Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence

T n HE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) has the reputation of being the most successful indigenously produced regional organization in the developing world.' Much of that reputation is attributable to ASEAN's apparent internal cohesion and international effectiveness. In the post-cold war era, ASEAN hopes to build on its success by shaping the emerging security relations of the Asia-Pacific through new mechanisms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, ASEAN's influence on Southeast Asia's regional security environment during the cold war was both more nuanced than is commonly recognized and dependent on a set of unique circumstances. ASEAN's experiences with regional security in the cold war are not readily transferred to the post-cold war era. This paper is a discussion and evaluation of ASEAN's efforts to manage its regional security environment (i.e., to affect the actors and events shaping security in Southeast Asia). The main argument of this paper is that ASEAN's ability to manage regional security in Southeast Asia has been, and is, limited by two factors: one, the interests and actions of the great powers, which have defined the parameters of ASEAN's security policies; and two, divergent security perceptions and interests within ASEAN, which have defined the limits of intraorganizational cooperation and made it difficult to evaluate the significance of ASEAN's stated security objectives. ASEAN has improved relations between its member states, but these achievements are contingent on its success as a larger regional actor. The ASEAN member states remain mostly motivated by narrow understandings of their self-interests, which are not always congruent and can undermine ASEAN's unity and ability to function effectively. ASEAN's present efforts to incorporate Vietnam, Burma, Laos and, eventually, Cambodia, may exacerbate this problem. This paper is broken into five sections. After a brief historical overview, I review ASEAN's stated regional security objectives and the political and

Introduction The end of the Cold War and the settlement of the Cambodian conflict opened a new chapter in the development of ASEAN-China relations. Four key characteristics distinguish ASEAN-China ties in the post-Cold War era from that of the preceding period. The first feature is the disappearance of the ideological barriers that eventually paved the way for the restoration or establishment of diplomatic ties between China and all ASEAN states by 1991. The second characteristic is the importance of economic links that have created both convergent and divergent interests for the two sides. The third feature is the salience of the Spratly territorial disputes in shaping the ASEAN-China interactions. The final--equally important but less noted feature--is the gradual emergence of multilateralism as a mode of diplomatic interaction between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the ASEAN countries. Throughout the Cold War period, China's interactions with ASEAN states were conducted solely on a bilateral basis. No institutionalized linkage was formally forged between China and the regional organization. Viewed in this light, the attendance by the then Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the opening session of the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on July 1991 as a guest of Malaysia was an important event for Sino-ASEAN relations. This was followed by China's presence in the ASEAN meeting in its capacity as the group's consultative partner in 1992, as well as its attendance at the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. Together, these events marked the beginning of the multilateral process between China and the ASEAN states. (1) It must be noted that Beijing's move to involve itself in ASEAN activities since the early 1990s was part of the country's good-neighbourliness policy [mulin zhengce] that aimed at strengthening its ties with the neighbouring countries in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, rather than a flesh orientation in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. Bilateralism remained the principal thrust of China's policy towards Southeast Asian countries. However, as a range of multi-level and multi-sector cooperation mechanisms developed one after another largely by ASEAN's initiative throughout the 1990s-notably but not exhaustively, the creations of ARF in 1994, the China-ASEAN senior official political consultation in 1995, as well as the ASEAN-China and ASEAN Plus Three (APT, i.e. ASEAN plus China, Japan and Korea) Summits in 1997--China's increasingly active involvement in these multilateral forums has considerably shaped the dynamics of its ASEAN policy. At the turn of the new century, multilateral diplomacy has become an important component of China's ASEAN policy in the eyes of many analysts (Thayer 2001; Roy 2002). While China's involvement in these regional multilateral institutions has not been an overlooked phenomenon, it is nonetheless an understudied field of inquiry. To date, there is no major scholarly work that attempts to examine the dynamics of China's participation in these regional multilateral institutions in a systematic manner. Although