Widespread Disagreement Research Articles

Europe's Democratic Deficits through the Looking Glass: The European Union as a Challenge for Democracy

Despite widespread disagreement about democratic deficits in the European Union (EU), most critics begin by conceiving democracy as a problem for the EU. Seeing the EU as undemocratic or insufficiently democratic, they devise institutional innovations to democratize it. These innovations seem to require breaking the traditional link between democracy and the nation-state, which in this context appears outmoded or inappropriate. This article challenges that approach, arguing that it gets the relationship between democracy and the sovereign state wrong—or at least, incomplete—by stressing modern democratic theory's empirical ties to the state while underestimating their normative significance. The complex interdependence of normative and empirical assumptions informing modern democratic theory means that detaching democracy from the state is much less straightforward than critics often imagine. The essay argues instead for conceiving the EU as a problem for democratic theory. Doing so reveals that democratic theory is ill-equipped to address recent changes in the configuration of rule and new structures of governance associated with Europeanization, European integration, and globalization more broadly. This change in perspective highlights important limits in recent democratic theorizing about the EU and clarifies the role of European debates in reinterpreting and reconstructing democracy in the age of globalization.Michael Goodhart is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh, where he holds a secondary appointment in Women's Studies (goodhart@pitt.edu). He is grateful to Chris Bonneau, Mark Hallerberg, Andrew Lotz, John Markoff, Guy Peters, Alberta Sbragia, Dan Thomas, and to anonymous reviewers of this essay for their kind help and advice. He is also grateful to the European Union Center of Excellence at the University of Pittsburgh for the chance to present an earlier version of this essay and appreciates the suggestions he received at that time.

Identifying threats and threatening identities: the social construction of realism and liberalism

How does a state determine if another state is an important military or economic threat? The issue of threat perception drives a wide variety of behaviors, from allegiance formation and defense spending to trade relations and regime membership. While liberal theorists and realists both agree that threat perception is a cornerstone of international relations, there is widespread disagreement on the factors that contribute to our fear of other states. In particular, the field is deeply divided between those who believe material factors such as the balance of military power determine the perception of threat and those who believe ideational factors such as shared democratic value determine the perception of threat. Using a variety of social scientific methods of investigation ranging from laboratory experiments and public opinion surveys to computer simulations and case studies, Rousseau challenges these conventional arguments and sheds new light on this debate. He presents a model of identity formation that can explain when ideas will (and will not) have a decisive impact on threat perception.

Hello, goodbye

Much has changed in the 5 years since the responsibility for editing the JCI was transferred to Columbia University. Wars and a hurricane have conspired with other factors to overwhelm the national treasury. Support for investigator-initiated research at the NIH is now at a level that jeopardizes the nation’s ability to adequately train future scientists to maintain the country’s leadership in biomedical research. Indeed, there is insufficient support for even the best and brightest biomedical scientists to pursue the frontiers of the sciences at a time of unprecedented opportunities. Human embryonic stem cell research is still being suppressed in the United States. Economic models that enable academic health centers to flourish in the face of increasing challenges and the rising costs of health care have for the most part remained elusive. Translational research has become the buzzword, but there is widespread confusion and disagreement about how to do it. Despite all of these and other challenges to the biomedical research enterprise, the JCI remains vibrant, with record numbers of submissions and a loyal and enthusiastic readership.

