Acquisition Of Nuclear Weapons Research Articles

Theoretical Approaches to Nuclear Proliferation

This article analyses discussions between representatives of three schools in the theory of international relations - realism, liberalism and constructivism - on the driving factors of nuclear proliferation. The paper examines major theoretical approaches, outlined in the studies of Russian and foreign scientists, to the causes of nuclear weapons development, while unveiling their advantages and limitations. Much of the article has been devoted to alternative approaches, particularly, the role of mathematical modeling in assessing proliferation risks. The analysis also reveals a variety of different approaches to nuclear weapons acquisition, as well as the absence of a comprehensive proliferation theory. Based on the research results the study uncovers major factors both favoring and impeding nuclear proliferation. The author shows that the lack of consensus between realists, liberals and constructivists on the nature of proliferation led a number of scientists to an attempt to explain nuclear rationale by drawing from the insights of more than one school in the theory of IR. Detailed study of the proliferation puzzle contributes to a greater understating of contemporary international realities, helps to identify mechanisms that are most likely to deter states from obtaining nuclear weapons and is of the outmost importance in predicting short- and long-term security environment. Furthermore, analysis of the existing scientific literature on nuclear proliferation helps to determine future research agenda of the subject at hand.

Beyond Emboldenment: How Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Can Change Foreign Policy

What happens to the foreign policies of states when they acquire nuclear weapons? Despite its importance, this question has not been answered satisfactorily. Nuclear weapons can facilitate six conceptually distinct foreign policy behaviors: aggression, expansion, independence, bolstering, steadfastness, and compromise. This typology of foreign policy behaviors enables scholars to move beyond simple claims of “nuclear emboldenment,” and allows for more nuanced examination of the ways in which nuclear weapons affect the foreign policies of current and future nuclear states. The typology also sheds light on Great Britain's response to nuclear acquisition. Britain used nuclear weapons to engage in greater levels of steadfastness in responding to challenges, bolstering junior allies, and demonstrating independence from the United States, but it did not engage in greater levels of aggression, expansion, or compromise. The typology and the British case demonstrate the value of distinguishing among different effects of nuclear weapons acquisition, have implications for scholars' and policymakers' understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics, and suggest avenues for future research.

On fear and nuclear terrorism

Fear of nuclear weapons is rational, but its extension to terrorism has been a vehicle for fear-mongering that is unjustified by available data. The debate on nuclear terrorism tends to distract from events that raise the risk of nuclear war, the consequences of which would far exceed the results of terrorist attacks. And the historical record shows that the war risk is real. The Cuban Missile Crisis and other confrontations have demonstrated that miscalculation, misinterpretation, and misinformation could lead to a “close call” regarding nuclear war. Although there has been much commentary on the interest that Osama bin Laden, when he was alive, reportedly expressed in obtaining nuclear weapons, evidence of any terrorist group working seriously toward the theft of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of such weapons by other means is virtually nonexistent. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by terrorists requires significant time, planning, resources, and expertise, with no guarantees that an acquired device would work. It requires putting aside at least some aspects of a group’s more immediate activities and goals for an attempted operation that no terrorist group has accomplished. While absence of evidence does not mean evidence of absence, it is reasonable to conclude that the fear of nuclear terrorism has swamped realistic consideration of the threat.

“Tossing a Match into Dry Hay”: Nuclear Weapons and the Crisis in U.S.-Canadian Relations, 1962–1963

Newly declassified archival sources allow a reassessment of U.S.-Canadian diplomacy during the final months of John Diefenbaker's government concerning Canada's prospective acquisition of nuclear weapons in the wake of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Scholars have traditionally argued that Canadian proposals for U.S. nuclear warheads to be supplied to Canada after the outbreak of an international emergency were unworkable. Diefenbaker has been deemed primarily responsible for his government's collapse after personally fumbling the bilateral nuclear weapons talks. Drawing on previously unavailable primary documents, this article shows that the U.S. decision to reject Ottawa's proposals was rooted in political, not military, imperatives. The article also demonstrates that U.S. officials waged a concerted campaign to undermine the Canadian government, most notably through the State Department's unprecedented public rebuke of Diefenbaker's nuclear weapons policy in late-January 1963.

Nuclear Weapons Acquisition and Deterrence

The effects of nuclear weapons acquisition on deterrence will depend on the nature of the state, leadership, or even organization that obtains the weapons; the types of actions to be deterred; the purpose and strategy the weapons serve; the consequences for the military situation between the acquiring state and its adversaries; and the ways in which those adversaries respond to the opposing nuclear threat. The implications of nuclear acquisition for deterrence are likely to change over time as nuclear capabilities move from a nascent state and gain, among other qualities, increased size, longer range, more diversity, better survivability, and greater destructive power. Deterrence is not only a matter of who is being deterred, from what action, by whom, for what reason, by what threats, and in what circumstances, but also when in the extended process of acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities a deterrence challenge occurs.