there are a number of important writings on China's involvement in the ARF (Foot 1998; Johnston 1999 and 2003; Pan 1999), studies on China's participation in the APT and the ASEAN-China cooperation (also known as the ASEAN-China dialogue, hereafter ACC) remain sparse in the literature. (2) This is surprising, considering that China's ASEAN policy is not only implemented through and affected by its participation in the ARF, but also involves other regional institutions particularly ACC and APT. Moreover, the fact that from the mid-1990s until early 2003 China's policy towards these three institutions had been managed by the same division within the Chinese Foreign Ministry's apparatus (namely the Division for Regional Cooperation of the Asian Department), strongly reflects the intertwined nature of these institutions for Chinese policymakers. …

This article explores why the People's Republic of China employed a surprisingly soft and lenient policy toward Japan in the 1950s despite their historical and political animosities. Relying on a relatively new concept in the study of international relations, I argue that China's conciliatory policy toward Japan represented a wedge strategy that was designed to detach Japan from the United States and weaken the US-Japan alliance. The logic of the theory also reveals that China's policy was in line with its against the United States during the Cold War. KEYWORDS: China-Japan relations, China's foreign policy in the 1950s, Cold War history, wedge strategy, US-Japan alliance.THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) EMPLOYED A SURPRISINGLY soft and lenient policy toward Japan in the 1950s despite the two countries' historical and political animosities. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Chinese people suffered Japan's military aggression in Manchuria, viewing Japan as China's main enemy. After the PRC was established in 1949, Japan continued to be in the enemy camp as the Cold War structure placed the two Asian states on opposing ideological sides. Japan signed a peace treaty with Taiwan, acknowledging the victory of the Republic of China in the Sino-Japanese war, and recognized the government of Taipei rather than the PRC. Nevertheless, China emphasized cultural links and sought to expand economic relations and political contacts with Japan. What explains China's approach toward Japan in the 1950s?Relying on a relatively new concept of wedge strategies developed by Timothy Crawford and Yasuhiro Izumikawa, I argue that China's overture toward Japan used those strategies to detach Japan from the United States and weaken the US-Japan alliance. The logic of wedge theory reveals that this policy was in line with China's strategy to deal with the United States during the Cold War.This article is organized as follows. First, I discuss how major schools of thought in international relations predict China's behavior and why their explanations are deficient. Next, I delve into key theoretical arguments about wedge strategies and explain why China is a significant case study. Then, I explain why China's policy toward Japan in the 1950s should be regarded as a wedge strategy by looking at the intent and origin of China's united front strategy. I explore the range of China's wedge strategies toward Japan and evaluate their effectiveness by looking at the US reaction. Finally, I examine some implications that the China case study can offer for the theory of wedge strategies.Major Schools of Thought and China's Friendly Approach Toward JapanChina's conciliatory policy toward Japan in the 1950s differs from what the major international relations theories might have predicted. Balance-of-power theory has difficulty in explaining why China tried to improve bilateral relations with Japan at that time. The theory assumes that states seek internal military mobilization or external alliance partners to confront others with considerable economic and military strength. China's foreign policy in the 1950s was clearly designed with the preponderant US military capability and the US alliance system in East Asia in mind. It is not surprising that the PRC, with dire economic conditions and a poorly equipped military force, chose to lean to one side, allying with the Soviet Union against the United States rather than opting for neutrality (Zagoria 1962; Gittings 1972; Yahuda 1978; Shen and Li 2011 ).1 The balance-of-power argument would predict that China would also confront Japan, given that Tokyo was a significant alliance partner for Washington. Instead, China sought to restore bilateral relations with Japan as early as 1952 when the Korean War was going on and US bases in Japan were crucial to the US war effort (Barnett 1977).The balance-of-threat theory has similar problems in offering explanations (Walt 1990). …

