Traditional Moral Theories Research Articles

Moral Status and Intelligent Robots

AbstractThe great technological achievements in the recent past regarding artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, and computer science make it very likely, according to many experts in the field, that we will see the advent of intelligent and autonomous robots that either match or supersede human capabilities in the midterm (within the next 50 years) or long term (within the next 100–300 years). Accordingly, this article has two main goals. First, we discuss some of the problems related to ascribing moral status to intelligent robots, and we examine three philosophical approaches—the Kantian approach, the relational approach, and the indirect duties approach—that are currently used in machine ethics to determine the moral status of intelligent robots. Second, we seek to raise broader awareness among moral philosophers of the important debates in machine ethics that will eventually affect how we conceive of key concepts and approaches in ethics and moral philosophy. The effects of intelligent and autonomous robots on our traditional ethical and moral theories and concepts will be substantial and will force us to revise and reconsider many established understandings. Therefore, it is essential to turn attention to debates over machine ethics now so that we can be better prepared to respond to the opportunities and challenges of the future.

Integrated Moral Agency and the Practical Phenomenon of Moral Diversity

The practical phenomenon of moral diversity is a central feature of many contemporary societies and poses a distinct problem to moral theory building. Because of its goal to settle the moral question fully and exclusively and/or to provide better understanding of moral disagreement, traditional first-order moral theory often does not provide sufficient guidance to address this phenomenon and moral agency in deeply morally diverse societies. In this article, I move beyond traditional first-order moral theorizing and, based on multilevel social contract theory (Moehler 2018, 2020a), develop a practically sound notion of moral agency for morally diverse societies. The interrelational and dynamic notion of integrated moral agency developed in this article demands that agents actively exercise their rational and affective capacities, are receptive to the capacities of others, and are aware of the type of moral interaction in which they engage with others. The notion of integrated moral agency helps agents to reconcile conflicting first-order moral directives and to maximally protect agents’ autonomy in morally diverse societies.

The Normative Implications of Recent Empirical Neuroethics Research on Moral Intuitions

Empirical neuroethics models have always had normative ambitions. Older models (e.g., dual process) attempted to debunk traditional moral theories, whereas newer models (e.g., ADC model) attempt to fit their empirical and normative claims with them. The issue of normative significance as it pertains to the use of social science methodology on moral intuitions remains open. This paper analyzes the Is/Ought gap and the empirical underpinnings of influential constructivist approaches in order to argue that the normative ambitions of empirical neuroethics models are not necessarily always misguided. The author clarifies how legitimate normative implications can be dissociated from overreaches and argues that moral intuitions could be used as the factual basis for ethics by employing the distinction between natural facts, social facts, and social constructs. Ultimately, morality can be fruitfully studied and informed by natural and social sciences and, thorough ethical reflection, ought also to inform empirical research.

Autonomous Reboot: Kant, the categorical imperative, and contemporary challenges for machine ethicists

Ryan Tonkens (2009) has issued a seemingly impossible challenge, to articulate a comprehensive ethical framework within which artificial moral agents (AMAs) satisfy a Kantian inspired recipe—"rational" and "free"—while also satisfying perceived prerogatives of machine ethicists to facilitate the creation of AMAs that are perfectly and not merely reliably ethical. This series of papers meets this challenge by landscaping traditional moral theory in resolution of a comprehensive account of moral agency. The first paper established the challenge and set out autonomy in Aristotelian terms. The present paper interprets Kantian moral theory on the basis of the preceding introduction, argues contra Tonkens that an engineer does not violate the categorical imperative in creating Kantian AMAs, and proposes that a Kantian AMA is not only a possible goal for Machine ethics research, but a necessary one.