The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

This critical review of the new political science literature on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation consists of seven parts. The first section briefly presents what we know about which states developed nuclear weapons and which states started but abandoned weapons development programs. I highlight the problems that result from uncertainty about the accuracy and completeness of the data. The second and third sections review the literature on the spread of the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons. We still lack robust knowledge about the relationship between the development of civilian nuclear power programs and nuclear weapons acquisition. The next two sections review the literature on the demand for nuclear weapons. Comparative case studies and statistical studies have improved our understanding of the diversity of motives for weapons development and restraints, but serious gaps in our knowledge remain. The sixth section outlines alternative theories about the potential impact of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on nuclear weapons programs decisions. Finally, I lay out a future research agenda to address the weaknesses in our current understanding of the causes of nuclear proliferation.

Olli Heinonen: Reporting from the front lines of nuclear proliferation

As one who has led inspection teams in North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and other nations, Olli Heinonen says he cannot discount the possibility that a nuclear weapon will be used in the next 10 years. He asserts that the verification regime of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may need an overhaul to contend with current developments such as the nuclear ambitions of non-state actors. He offers perspective on North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, Israel’s bombing of a suspected nuclear facility in Syria, Iran’s ambition to enrich uranium, the challenges of stopping proliferation, and the need for closer international cooperation and firmer action against proliferators.

Review: Essence of Indecision Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy

ESSENCE OF INDECISION Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963 Patricia I. McMahon Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009. 246PP, $85.00 cloth ISBN 978-0-7735-3498-8Five decades after it took place, Canada's nuclear weapons debate of the late1950S and early 60s remains poorly understood. This is a consequence of several factors - the long-standing tendency of Canadian defence scholars and historians to turn their attention elsewhere, the fact that most Canadians have only a limited knowledge of their own history, and perhaps even the discouragement of this country's foreign policy elites (who might prefer that Canadians not know about this entire affair) - but the net result is that the debate and final decision remains a subject of study.Patricia I. McMahon's book, Essence of Indecision, is the most recent attempt to try to make sense of this episode. Building on a relatively smaU body of scholarship (perhaps the best known of which remains Jon McLin's seminal 1967 work Canada's Changing Defence Policy), McMahon chaUenges the consensus view by arguing that Prime Minister John was not indecisive in being unable to determine whether Canada should accept US nuclear weapons during his period in office. Rather, his inability to reach a final decision was the result of considerations. In particular, Diefenbaker's Conservatives were attempting to navigate government waters for the first time in decades, and the prime minister was acutely aware of the political consequences of making the wrong decision. At the same time, the government had come under withering criticism for its decisions on other defence issues (especially establishing NORAD in 1957-58 and cancelling the Avro Arrow in 1959), thereby making the nuclear weapons decision even more difficult.Without question, McMahon's task is not easy. As I and others have written, dithered for virtuaUy his entire tenure as prime minister. Even as his time in office was coming to an end in early 1963, he was still unable to articulate a clear position. His speech in January of that year - intended to clarify his thinking in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis - remains a masterpiece of double talk and obfuscation. During his six years in office, steadily moved from one side of the debate to the other. He spent his first four years laying the groundwork to accept nuclear weapons, but over the last two years of his term he did everything possible to ensure that Canada did not accept the weapons that he had previously said it would.The consensus view is that this change was the result of several factors, three of which stood out. First, appointed Howard Green - a man committed to disarmament - as secretary of state for external affairs in mid1959. Second, contrary to the opinion polls of the day, believed that the majority of Canadians opposed nuclear weapons, a condusion he reached largely by reading his personal mail. Finally, in this period arms control talks between the US and the USSR got underway, the goal of which was general and complete disarmament and an end to nudear testing.McMahon argues that these explanations are insufficient, and that to understand the delay one must first understand Diefenbaker's tenuous political position (even after winning an unprecedented majority in 1958). As the author notes in a critical passage, Diefenbaker feared the potential political fallout that could accompany the acquisition of nuclear weapons... [and this] is what lent an air of indecision to his behaviour (x). According to McMahon, Diefenbaker's delay was understandable, and his recognition of the political risks that nuclear acquisition entailed largely explains his difficulty in coming to a final decision.McMahon insists that always wanted Canada to acquire the weapons, but the timing was never right. …

The Rise of Iran: How Durable, How Dangerous?

