial sea. Discussions at the United Nations had, by the mid-1970s, identified nine major principles as the guiding elements of a NWFZ: (1) the initiative should come from the countries of the region; (2) the specific provisions of the NWFZ treaty should be negotiated between the regional member states in the form of a multilateral treaty establishing the zone in perpetuity; (5) while adherence to the treaty should be voluntary, the NWFZ must nevertheless embrace all militarily significant states in the region: (4) existing treaty relationships within the zone should not be disturbed; (5) there should be an effective verification system: (6) peaceful nuclear development should be allowed; (7) the zone should hare clearly defined and recognised boundaries; (8) in defining the territory of the zone, members must respect international law, including freedom of the seas and straits used for international navigation and of international airspace; and (9) the NWFZ should have the support of the nuclear-weapon states. Thus the NWFZ concept in established United Nations vocabulary does not prohibit the temporary presence of nuclear vessels during transit or on port calls, and it does not necessarily preclude the acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities and materials tantamount to having a nuclear-weapon capability or producing untested nuclear bomb components. Nevertheless, it will be useful to follow the UN criteria in order to examine the nature and implications of the South Pacific zone.

Cooling the arms race in South Asia

It is still possible to maintain the nuclear status quo between India and Pakistan, and to address the underlying security concerns that have made nuclear arms attractive to both.Time is fast running out for averting a nuclear arms race in South Asia. India and Pakistan are now confronting decisions on the acquisition of nuclear weapons that will fundamentally affect their bilateral security relations and will have important regional and global consequences as well.To inform the debate on these issues, in mid-1986 the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace established a task force on nonproliferation and South Asian security, composed of American specialists in the fields of nuclear nonproliferation, South Asian studies, and arms control. The task force's final report, released in January, offers a blueprint for a nuclear stand-down in the region. Its conclusions are summarized below.

In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 249 reader (or merely to reinforce a previous degree ofexpertise) on the technologies involved in nuclear commerce, legal and otherwise. Although occasional repetitiveness leads one to feel that the book could have been condensed somewhat , it is nonetheless a highly worthwhile work that deals effectively with the complex and controversial issues involved in the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations. By Caroline Thomas. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1987. 228 pp., $30.00/cloth, $14.95/paper. Reviewed by Angela Lykos, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Caroline Thomas intends In Search of Security to be a textbook designed to familiarize the student of international relations with the problems confronting developing countries. Given her assumption that economic independence precludes political security, she devotes much of her book to arguing that the present global economic system, as run by the industrialized nations, violates Third World states' sovereignty. In using this analytical framework of NorthSouth relations, Thomas presents a one-sided account of the Third World's plight in the international system. Thomas asserts that the international monetary system, as led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), deprives the developing nations of the right to form their own economic policies. Since the IMF's primary aim is the maintenance of the world capitalist system, it chooses to ignore the Third World's special needs. By pointing out that the IMF's stabilization programs impose austere conditions on nations seeking assistance, Thomas questions the IMF's premise that balance of payments equilibrium facilitates economic growth. Moreover, she contends that the IMF incorrectly assumes that a developing nation 's domestic policies are the main cause of balance of payments difficulties and that it disregards the fact that exogenous factors often play a crucial role. Although Thomas's interpretation is valid, she oversimplifies the Third World's dilemma by placing so much emphasis on the IMF's actions and by failing to elaborate on other external and internal causes. Thomas also criticizes the international trade system for being insensitive to Third World problems: The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the IMF's counterpart, has established a trade structure inherently biased against the developing nations. Third World efforts to reform the existing trade regime, such as United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, have been disappointing , since the industrialized countries are primarily interested in preserving their economic power, not in distributive justice. She also maintains that world hunger is due not to a supply shortage but to an unfair distribution system among nations. Thomas, however, acknowledges that the problem ofland reform does exist at the domestic level. In the political arena, Thomas denounces the nuclear weapons NonProliferation Treaty as an effort by the nuclear powers to formalize inequalities 250 SAIS REVIEW in the international system. Since nuclear weapons are symbols of power, by preventing the Third World from acquiring them, the superpowers maintain their dominant position. Thomas disagrees with the notion that the developing nations do not possess the "common sense" to have nuclear weapons at their disposal. Nevertheless, the Third World is more volatile than the industrialized nations, and Thomas fails to consider what effect the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the developing nations would have on stability. Finally, Thomas uses Jamaica as a case study to illustrate how external factors, such as foreign governments, multinationals, the IMF, and the capitalist economic system limit a developing nation's policy options. What characterizes Thomas as a typical Third World proponent is her argument that the main cause of the Third World's economic and political dilemmas are the industrialized nations' actions. Although In Search of Security is not objective, it does provide a comprehensive view of one side of the North-South confrontation. Soviet-Latin American Relations in the 1980s. Edited by Augusto Varas. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987. 290 pp. $38.50/cloth. Reviewed by Susan Thornton, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Traditional Soviet-Latin American relations have been cautious and have not enjoyed a high priority in the USSR— which, for the most part, acknowledges U.S. hegemony in the region and seeking to avoid provoking further superpower tensions by challenging declarations of U.S. strategic...

