Warsaw Treaty Organization Research Articles

Poles in Suceava County during Nicolae Ceausescu’s nationalist-communist regime. Contributions

This study was carried out on the basis of the original documents discovered during the research carried out in the Archives of the National Council for the Study of Security Archives in Bucharest (ACNSAS), Romania. The analysis of these documents shows us the fact that the Poles from Suceava county (Romania) were monitored by the Securitate during the nationalist-communist regime of Nicolae Ceaușescu. Officially, Romania and Poland were allies within the political-military alliance called the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The totalitarian regime led by Nicolae Ceaușescu was extremely conservative and restrictive towards the groups of cohabiting nationalities (national minorities), repressing and discouraging any form of expression of ethnic-national and religious identity. The Poles were no exception to the measures adopted by the regime, although the Hungarians were especially targeted by the policies of the communist regime in Romania. The documents analyzed in the present study reflect the official position of the regime towards the Polish community in Suceava County, as well as the efforts made by the diplomats of the Republic of Poland accredited in Romania to stimulate the efforts of their compatriots to preserve their language, traditions and school without the process of ethnic homogenization. In this case, the Roman Catholic Church, the school, the teachers of Polish ethnicity were the opinion leaders of the Polish communities in Solonețu Nou, Pleșa and Poiana Micului.

УЧАСТЬ КНР У РОЗВИТКУ НАФТОГАЗОВОЇ ГАЛУЗІ КАЗАХСТАНУ, ТУРКМЕНІСТАНУ ТА ІНШИХ КРАЇН ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЇ АЗІЇ 1990 – 2016 РР.: ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНІ ТА ЕКОНОМІЧНІ ФАКТОРИ

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the military- political and economic situation in the world had changed radically. The Berlin Wall fell ,The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) stopped its existence, the socialist bloc of countries in Europe and the USSR collapsed. The world was no more bipolar. The PRC, led by the CCP, despite the ruling Communist Party ideology, strived to take advantage of these changes. China aimed to open for itself foreign markets, including energy resources. PRC’s rejection from complete isolationism, the initial cessation of confrontation with the United States and countries of the West, and then cessation of the struggle with the USSR and its allies for leadership in building a world socialist system, allowed Chinese government not only to save huge resources, including energy, which went to maintenance of a huge army and ambitious military-political projects, by directing them in a peaceful direction, but also by starting the introduction of market reforms, what changed China's image in the world from a negative to a positive one. Sinc the formation on the territory of the former Soviet Central Asia of the independent states of Central Asia – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan – hydrocarbon resources of the region acquired key importance in the foreign policy of the new countries. China formed the priorities of its foreign energy policy in relation to Central Asia gradually. Energy expansion of Beijing was preceded by an active trade and economic policy, the results of which created preconditions for the foreign policy refocusing of the countries of the region. Pipelines became an important element of energy policy, proposed and implemented by Beijing for the supply of hydrocarbon resources in Chinese direction. Beijing achieves access to new oil and gas deposits, expecting due to their development, to realize promising plans to increase the exports volume of hydrocarbon raw materials from Central Asia countries.

NATO – RUSSIA CRISIS OF 2022. TAKING LESSONS FROM THE PREVIOUS CRISIS

In this article we are placing an analysis of the current crisis that erupted at the Russian-Ukrainian border. The main purpose is to identify possible hidden causes that could influence evolution. For this purpose, we have developed a comparative analysis of the current situation, taking attention to the similarities with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Next, using the hypothetical-deductive analysis, we will highlight what could be the major objectives of the big actors involved and what could be the big dilemmas they are facing in decision making. At the end of the paper, we will submit the conclusions by following the analyzes that we have proposed. The motivation for choosing this topic is to understand the future of the crisis and to focus on the crisis in the interests of the EU and NATO in general, and especially in Romania. The novelty of the research lies in comparing the evolution of the actual state of the situation on the Russian-Ukrainian border, with the one of 1962, when the tensions between NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization reached their peak, as well as from the analysis based on the fundamental differences between the democratic regimes and the totalitarian ones, focused on identifying the objectives of great importance that each of the parties wants to achieve.

