Aristotle's Treatment Research Articles

On certain philosophical-scholastic aspects of the doctrine of the Eucharist in the anonymous treatise on the Mass (manuscript München, BSB, Cgm 89)

The existing representation of juxtaposition of the religious literature of the late Middle Ages and contemporary to it university philosophy requires clarification. It is particularly difficult to draw this boundary in texts of the tradition of the so-called "German mysticism". This question is discussed on the basis of the German-language work “The Mystical Treatise on the Mass and Its Effects in the Loving Soul” (Mystischer Traktat über die Messe und ihre Wirkungen in der minnenden Seele). The treatise has survived in several manuscripts of the late Middle Ages, the earliest of which is the manuscript Cgm 89 (BSB, München, near 1375). The conducted historical-philosophical analysis of the selected passages of the anonymous treatise on the Mass indicates the presence of complex combination of stylistically diverse fragments consisting of rearrangement of topoi that belong to both scholastic and religious literature of the late Middle Ages. In enunciation of the doctrine of the Eucharist, the author of the treatise resorts to metaphorical language, description of personal experience of the church sacrament. At the same time, the text identifies the references to Aristotle's treatise "On the Soul" used by the author as the philosophical foundation to describe the process of connecting the soul to God. The conclusion is made that the anonymous treatise on the Mass testifies inappropriateness of rigid juxtaposition of the traditions of religious literature and scholastic philosophy, which still can be encountered in the overall description of the Medieval intellectual culture.

"POETICS" OF ARISTOTLE IN RUSSIAN TRANSLATIONS

The article presents an overview of the existing translations of Aristotle's “Poetics”, characterizes the features of each of them. In the preface to his translation of Aristotle's “Poetics”, V. Zakharov characterized the work of the Greek philosopher as a “dark text.” Each translation of this treatise, which forms the basis of European and world literary theory, is also its interpretation, an attempt to interpret the “dark places.” The first Russian translation of “Poetics” was made by B. Ordynsky and published in 1854, however, the Russian reader was familiar with the contents of the treatise through translations into European languages and its expositions in Russian. For instance, in the “Dictionary of Ancient and New Poetry” Ostolopov sets out the Aristotelian theory of drama and certain other aspects of “Poetics” very close to the original text. Ordynsky translated the first 18 chapters of “Poetics”, focusing on the theory of tragedy. The translator presented his interpretation of Aristotle’s concept in an extensive preface, commentaries and a lengthy “Statement.” This translation set off a critical analysis by Chernyshevsky, and influenced his dissertation “Aesthetic relations of art to reality”, in which the author polemicizes with the aesthetics of German romanticism. In 1885 V. Zakharov published the first complete Russian translation of “Poetics”, in which he offered his own interpretation of Aristotle's teaching on language and epic. The author of this translation returns to the terminology of romantic aesthetics, therefore the translation itself is outside the main line of perception of the teachings of Aristotle by domestic literary theory, which is clearly manifested in the translations of V. G. Appelrot (1893), N. N. Novosadsky (1927) and M. L. Gasparov (1978). The subject of discussion in these translations was the interpretation of the notions of μῦϑος and παθος, the concepts of mimesis and catharsis, the source of suffering and the tragic, the possibility of modernizing terminology. An important milestone in the perception and assimilation of Aristotle's treatise by Russian literary criticism was its translation by A. F. Losev, which was not published, but was used by the author in his theoretical works and in criticizing other interpretations of “Poetics”. M. M. Pozdnev penned one of the last translations of “Poetics” (2008). The translator does not seek to preserve the peculiarities of the original style and interprets “Poetics” within the framework and terms of modern literary theory, focusing on its English translations. The main subject of the translator's reflection is Aristotle's understanding of the essence and phenomenon of poetic art. Translations of the Greek philosopher's treatise reflect the history of the formation and development of the domestic theory of literature, its main topics and terminological apparatus.