Autonomous reboot: Aristotle, autonomy and the ends of machine ethics

Tonkens (Mind Mach, 19, 3, 421–438, 2009) has issued a seemingly impossible challenge, to articulate a comprehensive ethical framework within which artificial moral agents (AMAs) satisfy a Kantian inspired recipe—"rational" and "free"—while also satisfying perceived prerogatives of machine ethicists to facilitate the creation of AMAs that are perfectly and not merely reliably ethical. Challenges for machine ethicists have also been presented by Anthony Beavers and Wendell Wallach. Beavers pushes for the reinvention of traditional ethics to avoid "ethical nihilism" due to the reduction of morality to mechanical causation. Wallach pushes for redoubled efforts toward a comprehensive account of ethics to guide machine ethicists on the issue of artificial moral agency. Options, thus, present themselves: reinterpret traditional ethics in a way that affords a comprehensive account of moral agency inclusive of both artificial and natural agents, or give up on the possibility and “muddle through” regardless. This series of papers pursues the first option, meets Tonkens' "challenge" and pursues Wallach's ends through Beavers’ proposed means, by "landscaping" traditional moral theory in resolution of a comprehensive account of moral agency. This first paper sets out the challenge and establishes the tradition that Kant had inherited from Aristotle, briefly entertains an Aristotelian AMA, fields objections, and ends with unanswered questions. The next paper in this series responds to the challenge in Kantian terms, and argues that a Kantian AMA is not only a possibility for Machine ethics research, but a necessary one.

Beyond the Moral Influence Theory? A Critical Examination of Vargas\u2019s Agency Cultivation Model of Responsibility

This paper repudiates Manuel Vargas’s attempt to supplant the traditional moral influence theory of responsibility (MIT) with his ‘agency cultivation model’ (ACM). By focusing on fostering responsiveness to moral considerations, ACM purports to avoid the chief pitfalls of MIT. However, I contend that ACM is far less distinctive than it initially appears and so possesses all of MIT’s defects. I also assail Vargas’s counterfactual test for assessing whether a wrongdoer can respond to moral considerations. It is argued that the counterfactual test is epistemically redundant because it can only be fleshed out once we have settled the issues it is supposed to resolve. Moreover, it tacitly inverts the relation between freedom and responsibility—we cannot attribute free will to wrongdoers unless we have already established their blameworthiness. The upshot of this is that enquiries into an agent’s freedom are irrelevant to the ethics of holding her responsible.

The Paci-Feminist Ethic of Virginia Woolf and Malala Yousafzai: Rhetorics of Care and Justice in the Face of Tyranny

The Paci-Feminist Ethic of Virginia Woolf and Malala Yousafzai: Rhetorics of Care and Justice in the Face of Tyranny Hillary Coenen (bio) In August of 1940, the United States had yet to enter the Second World War, and Virginia Woolf wrote the widely circulated “Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid” in part to advise Americans on their approach to the war. Many of Woolf’s works address issues of peace and women’s rights, as does this one. The brief entreaty was written for a symposium addressing “current matters concerning women” (Woolf, “Thoughts” 243). Less than one month after writing the piece, Woolf’s London home was destroyed by a bomb during the London Blitz, and the address was never delivered to the American symposium. Just days before the address was published in The New Republic, Woolf witnessed the bombing and destruction of Tavistock Square, a significant local landmark. “Thoughts on Peace in an Air Raid” is an essay inseparable from its time. Over seventy years later, in a notable 2013 interview with Jon Stewart of the Daily Show, Malala1 Yousafzai made her first appearance on a major late-night news program. There she described her experience of being threatened and attacked by the Taliban, and she shared why she took on what she knew to be the dangerous task of advocating for girls’ education. The interview occurred three months after she delivered a highly publicized speech at the United Nations General Assembly on what was her 16th birthday, and a year after she was shot in the head by a Taliban gunman for her advocacy of the rights of women and girls. Both Woolf’s undelivered (but later published) address and Malala’s interview represent public assertions that highlight how investing in education for women and girls can promote peace and justice while resisting violence. Rejection of violence has a long history in feminist scholarship and literature, and this theme has often been linked to care as a value that informs feminine ethics. In philosophy, care as an ethical and moral value has often been contrasted with the more traditional (and supposedly masculine) value of justice.2 While feminist scholars have acknowledged that both care and justice are essential values for ethical thinking and decision-making, in recent years feminist scholarship has fully embraced an ethic of care as a guiding principle. With the landmark publication of Jaqueline Royster and Gesa Kirsch’s Feminist Rhetorical Practices: New Horizons for Rhetoric, Composition, and [End Page 139] Literacy Studies (2012), feminist rhetorical studies developed a renewed interest in the connection between feminism and care. Scholars in feminist rhetoric have taken up an “ethos of humility, respect, and care” that Royster and Kirsch claim is essential for excellent feminist inquiry (21). This research stance is consistent with the portrayal of feminist thought that Virginia Held upholds in The Ethics of Care. Held claims that “the ethics of care now has a central, though not exclusive, place in feminist moral theorizing” (28). Held responds to Carol Gilligan’s earlier work that distinguishes a “care perspective” from a “justice perspective.” In that response, Held explains that, although feminists who work within an ethic of care “share the goals of justice and equality,” this approach challenges traditional moral theories, in part because it is feminist (26). Feminists have long been faced with the violence of oppression and tyranny supported by willful ignorance and overt hatred. Appropriate and effective responses to these forces need to balance the need for justice and equity with a need to educate and build empathetic communities. Acknowledging these tensions, a pacifist and feminist response would necessarily incorporate care and justice perspectives, as well as notions of humility and respect. Feminist Rhetorical Practices provides “critical terms of engagement” that guide the rhetorical study of texts and contexts that have traditionally been excluded from the rhetorical canon or that apply non-traditional strategies (21). One of these terms is critical imagination, an approach that prompts us to rethink “what is there and not there” (20). Drawing from Jaqueline Royster’s Traces of a Stream, Royster and Kirsch explain that critical imagination involves “account[ing] for what we ‘know’ by...

