Macklins Substitutionsthese und der Begriff der Menschenwürde in der Bioethik

Abstract

Definition of the problemRuth Macklin’s influential essay “Dignity is a useless concept” has revitalized a broad debate on the question whether the concept of dignity is meaningful in medical ethics. In this paper, I would like to examine Macklin’s so-called redundancy claim: according to this claim, the concept of human dignity can be replaced by other concept(s)—the concept of autonomy most prominent among them. What is the meaning of this claim?ArgumentsStarting from an analysis of Macklin’s arguments, I am going to show under which conditions a redundancy claim indeed leads to the eliminating consequences emphasized by its defenders—we should abandon the concept of dignity.ConclusionI am going to identify the advantages of her position both in comparison with more radical eliminative standpoints as well as positions that regard it as valid, but unanalyzable.