Widespread Disagreement Research Articles

Abortion and human rights.

Philosophical and popular thinking about abortion is influenced by the belief that the fundamental issue in settling the morality of abortion is whether a fetus is a person (is a human being, has a right to life, or has passed the point at which begins). Despite widespread disagreement over where to draw the line, many people believe (a) that there is a point somewhere between conception and adulthood that is morally significant, and (b) that the morality of a particular abortion depends upon whether it occurs before or after that point. These assumptions are widely shared: ardent antiabortionists insist that the significant point is conception; at least one philosopher thinks that the Supreme Court, in permitting abortions during the first two trimesters of pregnancy, has . for all practical purposes . . . resolve[d] the difficult question of when life begins;' and more than one philosopher has searched for criteria for determining whether or not a being is a person in order to settle the morality of abortion-the basic idea being that if a fetus is not a person, then abortion is morally permissible. All of these ideas, I shall argue, rest upon mistaken assumptions, and after explicating briefly some of the principles that determine the distribution of human rights, I shall argue on the basis of those principles that (a) and (b) are false.

Teaching Problem-Solving Heuristics: A Critique of Two Studies

The mathematics curriculum innovations of the sixties generated a great deal of research comparing discovery with other teaching methods. It soon became evident that there was widespread disagreement about the definition of discovery and that results were difficult to interpret because many research reports did not make clear what the discovery treatment had been. Further, it was often impossible to learn from the studies the effects of discovery on anything other than overall achievement. Although the absence of consistent and clear research results was not the only reason, there was doubt that discovery teaching ever gained wide classroom acceptance (NACOME, 1975). Are we destined to repeat these same errors, with similar implications for classroom acceptance, in research on the teaching of methods of problem solving? Renewed interest in methods has generated research on comparisons of these with other approaches to teaching problem solving. The parallels with discovery research are already evident, beginning with the lack of a clear or consistent meaning of heuristic and the failure of research reports to define treatments operationally. Two recently reported studies (Bassler, Beers, & Richardson, 1975; Post & Brennan, 1976) illustrate these and other serious problems in doing research on the teaching of heuristics. In neither study were the authors able to establish a sound rationale for the comparison of the methods used. Both seemed to be based on a feeling or intuition that one method ought to be better than the other. The absence of theoretical or empirical bases for hypotheses about treatments raised questions about the application of controlled experimental designs that both studies were so careful to use (although neither study was careful enough to include a true control group in the design). It is interesting that both studies attempted to remove the teacher effect as completely as possible by using written instructional packages. This solution to the difficulties of experimental control has the disadvantage that

Critique: Teaching Problem-Solving Heuristics: A Critique of Two Studies

The mathematics curriculum innovations of the sixties generated a great deal of research comparing discovery with other teaching methods. It soon became evident that there was widespread disagreement about the definition of discovery and that results were difficult to interpret because many research reports did not make clear what the discovery treatment had been. Further, it was often impossible to learn from the studies the effects of discovery on anything other than overall achievement. Although the absence of consistent and clear research results was not the only reason, there was doubt that discovery teaching ever gained wide classroom acceptance (NACOME, 1975).

Changing Indian Student Perceptions of the Indian Government

Research Article| March 01 1977 Changing Indian Student Perceptions of the Indian Government Alan N. Katz Alan N. Katz Search for other works by this author on: This Site PubMed Google Scholar Far Eastern Survey (1948) 17 (3): 264–274. https://doi.org/10.2307/2643500 Views Icon Views Article contents Figures & tables Video Audio Supplementary Data Peer Review Share Icon Share Twitter LinkedIn Tools Icon Tools Get Permissions Cite Icon Cite Search Site Citation Alan N. Katz; Changing Indian Student Perceptions of the Indian Government. Far Eastern Survey 11 February 1948; 17 (3): 264–274. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2643500 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAsian Survey Search This content is only available via PDF. Copyright 1977 The Regents of the University of California Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Goldschmid, Mann, and Weston's Industrial Concentration: The New Learning