Assessing creativity in the creative arts

This paper follows the authors' and their faculty colleagues' experiences in developing an innovative approach to creative design teaching and assessment. Failure to adequately explain to students how they were to be assessed in creative design had led to a formal appeal by students and an inquiry which focused attention on how difficult it was to define creativity and creative ability. The inquiry led to University pressure for objective or transparent assessment that conformed with the University's quality assurance protocols. From the teachers' perspective, however, creative ability was associated with conceptual ideas that were higherorder thinking activities that could not be adequately assessed objectively or transparently in the conventional meanings of these terms. Subsequent investigation showed widespread disagreement among the various design and creative arts disciplines (within the University and beyond) on what constitutes creativity and what constitutes creative ability; whether creative ability is essentially intuitive or essentially rational or procedural; whether creative ability could or should be reduced to quantifiable parameters for assessment; and whether the most important aspects of creative achievement reside in the initial thinking (creative ideas) or in the subsequent process of development of the idea (crafting a work of art, design, etc.) or in the creative work that is the end product (the work of art itself). The paper follows, from the perspective of the authors as teachers, curriculum developers and researchers, how a new approach to the problem unfolded, and how a basic empirical research project tracking the psychological processes of inspiration and complex decision-making (and other applied research) contributed to the evolution of an innovative approach to creative design education that recognized multiple levels of creativity and engaged multiple forms of assessment, and that has satisfied both teachers' pursuit of realistic creative thinking objectives and the University's transparency and accountability agenda.

보건의료체계에 대한 전문가 인식 분석

Either ways of understanding health care as a commodity or public work are at opposite ends of health care spectrum. These two rival conceptions reflected by viewpoint(ideology) would lead to different directions in policy-making for health care reform. The purpose of this study is to access the value differences of experts' policy views about health care issues by analyzing the extent of consensus among experts in the field of health care. Using primary data obtained through a mail survey of 558 experts in the field of health care, we analyzed the differences of experts' opinions about characteristics of health care market, policy issues and values Gdeology). The study represents from 50-50 split analysis, entropy index, and factor analysis that the wide spread disagreements over health policy, which is a major barriers to effective policy-making, could be caused by the ideological perception differences among experts. This implies that, if values play an important role in policy-making, we should identify the differences in value and seek ways to balance among the diverse values such as efficiency, equity, freedom, and security. For this, the policy issues debated on differences in values should be reconciled for narrowing gaps of experts' perceptions through various ways.

Fifty Years after Samuelson's “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”: What are we Left With?

In 1954, Paul A. Samuelson presented on just two and a half pages what he claimed to be “a pure theory of government expenditure on collective consumption goods” (1954c, p. 388). Just a year later, he supplemented this theory by an equivalent diagrammatic formulation and a few clarifying comments (Samuelson 1955). Although his initial paper was strongly criticized on various grounds, an industry was launched and public goods—or, as referred to initially by Samuelson, collective consumption goods—now play a crucial role in a number of theories like fiscal competition or endogenous growth, and in almost all textbooks on public economics or microeconomics at least a paragraph is devoted to public goods. In fact, Samuelson's 1954 paper is conventionally considered the foundation of the modern theory of public goods (for example, see Richard A. Musgrave 1983a, p. 141). However, the many contributions to the modern theory of public goods, including Samuelson's subsequent writings, have revealed that there is widespread disagreement both on fundamental aspects of the theory as well as on its significance for the determination of government expenditure.

FIFTY YEARS AFTER SAMUELSON'S “THE PURE THEORY OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE”: WHAT ARE WE LEFT WITH?

In 1954, Paul A. Samuelson presented on just two and a half pages what he claimed to be “a pure theory of government expenditure on collective consumption goods” (1954c, p. 388). Just a year later, he supplemented this theory by an equivalent diagrammatic formulation and a few clarifying comments (Samuelson 1955). Although his initial paper was strongly criticized on various grounds, an industry was launched and public goods—or, as referred to initially by Samuelson, collective consumption goods—now play a crucial role in a number of theories like fiscal competition or endogenous growth, and in almost all textbooks on public economics or microeconomics at least a paragraph is devoted to public goods. In fact, Samuelson's 1954 paper is conventionally considered the foundation of the modern theory of public goods (for example, see Richard A. Musgrave 1983a, p. 141). However, the many contributions to the modern theory of public goods, including Samuelson's subsequent writings, have revealed that there is widespread disagreement both on fundamental aspects of the theory as well as on its significance for the determination of government expenditure.

