Nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war

Abstract

This paper studies the effects of nuclear proliferation, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional nation states, on the probability of nuclear war. There are, of course, multiple interrelated effects of nuclear proliferation in addition to its effect on the probability of nuclear war, such as economic effects on the global distribution of wealth, political effects on the structure of alliances and alliance relationships, and military effects on the nature of war.' All of these effects are, however, arguably less important than the question of nuclear war outbreak itself. Thus the focus of this paper is the influence of additional nuclear weapons states on the probability of nuclear war. The principal analytic conclusion of this paper is that there may be different qualitative effects of proliferation on the probability of nuclear war, depending on the number of existing nuclear nations and that in certain instances proliferation may reduce, rather than increase the probability of nuclear war.2 The principal policy conclusion of this paper is that where there are adverse effects on world stability of an additional nuclear nation, these effects may be partly offset by policies and programs which have the effect of reducing the probability of accidental or irrational war. Related arguments on the effects of nuclear proliferation have been presented by Gallois, Wentz, and Tullock. Gallois argued that additional nuclear weapon states, such as France, would so raise the stakes of a potential conflict that such proliferation would make nations more cautious and thus reduce the probability of nuclear war.3 Wentz argued that it might be in U.S. interests to promote selective nuclear proliferation.4 Tullock treated multicountry