As long as foreignness is concerned, it usually refers to northern ones in Chinese history. It’s true that relations between China and southern states were much more peaceful, and therefore, often called less attention. However, ASEAN has made efforts and progress for several decades, especially during the post-Cold War Era. Nowadays, ASEAN has become an important actor in furthering the security in the Asia-Pacific area by showing its collective power and offering a dialogue platform. In comparison with the past Southeast Asia of being colonized and being under the pressure of the US and the USSR outside and the insurgencies inside, it is definitely different on ASEAN’s condition. All states care about the security affairs, especially China. China has transferred to develop its economic from starting the “Reform and Openness”. But China still didn’t get foreign trust historically, and couldn’t make them feel secure realistically. As a result, China had to make changes to improve the relations with them more actively that it could emergence to be a great power. China and AEAN, both international actors in the Asia-Pacific area progressive economically and concerned security affairs, have reasons to cooperate with each other and at last, they built up the strategic partnership in 2003. And it is significant that Southeast Asia suffered from economic crisis in 1997 and 1998 striking the economies heavily and further ASEAN to cooperate with China. It is really a great chance for China to improve their relation and, moreover, make ASEAN more dependent upon it so that China would lead Southeast Asia and put its “Peaceful Emergence” strategy into practice in the future. In fact, ASEAN realized it, but it still avoidably chose to come to China because of the need of recovery. The reaction between the biggest developing nation in the world and international institution in East Asia not only concern both part but also make other big power nervous. Hence, it is important to observe how China and ASEAN operate in their strategic advantage and how it changes to understand and predict the balance of power in Asia Pacific. Whether China will complete the “Peaceful Emergence” (Peaceful Development) strategy or blocked by any big power else? Whether ASEAN will become more and more dependant on China and even being controlled in recovering through China’s help? This document focuses on their reactions and if they make it.

From the point of view of modern geopolitics, China lies at the crossroad between world marine geographical strategic region and Eurasia continental geographical strategic region. The unique strategic position protrudes that China can exert an important influence on the two great strategic regions, and that its security environment is tied to the big powers relationship of the regions at the same time. In addition, in the 20th century only, China had military conflicts with the USA, Soviet Union, Japan, India, Vietnam, South Korea and Taiwan within or near China’s territory; it implies that a war could most likely be taken place within the Chinese territory, but not overseas. Since Deng Xiaoping, the second generation of leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, headed the administration, China’s national policies have significantly been changed: while they insisted the course toward a “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” they realized the importance of “peace” and “development” in solving the problems among “East-West” and “South-North” relations, they re-established their foreign policy following the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence”, and they actively expanded their foreign relations with neighboring countries, especially with the ASEAN countries. It is based on two considerations that China seeks to improve and develop a peaceful and steady relationship with the surrounding countries: for the needs of their own economic development, and for strategic purpose. The ASEAN countries have sensitive and contradictive psychology: on one hand, they are afraid China will be like a magnet siphoning away all of the foreign capitals from the ASEAN countries, and on the other hand, they expect a large Chinese market urgently. Based on the “Good Neighboring Principle”, China has successfully signed a couple of protocols with the ASEAN countries in recent years, including the “Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China,” the ”Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”, “The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia” and the “Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity”. These protocols have not only effectively reduced the negative impression of “China Threat” and the qualm of the neighboring countries to China’s emerging, but also provided enormous opportunities and interests for the neighboring countries through economic cooperation. The trends and results of the close relations between China and the ASEAN will inevitably generate great impact on the strategic interests of the United States in the Asian-Pacific area, on Japan’s and India’s seeking for big powers in political and economic arena, and furthermore on the more complicated and uncertain situation in east Asia in the post-Cold War era. The Document Analysis will be used in this thesis to explore the strategic meaning of China’s “Good-Neighboring Principle”, in view of traditional realism and Neo-realism theories, to find out the importance and outcome of the principle in the course of “Peaceful Emerging” of China, and to empirically describe the achievement of the Chinese Communist Party regime, after having abandoned the dogmatic ideology and adapted a practical and realistic approach to achieve the goal of peaceful emerging.

