A moral nihilist ethic

Abstract

Moral nihilism is the view that objective moral values do not exist. It is often presumed that if moral nihilism were to catch on we would lose any rationale for shared norms, people would stop behaving cooperatively and society would collapse. It is also often presumed that moral nihilism and moral realism are ontologically opposed. In response to the first presumption this thesis argues that, on the contrary, a society of moral nihilists would be motivated to behave cooperatively. Even without moral motivation, the personal benefits of living in a cooperative society (access to shared food, labour and specialised skills, etc.) together with our altruistic desire to see others do well are sufficient to motivate us to endorse shared norms. In response to the second presumption, I will argue that moral nihilism is in fact ontologically compatible with several forms of (moral realist) moral naturalism. Thus, moral nihilism can adapt moral naturalist theories in order to provide a consistent rationale for social norms in a moral nihilist society. To show exactly what the ontological commitments of moral nihilism are, I will draw on the work of J.L. Mackie, Ian Hinckfuss and Richard Joyce. I will then draw on two different moral naturalist accounts- Rosalind Hursthouse's naturalist virtue ethics and Peter Railton's consequentialism- showing that they are ontologically compatible with moral nihilism and, where necessary,adapting them to suit moral nihilist needs.