Southeast Asian States Have Their Own Views on the Ukraine War Jeffrey Reeves (bio) Just as Southeast Asia has emerged as the center of gravity for the countries of the global West's respective Indo-Pacific strategies, so too has the region become a priority area for Western diplomacy on the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the start of the conflict, the United States, in particular, has lobbied Southeast Asian states and the secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn Russia's aggression and to comply with Western sanctions against Moscow. In May 2022, for example, the Biden administration raised the Ukraine war in discussions with Southeast Asian leaders at their summit in Washington and tried to insert language in a joint U.S.-ASEAN vision statement criticizing Russia's militarism, ultimately having to settle instead for more vague language on support for territorial sovereignty and international law.1 Similarly, in 2022, the entire Western cohort of the G-20 pressured then host Indonesia to include language criticizing Russia's invasion in the group's joint statement. According to one European sous-sherpa involved in the statement's drafting, China and India also partially supported this language, which therefore made it possible to include.2 In at least one instance, however, European leaders were unable to bring their Southeast Asian counterparts on side with their criticism of Russia. In a December 2022 joint statement following an EU-ASEAN summit, negotiators failed to draft a common critique of Russia's actions.3 Neither have Western leaders had much success in securing Southeast Asian state support in condemnation of the war at the bilateral level, aside from Singapore, which is unique in the region for its relative acceptance [End Page 55] of Western views on the Ukraine war. Indeed, for all the West's efforts to propagate a distinctly critical narrative of Russia in Southeast Asia, regional media, scholarship, and leadership remain either noncommittal to the idea of Russian censure or sympathetic to what they perceive as Russia's strategic logic. As the Ukraine war passed its one-year anniversary in February 2023, Southeast Asian states were decidedly less interested in the war and in criticizing Russia than before. Although in a March 2022 UN General Assembly resolution eight ASEAN members voted to condemn Russia (Vietnam and Laos abstained), polling now shows that Southeast Asian states lead the world in their disinterest toward the war.4 Large majorities of the public in Thailand (60%) and Malaysia (56%) and sizable numbers in Singapore (44%) and Indonesia (48%) believe that the war is not their business and that their states should not interfere.5 Far from being a region that is sympathetic to Western narratives on the Ukraine war, Southeast Asia stands out for its perceived detachment from the conflict. How can one explain Southeast Asian states' apathy toward the war at a time that stands out in many ways as a high-water mark for Western states' attention? While the diversity within and between Southeast Asian states makes it nearly impossible to answer this question comprehensively in short form, there are several trends and characteristics across the region that provide some degree of insight. First, there is a clear lack of consensus on the origins, strategic direction, and global impact of the Russia-Ukraine war among Southeast Asian states and within ASEAN. Second, most Southeast Asian states remain open to and interested in maintaining economic, political, and social ties with Russia despite Western pressure to limit or restrict engagement. Third, Southeast Asian states are, in general, more cynical about Western intentions toward the war than other states, particularly with respect to Washington's proclivity to use the conflict to justify the further isolation of China and NATO's attempt to use the conflict to expand its influence in Asia. In this essay, the author will draw on polling data, official statements, media, and scholarship from across Southeast Asia to detail regional states' contemporary views on the Ukraine war and demonstrate that Southeast Asian states are generally less concerned about Russia's invasion [End Page 56] of Ukraine than their European and North American counterparts, more critical of the war's...
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May 17, 2023
Ying-Ho Kwong + 1
Open Access