Swinburne on natural evil from natural processes

Abstract

Richard Swinburne has argued that the existence of natural evil is compatible with the existence of God as defined in traditional theism. At the core of that definition is the idea of God as the omniscient, omnipotent, morally perfect, benevolent, worshipful designer-creator of the universe. In particular Swinburne has argued that natural evil is necessary for human beings to develop moral responsibility and maturity. Among natural evils he is especially interested in the pain and suffering resulting from the operation of natural processes, henceforth NENP (natural evil from natural processes). In regard to that very common class of natural evils, Swinburne's argument is that, in a God-made world, NENP is logically necessary for human beings to become morally mature and to be able to choose their own destinies.1 If he is right about this he will have established that natural evil is logically necessary in a God-made world, and thereby he will have succeeded in proving that natural evil is compatible with the existence of God. In this paper I will argue that Swinburne fails to justify the existence of NENP in a God-made universe. I will do this by showing that moral maturity and choice of destiny are possible without any NENP whatsoever. If I am right, the just-sketched chain of inferences will be broken and Swinburne's position on God and natural evil defeated.