Do We Have Any Justified Moral Beliefs?*

Abstract

In this fine book, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argues for a "moderate Pyrrhonian" skeptical view about justified moral belief.1 His argument rests on the thesis that the justification of a belief is a relation between that belief and a class of alternatives (83-87). On this thesis, the "contrast-class view," we can assess the justification of a belief relative to various contrast classes. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that there is no showing that any particular class has epistemological priority (97-103; 117-129); because of this we should suspend belief about whether any moral beliefs are justified "without qualification" (130; 251). This is his "Pyrrhonian moral skepticism." Sinnott-Armstrong also argues that moral nihilism cannot be ruled-out (99, 133); given this, no positive moral belief is justified relative to contrast classes that include moral nihilism. Nevertheless, he thinks, some moral beliefs may be justified relative to alternatives that are taken seriously in ordinary deliberation (130-131). This is his "moderate moral skepticism." Sinnott-Armstrong's arguments are rich and subtle. His book includes a sophisticated assessment of debates in epistemology as well as a thorough examination of the epistemological resources of metaethical theories. I cannot do justice to all of this. I will attempt merely to raise problems for the contrast-class view and for Sinnott-Armstrong's position that nihilism cannot be ruled-out.