The Nuclearization Debates: The Cases of Israel and Egypt

Since the early 1960s, the nuclear question has been high on the agenda of both Israel and the Arab states. Studies, reports and statements by academics, governmental agencies and decision-makers have speculated that Israel has been producing nuclear weapons. Indeed, a continuing state of war, the economic burden of the arms race, a pessimistic view of Israel's future capacity to afford and absorb new technologies and to build new generations of conventional weapons systems, and the increased Israeli dependence on the US have encouraged some Israelis to advocate nuclearization. Subsequent Arab acquisition of nuclear weapons, they argued, would create a stable nuclear balance of terror. Among the Arabs, the acquisition of nuclear weapons offered the prospect of military parity or superiority in order to defeat the Jewish state. Such a capability might then serve as a potential point of political or diplomatic leverage. With this justification in mind and believing Israel's nuclear ambitions left them no choice, the Arabs embarked on their own nuclear program. This article will trace the Israeli and Arab march toward nuclearization. The focus, however, will not be on nuclear hardware but rather on the software, the debates and perceptions of the actors. The three major component strands of thought in the nuclear debate in Israel will be

Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war

This paper studies the effects of nuclear proliferation, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional nation states, on the probability of nuclear war. There are, of course, multiple interrelated effects of nuclear proliferation in addition to its effect on the probability of nuclear war, such as economic effects on the global distribution of wealth, political effects on the structure of alliances and alliance relationships, and military effects on the nature of war.' All of these effects are, however, arguably less important than the question of nuclear war outbreak itself. Thus the focus of this paper is the influence of additional nuclear weapons states on the probability of nuclear war. The principal analytic conclusion of this paper is that there may be different qualitative effects of proliferation on the probability of nuclear war, depending on the number of existing nuclear nations and that in certain instances proliferation may reduce, rather than increase the probability of nuclear war.2 The principal policy conclusion of this paper is that where there are adverse effects on world stability of an additional nuclear nation, these effects may be partly offset by policies and programs which have the effect of reducing the probability of accidental or irrational war. Related arguments on the effects of nuclear proliferation have been presented by Gallois, Wentz, and Tullock. Gallois argued that additional nuclear weapon states, such as France, would so raise the stakes of a potential conflict that such proliferation would make nations more cautious and thus reduce the probability of nuclear war.3 Wentz argued that it might be in U.S. interests to promote selective nuclear proliferation.4 Tullock treated multicountry

Incentives for Nuclear Weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran

DISCUSSION OF THE DANGER of nuclear proliferation has suffered from too much abstraction and too little specificity. Conceptualization of the problem as a general, global threat distracts attention from the particular determinants of a nation's decision for or against acquisition of nuclear weapons. These determinants vary widely both in degree and in kind.1 Moving the analytic focus to case studies of the incentives and constraints in individual countries and regions offers greater promise for new insights. For much of the postwar period the only nations with the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons (principally the advanced industrial states of Europe and Japan, and the People's Republic of China [PRC]) had weak incentives to do so. Their security problems were subsumed under the competition between the superpowers. The strength of the United States and the Soviet Union that provided nuclear umbrellas for their allies, and the solidity of the alliances, gave most of these countries sufficient reason to feel they could do without independent nuclear capabilities. The exceptions were those countries -France and the PRC-whose leaderships decided they could not or should not place their security in the hands of one of the superpowers. For most of the candidates for proliferation, the bipolarity of international strategic competition reduced incentives. These conditions do not apply in South and West Asia, for two reasons. First, alliance ties with the superpowers, both formal and tacit, have existed in the region, but even at their best these ties have been weak, conditional, and unreliable when compared with NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Japanese-American security treaty. None of the great powers since the 1940s have stationed combat forces in India,

The US-India safeguards dispute

The current U.S.-India dispute over nuclear safeguards is likely to be the single most important test of the Carter administration's anti-proliferation policies. The Carter administration wants India to accept comprehensive safeguards that would bar further production of nuclear explosives. The Desai government wants to maintain unsafeguarded facilities, in effect keeping the weapons option open. It has been a basic tenet of Indian nuclear policy since the mid-1950s that the big powers must disarm if the small powers are to renounce acquisition of nuclear weapons. As a matter of practical policy, India is willing to forego a nuclear deterrent only if sustained world pressure keeps China's nuclear aspirations in check. As a matter of basic principle, India regards it as unfair and imperialistic that the heavily armed big powers ask for special assurances from the lightly armed small powers. India takes the position that it will cooperate with the United States only voluntarily and only if the nuclear weapon states or at least the superpowers start to clean up their own act. The superpowers must (1) negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; (2) accept full-scope safeguards themselves, which would be tantamount to a ban on any further production of weapons-grade materials;more » and (3) make significant moves toward total nuclear disarmament. The dependence of India on the United States for nuclear supplies is almost negligible. India's major nuclear facilities in operation or under construction include five research reactors, seven power reactors and three reprocessing facilities. Of these 15 facilities, the United States supplied only one (the Tarapur reactor) and 12 of them are not under IAEA safeguards. The United States, in short, is threatening to terminate supplies of low-enriched uranium for just one reactor unless India places these 12 facilities under IAEA safeguards. (MCW)« less