Housing Wealth and UK Consumption

There is widespread disagreement about the role of housing wealth in explaining consumption. However, much of the empirical literature is marred by poor controls for the common drivers both of house prices and consumption, such as income, income growth expectations, interest rates, credit supply conditions, other assets and indicators of income uncertainty (e.g. changes in the unemployment rate). For instance, while the easing of credit supply conditions is usually followed by a house price boom, failure to control for the direct effect of credit liberalisation on consumption can over-estimate the effect of housing wealth or collateral on consumption. This paper (Janine Aron, John Muellbauer and Anthony Murphy, October 2006) estimates an empirical model for UK consumption from 1972 to 2005, grounded in theory, and with more complete empirical controls than hitherto used.

How Prepared Are You For The First Day Of Class--Or "Blink", Does It Matter?

Recent findings indicate that students often form lasting impressions and opinions of teachers and their potential teaching effectiveness within the first few minutes or even the first few seconds on the first day of class. This paper argues it is the entire first day of an economics class that deserves special attention. Teachers of economics should clearly define economics as a science and explain its scientific methodology. They should emphasize the distinct limitations of economics that explain the many widespread disagreements among economists. Of equal importance, they should stress that understanding the science of economics will be of assistance in preparing and expanding a student’s critical-thinking skills that will ultimately result in sound decisions throughout life. Finally, the paper calls upon teachers to bond with their students by reaching out with genuine concern for each student's success in the class.

The pragmatics of defining religion in a multi-cultural world

Few seem to have difficulty in distinguishing between religious and secular institutions, yet there is widespread disagreement regarding what “religion” actually means. Indeed, some go so far as to question whether there is anything at all distinctive about religions. Hence, formulating a definition of “religion” that can command wide assent has proven to be an extremely difficult task. In this article, I consider the most prominent of the many rival definitions that have been proposed, the majority falling within three basic types: intellectual, affective and functional definitions. I conclude that there are pragmatic reasons for favouring the formerly popular view that essentialist definitions of “religions” are inadequate, and that religions should be construed, instead, as possessing a number of “family resemblances.” In so arguing, I provide a response to the view that there is nothing distinctive about religions, as well as to the recent claim that religions do not exist.

THE NATURE OF TESTIMONY

I discuss several views of the nature of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I then offer a diagnosis of the widespread disagreement regarding this topic; specifically, I argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one of them. Finally, I develop an alternative view of testimony that captures both aspects of the nature of testimony and thereby provides the basis for an illuminating theory of testimony's epistemological significance. Is testimony a reliable source of belief ? When are we justified in accepting the testimony of a speaker? Is testimony just as basic a source of know- ledge as sense perception, memory, and reason? These sorts of questions pervade the literature in the epistemology of testimony, and yet it is seldom recognized that there is substantive disagreement about what testimony even is, with theories being offered about what conditions need to be met for a person to testify that scarcely resemble one another. Even more importantly, when attempts are made at answering these ques- tions, the epistemological consequences of competing views of the nature of testimony are often ignored. In this paper, I plan to remedy this by, first, clearing up much of the current confusion about the nature of testimony and by, second, sketch- ing an account of what it is to testify that is suitable for the epistemology of testimony. I shall proceed as follows: I shall first discuss various sub- stantively different views of testimony and show how each proposal has importantly different problems. I shall then offer a diagnosis of why the disagreement over the nature of testimony is so deep; specifically, I shall argue that our concept of testimony has two different aspects to it. Inadequate views of testimony, I claim, result either from collapsing these two aspects into a single account or from a failure to recognize one

On the Quantificational Status of Indefinites: The View From Child Language

Theories of indefinites vary with respect to whether these noun phrases can be treated as quantificational. Although everyone seems to be in agreement that indefinites do not always introduce their own quantificational force, there is widespread disagreement as to whether they ever do. In this article, we present experimental evidence from children learning English and Kannada demonstrating that children's indefinites show scopal restrictions parallel to the restrictions they show with other unambiguously quantificational expressions. Children, unlike adults, show a strong preference to assign quantificational expressions surface scope. This is true for both strong and weak quantifiers, which would be surprising on a theory of indefinites that treated these expressions as uniformly nonquantificational. Consequently, we argue that in adult grammars indefinites must have a quantificational representation at least some of the time.