It seems that the current relationship between the European Union (EU) and Asia is at a turning point. During the Cold War era, the status gap between the European Community [(EC), formerly European Economic Community (EEC)] and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was quite large. In fact, the EC was considered a highly institutionalised and developed region, while ASEAN was considered an association of developing countries; however, in the post-Cold War era, the status of Asia compared to that of Europe has significantly risen. The establishment of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 among heads of states as “equal partners” is a striking example. In addition, ASEAN will have a community in place by the end of 2015, while Europe has struggled from its sovereign debt crisis to such an extent that it has shown its eagerness to learn even from Asian countries. Finally, the EU is now expected to play a role as a “soft power” ally with ASEAN. Based on multiple archives (French, German, and EC archives), this article retraces the course of EC/EU-ASEAN relations from the origins of ASEAN until the establishment of the Joint Study Group (JSG) of 1975, considered as a formal institutionalisation of EC–ASEAN relations, although informal dialogue between the EC and ASEAN began in 1972. This article aims to clarify why and how this formal institutionalisation occurred. In June 1975, the regional organisations established the JSG between the European Commission and the ASEAN member states. The JSG can be interpreted as a precursor to the EEC-ASEAN co-operation agreement signed in 1980, in that this event is in certain times considered as a “turning point.” EC/EU-ASEAN relations have been widely discussed. The existing research derives mainly from political scientists. Most early research has stressed ASEAN as a “stepping stone” to the “Asia-Pacific” region; in other words, an economic valuation of ASEAN is offered as the reason why the EC deepened its relationship with ASEAN. Later studies have underlined ASEAN’s value as a reliable partner to break an impasse in the North-South negotiations; however, existing literature ignores a strategic aspect. This article establishes the decisive strategic reason for the EC to have chosen a formal relation with ASEAN: to establish a substantial presence in a region where US presence declined after the Vietnam War. This viewpoint is especially supported by Sir Christopher Soames, British Vice-President of the European Commission and commissioner for external relations. Focusing on this strategic aspect and based on the method of diplomatic history, this article also tries to analyse the impact of international contexts such as the Asian Cold War and North-South affairs on the EC’s decision-making process.

If we had to choose one word to describe the relationship between China and the Southeast Asian states, it would be “asymmetric.” China’s population is 2.2 times the combined population of the ten countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).1 Its GDP is 4.3 times these countries’ combined GDP,2 while its 2017 military expenditure was almost 6 times the amount they spent collectively.3 Some scholars like to use the metaphor of Gulliver and the Lilliputians to compare China and the ASEAN states in world politics.4 The hope is that the Lilliputians can somehow tie up Gulliver if they work together. In the post–Cold War era, the ASEAN states successfully constrained China’s behavior through multilateral institutions, especially the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). After the 2008 global financial crisis, China’s assertive diplomacy in the South China Sea indeed caused some worries and suspicions in the region. However, the overall relationship between China and the ASEAN states has not fundamentally changed. Since 2013, China has continued its “charm offensive” to woo the ASEAN states with the proposal of the Maritime Silk Road—a massive infrastructure investment project that is part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). On the one hand, Chinese investments, especially in the infrastructure sector, are largely welcomed in Southeast Asia despite some ups and downs, such as Malaysia’s [End Page 17] cancelation of two BRI-funded projects. The ASEAN states have, on the other hand, kept a nuanced and balanced attitude toward U.S. competition with China. I argue that a relationship of strategic interdependence has taken shape between China and the ASEAN states. Each side views the other as an indispensable actor in pursuing its strategic interests. Although the power asymmetry between China and the ASEAN states makes the latter more vulnerable than the former, the U.S. factor increases the sensitivity of China’s strategic dependence on ASEAN. Multilateral institutions have played a vital role in shaping Chinese-ASEAN relations. The more institutionalized relationship will empower both parties to reduce vulnerability and sensitivity levels in their nascent strategic interdependence in the future.

