United Arab Republic Research Articles

MAIN IMPACTS ON THE SYRIA’S CRISIS

The historical background that have influenced the Syria’s crisis is described, geographical position and demographic composition that makes Syria a convenient base for opposition forces, political contacts between France, Great Britain and Russia considering the situation in Syria are characterized. The attention is focused on the prerequisits that have lead to the crisis in Syria including both inner and external factors.
 In the article is mentioned two unsolved territorial disputes: the Shebaa Farms and Hatay region. Another issue, that makes Syria more diverse is Kurdish question. Colonial powers divided Middle East by not existing boarders. It has led Egypt and Syria to unite and establish the United Arab Republic. One more important question is coup d’état, which was led by representatives of the military elite Salah Jadid, Hafez al-Assad, Salim Hatum, Mustafa Tlas.
 The author mentioned that the civil war in Syria is mistakenly concidered to be a religious conflict. The origins of the Syrian vulnerability derive not from the sectarian divisions. In fact the deterioration of situation in Syria hugely depended on social and economic factors.
 Another important issue discussed in the article is that Bashar’s rulling led to the so-called Damascus Spring, which represented the most important civil society mobilization preceding the 2011 uprising.

Egypt in Middle East policy of the USSR (1957-1961)

The article examines Soviet-Egyptian relations from the beginning of 1957 (the completion of the Suez crisis) to the Autumn 1961, when the XXII Congress of the CPSU took place. The Egyptian vector of Soviet foreign policy is sufficiently studied in modern historiography. Soviet-Egyptian relations were the object of study of such researchers as A. Vasilyev, A. Fursenko, Y. Primakov, S. Sinayskiy, M. Gat, J. D. Glassmen, R .Ginat, I. Ginor and others. However, today far from all aspects of the problem are examined, especially concerning 1957-1961. The purpose of this article is to fill in the some gaps in modern historiography. We need to highlight the Egyptian factor in the policy of the USSR regarding the Syrian, Iraqi and Lebanese crises of 1957-1958; the supply of arms to the Arab States during that period; economic and cultural cooperation between countries. The aim of the article is analysis the policy of the Soviet Union regarding Egypt from the end of the Suez crisis, which radically strengthened the interaction between the two powers, until the XXII Congress of the CPSU (October 1961), which fixed the final normalization of Soviet-Egyptian relations. After the Suez crisis, the USSR significantly expanded the range of cooperation with Egypt. The aim of the Soviet Union was to consolidate and strengthen its influence in the Arab world on the wave of propaganda success after the Suez crisis. In general, the Khrushchev leadership managed to achieve the set tasks. Moscow focused on exporting arms and expanding economic assistance. Because of the emerging of the United Arab Republic and the Panarabist and anti-communist policy of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in the late 1950s, the ideological contradictions between the two states had worsened. Despite ideological disagreements with the President of the United Arab Republic, during the series of Middle Eastern crises of 1957-1958, the Kremlin invariably took the side of Arab nationalists to protect them from the actions of other states. The volume of military and financial and technical assistance to Cairo has also steadily increased, despite any ideological contradictions. Due to the new wave of socialist transformations in Egypt, the disintegration of the UAR and the beginning of the persecution of Communists and Kurds in the Iraq, the disagreements gradually came to naught, was recorded by the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961.

The United States Recognition for the United Arab Republic: Why?

The United States Recognition for the United Arab Republic: Why?

Mīšīl ʿAflaq’s Thought between Nationalism and Socialism

This article analyses and describes the political thought of Mīšīl ʿAflaq, the founder—together with Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Bīṭār—and the main ideologue of the Arab Baʿṯ Socialist Party (Ḥizb al-Baʿṯ al-ʿarabī al-ištirākī).1 Mīšīl ʿAflaq was an atypical figure in his contemporary Middle Eastern society, who differ from the strongmen that typified his era such as Ǧamāl ʿAbd al-Nāṣer and Qaḏḏāfī. He was an intellectual, a philosopher, who, with his ideas of Panarabism and Arab socialism affected more than a generation of Arab youth. His dream of Arab Unity became a reality from 1958-1961 with the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic, and the Panarabist Party he created became one of the key players in Middle East from the 1940s onwards. This paper, after sketching a brief biography of Mīšīl ʿAflaq, focuses on his understanding of Nationalism and Arab Socialism, on which his ideology is grounded. By connecting these two ideas, he created a monist ideology in which the mission of Arab Unity is both the starting point and the final goal.