Human Capital Concept Evolution in the Context of Scientific Knowledge Stages Dynamics

The article studies the human capital concept genesis and development in the context of philosophical and scientific knowledge dynamics. Society transformation to the post-industrial stage of social development led to the foundation of human capital theoretical conception. The relevance of the paper was dictated by the increasing human capital volume in the structure of modern social reproduction. The theoretical and methodological bases of the research are philosophical treatises of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, T. Hobbes; political economy classics works by W. Petty, J. S. Mill, A. Smith, K. Marx; ideas analysis by F. Taylor, H. Ford, J. Minser, T. Schultz, G. Becker and others; articles by Russian and Belarusian economists like R. M. Nureev, Yu. V. Latov, R. I. Kapelyushnikov, M. M. Kovalev, E. G. Gospodarik. The empirical base is World Bank reports, human development reports of the UN. Analysis of literature revealed insufficient interest in human capital in the philosophical knowledge field, despite the fact that the concept related to axiological and existential aspects of human existence. The purpose of the paper was to perform philosophical and methodological research of the human capital concept, and identification of human capital status in post-industrial society resources structure. Historical and philosophical reconstruction methods, principles of systemic and transdisciplinary approaches were used to achieve the goal. The relationship between stages of social-economic society development and resources dematerialization was revealed. Four development stages of the human capital concept in the paradigm of science dynamics by V. S. Stepin were highlighted. The ambivalent status of the concept in scientific knowledge and public consciousness was substantiated. The significant resource potential of human capital at the post-industrial stage of society development was revealed.

Justice Speaks: Nemesis, Nature, and Common Law in Aristotle's Rhetoric

AbstractThis essay explores Aristotle's treatment of the passion of nemesis or “righteous indignation” in his Rhetoric and its relevance to contemporary displays of passion in democratic political orders. It does so by considering Aristotle's perplexing definition of nemesis in relation to two other passions, pity and envy, as well as its significance to his discussion of common law (a transpolitical standard of justice according to nature), which he presents through allusions to Sophocles's Antigone. Aristotle's discussion sheds light on the way in which nemesis, which is aroused in relation to the concern for justice, necessarily takes into consideration questions of moral worth that liberal democratic regimes attempt to relegate to the private sphere.

Reading and Rebellion in Catholic Germany, 1770–1914

Reading and Rebellion in Catholic Germany, 1770–1914

Рыбы, живущие в земле Аристотель. О дыхании 9, 475b 10-11

Many translators and commentators of Aristotle's treatise On respiration are puzzled by his statement at De resp. 9, 475b 10-11 that “most fishes live in the earth … and are found by digging” (τῶν ἰχθύων οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν ἐν τῇ γῇ). Indeed, this phrase seems to contradict not only common sense, but also Aristotle’s own words in the History of animals and other biological treatises, that aquatic animals, like fishes who take in water for cooling, cannot survive for a long time outside their native element. The paper shows that the replacement of the expression “most fishes” (οἱ πολλοὶ) by “many fishes” (πολλοὶ) proposed by W. Ogle and D. Ross does not solve the problem, since the few rare species of the land fish reported by Theophrastus in the treatise On creatures that live on dry land can hardly be called “many fishes”. In my opinion, the reason why the Aristotelian text is so puzzling is a misunderstanding of the expression ἐν τῇ γῇ. Although Ogle and Ross believe this to mean "on dry land", Aristotle may have in mind the mud and sand on the seabed. According to the philosopher, most fish do periodically bury themselves in mud at the bottom of the sea or rivers, thus maintaining the balance of heat and cold necessary for their life. Therefore, I affirm that the text of Aristotle does not need to be corrected.