Діяльність вишеградської групи в розрізі українсько-польських відносин у військовій сфері на сучасному етапі

Проаналізовано форми, методи та діяльність членів Вишеградської групи щодо перспектив співпраці з Україною в розрізі українсько-польських відносин у військовій сфері. Досліджено вплив членів Вишеградської групи на перспективи інтеграції України у Північноатлантичний альянс (далі – НАТО) та Європейський Союз (далі – ЄС).

The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969. by Laurien Crump, New York: Routledge, 2015. 322 pp. $168.00.

<i>The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969</i>. by Laurien Crump, New York: Routledge, 2015. 322 pp. $168.00.

Протидія кібернетичним загрозам у Польщі: досвід для України

Studying the experience of reforming the armed forces of the Republic of Poland (RP) in accordance with NATO standards is extremely relevant, given the path that the RP has taken from the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to its integration into the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. After all,Ukraineis also trying to introduce NATO standards, and in accordance with the Concept for the Development of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine, the fulfillment of the tasks of reforming and developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine includes:- formation of cyber security and cyber defense units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;- the creation of the necessary material and technical reserves for an adequate response, along with other components of the security and defense sector, to all challenges and threats.An assessment of the state’s military security, as well as the experience gained from the participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the antiterrorist operation, conducted as part of a comprehensive review of the security and defense sector, revealed a number of problems in the functioning of the defense forces in the context of existing and potential threats.The purpose of the article is to study the experience of theRepublic ofPoland, to counter cyber threats, the possibility of using this experience inUkraine.Since no one can say with confidence that his networks are fully protected and can withstand multi-vector cyber attacks, cyber security has become a priority for the development of the modern army. TheRussian Federationis constantly increasing the number of operations with cyber espionage and is increasingly trying to influence public opinion in our country, not disdaining the use of fake news and outright propaganda. The main purpose of these operations is to loosen the situation inside the country, creating chaos and panic as the basis for promoting their own interests.The conclusion that we have to do for ourselves is the need to increase investment in cyber security so that the defense forces are able to resist cyber attacks and provide the necessary level of cyber defense of the critical information infrastructure.In the future, it is advisable to conduct an analysis of measures to ensure the cyber defense of the critical information infrastructure under the state of emergency and martial law, as stipulated by the law “On the Basic Principles of Ukraine’s Cyber security”, which were carried out from 14:00 on November 26 from November 201 to 14:00 December 26, 2018 that is, during the imposition of martial law in Ukraine.

"Je třeba se poučit." Vývoj politických struktur organizace Varšavské smlouvy v letech 1985-1989

Studie analyzuje fungování politických struktur organizace Varšavské smlouvy v době mezi nástupem generálního tajemníka Ústředního výboru Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu Michaila Gorbačova a zhroucením státněsocialistických diktatur ve střední a východní Evropě na konci osmdesátých let, které bylo doposud probádáno pouze povrchně. Na základě výzkumu v českých, německých a polských archivech i studia publikované dokumentace přibližuje nezanedbatelné změny v praktickém chodu politických struktur této organizace, k nimž tehdy došlo. Pokouší se objasnit a zhodnotit podstatu těchto posunů, posoudit je v kontextu předchozího vývoje a nastínit, jaký měly význam pro osud Varšavské smlouvy po roce 1989. Ukazuje, že Gorbačov v organizaci inicioval poměrně výrazné změny, avšak jejich samotnou realizaci málokdy prosazoval asertivně. Větší otevřenost a pobídky vůči spojencům, které přístup sovětského generálního tajemníka charakterizovaly, však zaznamenaly jen částečný úspěch. Na jednu stranu začaly politické struktury Varšavské smlouvy po roce 1985 poprvé v historii aliance stabilně fungovat a staly se místem pro sdílení informací i prezentaci zahraničněpolitických stanovisek či iniciativ členských států, navzdory prohlubující se krizi východního bloku. Na straně druhé však ve fungování politických struktur Varšavské smlouvy přetrvávaly praktické problémy, které zrcadlily slepou uličku, do níž se dostal východní blok jako takový a systém vztahů mezi jeho zeměmi, vybudovaný v předchozích čtyřech desetiletích. Organizaci samotnou se pak před rokem 1989 nepodařilo vnitřně posílit natolik, aby nebyla po zhroucení stávajících politických režimů ve střední a východní Evropě odsouzena k brzkému zániku.

