The Argument ofthe Natural History Mark Webb In the NaturalHistoryofReligion Hume claims there are two principal questions concerning religion: one "concerning its foundation in reason," and the other "concerning its origin in human nature." He forthrightly states that his concern here is to determine "[w]hat those principles are, which give rise to the original belief, and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation."1 That is to say, his express intentis, via an empirically based study, to determine and elucidate the causal or natural origin of religion—its beliefs and practices. These are among his first remarks. Consider now his very last remarks: The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result ofour most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species ofsuperstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions ofphilosophy. (NHR 4:363) These last remarks should strike one as enigmatic: for, given that his purported aim is to offer a naturalistic account ofwhy humans hold religious beliefs, it is strange that he should be content to end in mystery—particularly sosince theworkitselfonersaplausible account ofsuch origins. Still, even ifHume should have felt the project to have failed, what does that have to do with "suspense of judgment," "quarrelling superstitions," and especially his "happy escape"? But of course he is up to much more in the Natural History than he lets on. Indeed,he offersnotonly acausal accountofreligiousbeliefbutamoral critique ofitas well. Why shouldhe doboth in the same work? I suggest that the causal account and the moral critique are intimately connected; and that the work is first and foremost a moral critique intended to sever allegiance to "traditional religion"—traditional theism in general, and Christianityin particular. One aim ofthis paper Volume XVII Number 2 141 MARKWEBB is to offer a unified reading of the Natural History, while the other is to assess the cogency ofHume's project on this reading. To this end we should first situate the Natural History among Hume's other works. It follows the firstEnquiry which addresses inter alia the credibility of "revealed" religion (particularly section 10, "Of Miracles"), and the second Enquiry which advances a naturalistically based morality. It was completed about the time he began the Dialogues, the main contention ofwhich is that natural theology offers minimal if any support for most traditional religious claims. In the Natural History, then, it is reasonable to suppose he is assuming the cogency of his claims against revealed religion, the viability of a naturalistically based morality, and the utter inability of natural theology to ground either traditional religious tenets or morality. The Dialogues in particular illuminate Hume's thought: after concluding that a posteriori arguments offer absolutely no grounds for ascribing the traditional moral attributes to the Deity, Philo goes on to counter Cleanthes' claim—that "[r]eligion, however corrupted, is still better than noreligion atall"2—bycontendingthattraditional religion simply is unessential andeven harmful to the needs ofsociety. Hume advances his causal account because he believes both that traditional religion lacks any basis in reason, and that recourse to a supernatural origin is untenable. And it will become evident in the course of this paper that the Natural History is most accurately understood against the backdrop of his moral theory as expounded in the second Enquiry—indeed the former is an exercise in applied ethics. The Strategy ofthe Natural History The sceptical tone ofmany ofits passages should strike one as out of place. For the scepticism is directed not towards providing a causal account of the origin ofreligious beliefs and practices (the purported aim), but rather towards their plausibility. Yet one might well expect such passages if Hume is assuming that religion has no tenable basis in reason nor for its revelational claims, and that he intends the work to be more than merely a natural history—as indeed he does. Speaking of polytheism and the...