U This book contains papers prepared for a conference held at Airlie House in the Spring of 1974, and transcripts of the debates and discussions that went on there. While such volumes tend to be trite and forgettable, this one is a lively exception. To be sure, scholars of the field will not find much here. Those with some familiarity with the field who would like easy access to some of the research and the current policy debates should, however, find the volume well suited for this purpose. And selections from the volume should be very useful for both graduate and undergraduate teaching. The papers and discussions accurately reflect the state of knowledge and confusion in the field. Scholars know a lot of facts, and the dispute about the numbers is not particularly consequential. However, there is widespread disagreement about what the numbers mean, or imply, and consequent sharp disagreement on policy issues. The basic problem is that the theorizing, explicit or implicit, reflects a profound schizophrenia. Almost all of the authors appeal to old style textbook microeconomic theory as a basis for their arguments. Yet that theory often has no real grip on, or is inconsistent with, the various phenomena upon which the policy debate is focused. A major weakness of the volume is that authors and discussants alike seem strikingly unaware of this difficulty. Recent theoretical work, which has attempted to deal with some of the issues, is ignored. Despite its title, the book has an old fashioned look. I shall return to the theory problem and to the issue of where the new learning really is after a quick tour through the volume. The book contains an introduction, four survey sections reviewing various bodies of recent research, a debate involving economists, lawyers, and politicians regarding certain contemporary policy issues, and miscellaneous appendices. Donald Dewey's introduction articulates sharply what I believe is a plausible position to take regarding one dimension of antitrust policy. Antitrust policy has, and can, influence concentration. Within broad limits, economic performance is not particularly sensitive to different degrees of concentration. One's attitudes towards antitrust thus ought to hinge on one's attitudes about private business power. Many economists would agree with the points about concentration, but demur from the sweeping conclusion regarding antitrust. Antitrust, after all, has been at least as much about admissible behavior as about admissible firm size and shape. The influence of antitrust on what large firms can do, and think they can do, probably has significantly influenced behavior in important economic dimensions. NELSON / 729

Models of Madness, Models of Medicine

No one will deny that there is widespread disagreement among psychiatrists, psychologists, and lawyers about the nature of psychiatric disorder. Siegler and Osmond attempt to clarify the situation by pointing out that mental illness and addiction are conceptualized in terms -of different models. In the moral model, the patient's behavior is viewed as bad, to be corrected by punishment or reward. This viewpoint is especially common in regard to alcoholism and drug addiction, but also directs much of the everyday handling of patients in mental hospitals. It forms the background of the increasingly popular behavior modification therapy. The impaired model is applied to long-term patients who are regarded as suffering from an untreatable and probably incurable defect that requires them to receive special protection (custodial care). In the psychoanalytic model, patients are viewed not as suffering from a specific disease but from a lifelong disorder probably due to errors in

The Days of Yahweh

THE concept of the Day of Yahweh has long been recognized as a central theme in prophetic thought about the future. There has been widespread disagreement, however, about the precise nature or character of the Day of Yahweh. At the center of the controversy has been the question of the most appropriate point of departure for understanding the tradition. From what vantage point can this sacral tradition in Israel's history come into clearest perspective? In recent years most studies have centered on the question of the origin of the tradition. These studies suggest that the prophetic texts which speak of a Day of Yahweh will come into focus when the origin of the tradition is properly understood. Thus, Sigmund Mowinckel maintains that the Day of Yahweh is to be understood primarily from within the history of Israel's cult. Within the world of myth and ritual, the Day of Yahweh was originally the event of the enthronement of Yahweh, the time when Yahweh comes to guarantee victory over enemies, the time when Yahweh brings deliverance from distress and the realization of peace, good fortune, and favorable conditions. The cultic Day of Yahweh is the time when these realities are reaffirmed for successive generations of people.' Quite in contrast, Gerhard von Rad contends that the Day of Yahweh should be understood not from within the cultic context but rather from the perspective of the historical traditions of holy war. The Day of Yahweh, declares von Rad, is a pure event of war, an event involving the appearance of Yahweh to annihilate his enemies.2 For Mowinckel, the Day of Yahweh comes into perspective through the study of Israel's early cult; for von Rad, the perspective is to be found in the study of the traditions of holy war.3