Arab Nationalism and the Arab Union of 1958

The late 1950s was a turbulent period in the history of Arab nationalism. It saw the birth and demise of unity states (the United Arab Republic and the Arab Union), civil war, revolution and Western intervention. Despite its short five-month lifespan, the Iraqi–Jordanian Hashemite Arab Union contributed to the intensification of the traditional Egyptian–Iraqi rivalry, the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 and the American intervention in Lebanon the same year. It was the result of Arab nationalism, lingering British imperial dreams, the East–West conflict, economic considerations and an inter-Arab cold war. The Arab Union had obvious advantages over the United Arab Republic. Two such advantages were the greater number of cabinet posts granted to Jordan by the Arab Union than were granted to Syria by the United Arab Republic, and the fact that Amman retained its status as capital (one of two union capitals), whereas Damascus was downgraded to the status of provincial capital. These advantages, however, failed to prevent the premature demise of the union, which was caused by a combination of negative domestic and regional perceptions, economic constraint and military commitments.

Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence

<i>Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence</i>

World camel research: a scientometric assessment, 2003–2012

An analysis of 3,089 papers on global camel research during 2003---2012, as indexed in Scopus international multidisciplinary database indicate an average annual growth rate of 11.20 % and registered an average citation per paper of 2.24. The publication output was scattered in 257 journal titles and originated in 104 countries, of which the top 15 countries contributed 87.44 % share to global publication output during 2003---2012. The highest publication output came from USA, followed by India, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, France, China, Germany, Sudan, Belgium, Australia, Canada and Kenya. The publication share has increased in case of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, China, France, Sudan, India, Australia and Canada, as against decrease in UK, USA, Kenya, Belgium, Germany and UAE from 2003---2007 to 2008---2012. Eight out of 15 most productive countries have achieved high relative citation index (1 and above): Belgium (3.61), Australia (2.69), UK (2.38), Canada (2.33), France (2.07), USA (1.87), Germany (1.65), UAE (1.11) and Kenya (1.09) during 2003---2012. Agricultural and biological sciences (43.35 % share) contributed the largest share, followed by veterinary science (29.75 % share), medicine (17.74 % share), immunology and microbiology (13.99 % share), biochemistry, genetics and molecular biology (13.99 % share), environment science (5.08 % share) and pharmacology, toxicology and pharmaceutics (3.11 % share) during 2003---2012. Among narrow sub-fields, the focused areas were camel disease and infection, camel milk and dairy produce, camel non-milk products, camel reproduction, camel feed and diet camel physiology, camel genetics, camel parasitology, etc. The world camel research output originated from 311 organizations, of which the top 20 contributed 31.72 % global publication share during 2003---2012.

Celebrating Continuity: The Role of State Holidays in Syria (1918–2010)

National holidays are one of the major instruments of regimes and rulers aiming to legitimise their hegemony and maintain the social and political order. This article deals with the way in which successive Syrian regimes have celebrated the national—secular and religious—holidays. It compares the various Syrian regimes: the monarchy (1918–1920); the mandate period (1920–1946); and the republic period (1946–present).Although the latter period will be treated as a whole, the analysis differentiates between five periods: post-independence (1946–1958); the United Arab Republic (UAR; 1958–1961); the secessionist regime (1961–1963); and the Ba‘th regime (1963–present), with Bashar replacing his father in June 2000. The main thesis of this article is that Syrian regimes prefer continuity over change in the realm of state holidays. Thus, in contrast to Iraq, where each new regime has attempted to delegitimise its predecessor by abolishing the national calendar and inventing a new one, Syrian regimes have added new holidays to the calendar without erasing the old ones. In this way, Syria's calendar resembles an edifice occasionally renovated according to the regime's needs, but never demolished. This policy emanated from a desire to demonstrate continuity even in times of change and upheaval, while at the same time consolidating the local national identity, which has often competed with other supra-identities, such as pan-Arabism and Islam.