The Importance of Being Modest

The Importance of Being Modest Nilanjan Das (bio) Vrinda Dalmiya's Caring to Know is a rich and wide-ranging book. Its aim is to extend the insights of feminist care ethics to analytic virtue epistemology. According to the theory that Dalmiya defends, a good knower possesses certain intellectual virtues that are conductive to caring interpersonal encounters. Dalmiya argues that the Sanskrit epic Mahābhārata gives us the resources to construct this conception of a good knower. At a number of places in the book Dalmiya claims that her approach to the Mahābhārata is an instance of comparative philosophy: she takes some concepts from contemporary care ethics and analytic virtue epistemology and uses them to make sense of certain portions of the Mahābhārata. But treating the book merely as a work of comparative philosophy would be doing it an injustice. Dalmiya argues that interpreting the Mahābhārata as an epistemological text can help us make progress in some live debates in contemporary epistemology. However, I worry that the project isn't entirely successful in this last respect. In what follows, I explain why this is so. I. The Project Let me begin by laying out the contours of Dalmiya's project. What distinguishes the care-theoretic approach to morality from traditional moral theories is that it presupposes a conception of persons as relational entities, i.e. constituted by a network of social relationships that shape how they think, feel, and act. Since, in the care-theoretic approach, persons are constituted by their relations with particular others, being a good person involves being good toward those particular others. According to this view, then, a morally good person is attentive in her practical deliberation to the needs of particular others who depend on her for their well-being and to whom she therefore is responsible. This is significant: it means that certain patterns of deliberation that are treated as suboptimal by impartialist moral theories turn out to be morally ideal in this view. For instance, the good person may often be guided by her emotional attachments to her loved ones in figuring out what to do. Similarly, she may not always be guided by general moral principles in her decision making; rather, she might carefully weigh the needs of affected persons on a case-by-case basis. The good person, even when she makes the right choice, may not be able to respond adequately to the needs of all those who depend on her. Thus, she will [End Page 870] remain acutely aware of the responsibilities that go inevitably unfulfilled, and thus will be subject to moral uncertainty and feelings of guilt and regret. Dalmiya's aim is to extend this care-theoretic approach to epistemology. In chapter 1, Dalmiya motivates this project. She distinguishes two different ways in which one could pursue a care-centered approach to epistemology. On both these views, care functions as an epistemic virtue, so both views give rise to a form of virtue epistemology. 1. Care as a Virtue of Mechanism. The first approach involves arguing that the practice of caring is itself conducive to gaining knowledge. For instance, a mother who cares for her child might thereby gain some knowledge of her child that she could not otherwise gain. According to this view, care is a virtue of mechanism, that is, a cognitive skill or process, like normal vision, and by this agent one can reliably acquire certain kinds of true beliefs. 2. Care as a Virtue of Character. The second approach involves using the conceptual resources of care ethics to offer a conception of a good knower. Just like a defender of care ethics, a care theorist in epistemology might argue that a good knower adopts caring attitudes toward others: she is attentive to the needs of particular others when she engages in projects of inquiry, and she can be fruitfully guided by her emotions, like anger or empathy, when she is trying to figure out certain truths about the world. Following this line of thinking, care functions not merely as a virtue of mechanism, but also as a virtue of character that guides inquiry in all domains...