ЛЕОНАРДО БРУНИ И ГЕОРГИЙ ТРАПЕЗУНДСКИЙ О СТРАТЕГИЯХ ПЕРЕВОДА ДРЕВНЕГРЕЧЕСКИХ АВТОРОВ

The paper addresses one of the episodes in the history of the early Renaissance polemic about the theory and practice of translation, namely, the views on the goals and methods of translation as presented in Leonardo Bruni’s treatise De interpretatione recta and in the writings of one of the most talented and prolific translators of the time, George of Trebizond. Although the basic principles of translation which guided both authors dated back to the Antiquity, their views on the medieval practice of literal translation are rather different: while Bruni believed that medieval translators “distorted and mutilated” the works of ancient authors, George considered their methods to be the most suitable for the translation of “scholarly” writings (such as treatises of Aristotle and other philosophers).

Life and Mind: Varieties of Neo-Aristotelianism: Naive, Sophisticated, Hegelian

AbstractIn his treatment of subjective mind, Hegel argues that the development that characterizes the vital process of a human individual is logically unique in that it dissolves the contradiction between two logical determinations that characterize any vital activity: the contradiction between the ‘immediate singularity’ of the subject of this process and its ‘abstract generality’. Hegel employs the term Bildung to characterize any vital activity that has this form. The idea that the distinction between human life and non-human life is a logical distinction is one of the main lessons that Hegel thinks we should learn from Aristotle's treatment of the idea of life. In this article I distinguish between two contemporary varieties of this Aristotelian idea: a sophisticated variety that emphasizes the idea of second nature in order to characterize the distinctiveness of the human, and a naive variety that thinks of the human's uniqueness in terms of characterizations that already belong to its first nature. I argue that Hegel is neither sophisticated nor naive but offers a third variety of Neo-Aristotelianism that solves the difficulties of the other two. This has decisive consequences for his understanding of Bildung. Although the notion of Bildung describes an empirical process, Hegel argues, it is not an empirical concept. Rather, it is the concrete concept of the process of actualization that characterizes a self-conscious form of life that reflects the inner temporality of this form's actuality.

Sweet and Lowdown: Woody Allen's Cinema of Regret

Sweet and Lowdown: Woody Allen's Cinema of Regret

Rhetoric and Power: The Drama of Classical Greece

Rhetoric and Power: The Drama of Classical Greece

GALIEN, AL-RĀZĪ, ET L’ÉTERNITÉ DU MONDE. LES FRAGMENTS DU TRAITÉ SUR LA DÉMONSTRATION, IV, DANS LES DOUTES SUR GALIEN

AbstractThis article aims to reconstruct part of Book IV of Galen's lost treatise On Demonstration. This reconstruction is based on testimonies transmitted by Abū Bakr al-Rāzī (d. 925) in the Doubts About Galen, as well as on a source that until now has never been studied, namely the Solution to the Doubts About Galen of Abū al-ʿAlāʾ ibn Zuhr (d. 1131). This paper argues that, in Book IV, Galen maintains that no one can reach any certain conclusion regarding the eternity of the world, and that he consequently criticizes Aristotle's treatment of the subject in On the Heavens. Galen approves only of one of the arguments used by Aristotle in On the Heavens I, 3 (270b12–17), because it is based on empirical evidence. Al-Rāzī focuses on Galen's commentary on this passage. Our hypothesized reconstruction resolves some of the contradictions between the fragments of Book IV that are transmitted in al-Rāzī's report and Philoponus’ Against Proclus On the Eternity of the World. Finally, this article shows that al-Rāzī's interest in this passage from On Demonstration can be explained with reference to his own philosophical-theological goals. As my examination will make clear, al-Rāzī objects to Galen's arguments because he considers that Galen's teleology is based on a framework where the world is eternal (although Galen does not state this view explicitly), and that this framework does not allow Galen to understand that theodicy is prior to both cosmology and biology.

Aristotle on Like-partedness and the Like-parted Bodies.