1958 RECONSIDERED: STATE FORMATION AND THE COLD WAR IN THE EARLY POSTCOLONIAL ARAB MIDDLE EAST

AbstractUsing Arabic, English, and French sources, and engaging Middle East and Cold War historians, this article makes a threefold argument. First, in United Arab Republic (UAR)–Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, the 1958–59 explosion of domestic and regional tensions triggered state-formation surges. Second, these formed one process, which made those states more alike, with state-led socioeconomic planning playing a key role. Third, that process partook of a global Third World trend intersecting with the early Cold War. I draw three conclusions. Although existing scholarly readings that the events of 1958–59 in the Arab Middle East formed a crisis but not an ideological or political watershed are correct, from the viewpoint of state formation this crisis was a milestone. Moreover, UAR–Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon had persisting affinities and shared regional positions—notably, the fact that all were sandwiched between the unstable poles of the Arab state system, Iraq and Egypt—that shaped their individual postindependence histories of state formation. Last, Washington's low-profile involvement in this state-formation surge illustrates how domestic sociopolitics and regional geopolitics—including the UAR's peaking popularity and influence in 1958–59—affected U.S. policy in the Cold War postcolonial world.

Secular Aspirations and Political Islam in the Arab Middle East: The 1950s Reconsidered

The Maghreb Review, Vol. 37, 1, 2012 © The Maghreb Review 2012 This publication is printed on longlife paper SECULAR ASPIRATIONS AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST: THE 1950S RECONSIDERED BY JAMES PISCATORI∗ Wm. Roger Louis ends his great study of the British empire in the Middle East by noting that, as the 1940s had witnessed British concern over the old regimes, the 1950s would turn to concern about a revolutionary Middle East.1 Those regimes were assumed to be revolutionary because they would be antiimperialist or nationalist. Military coups in Syria in 1949, 1951 and 1954, the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1954, the Suez war of 1956, and in 1958 the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, the Lebanese civil war, the British military intervention in Jordan and the formation of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria were highlights of an eventful decade that induced anxiety in the West as bipolar geostrategic rivalry unfolded on the larger world stage. Mid-ranking military officers, nationalist and socialist ideologues and urban technocrats looked set to dominate the modern Middle Eastern political universe. While this view was common, it needs to be qualified in two ways. First, any implication that Islam was absent from the political equation of the time is offset by a defined view of the time that it was very much present. In this view, it was an unpredictable throwback to an earlier age but, with luck, it could be positively channelled given Islam’s even greater hatred of communism than of the West. The ascendancy of modernization theory in the 1960s somewhat obscured the extent to which Cold War imperatives had dictated an approving, utilitarian view of what was regarded as a traditional religious force. Second, some of the literature on political Islam has drawn misleading conclusions from the purportedly revolutionary Middle East of the 1950s. While explanations for political Islam, fundamentalism, Islamism, the Islamic revival or Islamic resurgence almost always prudently point to several causes, considerable emphasis has been placed on the reaction to this period’s perceived prevailing secularism, the belief that religion should be separated from the state and had little to contribute to political goals and programmes.2 * Durham University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference on ‘The Middle East in the 1950s: Historical Perspectives: Israel, the Arab World, and the Great Powers’, co-sponsored by the Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies and the Crown Family Center for Jewish Studies at Northwestern University, 25-27 April 2010. I am grateful to Professor Elie Rekhess for his kind invitation to participate and for suggesting this topic and to Ronald Nettler for his useful comments. 1 Wm. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 747. 2 The new Egyptian revolutionary leader, ‘Abd al-Nasir, told the French journalist Jean Lacouture in 1954: ‘after eighteen months in power, I still don’t see how it would be possible 4 JAMES PISCATORI Even so perceptive an observer of the Arabs as Malcolm Kerr, who famously chronicled the Arab Cold War between the Arab nationalist revolutionaries and the conservative monarchies, argued that the struggle for secularization had been largely won in the 1950s, except among the diehard Muslim Brothers and in the cultural area. The remaining unspoken debate was between secularists who ‘would combat religious traditionalism by surgery and those who prefer medication’.3 In addition, a good deal of the literature on political Islam tends to date its emergence to a period of a decade or more after the end of the 1950s. Many would ascribe its rise as a formidable force in the Middle East to the mid- to late 1970s. For Gilles Kepel, this decade was neatly bracketed by the death of Egypt’s ‘Abd al-Nasir in 1970, heralding the decline of Arab nationalism, and the overthrow of the Shah in Iran in 1978–9, marking the rise of a revolutionary Islam. Some date it, at its earliest, to the loss of Jerusalem in the Arab–Israeli war...

