Pessimism and the Questions of Moral Nihilism and Ethical Quietism

Abstract

The Nietzschean critiques of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical and ethical pessimism are well known. For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer’s pessimistic metaphysics necessarily leads to a nihilation of reality that gives rise to a mode of passive ethical quietism. To correct these perceived weaknesses, Nietzsche famously endeavors to develop a new “pessimism of strength” that, he argues, will promote a more vital and positive sense of natural moral value and ethical activity. The aim of this paper is to interrogate Nietzsche’s claim that Schopenhauer’s metaphysics necessarily leads to a nihilation of natural value and ethical quietism. To these ends, I will examine the nature of Schopenhauer’s pessimism, its metaphysical foundations and ethical applications, and show how Philipp Mainländer, a hitherto understudied inheritor of this pessimism, saw in it not a gateway to moral nihilism, but an inversion of moral naturalism which called for radical acts of ethical, social, and political engagement. By translating and interpreting key passages from Mainländer two-volume Die Philosophie der Erlösung, this paper shows how Mainländer’s ethics and politics help us to understand the ethical consequences of Schopenhauer’s metaphysical pessimism in a new light, not as a precursor to nihilism and quietism, as Nietzsche claims, but as a foundation for revolutionary ethical and socio-political activity.