This paper offers an interpretation of Aristotle's treatment of the homoeomerous, or like-parted, bodies. I argue that they are liable to be far more complexly structured than is commonly supposed. While Aristotelian homoeomers have no intrinsic macrostructural properties, they are, in an important class of cases, essentially marked by the presence and absence of microstructural ones. As I show, these microstructural properties allow Aristotle to neatly demarcate the non-elemental homoeomers from the elements. That demarcation, in turn, helps to clarify Aristotle's conceptions of both homoeomery and what it is to be a bodily element. On Aristotle's account, I argue, a homoeomerous body, as such, is divisible into at least one part that is the same specific kind as the whole. Elemental bodies are the limiting case. For Aristotle, an elemental body is only divisible into parts that are of the same specific kind as the whole.

ThePoeticsfrom Athens to al-Andalus: Ibn Rushd’s Grounds for Comparison

The Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics by the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd (d. 1198) has been treated by commentators as wide-ranging as Borges, Renan, and Kilito as an exemplary case of the failure of translation. Critics who presume Ibn Rushd's failure often concentrate on his rendering of Aristotle's tragedy and comedy by praise (madīh) and blame (hijā’). Taking account of Ibn Rushd's stated intention of using Aristotle‘s Poetics to facilitate comparative literary analysis, I argue here that far from representing a failure of comprehension, the rendering of tragedy and comedy as praise and blame respectively offered the Arabic philosopher a useful means of conceiving literary form outside the confines of a single literary tradition. Contrary to recent arguments in contemporary translation theory, Ibn Rushd's methodical appropriation of Aristotle's treatise suggests that at certain cultural junctures pursuing the path of fluency and localization can accomplish more than literalist foreignization.

‘Living Well’ vs Neoliberal Social Welfare

As a disabled activist, I much prefer Aristotle's concept of ‘eu zen’, or ‘living well’ to that of ‘well-being’. ‘Eu zen’ is part of Aristotle's treatise on ‘eudaimonia’, which Grayling describes as: ‘…. a strong and satisfying sense of well-being and well-doing, of flourishing as only a rational and feeling human individual can flourish when his life and relationships are good’ (emphasis added). Aristotle's concepts are preferable because they promote ‘well-being’ through familial, social and civic activity, whilst recognising that such activity requires resources, both human and material. These concepts are akin to those advocated by disabled people within the ‘independent living movement’; i.e. that the individual's ‘choice’, ‘control’, ‘dignity’ and ‘freedom’, over their lives and lifestyles, are supported by an inclusive community. However, both sets of principles are now being undermined by neoliberal managerial social work practice, which not only deny basic human rights which underpin ‘eu zen’, but lead to fear and a sense of ‘commodification’ or de-personalisation among disabled recipients. Relevant examples will come from experience, both personal as well as that from other disabled people.

The Fragment of Al-Kindī's Lost Treatise on Observations of Halley's Comet in A.D. 837