Diplomacy as counter-revolution? The ‘moderate states’, the Fedayeen and State Department initiatives towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1969–1970

Explanations for the Nixon administration's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict have generally concentrated on US relations with the United Arab Republic and Israel, which are portrayed as the focal points of American strategy in the region. This article argues that the fate of the moderate Arab states, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, also played an important role in motivating the State Department's two major diplomatic initiatives during 1969–70, the Rogers Plan and Rogers Initiative, as well as US diplomatic considerations after the September 1970 civil war in Jordan. US mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict was at least in part intended to ease pressures on the governments of these countries. For this reason, these initiatives should be considered counter-revolutionary.

Stepping Back from the Third World: Soviet Policy toward the United Arab Republic, 1965–1967

This article shows that for two years prior to the June 1967 Six-Day Mideast War, Soviet-Egyptian relations had begun to fray because the Soviet Union wanted to loosen its ties with radical regimes in the Third World, including Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. Soviet leaders urged Nasser to reform the Egyptian economy, decrease Egypt's military involvement in Yemen, and allow the Soviet Navy unfettered access to Egyptian ports. But like numerous other small powers during the Cold War, Egypt was able to fend off the pressure of its superpower ally. In May 1967, when Egypt unilaterally decided to bring its forces into the Sinai, Soviet leaders were divided over how to respond to the crisis that engulfed the Middle East. In the end, the more cautious faction in Moscow prevailed, and the Soviet government continued to be wary of becoming embroiled in conflicts initiated by radical Third World regimes.

Accommodating to a working relationship: Arab Nationalism and US Cold War policies in the Middle East, 1958–60

The article reconsiders the attempts of the Eisenhower administration (1958–60) to come to terms with the realities of Middle Eastern politics by initiating a rapprochement with the forces of radical Arab nationalism. The establishment of a limited ‘working relationship’ with Gamal Abdel Nasser's United Arab Republic had a stabilising influence on intra-regional developments and contributed to the containment of Soviet advances in Iraq and Yemen. Despite these successes, the Eisenhower administration proved to be ideologically disinclined to establish a constructive long-term relationship with the key regional force.

Syria's Kurds: history, politics and society

Introduction 1. The Kurds During the French Mandate 1.1 Kurdish Populations under the French Mandate 1.2 The Mandate System and the Birth of the Syrian State 1.3 The Mandate and the Colonial Expertise 1.4 The Kurdish Cultural Movement in Syria and Lebanon 1.5 Fragmentation of the Kurdish Community: Politics in Jazira 2. Syria in Transition, 1946-63 2.1 Searching for New Political Horizons 2.2 The Triumph of Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic 3. The Ba'athist System and the Kurds 3.1 Ba'athism: an Exception in Arab Nationalism? 3.2 The Years of Ideological Purity (1963-70) 3.3 The Years of Exploitation (1970-2000) 4. The Kurdish Issue and Its Transnational Dimension 4.1 The emergence of Hafiz al-As'ad's Game 149 4.2 The Fall of Saddam Husayn And The Collapse of Syrian Strategy 5. The Kurdish Response and its Margins: Dissimulation of a hidden conflict 5.1 The Kurdish Parties at the Margins of the Legal System 5.2 Kurdish Identity at the margins of official islam 5.3 The Defense of Kurdish Culture 6. The Qamishli Revolt, 2004: The Marker of a new Era for the Kurds in Syria 6.1 The Activities Preceding the Kurdish Upheaval 6.2 The Qamishli Revolt 6.3 Toward a Radicalization of Ethnic Divisions? Conclusion

