Характеристика развития армяно-иранских экономических отношений после Арцахской войны 2020 года / Features of the Development of Armenian-Iranian Relations after the Second Artsakh War

Abstract

Neighboring countries Armenia and Iran considered each other as partners and friends, after Armenia declared its independence. In 1992, Iran, with a balanced approach to the Karabakh conflict and the First Artsakh War, created new prospects for the development of bilateral relations for both countries. After the end of the First Artsakh War and the victory of the Armenian side, Armenia and Iran started establishing and strengthening multilateral relations, striving to expand economic cooperation. Economic relations between Iran and Armenia have expanded significantly over the past three decades, and the main thing for Armenia in bilateral relations was Iran's balanced approach to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Tehran has been in serious international isolation for several years, which has been exacerbated in recent years due to the maximum pressure policy of the United States. In this situation, Iran is particularly interested in finding ways to overcome these restrictions. Armenia, which is under partial blockade, is one such option. The need to implement the project of creating an international transport and logistics corridor connecting the Persian Gulf with the Black Sea, the construction of the North-South highway has been discussed for at least 15 years, and the recent increase in Iran's interest in the implementation has a number of reasons. It seems that Tehran's latest initiatives towards their implementation are largely determined by the current regional geopolitical shifts. In particular, with the emergence of projects to unblock regional communications as a result of the 44-day war. And, the trend towards de facto cessation of Western sanctions policy against Iran is another factor that allows Iran to begin to respond significantly to recent regional transformations. First of all, due to the fact that the absence of sanctions will allow Tehran to initiate new, rather large-scale programs. It is also clear that all these relevant programs have always been relevant for both Iran and Armenia. But they have not been implemented yet due to a number of circumstances. In this light, the active opposition to communication projects by both Azerbaijan and Turkey has not disappeared even today. And, naturally, in this regard, one can predict a number of steps by Ankara and Baku to reduce the international attractiveness and, accordingly, the degree of relevance of these projects, with the ultimate goal of preventing their financing by large international donors. Against this background, the most important problem of Yerevan seems to be the demonstration of an extreme level of consistency in the direction of the implementation of these projects, despite the Turkish and Azerbaijani opposition.