Toward a Long-Range Energy Security Policy

Events in recent decades have produced a broader definition of security. (1) The entry of phrases like environmental security, resource conflict, and into the lexicon of security experts provides examples of this changing dialogue, but these concepts remain on the margins of the discussion for the most part. Where US policy is concerned, the debate generally has been limited to arguments that the United States must preserve its access to the oil reserves of the Middle East and Central Asia, and a vague sense that domestic supplies would be highly desirable. Cornucopian optimists continue to insist that oil will remain abundant and for the foreseeable future, and indeed more concern is expressed over the unsavory character of governments in major oil-producing states than over the finite nature of the resources themselves. The vagaries of oil politics (and the ecological problems raised by carbon emissions) are indeed serious problems, and they are not entirely separable from the questions this article means to raise, but the focus here will be on the problem of fossil fuel scarcity at the global level. This article seeks to provide an overview of the situation, including the prospects for an economy based on renewable energy, the security problems likely to result from tightening oil supplies, and a possible basis for making the transition to alternatives widely acknowledged as inevitable in the long run. The Outlook for Energy At the time of this writing, the price of oil has hit $70 per barrel and is projected to rise even higher in the near term. While not a record when the figure is adjusted for inflation, this was still commonly taken as a sign that the era of cheap energy may be coming to an end. Other numbers bear this out. Annual worldwide oil consumption is roughly 29 billion barrels a year, and estimated to be rising at two percent annually. (2) While there is widespread disagreement over their actual size, the world's total reserves of oil come to roughly one trillion barrels. A linear projection has oil supplies running out around 2030 after a long period of rising prices and tightening supplies, likely to begin after production peaks, generally expected to be sometime between 2010 and 2020--maybe just five years away. The consequences of a shortfall in oil supplies on the scale of such predictions are as obvious as they are terrifying. A prolonged economic contraction and possibly a desperate scramble for resources that might bring major powers to blows are not out of the question, especially when the cost of other problems likely to place more pressure on the base (climate change, water shortages, population growth, etc.) are taken into account. (3) In the absolute worst case, modernity might simply grind to a halt, a catastrophe that James Howard Kunstler describes in his recent book on the subject, The Long Emergency. Of course, linear projections have their limitations, and any number of developments could throw them off--unanticipated changes in the character of economic productivity, or an economic slowdown, for instance. Actual oil reserves are likely larger than the proven figure, which would delay the crunch for some years. Rising needs will mean higher prices and shorter supplies, which will stretch out the supply by encouraging conservation. (4) They also will produce increased efforts to supplement oil with more plentiful coal, heavy oil, and natural gas. The degree to which these alternatives can pick up the slack, however, is a subject of intense disagreement, as all these resources will mean higher prices. (5) Moreover, they do not eliminate the problem of the finite amount of these resources, with natural gas reserves particularly unlikely to last all that much longer than oil. In short, the oil age may end within a generation given the present economic picture, with potentially dire consequences. …

Research With Stored Biological Samples

There is widespread disagreement about the type of consent needed for research with stored biological samples. Many believe consent for each future use is required to respect individuals. Others worry this approach may block important research. We analyzed 1670 consent forms signed by research participants at the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center, National Institutes of Health, between January 1, 2000, and May 31, 2002, that offer options for future research with participants' biological samples. The research participants were healthy volunteers, family members of affected individuals, and individuals with a broad range of medical conditions enrolled in clinical research studies with and without the prospect of direct medical benefit. Overall, 87.1% of research participants given the option chose to authorize future research on any medical condition. More than 85% permitted unlimited future research with their stored biological samples regardless of sex, age, geographic location, or whether the individual was affected by the disease being studied or a healthy volunteer. Only 6.7% of those given the option to refuse all future research did so. Although African Americans were less likely to permit future research, 75.0% of African Americans still authorized unlimited future research with their samples. Most research participants authorize the unlimited future research use of their biological samples when given the opportunity to do so. These findings suggest that providing research participants with a simple binary choice to authorize or refuse all future research might allow individuals to control use of their samples, simplify consent forms, and allow important research to proceed.