Die Gegenwart der Vergangenheit oder Die Grenzen des Sagbaren. Briefe, Tagebücher und fiktionale Texte von DDR-Autoren um 1970

Die Gegenwart der Vergangenheit oder Die Grenzen des Sagbaren. Briefe, Tagebücher und fiktionale Texte von DDR-Autoren um 1970

NATO at Sixty: America Between Law and War

NATO was founded to counter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Both have been gone for over twenty years. So why is NATO still here? Part of the explanation may lie in Americans’ strong belief in the efficacy of military force. NATO remains associated in Americans’ minds with the greatest time of U.S. military power. Yet, the United States also has a strong commitment to the rule of law. The country appears overdue for a return to this other commitment. We should not be surprised to soon see the United States promoting international law again—and that could mean finally shutting down NATO.

Encyclopedia of the atomic age

The last half of the twentieth century has often been called the Age, a name that has not faded even with the end of the Cold War. Nuclear testing in India and Pakistan, along with continuing tensions over weapons development in Iraq and China, has kept issues surrounding the use of nuclear energy at the forefront of world consciousness. Written by an expert in nuclear history, the Encyclopedia of the Atomic Age is a definitive resource, with more than 500 well-researched, accessible entries on the people, events, and institutions that have shaped and defined this crucial historical era. The volume presents a balanced viewpoint on many of the hotly debated issues of the period, with international coverage of both the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the controversial arena of nuclear weapons development. Entries Include: Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; Niels Bohr; Cuban Missile Crisis; Enola Gay; Fail-Safe; Gamma radiation; Hiroshima; Isotope; Limited Test Ban Treaty; Meltdown; Nagasaki; Quantum Theory; Radioactive waste; Salt; I and II; Three Mile Island; Warsaw Treaty Organization; Yalta Conference; Zero Option.

Defence Industry Consolidation in East Central Europe in the 1990s

THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY WAS ONE OF THE PILLARS of the command economy system. It was the centre and quintessential representation of a classic command economy, with its rigidity, centralised control, strong vertical hierarchy and meticulously elaborated, quantitative, obligatory plans that articulated political and military-technical needs rather than efficiency considerations. Being a specific, closed sector of the economy, the defence industry managed to preserve these basic characteristics practically until the end of the 1980s. Not only in the former Czechoslovakia, but even in reformminded Hungary, defence-related production remained an almost untouched residuum of the classical command economy. Defence industrial production peaked in the late 1980s in East Central Europe. Soon afterwards, however, the sector was hit by an unprecedentedly deep crisis. The first major blow was the sudden end of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). The large-scale and lucrative military markets and intense military-economic cooperation networks of the region collapsed. Defence industry enterprises quickly became insolvent. Their financial difficulties were aggravated by the burdens of unsold stocks, cancelled production lines and enormous reserves. The collapse of the WTO military markets took place simultaneously with the collapse of the civilian markets organised within the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) system. Defence industry enterprises in East Central Europe were dual-purpose: in addition to their military-related output, they exported large quantities of civilian goods to the Eastern European markets. The disappearance of the WTO and CMEA meant the collapse of an extended supply system as well. Companies could not rely anymore on large and cheap raw material and energy supplies from the Soviet Union, and lost their stable network of intra-regional subcontractors as well. This was another factor that pushed production costs upwards and caused major practical problems in reorganising the firms' activities. Another unexpected blow was the loss of the traditional Third World markets, principally in the Arab world. This market became an increasingly important source of hard currency for defence industry enterprises from the mid-1970s. The Gulf War and the subsequent US embargo on Iraq, Libya and Syria froze these business contacts.

