Abstract
The 'New Nato'In May 1997, George A. Joulwan, a general in the United States army and supreme allied commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, paid the traditional farewell visit to Canada before relinquishing his official duties. In the nature of things, this was an occasion to show the flag for NATO, to review the state of play with the Canadian government, and to thank the Canadian forces for their support and co-operation.A burly, engaging figure, Joulwan enthusiastically presented the 'new NATO' to a meeting organized by the Atlantic Council of Canada. In direct, vivid language, he described how NATO was reaching out to its former adversaries -- to Poland, Hungary, Russia, and the whole array of countries that had once been encompassed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (more commonly called the Warsaw pact). Of course, the 'new NATO' had kept the attributes that had enabled it to give its members political confidence and military security for over forty years, the firm base on which Europe's unprecedented half-century of prosperity, tranquillity, and freedom had been built. Given his audience, he did not need to spell out that the popular desire in central and eastern Europe for a similar measure of freedom and prosperity was what finally brought the cold war to an end.While the new NATO had not abandoned the vigilance and solidarity of the past, Joulwan was at pains to demonstrate that it now went well beyond collective defence. Through a series of special instruments devised for the purpose, NATO had reached out to Russia and its other interlocutors east and south of the Oder. It had initiated a deep, continuing institutional dialogue with those countries and, perhaps more important, had started to work closely with a number of them on matters of military management, including civilian control, training, doctrine, communications, equipment, and peacekeeping techniques.Joulwan took considerable and justifiable pride in how the new NATO programmes with their elaborate titles -- the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (subsequently transformed into the EuroAtlantic Partnership Council), Partnership for Peace, and Combined Joint Task Forces -- grew and developed during his time as supreme commander. They not only created a pool of common knowledge and a capacity to work together among the military forces involved, but, by fostering a habit of co-operation, they also helped to overcome the fears and suspicion of the past. Almost 30 non-NATO countries had missions accredited to NATO headquarters in Brussels with ready access to its senior managers, current thinking, and specialized programmes. Those missions were both means to achieve closer collaboration and symbols of growing ties.All this was quite impressive -- a series of measures that were working and held promise for the future. But when the bluff and confident general was asked how the enlargement of NATO would strengthen security and co-operation in Europe- specifically, what the addition of new members would contribute to the new NATO -- he was momentarily at a loss: 'Oh, that is a political question ...' He quickly rallied, affirming his support for NATO's official policy with standard words about 'extending stability' to central and eastern Europe. What he did not do was try to define the concrete benefits that would accrue to NATO members beyond those already conferred by the current outreach programmes.It was a telling moment. Joulwan's hesitation puts him in good company. Some specialists in Europe and the United States complain that these issues have not been sufficiently aired there, although their debates look very lively indeed compared to the relatively few voices raised in comment or advocacy in Canada.(f.1) In fact, there is now an extensive literature on NATO expansion, in scholarly journals and general publications, in western Europe and particularly in the United States. What is striking about this debate is that a large proportion of the military and security experts, and many interested historians and students of politics, find little to commend in NATO enlargement. …
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