The substantive dimension of deliberative practical rationality

The aim of this paper is to propose a model for understanding the relation between substance and procedure in discourse ethics and deliberative democracy capable of answering the common charge that they involve an ‘empty formalism’. The expressive-elaboration model introduced here answers this concern by arguing that the deliberative practical rationality presupposed by discourse ethics and deliberative democracy involves the creation of a practical medium in which certain general basic ideas of solidarity, equality and freedom are expressed and elaborated in the context of widespread moral disagreement. In the course of this paper I propose an elucidation of these ideas and argue for the thesis that they are internally related to the endorsement of deliberative practical rationality. The three basic substantive ideas contribute to the determination of the existence, the form, the topics and intended outcomes, and the effects of the practice of public deliberation. This amounts to an elucidatory defense of deliberative practical rationality by explicating its substantive significance or point.

How To Choose a Capital Structure: Navigating the Debt‐Equity Decision

In corporate offices as well as the classroom, there continues to be significant debate about the costs and benefits of debt financing. There is also considerable variation in corporate credit ratings, even among companies as large and successful as those that make up the S&P 500. Many companies have been reassessing how they manage their balance sheet and their rating agency relationships; and with the market's generally favorable response to recapitalizations and dividend increases, such financing issues are likely to receive even more attention.Underlying the diversity of corporate credit ratings is widespread disagreement about the “right” credit rating—a matter that is complicated by the fact that the cost of debt varies widely among companies with the same rating. Although credit ratings are clearly tied to measures of indebtedness such as leverage and coverage ratios, the most important factor in most industries is a company's size. For many mid‐sized companies, an investment‐grade rating can be attained only by making a large, equity‐financed acquisition—or by making minimal use of debt. In this sense, the corporate choice of credit rating can be as much a strategic issue as a financial decision.Maintaining the right amount of financial fl exibility is a key consideration when determining the right credit rating for a given company (although what management views as value‐preserving flexibility may be viewed by the market as value‐reducing financial “slack”). A BBB rating will accommodate considerably more leverage (30–60%) in companies with fairly stable cash flows and limited investment requirements than in more cyclical or growth‐oriented companies (10–20%). When contemplating taking on more leverage, companies should examine all major operating risks and view their capital structure in the context of an enterprisewide risk management framework.

Reward, punishment or inducement? US economic and military aid, 1946–1996

If the US has wielded power as global hegemon, then there should be evidence of a linkage between American resources and the ability to influence behavior. However, there is widespread disagreement on how this power is manifested (see Krause, 1991). Methodological and epistemological issues have hampered empirical studies of US hegemonic behavior. For example, does the US reward past behavior or does it offer inducements for future behavior? We document and discuss these issues in terms of the aid–foreign policy compliance nexus. The empirical portion of our paper tests whether US military and non‐military aid are correlated with foreign policy similarity. The main merits of our study are that: (1) we test a new measure of foreign policy similarity developed by Signorino and Ritter (1999) and compiled by Gartzke et al. (1999); (2) we relax the causality issue and test using vector autoregression (VAR) for 76 developing countries; and (3) our time horizon is a minimum of 30 years for each country. Our central finding is that aid is most often used as a reward. More specifically, foreign policy similarity leads to greater economic aid for most African countries, foreign policy similarity leads to greater military aid for a majority of Latin American states, and there are no overarching patterns for Asia and the Middle East. We discuss the implications of our findings in the context of the bargaining and structural approaches to statecraft.