Citizen Advisory Boards and Public Involvement: The Role of Citizens in Public Decision Making, Post–Cold War Demilitarization, and Environmental Cleanup

AbstractThe demise of the Cold War in the late 1980s catalyzed a dramatic reduction in standing armies and widespread closure of military bases throughout the two competing alliances, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), also known as the Warsaw Pact, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Similarly, the dismemberment of the WTO and the breakup of the Soviet Union have led to major reductions in Russian and East European forces. These historic contractions in Russian, American, and allied militaries at the end of the twentieth century and the Cold War have presented a number of major challenges to each country. One major challenge is environmental—how to destroy millions of tons of obsolete, dangerous, and costly war munitions and weapons inventories, and how to clean up the polluted legacies that capital‐intensive militaries have left behind on military bases and civilian communities. This article traces the development of mechanisms to increase the role of citizens in public decision making involving post–Cold War demilitarization and environmental cleanup. © 2001 John Wiley &amp; Sons, Inc.

Discovering Canada's International Role in Russia's Archives

ALTHOUGH CANADIANS AND RUSSIANS are citizens of countries with greatly different historical, political, and social traditions, they also share territorial, political, and economic characteristics unique to them. As inhabitants of the world's two largest countries territorially, their style of life is moulded by long-distance considerations. The Arctic is more or less a Canadian and Russian preserve, and a sense of the north, of 'northernness,' is ever present in both cultures. The flora and fauna are much the same in both countries, as are deposits of natural resources; thus, both countries process and attempt to market more or less the same things. Both are multilingual and multinational societies; political life in both is dominated by tensions between federal centres and provincial peripheries.More important for observers of international affairs, however, are the neighbours we share, especially the United States. Canada's location as a potential battleground between Great Britain, Russia, and the United States has long been a consideration for Russian authorities. From the eighteenth century, when Russians crossed the Bering Sea to the west coast of North America, to more recent confrontations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Canada's strategic position has attracted the attention of officials in St Petersburg and Moscow.These and other shared characteristics and tensions provided the incentive for the Centre for Research on Canadian-Russian Relations (CRCR) at Carleton University to send a research team to Russia to seek archival information on Canada. The origins and nature of the project have been described elsewhere.(1) Suffice it to say here that, although Carleton's search for materials on Canada in Russia was kick-started in the mid-1980s with small grants from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the project received its greatest impetus in March 1997 when the Donner Canadian Foundation awarded the CRCR a generous sum of money. Since then, the team has been scouring archival holdings in Moscow (and St Petersburg and Kiev), photocopying and relocating thousands of pages to the CRCR.(2) The formal, funded stage of the project is complete, though the CRCR still has much to do to organize and process the documents. Most of some 12,000 pages are catalogued and available by appointment at the CRCR for general use. To that store will be added about 100 documents recently copied at the State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF).(3) Work on translating selected documents is under way.Photocopies and microfilms of dozens of books on Canada, written in Russia between the 1850s and 1950s, supplement the archival documentation. Many are very rare. Hundreds of Imperial Russian and Soviet articles, reports, and papers have been placed on file in the CRCR as well.The purpose of this essay is to inform readers of the depth and often startling nature of the archival and special monographic findings.(4)It has long been known that Russia's archives contained much of interest about Canada. Canada's first dominion archivist said as much in his annual report for 1883. But, for a variety of reasons, mostly obvious, no attempt to discover the true extent of these holdings was possible until the 1990s.Because it is in the 'diplomatic' sphere that the Russian connection has most consistently been ignored by scholars who look only to Canadian, American, French, and British archival collections, that is where our tale begins. Formal relationships between Ottawa and St Petersburg got their start in 1899, when the Russian State Council approved the opening of a consulate in Montreal. According to the Russian documents, Canadians 'eagerly' awaited this event. On the other hand, a confidential memorandum from the minister of foreign affairs, Count M.N. Murav'ev, explains that 'the study of the circumstances of its [England] trade with Canada. …