О нормативных следствиях одной импликации

The paper treats the “ought implies can” principle as a normative dilemma in relation to epistemic and moral obligations. It shoes that the standard interpretation of this principle as a contraposition is not the only possible one or heuristically interesting. The author draws on the examples of obligations and actions of different types to show how it is possible to shift the focus from the modality of possibility to the modality of obligation. It allows to explain a number of actions not adequately described in traditional moral theory. It also helps to understand the links between moral and epistemic imperatives.

Some Critical Comments on Zimmerman’s Ignorance and Moral Obligation

In his recent book, Michael Zimmerman continues to defend the Prospective View, according to which moral obligation depends on evidence about both empirical and evaluative factors. In my commentary, I shall first focus on Zimmerman’s framework in which different moral theories are defined and distinguished. I argue that Zimmerman fails to formulate a clear and coherent distinction between The Prospective View and the Objective View, which he rejects. Then I turn to the so-called constraint #2, a crucial premise in Zimmerman’s master argument against the Objective View. Here I argue that it should be given up so that we can give the right verdict in cases of fundamental moral uncertainty. More specifically, I shall argue that a morally conscientious agent can rationally choose the option that is guaranteed to be morally wrong in a Jackson-case of fundamental moral uncertainty. Finally, I shall argue that the Prospective View, in its most recent guise – according to which moral obligation depends on empirical and evaluative evidence the agent has actually availed herself of – has very troubling substantive implications that go against all traditional moral theories, as well as an earlier version of Zimmerman’s Prospective View.

Doctrines and Dimensions of Justice: Their Historical Backgrounds and Ideological Underpinnings.

Justice can be approached from many angles in ethical and political debates, including those involving healthcare, biomedical research, and well-being. The main doctrines of justice are liberal egalitarianism, libertarianism, luck egalitarianism, socialism, utilitarianism, capability approach, communitarianism, and care ethics. These can be further elaborated in the light of traditional moral and social theories, values, ideals, and interests, and there are distinct dimensions of justice that are captured better by some tactics than by others. In this article, questions surrounding these matters are approached with the hermeneutic idea of a distinction between "American" and "European" ways of thinking.

Ethics and disasters in the work of Albert Schweitzer

Abstract Traditional ethical frameworks are challenged in disaster settings as they are often too rigorous to be applied to such situations. Nonetheless, the role of moral theories in discussions on disasters should not be dismissed. Indeed, some of the ideas and concepts in traditional ethical frameworks and moral theories may be a source of inspiration in such debates. Therefore, the present paper presents the two main concepts in Albert Schweitzer’s philosophical thinking: the concept of cultural crisis and his understanding of ethics. These concepts form the basis of Schweitzer’s formulation of an ethics of the reverence for life as an answer to the cultural crisis and the need for a new ethics for a modern, humane civilisation. His thinking is reflected through the scope of disaster ethics and its potential to enrich discussions on disaster ethics is critically analysed.

Orthodox rational choice contractarianism

In a recent article, Gauthier (2013) rejects orthodox rational choice contractarianism in favor of a revisionist approach to the social contract that, according to him, justifies his principle of maximin proportionate gain (formerly the principle of minimax relative concession or maximin relative benefit) as a principle of distributive justice. I agree with Gauthier that his principle of maximin proportionate gain cannot be justified by orthodox rational choice contractarianism. I argue, however, that orthodox rational choice contractarianism, before and after Gauthier, is still a viable approach to the social contract, although the scope of this approach is limited. Orthodox rational choice contractarianism can be applied fruitfully to moral philosophy only in situations of deep moral pluralism in which moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning, because the members of society do not share, as assumed by traditional moral theories, a consensus on moral ideals as traditionally conceived as a starting point for the derivation of moral rules but only an overarching end that they aim to reach. If orthodox rational choice contractarianism is applied adequately, then it offers a viable approach to the social contract that, in contrast to Gauthier’s theory, justifies a rival principle for distributive conflicts that is valid for deeply morally pluralistic societies.