The “Shia crescent” and Arab State Legitimacy

The “Shia crescent” and Arab State Legitimacy Kevin Mazur For all of the discussion of radical political movements and looming crises threatening to upset their region, most leaders of the Arab world have enjoyed remarkably long tenures. Hosni Mubarak’s 28 years in power in Egypt are dwarfed by Muammar Qadhafi’s forty in Libya and the Saud dynasty has ruled the better part of the Arabian peninsula for 82 years. Indeed, it appears that these regimes have either become extremely effective at parrying challenges to their authority or the threats to their rule are not as menacing as they are often portrayed. While the existence of vast, overlapping security apparatuses in each of these countries points to the veracity of the first explanation for regime longevity, there is also an element of truth to the idea that some threats to these regimes are manufactured. The ‘Shia crescent’ bogeyman—introduced in 2004 by King Abdullah of Jordan, one of the Sunni leaders ostensibly most threatened by it—is one such embellishment of dangers to Sunni Arab regimes. This accusation, echoed in muted terms by Saudi officials, was explicitly reiterated by Hosni Mubarak in 2006 when he claimed that Shia are loyal to Iran wherever they live. The notion of a ‘Shia crescent’ fails as an explanation of the role and intentions of Shia leaders in Arab politics. Reidar Visser demonstrates in the preceding article that the Iraqi Shia clergy is, in fact, a willing participant in the existing state system because the status quo fulfills the clergy’s goals better than direct intervention in political affairs or collusion with Iran. However, that the threat of a Shia uprising does not correspond with political reality does not deprive the allegation of its utility as a political tool. The aforementioned Sunni leaders warn of Shia intentions to strengthen their hold on political power vis-à-vis both their citizens and the international community. An enemy whose members share a deeply rooted, hostile ideology and span state borders is a compelling reason to prefer the existing power structure to the regime change desired by some average citizens and more outspoken advocates of the Bush ‘Freedom Agenda’. Ironically, Sunni leaders offer the ‘Shia crescent’ accusation for the same reason that the Iraqi Shia clergy does not attempt to directly insert itself into politics—the stability of the region’s existing state system is in the interest of both parties. However, this convergence of tactical preference does not equate to a goal shared by Sunni political leaders and Shia clerics. Whereas Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issues carefully worded statements [End Page 21] supporting the existing system to maintain his influence as a supranational, pan-Shia leader, the political leaders of the Sunni Arab world make oblique references to a Shia threat to give relevance and legitimacy to their rule. Sunni Arab leaders’ need to shore up their respective images is acute: garnering popular legitimacy—especially in an age where notions of democracy and capitalist economic development raise the expectations of citizens of the developing world—is no easy task for bloated, autocratic regimes. This work is especially difficult when one’s notion of economic liberalization primarily entails awarding monopolies to relatives and clients, as is often the case in the Arab world. Arab nationalism as professed by heads of state—beginning with Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser and continuing in some form until the present—has been a remarkably effective tool for deferring the Arab masses’ expectations of greater material well being and democratic reform. In spite of the 1960 breakup of the United Arab Republic, the crushing Israeli defeat of a combined Arab force in 1967, and Saddam Hussein’s assault on a fellow Sunni Arab state in 1991, championing Arab nationalism was one of the primary methods of publicly justifying the rule of several of the Arab autocracies. In fact, the second article of the Egyptian constitution still lists unification of all Arab polities as an explicit goal of the Egyptian state. But a key ingredient in the Arab nationalist veneer is the claim of participation in the resistance against foreign influences, in general, and the Zionist one, in particular. When the leaders of...

The Interpretation of the 1929 Treaty and its Legal Relevance and Implications for the Stability of the Region

Abstract

Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War

In the historiography of the 1967 War, the common reading is to portray it as an "inadvertent war." Using recently declassified documents, this article offers an alternative interpretation. In critically examining existing master plan theories, it is shown that the United Arab Republic's (UAR) military actions were limited in size and were without aggressive intentions. The Israeli decision to strike was taken not for military reasons but rather to prevent a diplomatic solution which might have entailed disadvantages for the Israeli side.