1. IntroductionIn the first half of the ninth century, a generation of Muslim scholars emerged under the support of the Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad, among whom the great polymath al-Kindl stands tall. There is an astrological work written by him (on the duration of the reign of the Arabs), in which he mentions an uprising in a.d. 866, and so he must have died later than that date,' most likely around 870. He started his work under al-Ma'mun (reigned 813-833) but served mostly under the caliphate of al-MuTasim (reigned 833-842), during which his career reached to its peak.2 Since he was still alive in the late 860s and most likely an active scholar around 830, he probably was bom about 800.3The most important feature of al-Kindl's wider historical context is that he worked during the translation movement that was encouraged by the Abbasid Caliphs.4 Al-Kindl's scientific works had a two-fold influence on the development of the sciences in the early stage of the Islamic period: they expounded the newly translated Greek texts, and then promoted them by discussing their authenticity.Ibn al-Nadlmin his al-fihrist devotes several sections to al-Kindl's scientific works, such as arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy, meteorology, and spherics.5 The list of Al-KindT's meteorological works includes two lost treatises, entitled His treatise on what was observed of the great atmospheric phenomenon in 222 a.h. (Kitab risalatih fima rasada min al-athar al-cazim fisanat ithnatayn wa cishnn wa mi 'atayn li- 'l-hijra) and His treatise on a comet that appeared and [al-Kindl] observed it for some days until it faded out (Kitab risalatih fi kawkab alladhi zahara wa rasadahu ayyaman hatta idmahalla).6The title of the first treatise indicates that it concerns al-Kindl's observation of an 'atmospheric' phenomenon that appeared in 222 a.h./a.d. 837 and which we can probably identify as a comet.7 Rada supposes that this would have been al-Kindl's treatise on observations of Halley's Comet which appeared in that year.8 In this article, I will demonstrate that this conjecture is definitely correct. Moreover, it is quite possible that the second treatise was associated with the same topic.9Recently, I came across a treatise entitled Nayazik,'0 during my research into a collection of manuscript images from Princeton University Library. This treatise is said to be an Arabic commentary on Aristotle's lost treatise on comets, written by Hunayn ibn Ishaq al-clbadl from the ninth century.12 Hunayn, who was contemporary to al-Kindl, translated numerous Greek scientific texts into Arabic.13 However, Hunayn's commentary on Aristotle's treatise has not come down directly to us in the original form although a recension (with later additions) is currently at our disposal. Much of the text concerns the implications of for judicial astrology.14 The recension was certainly written after 299 a.h./a.d. 912 (see below), and as a whole it still awaits a detailed study. However, there is a passage in it dealing with al-Kindfs observational report of a comet that appeared in 222 a.h7a.d. 837.15 This passage (with some hiatuses) also appears in another treatise regarding prognosis of entitled 'The gift of sages on description of the prognosis of comets (Tuhfat al-albab fibayan hukm al-adhnab) written by al-Maqdisiwho lived c. 1675, probably in Cairo.16 Further research shows that the report is very likely a summary or a fragment of al-Kindfs lost treatise on observations of Halley's Comet in a.d. 837 (see below).17 Only one other description of Halley's Comet's appearance in 837 has previously been known from Islamic sources, to be found in the voluminous History of Ibn al-Athlr; this has been examined by Rada and Cook.18The return of Halley's Comet in a.d. 837 marks its closest known approach to Earth and has been among the closest ones for any comet ever seen in history. It was also the most thoroughly documented account of Halley's Comet during the first millennium. …

Internal Needs, Endoxa and the Truth: An Aristotelian Approach to the Popular Screenplay

Robert McKee, in his widely-esteemed screenwriting manual, Story , speaks of storytelling in general, and the screenplay in particular, as 'the creative demonstration of truth.' But what could it mean to think of the screenplay as a 'demonstration,' that is, as an argument? In this article I explore this question, taking my cue from McKee's own description of screenplay narrative as 'dramatized dialectical debate.' McKee's reference to dialectic suggests a connection to the dialectical inquiries in Aristotle's major treatises, especially the dialectical inquiry into the nature of human happiness found in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics . I argue for an analogy between this dialectical inquiry in Aristotle's ethics, and the dialectical trajectory of popular screenplays. Such an analogy helps us understand how films do work as kinds of argument, arguments that aim at the truth of what it means for human beings to achieve their good.

Aristotle on Sounds

In this paper I consider two related issues raised by Aristotle's treatment of hearing and sounds. The first concerns the kinds of changes Aristotle takes to occur, in both perceptual medium and sense organs, when a perceiver hears a sounding object. The second issue concerns Aristotle's views on the nature and location of the proper objects of auditory perception. I argue that Aristotle's views on these topics are not what they have sometimes been taken to be, and that when rightly understood they compare favourably in many respects with leading contemporary accounts.