TO SEE OURSELVES AS OTHERS SEE US!: RELATIONS AMONG SELF-PERCEPTIONS, PEER-PERCEPTIONS, AND EXPECTED PEER-PERCEPTIONS OF PERSONALITY.

Past research claims to demonstrate (a) widespread intercultural agreement on the social desirability of personality test items, and (b) that a priori scaling of an item on this presumably universal social desirability continuum is highly predictive of the probability of its endorsement. These notions are challenged by present findings which show (1) widespread disagreement among nominally identified groups within a single culture as to the desirabilities of a sample of commonly used personality items, and (2) substantial inconsistency of a social desirability wale values to predict individual endorsement probabilities. Implications for best construction are discussed, particularly concerning the use of forced-choice formats for personality inventories.

A Survey of Values of American Theological Students

This report's findings from an extensive mail survey of the values of 765 Catholic and Protestant theological students at fifteen representative seminaries. Values were assessed by the Polyphasic Values Inventory, which consists of twenty mutliple-choice questions over selected philosophical, political, economic, educational, social, personal-moral, and religious areas of value difference. Responses are organized on a liberal-conservative continuum. Each question is treated as a separate piece of information, and no total score is awarded respondents, who remain anonymous. A common core of values held by the vast majority of the participants was identified. Generally, this can be described as a rather strong commitment to American-style democracy with its emphasis on private initiative, racial tolerance, and moral responsibility. Within this framework, however, there were many areas of widespread disagreement, so it would be an error to speak categorically about the values of the population under study. This is particularly true with respect to certain religious doctrines traditionally associated with Christianity.

Polarity in the Social Sciences and in Physics

In the social sciences, data are measured in terms of spatial dimensions, and according to the technique employed such measurement results in scales or factors. Some social scientists however, especially psychologists, are too satisfied with mere units of length; they overlook directionality in measurement, and are insufficiently aware of problems of polarity. This is not particularly true of sociologists. But in psychology, bi-polar measurement would often be more appropriate where, instead, measurement is used [13]; for, whether or bi-polar measurement should be employed, ought to be determined in part by the data. It is important to know when, and with what kind of data, a minus sign is essential and when it is not. Holistic activities such as gestalt perception require a plus and a minus sign but a factor measuring eyeblink can be regarded as unidirectional and extending from little to much. In the social sciences measurement, when used to excess, can lead to euphemistic thinking and overlooking such problems as backwardness and mental deficiency in education [9]. Unidirectionality is incapable of expressing complex relationships in linguistics [12] and is inappropriate in studying ethical and aesthetic values in philosophy [14]. It is frequently possible to express measure functions in either bi-polar or in form; and in the social sciences one of the crucial problems is to distinguish between bi-polar measures which can be converted into measures without destroying an antithesis, from those which cannot be thus converted without loss in transformation [10]. There is a similar problem in physics. There is widespread disagreement in physics regarding the representation of space and time in connection with relativity which raises issues that, although not identical with those which have been raised in the social sciences, are very similar from the point of view of measurement theory. Philosophers frequently have arguments concerning the isotropy and anisotropy of space [8], arguments about why there are only three dimensions of physical space (as distinct from hypothetical space in geometry, where for the purpose of calculation there can be any number of spatial dimensions, orthogonal