Slovenia and NATO Enlargement

THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into central-east Europe has been the subject of lively debate for almost a decade. Opinions and positions on this subject in Europe and North America have ranged from angry denunciations through solid criticisms, serious doubts, and guarded support to enthusiastic accolades. These contrasting attitudes underline the flux and uncertainties, as well as the divisibility, of security in the post-cold war era. Less than three years after NATO's initial stonewalling on enlargement in late 1994, invitations to join have been extended to three former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. But nine of the twelve central-east European candidates still remain at NATO's gates, not satisfied with the status of so-called 'partner countries.' One of them is the Republic of Slovenia.According to many experts and observers, reducing the 'grey zone' of insecurity and uncertainty in Europe is an important rationale for NATO enlargement. Javier Solana, the secretary general of NATO, con firmed this when he stated that 'enlargement must ... promote greater stability not only to the territories of the new invitees but through them to the neighboring regions.(f.1) Although this statement and its underlying contention have certain merits in general terms, they raise some serious questions in relation, for example, to Slovenia, whose candidacy was deferred at the NATO meeting in Madrid in July 1997.On the whole, the lines separating secure and insecure areas in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Asia do not coincide with the division between NATO members and non-members. Furthermore, flash-points of violence and terrorism in the territories of NATO members - Ulster, the Basque country, Corsica, parts of Turkey, for example - have existed for decades. Actual or potential interstate conflicts have taken place or might conceivably (again) take place between NATO member-states, for example, on the Greek-Turkish border, in Cyprus, or over Gibraltar. It is true that Slovenia is situated in the geographic proximity of recent armed hostilities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, a string of trouble spots stretches from Bosnia across the 'Eurasian Balkans,' as Zbigniew Brzezinski calls them, all the way to southeast Asia. However, Slovenia, together with a number of other European countries, including neighbouring Austria, belongs to an area of stability and security. As for Slovenia's intentions, there is no room for uncertainty or for treating the country as part of a 'grey zone' in Europe.Soon after Slovenia became independent in June 1991 its political elite found little comfort in relying on membership in the United Nations and participation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) alone. The ineffectiveness of the international community in dealing with even a relatively small aggressor in the Balkans only contributed to the sense of unease.Since then the Slovenian government has abandoned ex-Yugoslavia's stance of 'active non-alignment.' During the same period, the considerable political strength of the pacifist 'Greens,' who advocated Slovenia's unilateral disarmament and neutrality, has practically evaporated. Because of this shift in the political scene, and with no tradition of neutralism and no constitutional or international legal obligations in this respect, Slovenia did not opt for a defence policy of armed neutrality. As a non-member in the only remaining effective regional security organization (NATO), Slovenia has been left for the time being with no option but to pursue external non-engagement and armed self-reliance - a posture practiced by the state but not desired by the largest coalition party. In addition, the Slovenian defence ministry signed bilateral co-operation protocols with its counterparts in the United States, Britain, Hungary, Austria, and the Czech Republic, among others, and a trilateral protocol on military co-operation with Italy and Hungary. …

Operability and shared responsibility after new membership: (first impressions from East-Central Europe)