Israel's nuclear option: behind the scenes diplomacy between Dimona and Washington

Introduction - Neutralism in Retrospect: Definitions and Paradigms Syrias Road to Independence: The Emergence of Pragmatic/Calculative Nationalist Neutralism The Rise of 'Anti-Western Neutralism' in Post-Mandatory Syria Neutralism in Practice: Syria and the Consolidation of the Arab-Asian Group Communism, Syria, and Neutralist Trends Syrias Rival Schools of Neutralism and the Road to Union Nasserite 'Positive Neutralism' and the United Arab Republic Conclusion - The Rise of the Neo-Bath and the Gradual Demise of Neutralism Appendix - Modes of Practised Arab Neutralism Index.

Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U. S.-Israel Alliance (review)

Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle and Making of U.S.-Israel Alliance, by Warren Bass. A Council on Foreign Relations Book. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 336 pp. $30.00. The United States and Israel have had a fascinating and complicated special relationship extending over decades about which numerous authors (including this reviewer) have written extensively. Generally relatively brief tenure of administration has been overlooked by most students of Middle because of its limited effect on regional developments. Warren Bass, a senior fellow in U.S. foreign policy and Middle studies at Council on Foreign Relations, has examined administration and its role in region, focusing on relationship between United States and Israel, in an effort rectify that oversight. He argues that set precedents that continue to shape America's encounter with the-Middle East (book cover). He concludes: Kennedy was first American president make a major arms sale Israel, last president push hard stop Israel from getting atomic bomb, and last president reach out greatest champion of Arab nationalism, Egypt's Jamal Abd al-Nasser (book cover). Bass points out that one could call Israel an American ally by end of Kennedy's administration and, while this is overstated, it certainly marked an important point on that path. Bass overstates a claim, on page 3, that Kennedy's was the pivotal presidency in U.S.-Israel and, on page 14, asserts that Kennedy's policies stand as foundation of U.S.-Israeli alliance. The inauguration of administration in 1960 suggested possibility of change in U.S. Middle policy. There were no precise conceptions concerning appropriate course of American policy and changes that needed be made. The administration also did not seek a comprehensive resolution Arab-Israeli conflict but rather various smaller steps move in direction of a solution. To a significant degree major policy lines were determined by existing programs and approaches, but John F. seemed develop a new style that had its effect on U.S. position in Arab world and with regard Israel. launched a more activist foreign policy than that of Eisenhower. sought establish a dialogue with Arab leaders and improve climate of relations by reiteration of past policy in support of U.N. resolutions and use of American influence help establish a just and peaceful solution Arab-Israeli dispute. The tenure was also marked by a belief that peace in area was dependent on a balance of military power between Israel and Arabs, and in September 1962, United States agreed sell Israel missiles as a defense against jet aircraft supplied United Arab Republic by Soviet Union and also against potential threat of Egypt's missiles. The administration was first sell Israel modern weapons with Hawk missile defense sale. Bass suggests that Hawk precedent remains perhaps most under-appreciated milestone in U.S.-Israel relationship. This is and remains a period and subject often overlooked by students of Arab-Israeli conflict. Bass has helped correct that omission by providing a glimpse into diplomacy and politics of early 1960s utilizing new archives and recently released documents. He has provided us with insights into personalities and their diplomacy, a feel for diplomacy, and an understanding of relationship between United States and Israel and between senior players on both sides. He has put together some useful stories which are well written and dramatic in nature. …

Syria and the doctrine of Arab neutralism: from independence to dependence

Introduction - Neutralism in Retrospect: Definitions and Paradigms Syria's Road to Independence: The Emergence of Pragmatic/Calculative Nationalist Neutralism The Rise of 'Anti-Western Neutralism' in Post-Mandatory Syria Neutralism in Practice: Syria and the Consolidation of the Arab-Asian Group Communism, Syria, and Neutralist Trends Syria's Rival Schools of Neutralism and the Road to Union Nasserite 'Positive Neutralism' and the United Arab Republic Conclusion - The Rise of the Neo-Ba'th and the Gradual Demise of Neutralism Appendix - Modes of Practised Arab Neutralism Index.