An Evaluation of Recent Federal Reserve Policy: 1961 through 1964

TO PROPERLY EVALUATE recent monetary policy one should compare results with objectives. Furthermore, the objectives of monetary policy must be attainable through monetary action. Unfortunately, there is not universal agreement on what is attainable by monetary action, and hence, there is not agreement on specific objectives to be attained by monetary policy. To make matters even more complex, there is widespread disagreement as to how monetary action should be measured. As to broad objectives, many agree that monetary policy should contribute to the achievement of an orderly economic expansion with rising employment and price stability. Some would want to add the objective of keeping short-term interest rates in line with rates abroad so as to avoid a deterioration in the U. S. balance of payments. When one attempts to specify concrete operational monetary objectives and the means by which the Federal Reserve contributes to these objectives, disagreement develops. My analysis will be directed to the following points:

A Scale Analysis of Senators' Attitudes Toward Civil Rights

S INCE THE END of World War II, the struggle to secure civil rights for Negroes has assumed increasing importance on the American political scene. The movement of southern Negroes to the North means that integration has become less of a sectional and more of a national issue. In terms used by Donald E. Stokes, civil rights represents an example of a issue, i.e., an issue which involves advocacy of government actions from a set of alternatives over which a distribution of voter preferences is defined. 1 On the basis of national sample survey data, V. O. Key reports that, of all contemporary problems, the issue of federal action to further school integration generates a bipolarized opinion of highest intensity.2 With the decline of conflict over New Deal policies after World War II, the issue of civil rights has become the dominant position issue of American politics. In view of this widespread disagreement on the value of integration, Guttman scale analysis represents an appropriate technique for assessing, in a relatively precise way, attitudes toward civil rights. Scale analysis assigns an individual a score somewhere between the two extremes of consistently favoring an issue and always opposing the issue. In a perfect Guttman scale, the items, or statements measuring an attitude, are cumulative. A person who responds favorably to an item also responds favorably to all items of higher rank. Likewise, anyone responding negatively to an item makes an unfavorable response to all items of lower rank. Statements forming a Guttman scale measure only one attitude. If the items fall into a fairly perfect cumulative scale pattern, they comprise a single core of meaning.3 Of all branches of government, the United States Congress has moved most slowly to secure the enforcement of integration. In 1960, however, Congress did approve a fairly comprehensive Civil Rights Act. By employing Guttman scaling procedures, we have measured senators' attitudes toward integration during the 1960 session. In this study, the issue of civil rights refers to federal government action to enforce political, economic, and social rights for Negroes, e.g., the right to vote,

RECOVERY FROM RADIATION INJURY IN MAMMALS.

An attempt is made to provide a statement of the problem with respect to mammalian recovery rate estimations. The few concepts on which there is now general agreement, as well as some of the many concepts on which there is widespread disagreement, are poirted out. It is hoped that this approach may contribute to the solution of the problem by defining it and by emphasizing areas where more data are needed and other areas where novel approaches are required.

The Etymology of Italian casamatta

In present-day usage, Italian casamatta and its cognates in other European languages (Sp. casamata, Fr. and Eng. casemate, Ger. Kasematte) refer to a type of chamber, vault, or embrasure in the ramparts of a fortress, or to a similar embrasure on ships.1 In some castles, the casemate can assume the shape of a vaulted passage, running along from tower to tower above the inner edge of a moat, and pierced with arrow-loops to the field.2 It is generally acknowledged that Eng. casemate,3 Fr. casemate,4 Ger. Kasematte,5 and Sp. casamata6 are all Renaissance borrowings, directly or indirectly, from Ital. casamatta, which is first attested in Machiavelli (1520).7 Concerning the origin of the Italian word, there is widespread disagreement. Two main etyma have been proposed. (1) Greek khdsmata 'abysses' (sg. khdsma). Earlier etymologists8 thought of this as a learned source, utilized by Rabelais and other Renaissance scholars, because of the spelling chasmates in Rabelais.9 This view has since been abandoned, because Fr. casemate is obviously a borrowing from Italian, together with many other terms of warfare and fortification;l10 but a number of etymologists still favor Gk. khdsmata, supposedly borrowed through the dialect of Ravenna from Byzantine Greek. To support this derivation, the ORav. form