On 12 March 1999 three countries that had been parties to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and members of the Soviet-led military alliance based on this Treaty as little as 10 years ago joined the Atlantic Alliance. The first phase of NATO enlargement to the former Warsaw Treaty, and somewhat more broadly to the East, has thus been completed. It is open to question when this is going to be followed by a second wave. The experience of the first three new members from the East will thus be exclusive and decisive for at least some years to come. It is decisive not only in the political life of the three new members, but also of the Alliance. The performance of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, their readiness to play along with other members of the Alliance, to contribute to extra-territorial operations, to modernise their training and equipment may be regarded important when the Alliance is to decide if and when to continue the enlargement process. Consequently, the three new members should live up to their responsibility and recognise that they can do a major disservice to the enlargement process, and more generally to the Alliance if they turn out to be troublesome allies. This paper argues that the integration of the three new members will affect both sides. It has been evident for some time that the threat perception, security policy, and military strategy of the three new members have been undergoing a major re-

Russian policies on central and eastern Europe: An overview

After the collapse of both the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in 1990—91 Russia has lost highly effective instruments of (repressive) control of the East European countries and has been left without any significant influence on the economic, political and military developments in the region ever since. This can partly be explained by the deep distrust and emotional reserve vis‐à‐vis Russia on behalf of the new ruling elites in the region. A very important additional factor, however, has been the lack of a clear and coherent Russian strategy on the region in the early years of independent Russian statehood. After the initial loss of importance the region has regained prominence only indirectly as a crucial variable in Russian relations with Western countries and institutions such as NATO, the WEU, and the EU. Though deeper economic and trade relations between Russia and the region seem mutually advantageous, a major rapprochement seems to be blocked by political reservations and considerations.

NATO Enlargement

The 'New Nato'In May 1997, George A. Joulwan, a general in the United States army and supreme allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, paid the traditional farewell visit to Canada before relinquishing his official duties. In the nature of things, this was an occasion to show the flag for NATO, to review the state of play with the Canadian government, and to thank the Canadian forces for their support and co-operation.A burly, engaging figure, Joulwan enthusiastically presented the 'new NATO' to a meeting organized by the Atlantic Council of Canada. In direct, vivid language, he described how NATO was reaching out to its former adversaries -- to Poland, Hungary, Russia, and the whole array of countries that had once been encompassed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (more commonly called the Warsaw pact). Of course, the 'new NATO' had kept the attributes that had enabled it to give its members political confidence and military security for over forty years, the firm base on which Europe's unprecedented half-century of prosperity, tranquillity, and freedom had been built. Given his audience, he did not need to spell out that the popular desire in central and eastern Europe for a similar measure of freedom and prosperity was what finally brought the cold war to an end.While the new NATO had not abandoned the vigilance and solidarity of the past, Joulwan was at pains to demonstrate that it now went well beyond collective defence. Through a series of special instruments devised for the purpose, NATO had reached out to Russia and its other interlocutors east and south of the Oder. It had initiated a deep, continuing institutional dialogue with those countries and, perhaps more important, had started to work closely with a number of them on matters of military management, including civilian control, training, doctrine, communications, equipment, and peacekeeping techniques.Joulwan took considerable and justifiable pride in how the new NATO programmes with their elaborate titles -- the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (subsequently transformed into the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council), Partnership for Peace, and Combined Joint Task Forces -- grew and developed during his time as supreme commander. They not only created a pool of common knowledge and a capacity to work together among the military forces involved, but, by fostering a habit of co-operation, they also helped to overcome the fears and suspicion of the past. Almost 30 non-NATO countries had missions accredited to NATO headquarters in Brussels with ready access to its senior managers, current thinking, and specialized programmes. Those missions were both means to achieve closer collaboration and symbols of growing ties.All this was quite impressive -- a series of measures that were working and held promise for the future. But when the bluff and confident general was asked how the enlargement of NATO would strengthen security and co-operation in Europe- specifically, what the addition of new members would contribute to the new NATO -- he was momentarily at a loss: 'Oh, that is a political question ...' He quickly rallied, affirming his support for NATO's official policy with standard words about 'extending stability' to central and eastern Europe. What he did not do was try to define the concrete benefits that would accrue to NATO members beyond those already conferred by the current outreach programmes.It was a telling moment. Joulwan's hesitation puts him in good company. Some specialists in Europe and the United States complain that these issues have not been sufficiently aired there, although their debates look very lively indeed compared to the relatively few voices raised in comment or advocacy in Canada.(f.1) In fact, there is now an extensive literature on NATO expansion, in scholarly journals and general publications, in western Europe and particularly in the United States. What is striking about this debate is that a large proportion of the military and security experts, and many interested historians and students of politics, find little to commend in NATO enlargement. …