The international relations of Southeast Asia has traditionally been determined by external powers. During the Cold War until the conclusion of the Second Indochina War in 1975, the United States had overwhelming influence on the ASEAN states. Between 1975 and 1989, ASEAN achieved greater accommodation with China to address Thai security concerns. Since 1989, ASEAN has been relatively free of external power entanglements. Preliminary evidence from the past indicates a generally favourable appraisal of the United States and Japan and a more cautious attitude towards China. ASEAN's new latitude in managing its own affairs is complicated by its membership expansion and internal disagreements. However, ASEAN's manifest desire is that the major external powers will provide a favourable regional environment for peace and development. Introduction External powers have traditionally determined the contours and context of international relations in Southeast Asia. The earliest influences, until the sixteenth century, derived from China and India. However, beginning from the sixteenth century and especially after the eighteenth century, European colonial powers began to actively extend their empires into Southeast Asia. The only country that retained its sovereign status in the region was Thailand. [1] European influence on Southeast Asian international relations evaporated rapidly after World War II and the Japanese Occupation of the region from 1942 to 1945. The pressures of domestic independence movements, military engagements, and the crystallization of states as the primary political units in world affairs led to the breakup of colonial empires. The process began with the Philippines in 1946 as part of the first wave of decolonization and ended with the Geneva Accords of 1954 which partitioned Vietnam into two halves. [2] The second wave brought independence to the Malay Archipelago -- the Federation of Malaya in 1957, which was expanded to the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Singapore separated from Malaysia in 1965, and Brunei was the last state to become independent in 1984. The process of decolonization dovetailed with the onset of the Cold War. Accordingly, Southeast Asia operated as a sub-system of broader global structural arrangements for most of the period from the 1960s to the 1980s. [3] Given the overwhelming influence of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during this period, the region's destiny was understandably intertwined with and determined by these and, to some extent, other extra-regional powers. In this regard, both Southeast Asia as a region and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an organization have been relatively free of overwhelming external influences for only the last decade. This article examines the relationship between ASEAN and three major extra-regional powers -- China, Japan, and the United States. Two caveats are necessary at the outset. The first of these is that whereas Southeast Asia is a region comprising ten sovereign states, ASEAN is only an organization in which all ten states have collective membership. In this regard, the region is, to all intents and purposes, much larger, both philosophically and in terms of its major attributes, than ASEAN. Accordingly, the two units should not be used interchangeably. In this regard, ASEAN is but one of many international fora available to regional countries to create and utilize opportunities, ensure greater collaboration and calibration of policies, achieve and enhance familiarity and accommodation, and serve as a vehicle for extra-regional representations. The second caveat pertains to the treatment of ASEAN as a unitary corporate entity. It should be noted that insofar as collaboration and co-ordination is concerned, there are often significant differences or disagreements between the policy positions of individual member countries. Collective pronouncements are therefore often premised on the lowest common denominator principle, given ASEAN's consensual decision-making model. …

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been hailed as one of the more successful regional organisations in the developing world, credited for maintaining regional peace and stabilit...

The attempt by Severino (2011) to cover the width and depth of the intriguing integration process in Southeast Asia over four decades merits serious attention. One can hardly disagree with the comprehensive description and crispy analysis by Severino, a former Secretary General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Nevertheless, it will be useful to revisit some of the highlights and issues. ASEAN is unique. It was born in the heat of the Cold War driven primarily by security concerns emanating from communist threats. ASEAN was so loosely structured that the acronym was interpreted by some to read as "Ad-hoc Strategic Entity of Ambiguous Nature." Ambiguity turned out to be a virtue as it provided the flexibility, the absence of which the regional body might have aborted. ASEAN was wise enough to go for "consensus" by focusing on issues that would unite its members and steering away from contentious areas that would break up the fragile entity at the initial stage. From its inception in 1967 until the Bali Summit in 1976, ASEAN was seemingly dormant, but the hindsight shows that the first decade was not wasted, as it provided the space for its members to bury their hatchets and build confidence, trust, and understanding so that they could move on. The Bali Summit was a major milestone for ASEAN as it marked the end of the beginning and the dawn of a new era of economic cooperation, albeit on an extremely modest scale. The subsequent story was just one of "learning by doing" without any blueprint or road map, as manifested by the cumbersome "item-by-item" trade liberalization and clumsy industrial cooperation based on five mega projects. ASEAN had apparently put the cart before the horse by identifying the projects and the locations followed by feasibility studies. The projects were understandably shunned by the private sector. Lessons learned from this episode led ASEAN policymakers to work more closely with market forces. ASEAN was more successful in its external relations with major powers and trading partners, thanks mainly to the Cold War. The external support that ASEAN had received in its infancy was due not to its bargaining strengths but its inherent weaknesses and the importance the developed countries had attached to the region in geopolitical terms. The end of the Cold War was a rude awakening for ASEAN which had to reinvent itself to stay relevant not only for the rest of the world but also for its own sake. Consequently, the 1990s turned out to be very