Abstract
Explanations for the Nixon administration's policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict have generally concentrated on US relations with the United Arab Republic and Israel, which are portrayed as the focal points of American strategy in the region. This article argues that the fate of the moderate Arab states, particularly Jordan and Lebanon, also played an important role in motivating the State Department's two major diplomatic initiatives during 1969–70, the Rogers Plan and Rogers Initiative, as well as US diplomatic considerations after the September 1970 civil war in Jordan. US mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict was at least in part intended to ease pressures on the governments of these countries. For this reason, these initiatives should be considered counter-revolutionary.
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