Russia and NATO: A vital partnership for European security

Following‐ the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, Russia looks forward to a share in the partnership of democratic Europe. However, the potential security nightmare posed by the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of unstable independent and semi‐independent states, is of direct relevance to European security as a whole and argues Mr Stepashin is a major factor in the Russian quest for greater European economic and military assistance. There are still many prejudices in the Cold War legacy to overcome but the geographic extent of the former USSR stretching across two continents, is of vital strategic interest to NATO and western Europe, and represents one facet of the search for a new world order.

The political economy of arms exports in post-communist societies: The cases of Poland and the CSFR

At its peak in the late 198Os, the global arms trade amounted to over US%50 billion per year.2 As the Persian Gulf War revealed, the highly competitive arms market and liberal arms trade policies meant that most governments permitted arms exports to practically any buyer that could afford the purchase price.” The collapse of communism in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) drastically reordered the demand for arms. For the CEECs, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) sharply diminished the demand for defense items. The fiscal and economic distress facing the post-communist governments also meant that they could not sustain their traditional levels of defense spending. Nonetheless, the post-communist states have legitimate defense needs in which indigenous defense production can play a role. Some CEECs also earn substantial amounts of hard currency from arms exports. The newly democratic CEEC governments must balance a host of interests-political, economic, and military-in developing a policy regarding arms trade, defense production, and defense conversion. What export policies have CEECs adopted? How have the arms export policies of CEECs been formed? How have the governments balanced political, economic, and military interests in the process? Why have the new governments adopted their particular policies regarding arms exports and defense conversion?

Weapons modernization, doctrine, and the decline of the Warsaw pact

As the Soviet Union moves precariously into the 1990s, the attention of Western statesmen and analysts remains fixed upon Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to implement perestroika and glasnost at home and his still ambiguously defined new thinking abroad. Whether the topic is arms control negotiations with the West, the introduction of elements of pluralism into the long moribund Soviet political scene, or the abrupt withdrawal of Soviet power from forward vantage points in the Third World (i.e. Afghanistan), few Western observers any longer doubt that a fundamental transformation has taken place in the Soviet system. Indeed, as Western scholars increasingly acknowledge the significance of the Gorbachev revolution, it has also become apparent that the particular region most heavily influenced by this reform program has been the USSR's former East European empire. The implications of change have been most dramatic for Eastern Europe precisely because events have been propelled by both of the key elements in the Gorbachev program—the Soviet leader not only pushed glasnost and perestroika upon his East European allies (with what were probably unforeseen results), but the ultimate test of new thinking in the foreign policy realm has been the tolerant Soviet response to the collapse of Communist Party authority throughout the bloc. In this sense the movement toward liberal reform in Eastern Europe was both initiated and insulated by the dynamics of Gorbachev's own domestic and foreign reform programs. The apparent Soviet willingness to accept a reunified Germany on Western terms represents, of course, the ultimate Soviet concession along these lines. While the prospects for a peaceable transition away from communism for Eastern Europe may not be decided for some time, one more certain by-product of these developments has been the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) as a viable security system. As the institutional linchpin of the Soviet-East European relationship, the Warsaw Pact could hardly have been expected to remain unaffected by the dramatic changes sweeping bloc affairs. In many respects, the high level of Soviet-East European military integration fostered over the