Situationism and the Neglect of Negative Moral Education

This paper responds to the recent situationist critique of practical rationality and decision-making. According to that critique, empirical evidence indicates that our choices (1) are governed by morally irrelevant situational factors and not durable character traits, and (2) rarely result from overt rational deliberation. This critique is taken to indicate that popular moral theories in the Western tradition (i.e., virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, and utilitarian ethics) are descriptively deficient, even if normatively plausible or desirable. But we believe that the situationist findings regarding the sources of, or influences over, our moral agency do not reflect durable features of human nature, and claim that these findings are a byproduct of a deficient approach to moral education. Existing models of moral education, which are “positive” in nature, do a poor job of developing virtuous people. Instead, we argue that a “negative” approach to moral education, traceable to Locke, Smith, and Rousseau, would be more successful. This strategy represents something of a compromise between the strategies adopted by thinkers like Rachana Kamtekar (Ethics: Int J Soc, Polit, Leg Phil 114 (3): 458–491 2004), who argues that traditional moral categories escape largely untouched by findings in social psychology, and John Doris (Nous 32(4):504–530 1998) and Gilbert Harman (Bus Ethics Q 13 (1): 87–94 2003), who argue that findings in psychology prove our traditional moral theories are defective.

Who Cares? Care and the Ethical Self

Over three decades ago, Carol Gilligan’s seminal bookIn a Different Voiceprovided feminist theorists with a powerful new approach to address the shortcomings of traditional moral theories. With a focus on concrete situations, an ethics of care can attend to the specifics of moral dilemmas that might otherwise be glossed over. As feminist reflection on moral and political philosophizing has progressed, another challenge has emerged. Recent feminist scholarship proposes non-ideal theories as preferable action-guiding theories. In this paper, I examine Kittay’s call for a version of care ethics as a naturalized ethics that comes from lived experience, in order to draw out the salient characteristics of the caring agent. This allows me to show how Kittay’s key assertion that “we are all some mother’s child” resonates with Ricoeur’s framing of self-esteem, which is, in turn, anchored on a notion of solicitude. Secondly, I make the case that care ethics can benefit from Ricoeur’s little ethics as it helps buttress the goal of good caring practices. Finally, care ethics, with its emphasis on the universality of care needs, helps to strengthen the central role of solicitude for the political sphere.

Relational Selves

The analysis of moral reasoning requires an interdisciplinary approach. Because it is central to moral theory and ethics, it is a basic concern of philosophers; but because it deals with cognition, reasoning, and moral development (and thus, more generally, human development), it is also an important area in psychology. Our paper addresses both of these disciplines as well as intersection of gender and culture by exploring ways that empirical research can help to illuminate philosophical issues about moral reasoning and its relationship to conceptions of self. In a recent lead article for Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan argued that most research in psychology has been carried out on WEIRD subjects; Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic. (1) They assert that enough data exists to call into question generalizing those findings to status of universal psychological knowledge. Saying that Americans are the most individualistic people in world, they point out that Western cultures differ in cognition from non-Western ones. (2) Westerners prefer analytic thought while non-Westerners prefer holistic reasoning, and these differences give rise to different cognitive strategies employed in moral reasoning. In particular, Richard Nisbett also argues for this distinction, bringing empirical evidence to show that two cultures have different approaches to reasoning, and these match their independent and interdependent views of themselves. (3) In addition to these cultural studies, much research has been carried out on gender differences in moral reasoning, and increasingly research has also examined cultural differences specifically in moral thinking. In this paper we explore both parallels and intersections between gender and cultural differences in moral thinking. We bring together work from philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and women's and gender studies to analyze our recent empirical data that demonstrate both gender and cultural differences in moral reasoning, as well as their intersection. We support following claims about culture, moral reasoning, and concepts of self: 1) Concepts of self are tied to approaches to moral reasoning. 2) Concepts of self differ by gender and culture. 3) Moral reasoning differs by gender and culture. 4) Gender and culture intersect in formation of self-identity. We demonstrate above four points both through our empirical research and a discussion of growing body of literature in support of these claims in aforementioned disciplines. Furthermore, we believe that theoretical claims ought to be informed, at least in part, by empirical data when claims relate to aspects of human development, such as moral reasoning. Both theory and empirical research lends support to view that Western males are unique in their moral reasoning, overemphasizing independence and isolation over interdependence and connectedness. We find this in our data as American males consistently ranked lower on scales of interdependence and connectedness than American females, Balinese females and, interestingly, Balinese males. Given that American males are anomaly, it seems clear that theories of moral development should neither begin from nor be limited to American males. We propose that philosophy, particularly moral philosophy, follow lead of psychology and strive to be as inclusive as possible by including full range of human diversity and experience. For philosophers, this would mean embracing--indeed, starting from--a multicultural, feminist approach to moral theories and questions; this approach would not only be sensitive to gender and cultural bias, but it also offers an alternative model to paradigmatic rational, autonomous, independent agent of traditional moral theory. I. Conceptions of Self and Moral Reasoning Feminists have long questioned standard view of moral reasoning and concomitant conception of self. …

