The political economy of arms exports in post-communist societies: The cases of Poland and the CSFR

Abstract

At its peak in the late 198Os, the global arms trade amounted to over US%50 billion per year.2 As the Persian Gulf War revealed, the highly competitive arms market and liberal arms trade policies meant that most governments permitted arms exports to practically any buyer that could afford the purchase price.” The collapse of communism in the central and eastern European countries (CEECs) drastically reordered the demand for arms. For the CEECs, the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) sharply diminished the demand for defense items. The fiscal and economic distress facing the post-communist governments also meant that they could not sustain their traditional levels of defense spending. Nonetheless, the post-communist states have legitimate defense needs in which indigenous defense production can play a role. Some CEECs also earn substantial amounts of hard currency from arms exports. The newly democratic CEEC governments must balance a host of interests-political, economic, and military-in developing a policy regarding arms trade, defense production, and defense conversion. What export policies have CEECs adopted? How have the arms export policies of CEECs been formed? How have the governments balanced political, economic, and military interests in the process? Why have the new governments adopted their particular policies regarding arms exports and defense conversion?