challenging. Understandably, ASEAN has largely been reactive, not proactive. It is commendable that ASEAN could respond to these challenges in a positive way by widening and deepening the regional integration, as demonstrated by the expansion of ASEAN from six to ten and the bold integration initiatives, which included ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), and the ASEAN Charter. It is also remarkable that these processes gathered momentum despite the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis. The latter was a blessing in disguise as it underscored the need for regional arrangements. All is not well in ASEAN. It is doubtful if AEC will come to fruition by 2015 as planned. Community building calls for a single identity and a common destiny based on convergence of values and dreams, but there is still too much national pride and sovereignty. Business people tend to look at the region differently from policymakers. Things that seem too sacred to the latter in terms of national sovereignty are often seen as no more than obstacles by the former. The weakest link in the chain relates to the shallowness of financial integration. ASEAN has a long way to go before there can be meaningful macroeconomic policy consultation, cooperation, and collaboration, especially with respect to monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate management. ASEAN is too small to make a global impact: it is less than half of the size of China in terms of both population and purchasing power. The extensions through ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit do help, but the centrality of ASEAN in the mosaic of concentric circles cannot be taken for granted. There are already signs that the center of gravity in East Asia is shifting from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia. The huge development gap in ASEAN is also a cause for concern. The new members need a lot more help than what the older ones have provided thus far. In fact, the ASEAN efforts at reducing the intraregional development disparity pale miserably in comparison with the extraregional contributions. There is a need for a greater pooling and sharing of resources within ASEAN to close this gap. Finally, a reference must be made to the leadership crisis in ASEAN. Indonesia under Soeharto did play the "big brother" role in ASEAN. It is now obvious that there is a leadership vacuum which no member country is willing or able to fill. Indonesia is preoccupied with setting its own house in order. Thailand has no gumption in the face of domestic political turmoil. Singapore is too small to take the lead. Malaysia does not have the oomph or the charisma.

Southeast Asian states revised their strategic horizons during 1993 through an ASEAN-inspired initiative arising from the impact of the end of the Cold War. That development occurred, however, without a corresponding revision in eco nomic horizons; nor was there any evident reconsideration of domestic politi cal orders, which were in general strengthened. During the Cold War, Southeast Asia and Indochina in particular had been coupled to international contention, which was inherent in the global balance of power. It was for this reason that Southeast Asia was described at one time as the Balkans of the Orient in an analogy with the condition of southeast Eu rope before the outbreak of World War I. With the end of the Cold War, global rivalry has ceased to exist in the same way as a point of reference for regional relations. This has been demonstrated with the end of the Cambodian conflict as a major international problem. The states of Southeast Asia now inhabit a different strategic environment but not a fundamentally different international society, which is distinguished still by the absence of a common government able to enforce law and order. Furthermore, as a result of the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asia has begun to be called into question as a coherent category through which to address prob lems of regional security. A growing interdependence in security matters be tween Southeast and East Asia in particular has been perceived and registered by regional states. At issue, however, is the significance of a novel development in extended multilateral security dialogue joining Southeast and East Asia, in spired during the year by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Does that development indicate a genuine structural adjustment to a new stra tegic horizon or is it little more than a tinkering with the form of existing re gional security arrangements? Apart from involvement in vestigial security arrangements, which are both a legacy of colonialism and the Cold War, provision for either collective de fence or collective security has not been undertaken on an exclusive basis by regional states. ASEAN, which repudiated military pacts from the outset, has established a limited regional security system based on a formula of conflict

The balance between national security and economic interests at play in the United Kingdom’s ‘China policy’ has significantly evolved in the post-Cold War era. As the first recipient of Chinese foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Europe but also a close ally of the United States, the United Kingdom has faced difficult trade-offs in formulating its policy towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This chapter investigates how London has responded to China’s growing foothold in the United Kingdom through increased FDIs and the supply of advanced telecoms equipment for the digital infrastructure. It will be shown that Chinese inroads into these strategic sectors in the 2010s—and British policymakers’ perception thereof—have been a key driver of change in the United Kingdom’s ‘China policy’. In particular, heightened threat perceptions, coupled with increasingly competitive economic relations with the PRC, have caused the United Kingdom to recalibrate the national security and economic interests at stake in its ‘China policy’ and to harden its stance towards Beijing. To corroborate this argument, the first two sections examine two key drivers of the United Kingdom’s ‘China policy’, namely the shifting British economic interests with China—including the Chinese economic imprint in the national infrastructure and in the telecoms sector—and London’s threat assessment of the PRC. The subsequent two sections show how changing economic interests and threat perceptions have, in turn, caused the United Kingdom to recalibrate its policy goals and to strengthen the policy instruments leveraged to achieve such goals. The chapter also discusses the consequences of Brexit for the United Kingdom’s ‘China policy’ and for its cooperation with other European powers.