The Nature and Limits of Logic

THE NATURE AND LIMITS OF LOGIC LGIC, as logic, does not investigate its own nature. Epistemology does this for logic. However, there is no one for whom the epistemological knowledge of the nature and scope of logic is more significant than for the man who happens to be a logician. Yet it is clear from an examination of our treatises and textbooks in logic that the men who author them disagree, sometimes rather significantly, on the epistemological character of logic. In the face of sometimes contradictory opinions about the nature of logic, it is clear that some of our logicians rather thoroughly misevaluate the significance of logic. Because logic is universally and necessarily propaedeutic to any scientific effort, it is not surprising that this misunderstanding on the nature of logic has serious consequences for all the academic disciplines. It is easy to allow more to logic than logic deserves, and the history of philosophy yields more than one example of over-extended logicism. It is easy too, in reaction to this, to allow less to logic than logic deserves. Thus some would make of logic a highly restricted instrument of the intellect for a very limited area of scientific discourse. In truth, logic is not a universal science embracing all other sciences (or any other science) either as integral or as subjective parts, and yet it remains universally an instrument of the reason for all scientific discourse. The intention of this paper is to initiate an investigation into the nature of logic which will make these points clear. This study will not be exhaustive, and yet it will be developed in the light of those distinctions in terms of which any exhaustive study should be made. This paper is at best a preliminary work, yet it is determinately in conflict with many current notions about the nature and limits of logic. . The occasion for this paper is the widespread disagreement on the nature and importance of logic. The immediate inspira47 48 EDWARD D. SIMMONS tion for it is a footnote suggested by the translators of The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas.1 The footnote arises in the context of a discussion on the speculative, but " useful," character of logic. In the footnote the translators broaden the discussion and suggest "that the ideal noetic treatment (of logic) would correlate these four frequently made distinctions and divisions within logic: science and art, doctrinal and in use, formal and material, and dialectical and judicative or demonstrative." In our opinion, these are the fundamental distinctions in terms of which logic must be epistemologically understood. This paper will attempt to meet the challenge implicit in the footnote just quoted. It will be an attempt to correlate these distinctions in order to lay at least the groundwork of an adequate investigation into the nature of logic. Logic is both an art and a science. It is a strange kind of art, and it is a unique type of science. It is an art without being practical, and it is a science which is speculative, despite the fact that its value lies only in its use. And it is one discipline which is simultaneously both an art and a science. It seems that almost every textbook in logic distinguishes between the art of logic and the science of logic. But not all of them agree precisely on the character of logic as an art and logic as a science. To begin with, some would allow logic to be treated either as a science or as an art, despite the fact that logic is indivisibly art and science. Further, in most , 1 The Material Logic of John of St. Thomas, translated by Yves R. Simon, John J. Glanville, and G. Donald Hollenhorst (Chicago, 1955), pp. 598-594, note 85. Although it is this particular footnote which has proximately inspired this essay, we readily and gratefully acknowledge a larger debt both to John of St. Thomas and to his translators. Perhaps the most helpful primary source for this study has been John's analysis of the nature of logic in. the first two questions of the second part of his Ara Logica. Certainly nothing could have been...

Leadership: A Frame of Reference

The word “leadership” has been widely used. Political orators, business executives, social workers, and scholars employ it in speech and writing. Yet, there is widespread disagreement as to its meaning. Among social scientists, the theoretical formulations of the leadership concept have continued to shift, focusing first upon one aspect and then upon another. Much still needs to be done to develop a basic, systematic theory. The time seems ripe for attempting a careful statement of a frame of reference which may serve to make available research more meaningful, and which may guide future research and practice. Specifically, such a frame of reference can perform the useful function of pointing to the variables which need to be measured. It can help us to state hypotheses concerning the key variables underlying leadership effectiveness. It can also provide meaningful objectives for the development of more adequate leaders.