Federalization and Constitution-Making as an Instrument of Conflict Resolution

Throughout the past decade, there have been numerous proposals advanced to end the frozen conflict between Moldova and the breakaway region of Transnistria. Since the short but intense civil war in the summer of 1992, Transnistria has retained independence from Moldovan central authorities and functioned as a de facto state. Similar to situations in other former Soviet areas such as Abkazia and South Ossetia, the Transnistrian leadership has been able to function because of Russian economic, political, and military support. Although the Moldovan leadership has changed over the years, those Transnistrian individuals that were most directly involved with the civil war have been able to maintain their positions. This may promote continuity in discussions, but it also makes it very difficult to change negotiation positions and inject new ideas into the process. Indeed, what is striking about the current debate over the federalization of Moldova is how little new ground it covers. In July 2002, ambassadors from Russia, Ukraine, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) officially submitted to Moldova and Transnistria a project to federalize Moldova under joint mediation and guarantees by all three parties. President Voronin issued a draft plan for Moldova in February 2003 calling for a new constitution to be formed by Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, transforming Moldova into a federation. Although the specifics of the debate have changed, the nature of the debate between the parties, such as whether the plan should be conceived as a federal or confederal solution, has remained the same. For the European Union (EU), the settling of the dispute between Moldova and Transnistria has become an important foreign policy issue, as the border of the EU will extend to Romania by 2007. (1) Transnistria is often cited as an area in which arms, drugs, and human smuggling are conducted with the help of government resources. In addition, many in Russia view the federalization plan for Moldova as a template for use in other former Soviet republics, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan. Therefore, the solution to this frozen conflict has wider implications for Europe and elsewhere. Since the federalization plan was first proposed in July 2002, there has been any significant change in the negotiating position of the Transnistrians and very little input from Moldovan civil society. This is why the federalization plan for Moldova has elicited such a strong negative response, both from Moldovan opposition parties and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). For many Moldovan opposition groups, any compromise with the Transnistrian leadership is viewed as a defeat and a capitulation to Russian interests. Therefore, the federalization process is both an important domestic and foreign policy issue for the Moldovan government. This article briefly examines some common concepts of federalism and then examines the federalization proposal and its domestic and foreign consequences for Moldova. The Idea of Federalism One of the reasons why the federalization plan for Moldova has been so problematic is that there is widespread disagreement among scholars and governmental participants as to the nature and conceptualization of federalism and even what a federal state should look like. Brzinski, Lancaster, and Tuschloff (1999) argue that there are three perceptions of federalism. One view is that federalism is a sociological process based on a group governance in which groups agree to power sharing and certain rules of the game. For example, Elazar (1994) argues that federalism is not to be found in a particular kind of structure but a particular set of relationships among the participants in a political system (15). Moreno (2001) argues that the federalization of Spain and the gradual devolution of powers to the autonomous communities were brought about by the agreed political will of these communities rather than by any institutional feature. …

Manipulating the metonymic: the politics of civic identity and the Bristol Cenotaph, 1919–1932

The city of Bristol was one of the last major cities in Great Britain to unveil a civic memorial to commemorate the Great War 1914–1918. After Leicester (1925), Coventry (1927) and Liverpool (1930), Bristol's Cenotaph was unveiled in 1932, 14 years after the Armistice. During that lapse, its location, source of funding, and commemorative function were the focus of widespread disagreement and division in the city. This paper examines the nature of these disputes. The authors suggest that the tensions in locating a war memorial may have their origins in historic enmities between political and religious factions in the city. By examining in detail the source and manifestations of these disputes, the authors offer a detailed exemplar of how memory is shaped and controlled in British urban spaces.

Transnational citizenship: problems of definition, culture and democracy1

There is widespread disagreement over whether transnational citizenship provides defensible extensions of, or meaningful complements to, national citizenship. A significant strand of criticism relies upon empirical arguments about political motivation and the consequences of transnationalism. This paper addresses two questions arising from empirical arguments relating to the nation state and democracy. Do the alleged cultural requirements for effective political action provide an insuperable barrier to transnational citizenship? Does transnational citizenship necessarily require a commitment to transnational democracy? I argue that these largely empirical criticisms do not succeed in casting doubt upon the normative plausibility or practical viability of transnational projects. On the first question, I point to a growing transnational political culture that serves to motivate transnational citizens. On the second question, I argue for a legitimate category of transnational citizenship that, although inspired by cosmopolitan morality, is different from it, and that does not require transnational democracy.