Iran is viewed by many as a rising that poses an increasing threat to regional and even global security. This view is wrong for three reasons. Iran's and is exaggerated by most accounts; it is too limited to allow the Iranians to dominate the Persian Gulf let alone the Middle East, and its brand of Shi'ism has very limited appeal outside of Iran. Second, growing internal political and economic instability will seriously limit Iran's bid for regional dominance. Third, the failure to stop the Iranian nuclear program has led analysts to underestimate the ability of the other regional powers and the West to balance Iran and contain its influence, even if it acquires nuclear weapons. If these limitations on Iranian are taken into account the rise seems destined to be a short one. The consensus among Iran watchers and Middle East experts is that Iran is a rising power. Iran is generally portrayed as an unstoppable force with a capacity and a will to dominate the Persian Gulf and even the Middle East. The acquisition of nuclear weapons, regarded as a foregone conclusion by an increasing number of commentators and experts, is believed to further enhance Iranian and to make balancing and containment impossible. This view is fundamentally flawed, vastly exaggerating the extent of Iran's rise and the threat that it poses. It is important to accurately assess Iran's and the threat that it poses because the dominant view of Iran has a negative impact on the ongoing negotiations aimed at persuading Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program and increases the likelihood of a preventive attack against Iran's nuclear program. The latter option has recently received serious attention following the failure of the Obama Administration's engagement strategy.1 Our argument has five parts. First, we present the predominant view of Iran's rise and the threat that it poses. Second, we demonstrate the way in which Iran's and has been vastly exaggerated. The third section demonstrates that increased economic and political problems will make Iran's rise impossible to sustain. Fourth, we show that Iran, as a result, can be balanced and contained even if it develops nuclear weapons. We end with a conclusion summing up our main points. IRAN RISING: THE ACCEPTED WISDOM The ongoing debate on the rise of Iran and its consequences has been dominated by two camps: a hard power camp emphasizing military capabilities and geopolitics and a soft power camp emphasizing religious and ideological factors.2 The perspective suggests that Tehran has been the principal beneficiary of the American policy of regime change, as it removed two of Iran's arch enemies and tied down American forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, making it impossible for the United States to put effective pressure on Iran to stop its support for terrorism and its alleged nuclear weapons program. These favorable geopolitical developments coincided with unusually high gas and oil prices (1999-2008), enabling Iran to build up its military strength, expand its regional influence through closer alignment with Syria and support for militant groups, most notably Hamas and Hizbullah, and at the same time ignore the economic sanctions imposed by the US and the UN to stop its nuclear program. In the realist perspective, a rising Iran is a rising threat. Any state gaining relative is expected to enhance its security or power; Tehran is accordingly interpreted as a status quo-orientered seeking to enhance its security (deterrence),3 or as a revisionist seeking to establish regional hegemony and to export its revolution.4 The Iranian nuclear program is viewed as a major threat because of fear that the emergence of a nuclear Iran will result in a nuclear domino effect, triggering an arms race in the region. In addition, some analysts fear that the current regime might use its nuclear weapons against Israel, pass them on to terrorist groups, or employ them against its own citizens in the event that an internal rebellion threatens to overthrow it. …

Lessons of restraint: How Canada helps explain and strengthen the nonproliferation norm

The world takes Canada’s non-acquisition of nuclear weapons for granted. Though Canada does not pose a breakout threat from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the course of its nuclear weapons policy is far from simple, including at least two reversals and the electoral defeat of a sitting government. A careful observation of the history of Canada’s nuclear weapons policy illuminates a better understanding of the nonproliferation norm. This author looks at Canada’s restraint from acquisition of an independent nuclear weapons capability, which is often viewed as unremarkable. But the historical record is dense and interesting, shedding light on three important questions. First, why do states seek or reject nuclear weapons? Understanding the Canadian experience may help to explain other states’ nuclear weapons acquisition behavior and support the development of more nuanced policy and international legal instruments for nonproliferation. Second, what specific behaviors constitute compliance with the nonproliferation norm, and can we shape them to promote international peace and security? The Canadian experience suggests that our understanding of nuclear weapons did not spring into existence fully formed. Third, what should NATO’s role be with regard to preventing nuclear proliferation? As security threats evolve and nuclear proliferation increases in salience among threats to NATO members, response to this threat—whether it comes from one rogue state or the instability of the NPT regime—may move higher among alliance policy priorities. The author uses Canada as an example to improve our understanding of when the nonproliferation norm matters—and how competing priorities can be integrated with nonproliferation concerns within NATO.

Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941-2000

When do states attack or consider attacking nuclear infrastructure in nonnuclear weapons states? Despite the importance of this question, relatively little scholarly research has considered when and why countries target nuclear programs. The authors argue that states are likely to attack or consider attacking nuclear facilities when they are highly threatened by a particular country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Three factors increase the salience of the proliferation threat: (1) prior violent militarized conflict; (2) the presence of a highly autocratic proliferator; and (3) divergent foreign policy interests. The authors test these propositions using statistical analysis and a new data set on all instances when countries have struck or seriously considered striking other states’ nuclear infrastructure between 1941 and 2000. The findings lend support for the theory and very little support for the alternative explanations. States are not deterred from attacking nuclear programs by the prospect of a military retaliation and concerns about international condemnation do not appear to influence the willingness to strike. Ultimately, states are willing to accept substantial costs in attacking if they believe that a particular country’s acquisition of nuclear weapons poses a significant threat to their security.

Never Say Never: Considerations about the Possibility of Australia Acquiring Nuclear Weapons

Australia's decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nuclear program. These conditions interact with Australia's relationship with Indonesia and the technological and industrial feasibility of “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear weapons postures, respectively. The only Australian nuclear posture that does not lack credibility in light of all these factors is the use of “tactical” weapons to deter major landings on the Australian mainland.

Global Risk of Nuclear Terrorism

The emergence of nuclear terrorism, a threat that President Obama called "the gravest danger we face," has signaled a paradigm shift in international security. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, sensitive nuclear technologies and materials have become increasingly available. Globalization and the inadequate enforcement of treaties and export controls have allowed the proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. Today, international terrorist organizations seek to employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as a means to influence national policies around the world. AlQaida spokesman Suleiman Abu Gheith declared that in order to balance the injustices that have been inflicted on the Muslim population worldwide, al-Qaida's new objective is "to kill 4 million Americans–2 million of them children." As political scientist Graham Allison notes, this could be achieved with either 1,334 attacks similar in magnitude to those of 9/11, or one nuclear bomb.Building a nuclear program is an arduous task that requires tacit knowledge, the recruitment of nuclear scientists, engineers, and machinists, and the resources and time to obtain nuclear materials and components. While it is unlikely that terrorist organizations have the capacity to develop full-fledged programs in the near term, terrorist development and acquisition of nuclear weapons remains a long-term threat that requires international action.

Posturing for Peace? Pakistan's Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability

A probe of various regional power nuclear postures reveals that such postures, rather than simply the acquisition of nuclear weapons, can have differential effects on deterrence and stability dynamics. The India-Pakistan dyad is a useful candidate for exploring these various effects because the three regional power nuclear postures—catalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalation—have interacted with each other in South Asia. In particular, Pakistan's shift from a catalytic posture to an asymmetric escalation posture in 1998 against a continuous Indian assured retaliation posture allows the effects of nuclear posture to be isolated in an enduring rivalry in which many variables can be held constant. The asymmetric escalation posture may be “deterrence optimal” for Pakistan, suggesting that nuclear postures do have different effects on conflict dynamics, but it has also enabled Pakistan to more aggressively pursue longstanding revisionist preferences in India, triggering more frequent and intense crises on the subcontinent. Furthermore, the command and control procedures that Pakistan undertakes to make its asymmetric escalation posture credible amplify this instability. These procedures generate risks to the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear assets, both at present and as India and Pakistan continue to dynamically evolve nuclear and conventional postures. The conclusions for South Asian and international security of this reality are grim.

Nuclear Proliferation: Grounds for Optimism?

Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint. By Maria Rost Rublee. Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 2009. 297 pp., $22.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-8203-3235-2). This is a very valuable book on at least two dimensions. First, as one now often sees a perhaps excessive pessimism about whether the spread of nuclear weapons can be contained, when the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is widely seen as cracking and failing, the author here joins a number of others, including Mitchell Reiss's (1995) Bridled Ambition , T. V. Paul's (2000) Power Versus Prudence , and Etel Solingen's (2007) Nuclear Logics , who have examined the many interesting cases of countries that were once expected to be seeking such weapons, and then in actuality did not do so. Pessimism in this area may be all too attractive, just as in weather forecasting, because we do not mind if the forecast is wrong; and, if the thunderstorm or the nuclear weapons acquisition actually occurs, the forecaster has covered himself. But no one has ever made a thunderstorm happen by predicting it, while pessimistic predictions of nuclear proliferation can …