A trifocal perspective on medicine as a moral enterprise: towards an authentic philosophy of medicine.

The fundamental claim that the practice of medicine is essentially a moral enterprise remains highly contentious, not least among the dominant traditional moral theories. The medical profession itself is today characterized by multicultural pluralism and moral relativism that have left the Hippocratic moral tradition largely in disarray. In this paper, I attempt to clarify the ambiguity about practicing medicine as a moral enterprise and echo Pellegrino's call for a phenomenologically and teleologically derived philosophy of medicine. I proffer a realistic trifocal matrix in which the virtuous moral agency and the teleologically derived moral imperative of the physician are comprehensively integrated with an action-guiding practical analytical framework for the resolution of ethical dilemmas in medicine. I argue that this trifocal perspective points us towards an authentic philosophy of medicine that is not only verifiable through Lonerganian self-appropriation, but also authentically objective through the possible moral self-transcendence of the good physician.

Retribution and Revenge in the Context of Capital Punishment

Several Supreme Court opinions that reject capital punishment specifically or retributive punishment generally as inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution characterize those practices as vengeance or as revenge. These opinions apparently reflect the premise that vengeance is self-evidently evil. Non-judicial participants in the legal, political, and public debates regarding capital punishment specifically or retributive punishment generally sometimes demonstrate a similar tendency to repudiate capital punishment or retributive punishment as revenge without further justification, suggesting that the mere characterization of behavior or of an institution as revenge is sufficient to establish that it is illegitimate. This Article examines the relevant passages in these opinions and the central notions at issue in order to distinguish several possible interpretations of the positions asserted. It then evaluates the broader interpretations in the context of one traditional moral theory. Finally, it clarifies the significance of this analysis for the underlying debate regarding the justification (or lack thereof) of retributive punishment generally or of capital punishment specifically.

The scope of instrumental morality

In The Order of Public Reason (2011a), Gerald Gaus rejects the instrumental approach to morality as a viable account of social morality. Gaus’ rejection of the instrumental approach to morality, and his own moral theory, raise important foundational questions concerning the adequate scope of instrumental morality. In this article, I address some of these questions and I argue that Gaus’ rejection of the instrumental approach to morality stems primarily from a common but inadequate application of this approach. The scope of instrumental morality, and especially the scope of pure moral instrumentalism, is limited. The purely instrumental approach to morality can be applied fruitfully to moral philosophy only in situations of extreme pluralism in which moral reasoning is reduced to instrumental reasoning, because the members of a society do not share, as assumed by traditional moral theories, a consensus on moral ideals as a basis for the derivation of social moral rules, but only an end that they aim to reach. Based on this understanding, I develop a comprehensive two-level contractarian theory that integrates traditional morality with instrumental morality. I argue that this theory, if implemented, is most promising for securing mutually beneficial peaceful long-term cooperation in deeply pluralistic societies, as compared to cooperation in a non-moralized state of nature.

Workplace Civility: A Confucian Approach

ABSTRACT:We argue that Confucianism makes a fundamental contribution to understanding why civility is necessary for a morally decent workplace. We begin by reviewing some limits that traditional moral theories face in analyzing issues of civility. We then seek to establish a Confucian alternative. We develop the Confucian idea that even in business, humans may be sacred when they observe rituals culturally determined to express particular ceremonial significance. We conclude that managers and workers should understand that there is a broad range of morally important rituals in organizational life and that managers should preserve and develop the intelligibility and integrity of many of these rituals.