On the Term “Dunamis” in Aristotle's Definition of Rhetoric

The term dunamis, by which Aristotle defines rhetoric in the first chapter of The Art of Rhetoric, is a “power” term, as its various meanings in Aristotle’s corpus—from vernacular ones like “political influence” to strictly philosophical ones like “potentiality”—attest.1 In the Rhetoric, however, dunamis is usually translated as “ability” or “faculty,” a designation that, compared to other terms that describe persuasion in ancient Greek poetics and rhetoric (such as “bia” [“force”] or “eros” [“seduction”]), marks rhetoric as a neutral human capacity rather than the use of language entangled in the vagaries of violence and desire.2 John Kirby calls Aristotle’s definition “one of the boldest moves in the history of the philosophy of language: to redefine rhetoric, not as the use of peitho but as the study of peitho” (1990, 227). The presumption of rhetoric’s ethical neutrality implied by dunamis has indeed become commonplace in interpretations of Aristotle’s treatise itself and of rhetoric as a social phenomenon. As George Kennedy puts it in his authoritative translation of the Rhetoric, “Aristotle was the first person to recognize clearly that rhetoric as an art of communication was morally neutral, that it could be used either for good or ill” (1991, ix). In this article, I would like to probe another, perhaps not so reassuring, implication of dunamis as a term for rhetoric—that as “an ability to see all available means of persuasion,” it does not need to become (or emulate) practical oratory. In what follows, I suggest that Aristotle’s terminology, however neutral it may appear, constitutes an intellectually and politically motivated act of naming that severs rhetorical knowledge from historically specific rhetorical practices and thereby erects a protective barrier between practical rationality and discourses of democracy.

IL PARALLELISMO ARISTOTELICO TRA RAGIONAMENTO PRATICO E RAGIONAMENTO TEORETICO

Central topics pertaining to the current debate in the philosophy of action concern the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning, and the nature of a conclusion in a process of reasoning. In this debate the reference to the Aristotelian reflection is recurrent. In four passages from his works, that is MA. 7, 701a7-b1, EN. H 5, 1147a24-31, EE. B 11, 1227b23-33 and EN. Г 5, 1112bl1-24, Aristotle explores some important aspects of practical reasoning making a parallel with the logical structures of theoretical reasoning. In particular he finds specific analogies between practical and theoretical syllogism, practical and theoretical necessity, deliberation and analysis, action and demonstration. In spite of its specifications, the activity of reason shows its unity. Aristotle considers and deepens the constitutive ingredients of theoretical reasoning in the contest of practical philosophy. The comparison between practical and theoretical reasoning has consequently an expositive purpose, because it supports Aristotle's treatment of action theory.

Hegel and Religion: Avoiding Double Truth, Twice

When I was first studying Hegel, I encountered quite divergent readings of his views on religion. The teacher who first presented Hegel to me was a Jesuit, Quentin Lauer at Fordham University, who read Hegel as a Christian theologian providing a better metaphysical system for understanding the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. When I studied at Yale University, Kenley Dove read Hegel as the first thoroughly atheistic philosopher who presented the conditions of thought without reference to any foundational absolute being. Meanwhile, also at Yale, John Findlay read us a deeply Neo-Platonic Hegel who taught about absolute forms held in a cosmic mind. In giving my own reading, I want to talkabout the ways Hegel redefines both metaphysics and religion. I would like to approach these issues by way of the medieval controversy over double truth, which was a previous conflict between religion and science.In the thirteenth century, Aristotle's scientific and philosophical texts were becoming available in European universities from the Muslims in Spain. These texts offered a well-argued, systematic, and more comprehensive scientific view of the universe and its god. Reading Aristotle, people quickly realised that his ideas contradicted some Christian (and Muslim) doctrines. For example, Aristotle argued that the world could not have had a beginning in time, while the religious revelations told of a first moment of divine creation. Aristotle's obscure treatment of the active intellect seemed to argue that there was no individual immortal soul, while the revelations spoke of individual survival after death. And Aristotle's god, the totally self-absorbed first mover, the pure actuality, seemed useless for religious purposes.