Is dignity a useless concept?

Eleni Kalokairinou

doi:10.12681/ethiki.25983

Abstract

In this paper I undertake to examine Ruth Macklin’s claim that dignity is a useless concept. I explain her contention by the fact that dignity, as a concept, has a long history and has been presented differently at different times. I shed some lighton certain different conceptions of dignity in ancient times and in our contemporaryera. And I end up with the suggestion that the term “dignified”, like “good”, is a primarily evaluative term, unlike what some philosophers have thought.

Highlights

In this paper I undertake to examine Ruth Macklin’s claim that dignity is a useless concept
In a short article under the title, “Dignity is a useless concept” the American bioethicist Ruth Macklin puts forward the claim that, contrary to what is usually thought, dignity is a useless concept and that all appeals to it are “either vague restatements of other, more precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to an understanding of the topic”[1]
In a positive formulation of her contention she argues that dignity “means no more than respect for persons or their autonomy”[2]

Summary

Introduction

In this paper I undertake to examine Ruth Macklin’s claim that dignity is a useless concept. According to the American bioethicist dignity is either an empty concept which means nothing or a mere restatement of more precise concepts such as respect for persons or for their autonomy. It is interesting to notice at this point that, according to Siep, Aristotle conceives of dignity either as an intellectual activity in which only gods and very few exceptional men engage or as an exercise of practical reason with which only the virtuous men are occupied.

Results

Conclusion