Abstract

In an ambiguous and tense period, between the war in Vietnam, the policy of détente and the vigorous fight against any Communist expansion, Richard Nixon devoted more time to Latin America than he had originally planned, given that the region, though “peripheral” to the two superpowers, was at the heart of the Cold War. This article analyzes the policy towards the region pursued by Nixon and his National Security Adviser, then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, between 1969 and 1974, with an extension into the Ford years, taking into account the various parameters involved in decision-making: the international situation, international actors, electoral concerns, divergences within the executive branch, as well as the role of Congress, in order to propose a nuanced study. Three major issues will be examined: expropriations, the nationalist manifestation par excellence, which reached its peak at the time; Cuba, a real wound to US pride and the focus of all fears ; and finally, the Chilean tragedy.

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