A theistic proof of perfection

Abstract

The pinnacle of traditional theism is its claim that God is " tha t than which no greater can be conceived". As it has come to be interpreted in recent times, this is understood as the claim that God is a greatest possible, or maximally perfect, being? Now, this characterization of God has been thought by some to be the loftiest reMization of truth ever vouchsafed to human minds. I t has been seen by others, standing in the tradition of Hume, to be nothing more that the ultimate expression of the most obsequious human proclivity for fa tuous f lat tery and appeasement. Theists themselves are sometimes a bit ambivalent about the concept of divine perfection. Is the ascription of perfection to God anything more than, in McTaggart 's memorable phrase, "a piece of theological etiquette"? Is it a superadded bit of what Matthew Arnold called "over-belief"? Or on the contrary, can it be seen as a natural capstone to independent theistic convictions, an idea in which the theistic metaphysical vision culminates? In this short essay, I want to a t tempt to show how a number of metaphysical beliefs together can entail that God is a greatest, even the greatest possible being, beliefs which severally can be independently plausible to theists who may otherwise feel uncertain about the explicit claim of maximal perfection for God. I shall do this by laying out a simpl~ deductive argument whose premises will be the metaphysical claims which can be independently plausible to theists of a traditional bent, and whose conclusion will be the claim of perfection for God. Each premise will be briefly commented upon.