This article explores the impact of the Spratly Islands dispute on security relations between China and Southeast Asia after the Cold War. It is argued that the dispute reflects and promotes the emergence of a regional order combining deterrence with consultation and limited co-operation. The balance of power between China, Southeast Asia, and the United States promotes the emergence of a structure of deterrence. Within this structure, the approaches of China and Southeast Asia to diplomacy and international law allow for the development of a regional dialogue and a code of conduct based on consultation and co-operation on non-controversial issues. Consequently, the seeds of an order are emerging in the South China Sea that combines the extremes of deterrence and co-operation. Introduction The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea are located at the intersection of the security spheres of China and Southeast Asia. As such, the dispute between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei over this area is not merely a difference of opinion on rights to territory and maritime space. It brings to the fore incompatibilities between the practices China and the countries of Southeast Asia normally employ to ensure peace and stability in their regional environment. The implications of this dispute for the development of mechanisms of deterrence and co-operation between China and the countries of Southeast Asia have tended to be overlooked in the scholarly debate. The Spratly dispute is treated as a peripheral, yet potentially explosive, aspect of Sino--Southeast Asian relations. It is regarded as a product rather than a determinant of their security practices. [1] The Spratlys have been a sore point in the relationship between China and the Southeast Asian claimant states for decades . The dispute oscillates between conflict and co-operation without reaching the stage of crisis or resolution. [2] This protracted stalemate suggests that the dispute is at the fringes of the security agendas of China and Southeast Asia, compared with more pressing security concerns such as the regional financial crisis of the late 1990s and the Taiwan problem. At the same time, the nationalist overtones inherent in the justifications of territorial and maritime claims, coupled with a continuous military build-up in the Spratly area, suggests that the dispute will at some point wreak havoc on peace in the South China Sea. The problem with the dominant approaches to the study of the Spratly dispute is the tendency to overlook the fact that, in the 1990s, it has turned into an arena where the compatibility of the security practices of China and Southeast Asia were tested. During the Cold War, Chinese security policies were directed against the subregional environment of Northeast Asia. By contrast, most of the countries of Southeast Asia formulated their security outlook within the confines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, the increasing importance of the maritime resources of the South China Sea, and the allowances for extensive maritime zones in international law, have made China and Southeast Asia increasingly important variables in each other's security equations. This article argues that the Spratly dispute has profound implications for regional peace and stability because it promotes the development of a new order in the South China Sea between China and the Southeast Asian states. [3] By bringing representatives of contending security practices together around an issue of conflict, the Spratly dispute has changed the security practices of China and Southeast Asia. The dispute highlights differences in the approach of the two entities to the balance of power, diplomacy, and international law. As the contending parties attempt to find solutions to the problems coming to the fore, the seeds of a new order emerge, representing a compromise between the security practices employed by China and Southeast Asia. …

