Abstract
Tonkens (Mind Mach, 19, 3, 421–438, 2009) has issued a seemingly impossible challenge, to articulate a comprehensive ethical framework within which artificial moral agents (AMAs) satisfy a Kantian inspired recipe—"rational" and "free"—while also satisfying perceived prerogatives of machine ethicists to facilitate the creation of AMAs that are perfectly and not merely reliably ethical. Challenges for machine ethicists have also been presented by Anthony Beavers and Wendell Wallach. Beavers pushes for the reinvention of traditional ethics to avoid "ethical nihilism" due to the reduction of morality to mechanical causation. Wallach pushes for redoubled efforts toward a comprehensive account of ethics to guide machine ethicists on the issue of artificial moral agency. Options, thus, present themselves: reinterpret traditional ethics in a way that affords a comprehensive account of moral agency inclusive of both artificial and natural agents, or give up on the possibility and “muddle through” regardless. This series of papers pursues the first option, meets Tonkens' "challenge" and pursues Wallach's ends through Beavers’ proposed means, by "landscaping" traditional moral theory in resolution of a comprehensive account of moral agency. This first paper sets out the challenge and establishes the tradition that Kant had inherited from Aristotle, briefly entertains an Aristotelian AMA, fields objections, and ends with unanswered questions. The next paper in this series responds to the challenge in Kantian terms, and argues that a Kantian AMA is not only a possibility for Machine ethics research, but a necessary one.
Highlights
The descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness.– Immanuel Kant.1 Understanding subjective human morality has been a focus of traditional ethics since the Greeks
To engineer this condition into artificial agents is one aim of research into artificial agency, and it may be the best way to understand human morality and moral theory at the same time, with successes in these efforts anticipated in related fields, for example, in advancing work in computational modeling of social agency and of psychologically realistic sociopolitical structures in effective practical policy making
Thusly: In order to be treated as an end in itself, a Kantian artificial moral agents (AMAs) would need to possess dignity, be deserving of respect by all human beings, and be valued as an equal member in the moral community
Summary
The descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness. – Immanuel Kant. Understanding subjective human morality has been a focus of traditional ethics since the Greeks. The second obstacle is that, regardless of formal ethical constraints, recognizing artifacts as fully moral agents is not something that machine ethicists want to do Tonkens makes his case, thusly: In order to be treated as an end in itself, a Kantian AMA would need to possess dignity, be deserving of respect by all human beings (all other moral agents), and be valued as an equal member in the moral community. Thusly: In order to be treated as an end in itself, a Kantian AMA would need to possess dignity, be deserving of respect by all human beings (all other moral agents), and be valued as an equal member in the moral community Such equality entails personal rights, opportunities, and status akin to those of human beings.
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