Nuclear weapons and conflict transformation: the case of India-Pakistan

Introduction Part 1: Theory 1. Studies on Conflict Transformation 2. Scholarship on Ramifications of Nuclear Weapons Acquisition 3. Elucidating Conflict Transformation with Nuclear Weapons Part 2: The India-Pakistan Protracted Conflict 4. Life of the Protracted Conflict 5. Introduction of Nuclear Weapons in the Conflict 6. Crises and Wars in the Pre-Nuclear Period 7. Crises and Non-escalation in the Nuclear Period 8. Futile Peace Initiatives in the Midst of Violence 9. Conflict Transformed 10. Potential for Conflict Termination. Conclusion. Bibliography

Learning to love the bomb: Canada's nuclear weapons during the Cold War

In Learning to Love the Bomb, Sean M. Maloney explores the controversial subject of Canada's acquisition of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Based on newly declassified Canadian and U.S. documents, it examines policy, strategy, operational, and technical matters and weaves these seemingly disparate elements into a compelling story that finally unlocks several Cold War mysteries. For example, while U.S. military forces during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis were focused on the Caribbean Sea and the southeastern United States, Canadian forces assumed responsibility for defending the northern United States, with aircraft armed with nuclear depth charges flying patrols and guarding against missile attack by Soviet submarines. This defensive strategy was a closely guarded secret because it conflicted with Canada's image as a peacekeeper and therefore a more passive member of NATO than its ally to the south. It is revealed here for the first time. The place of nuclear weapons in Canadian history has, until now, been a highly secret and misunderstood field subject to rumor, rhetoric, half-truths, and propaganda. Learning to Love the Bomb reveals the truth about Canada's role as a nuclear power.

Iran and the bomb: the abdication of international responsibility

The Iranian regime is in the middle of a dangerous nuclear poker game with the West. Drawing on her inside knowledge and experience, Therese Delpech provides a hard-hitting analysis of Iran's intentions and its ability to beguile the international community, often with the aid of China and Russia, two countries eager to benefit from Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Delpech is one of the world's leading authorities on international nuclear security, and in this book, she dissects Iran's program in minute detail. Delpech begins with a history of Iran's nuclear project-which was launched with the help of several Western countries-from the 1970s to today. She examines the reasons behind Iran's renewed interest in nuclear power during its war with Iraq, and the national pride, exemplified by Mahmoud Amadinejad's bellicose rhetoric, that prevents the country from bowing to the dictates of the international community. Then she dissects the strategy of the various actors in this new global crisis: Iran, the commonly termed EU 3 (United Kingdom, France, and Germany), the United States, Russia, China, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Delpech follows with an analysis of the feasibility, practicality, and political viability of such possible solutions as dismantling by force, supervised third party reprocessing, referral to the United Nations' Security Council, and Iranian appeasement. In conclusion, Delpech unravels the tangled regional and international dimensions of the crisis, detailing the enormous impact of Iran's game on the Persian Gulf, Turkey, the political and military movements of Israel, America's presence in Iraq and the wider Middle East, and the future of the much-weakened Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Living with Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Korea

Between the poles of nuclear-weapons acquisition and transparent disarmament lies a third option: cultivating ambiguity about capabilities. The current crises with Iran and North Korea are playing out against the backdrop of the contrasting nonproliferation precedents set in 2003 - in Iraq, through a change of regime, and, in Libya, through change within a regime. Washington has sent mixed messages to Tehran and Pyongyang whether the US objective is regime change or behaviour change. Coercive diplomacy, combining credible inducements and penalties to roll back their nuclear programmes, is not possible when the goal is the maximalist one of regime change. But even if the United States clarifies its objective, negotiations with North Korea and Iran can realistically aim only to narrow, but not to eliminate, the ambiguity. A strategy of containment, whose key elements are deterrence and reassurance, offers the best approach for narrowing and hedging against these states' nuclear ambiguity.

Client State: Japan in the American Embrace

This title offers a comprehensive examination of Japan's postwar transformation into the Great Britain of the Far East - beholden to the agenda of the US. Japan is the world's No. 2 economy, greater in GDP than Britain and France together and almost double that of China. It is also the most durable, generous, and unquestioning ally of the US, attaching priority to its Washington ties over all else. In Client State, Gavan McCormack examines the current transformation of Japan, designed to meet the demands from Washington that Japan become the Great Britain of the Far East. Exploring postwar Japan's relationship with America, he contends that US pressure has been steadily applied to bring Japan in line with neoliberal principles. The Bush administration's insistence on Japan's thorough subordination has reached new levels, and is an agenda heavily in the American, rather than the Japanese, national interest. It includes comprehensive institutional reform, a thorough revamp of the security and defense relationship with the US, and - alarmingly - vigorous pursuit of Japan's acquisition of nuclear weapons.