The 1990s has proven to be a decade of great change for the members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The beginning of the 1990s brought fears that ASEAN would be unable to adjust to the new post-Cold War era. In 1989 the then Foreign Minister of Singapore, Wong Kan Seng warned, ‘the continued relevance of the organisation, post-Cambodia, cannot be taken for granted’, and that ASEAN would need ‘new rallying points or risk drifting apart to the detriment of regional cooperation and bilateral relationships’.1 The combination of weapons procurements by the ASEAN members; the thawing of territorial disputes frozen during the Cold War; the emergence of China as a regional hegemon; and the prevalence of ethnic tensions throughout the region, all indicated that Southeast Asia was entering a period of uncertainty at best and rising tension at worst. Yet prior to the economic crisis of the late 1990s ASEAN was touted as a success story. The association had not only managed to avoid drifting apart, but with the accession of Vietnam in 1995, Burma and Laos in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999 its membership increased to include all the states of Southeast Asia — the goal of an ASEAN-Ten has been achieved.KeywordsEthnic ConflictASEAN MemberSpiral ModelASEAN Regional ForumSecurity RegimeThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Situated at the geographic and cultural crossroads of China and India, Southeast Asia has historically attracted the attention of larger powers and has been a site for several experiments in self-determination, regional autonomy, and order building. The region has featured prominently in global processes past and present: from colonial rule in its various Euro-American and Japanese permutations, and decolonization in revolutionary and neo-colonial stripes, to the three Indochina Wars that spanned the arc of the Global Cold War, and a new era of Sino-US Great Power competition. These historical experiences inform the themes that structure the academic study of Southeast Asia’s international relations. These include: the foreign policies of the regions’ states vis-à-vis one another and the outside world, the involvements of the Great Powers, and diplomatic projects spearheaded by Southeast Asian elites to express their vision for regional order. A conspicuous feature of the International Relations (IR) scholarship on Southeast Asia is the dominance of often apolitical and indeed depoliticizing “regionalism studies” centered on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—the region’s most enduring project in multilateral diplomacy created during the Cold War. Notwithstanding its significance, the focus on ASEAN and regionalism has been arguably excessive. It has led to a fixation with narrow theoretical debates centered on ASEAN and has stymied a wider exploration of the region’s international politics drawing on area studies, international history, foreign policy analysis, and political sociology which would shine the spotlight on how colonialism, race, gender, class, emotions, populism, trade, political parties, interest groups, state-society relations etc. have shaped the regions international politics. Indeed, some of the more exciting new scholarship on the international relations of Southeast has been emerging in other disciplines and fields, namely, Cold War international history, comparative politics, and new currents in IR inspired by political sociology and microsociology. This article outlines these new literatures with a view to open the study of international relations in Southeast Asia in historical, theoretical, and substantive terms. This essay is divided into nine sections. Following General Overviews, the section Colonial Legacies looks to the colonial period to understand patterns of class and identity formation that have structured contemporary fault lines in regional relations. Decolonization, Cold War, and the Emergence of a Southeast Asian International System foregrounds how Cold War international pressures internationalized decolonization struggles and shaped the birth (and splintering) of Southeast Asia’s post-colonial international system. The Indochina Wars highlights the pitched “hot” battles of the Cold War that unfolded in Southeast Asia, most famously as the three Indochina Wars. Diplomacy: From SEATO and Bandung to ASEAN examines the diverse diplomatic responses by Southeast Asian elites—including Bandung and ASEAN—in crafting a preferred vision for regional order. Foreign Policy surveys some of the key works in the genre of foreign policy analyses of Southeast Asia’s major states. Southeast Asian Security in the Era of United States-China Rivalry examines a body of conceptually innovative literature on how the region’s small and middle powers have responded to the escalating post–Cold War rivalry between the United States and China. In the First Image: Biographies and Memoirs foregrounds the large but underutilized genre of biography and memoir on Southeast Asia’s diplomatic players, a resource that could be better integrated with emerging “first-image” studies in IR. The final section identifies some of the major journals and platforms for online commentary that serve the study of Southeast Asia’s international politics.