Defining Our Employment Goal Under the 1946 Act

THE wording of Section 2 of Employment Act of I946 -its declaration of policy -is notoriously vague. There is, even today, widespread disagreement as to whether or not it is really a law or even what courses of action a full employment policy would entail for government or require from business community. The negotiated language of act suggests both ends and means that are breath-taking in their implications and also includes artfully contrived restrictions that might be so construed in practice as to paralyze action. It thus devolved upon President, his executive heads, and his economic advisers to interpret new law so as to vitalize it or perchance sterilize it and upon Joint Economic Committee of and two Houses to review executive interpretation and to implement or perchance to correct or frustrate it. We are now ending tenth year of this interpretative experience, and it would seem timely to look back over developments of these years to see what light they throw on question what goals of employment are in fact coming to expression or acceptance as a feature -perhaps a preponderant feature -of our national economic life. Prefatory to such an analysis it will be helpful to consider some concepts of employment problem and beliefs as to what should be expected by way of its solution which were entertained in business and academic circles where problem was considered in years just preceding passage of Employment Act. That review will shed considerable light on what was the intent of Congress as it reflected Congressional reading of will of people.

The Problem of Julius Caesar

ULlUS CAESAR is one of Shakespeare's perplexing plays. Its stylistic simplicity, coupled with an absence of bawdy lines, has made it favorite school text, and this has led * vK tr , some critics believe that it o'ught be simple play, belief which has easily ripened into the conviction that it is simple play. Others have acknowledged its perplexities. Professor Allardyce Nicoll calls it one of Shakespeare's most difficult plays rightly assess,' and Mr. Wilson Knight remarks that to close analysis it reveals subtleties and complexities which render interpretation difficult.2 There is widespread disagreement among critics about who is the play's principal character or whether it has principal character, on whether it is tragedy and if so whose, on whether Shakespeare wants us consider the assassination as damnable or praiseworthy, while of all the chief characters in the play violently contradictory interpretations have been offered. To illustrate this polarity of views it will be sufficient refer two eminent critics. Professor Dover Wilson tells us that in this play Shakespeare adopted the traditional Renaissance view of Caesar, derived from Lucan, which regarded him as a Roman Tamburlaine of illimitable ambition and ruthless irresistible genius; monstrous tyrant who destroyed his country and ruined 'the mightiest and flourishing commonwealth that the world will ever see. play's theme is the single one, Liberty versus Tyranny (p. xxi). The assassination is wholly laudable, the conspirators are unselfish champions of freedom, while Brutus' tragedy consists in his vain struggle against the destiny of Rome, which lies in the establishment of Caesarism (p. xxii). we turn from this Sir Mark Hunter's interpretation of the play we are told that can be no doubt that Shakespeare's way of thinking, however much he extends sympathy the perpetrators of the deed, the murder of Julius was the foulest crime in secular history. Of Caesar we learn, When put the test of the stage the personality of Julius 'moves before us as something right royal', character sufficiently great render the impassioned eulogy of Antony and the calm tribute of not inconsistent with what we have actually heard and seen of the object of their praise. Of the conspirators we are told, Brutus excepted, there is no sign anywhere that the enemies

DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN KNEE JOINT

My interest in developmental and acquired pathologic disturbances of the meniscuses of the knee joint prompted me to seek an answer to the variations seen. I was desirous chiefly of learning the origin and time of appearance of the meniscuses and of the synovial membrane and their relationship to one another. The current textbooks and available literature were inadequate and confusing on these points because of widespread disagreement among various authors. The concept of the development of the knee joint varied according to the approach, whether from the point of view of embryology or that of comparative anatomy. The present study is based on embryologic observations and study of human anatomic specimens alone. COMPARATIVE ANATOMY In 1887 Sutton 1 explained the origin of the intra-articular structures by the indrawing of extra-articular ligaments with the assumption of ability to flex the joint. The meniscuses were said to be derived from the