Abstract
The paper treats the “ought implies can” principle as a normative dilemma in relation to epistemic and moral obligations. It shoes that the standard interpretation of this principle as a contraposition is not the only possible one or heuristically interesting. The author draws on the examples of obligations and actions of different types to show how it is possible to shift the focus from the modality of possibility to the modality of obligation. It allows to explain a number of actions not adequately described in traditional moral theory. It also helps to understand the links between moral and epistemic imperatives.
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